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ABSTRACT 
The thesis is an institutional analysis of governance and industrial development using 
case studies of different parts of the Indian subcontinent. It uses the framework of 
‘political settlements’ that emerge when the interaction of institutions and 
organizations achieves a sustainable level of political and economic viability. The 
analysis focuses on how the distribution of organizational power at the relevant level 
of a polity described by a political settlement can be an important determinant of 
economic policies and institutions. Even more so, the political settlement affects the 
enforcement and implementation of particular policies and institutions in ways that 
have implications for growth and stability. Over time, this distribution of power also 
changes, making the analysis dynamic and path dependent. This approach contrasts 
with the dominant ‘good governance’ analysis where a standard set of institutions 
and governance capabilities are identified as necessary for all developing countries.  
Gujarat, Tamil Nadu and Pakistan after 1980 are examples of different configurations 
of organizational power. Gujarat has sometimes been described as a sub-national 
developmental state. However, Gujarat’s political settlement is significantly different 
from East Asian developmental states. It has achieved high rates of industrial growth 
but without using conditional rent strategies characteristic of East Asia and this has 
limited the scope of capability development in its industrial sector. Tamil Nadu has 
intense clientelist competition and has yet managed high rates of industrial growth. 
The analysis sheds light on its success and identifies some of its vulnerabilities as its 
two-party system threatens to fragment further. Pakistan is an extreme case where 
there has been sustained violence and poor economic development in this period 
despite attempts at good governance reforms and liberalization. The analysis 
suggests that institutional and policy evolution has been dominated by a crisis of 
legitimacy of its ruling coalitions and weak economic organizations inherited from 
the populist 1970s. Liberalization in this context produced adverse results. The 
analysis offers an alternative framework for understanding differences in industrial 
performance and for evaluating future policy responses.  
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Chapter 1 . Introduction 
Economics began with the quest to understand the sources of the ‘wealth of nations’. 
However, for a long time the discipline focused on ‘lower-level’ problems about the 
determinants of value, the conditions of general equilibrium, the effects of 
aggregate demand and the variants of competitive markets. Interest seems now to 
have swung back to a greater interest in understanding the wealth of nations, this 
time in developing countries with questions of convergence and the obstacles that 
may prevent it. The earlier literature in this field focused on the role of technology 
and capital accumulation. Later literature started focusing increasingly on the 
underlying structures in a social order that affected the choices leading to specific 
growth outcomes. This literature included the study of institutions or rules that 
made social and economic interaction possible (North 1990; North 1995)  as well as 
the study of the interaction of politics and economics that refers to a broad set of 
questions in political economy. As a first approximation this thesis is broadly located 
in the area of economics investigating the political economy of institutions. 
Specifically it studies institutional choices, their implementation and the effect of 
their implementation on the economy. The issue of implementation and 
modification of policies and institutions is important for understanding the 
trajectories of development in different contexts. As Khan puts it: “(a)t the heart of 
the problem is that the analysis of development has paid inadequate attention to the 
critical problem of how the relative power of organizations in that society affects the 
enforceability of different institutional rules” (M. H. Khan 2010b). Our approach is in 
contrast with much of institutional analysis that attempts an analysis of the growth 
implications of different institutions regardless of the likelihood of their 
implementation in different contexts. This includes the ‘good governance’ analysis 
that dominates policy discussions of required reforms in developing countries, where 
a standard set of institutions and governance capabilities are identified as necessary 
for all developing countries. 
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The thesis is an institutional analysis of governance and industrial development using 
case studies of different parts of the Indian subcontinent. It argues that the choice of 
institutions and policies and their implementation depends on the relevant political 
context. The importance of the political context for determining the choice and 
implementation of policies and institutions is in general not contested. The 
argument in this thesis uses a particular analytical framework, that of ‘Political 
Settlements’, for examining the implications of institutions and organizations in a 
common framework in different contexts (M. H. Khan 2010b). A political settlement 
is a combination of institutions and organizations that achieves a sustainable level of 
political and economic viability, and is therefore reproducible over time in its broad 
features (though political settlements are always evolving). The critical characteristic 
of a political settlement is that the distribution of power across organizations has 
driven institutional change and the modification of institutions so that the 
distribution of benefits across institutions is broadly compatible with this distribution 
of power. This simply means that the distribution of power across organizations is 
now relatively stable because the institutions and their implementation create a 
distribution of benefits across organizations compatible with their relative power. 
The analysis focuses on how the distribution of organizational power at the relevant 
level of a polity, described as a political settlement, can be an important determinant 
of economic policies, institutions and technology adoption. In particular, we are 
interested in how a political settlement affects the enforcement and implementation 
of particular policies and institutions in ways that have implications for growth and 
stability. Over time, this distribution of power also changes, making the analysis 
dynamic and path dependent. This approach contrasts with the most common 
approach in institutional analysis, which ignores the distribution of power across 
organizations and how that affects institutional choice and implementation. In the 
standard approach, it is common for a standard set of institutions and governance 
capabilities to be identified as efficiency or growth-enhancing for all developing 
countries.  
Political settlements in developing countries are in general substantially different 
from those in developed countries. Developed countries are typically characterized 
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by a formal institutional structure based on the enforcement of a rule of law and 
property rights. In contrast, developing countries that are still going through a 
capitalist (or structural) transformation are typically characterized by the existence 
of significant informal institutions like clientelist networks and informal economic 
and political organizations. Hence political settlements in transition economies have 
a significant role for both informal institutions and organizations. Significantly the 
distribution of power must reflect the effective power of many informal 
organizations like clientelist political parties in informal institutions such as informal 
rent allocations and modifications in the operation of formal institutions that 
provide informal rents to informal organizations and these aspects of the 
institutional structure may be at least as important or even more important in these 
contexts than formal institutions. These informal institutions and organizations are 
another way of describing informally organized power. Identifying the relevant 
informal features of the political settlement in developing countries can help us 
identify the problems of enforcing particular institutions at the micro level. For 
instance, the structure and relative power of informal organizations may imply that 
particular formal institutions that impact on the incomes of powerful organizations 
are modified to a greater extent (for better or worse from the perspective of 
economic performance) relative to other formal institutions. Thus the growth 
trajectories of developing economies can depend very significantly on the 
characteristics of their political settlements (M. H. Khan 2010b). 
The research establishes that the success of any institution or intervention in a 
developing country in terms of promoting growth requires appropriate 
implementation capabilities. The institutions and policies required for sustaining 
growth in developing countries are complex because they have to ensure much 
more than efficient markets. Markets, even if they are moderately efficient, are 
insufficient for organizing the significant structural transformations that are required 
during the process of development. Institutions and policies therefore need to assist 
in the achievement of these structural changes. The capacities of the state and 
political organizations to implement these types of institutions in turn depends on 
the political settlement since the enforcement of particular interventions may 
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require overcoming the possible resistance of powerful organizations representing 
specific constituencies.  
Political organizations play a particularly important role in the political settlement. 
The ‘ruling coalition’ in a country is composed of some political organizations while 
others are temporarily or permanently excluded, depending on the formal and 
informal institutions regulating political competition in that polity. We look at the 
social and historical processes that led to the creation of the current ‘ruling coalition’ 
and how the distribution of power across political organizations can help to explain 
the enforcement capabilities of the state with respect to particular institutions and 
policies that are relevant for our analysis of development. In a developing country 
we need to look at both formal and informal political organizations and the formal 
and informal institutional arrangements through which they acquire their incomes 
and benefits, and which therefore underpins their relative power. This configuration 
is important for understanding the enforcement capabilities of the ‘state’, (by ‘state’ 
here we mean the range of organizations that claim policy making and enforcement 
powers in a society, based on a claim ultimately to a monopoly of violence, but all 
these claims may be only partially fulfilled in developing countries) with respect to 
particular policies and institutions since those policies or institutions that threaten 
the incomes of powerful political organizations will be obstructed or modified, while 
those that reinforce the interests of powerful organizations may be strongly 
enforced.  
The configuration of power at this level of detail can explain why growth could be 
triggered and sustained in ‘second tier’ developing countries defined as countries 
that exhibited strong growth in the period after 1980 but which had neither strong 
formal industrial policy institutions of the East Asian type nor met the “good 
governance” requirements of market-enhancing capabilities. An important policy 
implication of this analysis is that some of these high-growth developing countries 
are often unable to ensure that their growth can be sustained simply because they 
do not have a good understanding of the institutional basis of their growth, and how 
to incrementally improve these conditions given the nature of their political 
settlement. Equally, countries that are not performing well often do not understand 
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that if the ‘good’ policies that they have been trying to implement cannot be 
implemented, the only strategy may be to attempt the implementation of 
institutions and policies that may not be recommended by prevailing theory but 
which may have a better chance of implementation. This suggests that bureaucratic 
ineffectiveness and reforms enhancing bureaucratic capabilities are not sufficient for 
ensuring more effective policies. Clearly, both bureaucratic capabilities and policies 
matter, but the appropriate policy depends on the political settlement in a way that 
goes against the standard frameworks for thinking about the ‘right’ policies and 
governance capabilities. A developing country with a reasonably effective 
bureaucracy could have a policy implementation crisis if the ruling coalition was 
persuaded to adopt without further analysis, the policies that worked in an 
apparently similar country somewhere else. Our argument is essentially that the 
complexity of the argument suggested by the political settlements analysis for 
identifying feasible and implementable policies in different contexts raises 
challenges for bureaucratic and political leaderships in developing countries. This 
type of analysis is usually not conducted even in academic policy circles in 
developing countries, let alone by political and bureaucratic leaders. When effective 
policies emerge it is often because of serendipity and experimentation rather than a 
compelling ex ante analysis. This is not a problem for successful countries, but in 
developing countries that are performing less well, a better analytical frame is 
required, particularly because experimentation can itself be blocked by powerful 
interests. Triggering or sustaining growth requires strengthening institutional and 
political capabilities that are developmental in the context of specific political 
settlements and these may not necessarily be capabilities supported by standard 
policy prescriptions or even the example of successful developmental states. 
Without this understanding, the adoption of some types of governance reforms like 
the good governance reforms may inadvertently even undermine national 
capabilities to sustain growth. Why politicians and academics have been so quick to 
adopt explanations that a more careful investigation would find questionable 
requires an explanation that is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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The analysis of institutions and implementation is located in a broader analytical 
frame that recognizes that developing countries suffer from significant market 
failures and also that growth in many developing countries is generally based on 
institutional capabilities that address specific market failures in ways that inevitably 
combine formal institutions with informal modifications or informal rules of 
implementation. Growth in these countries is therefore likely to be vulnerable to 
shocks and to changes in conditions (M. H. Khan 2010b). And effective institutions 
are likely to look different from country to country (Rodrik 2004, 2008; John and 
Putzel 2009; Sen 2013). Note that we do not define market failures using a 
benchmark of a general equilibrium as the ‘first best’ nor do we imply that markets 
can work perfectly if some institutional conditions are met that reduce transaction 
costs. The reference to market failure simply tells us that there are missed 
contracting opportunities, and if markets (private contracting) cannot address these, 
different types of interventions or policy responses are required. We will use three 
case studies of Pakistan and the Indian states of Gujarat and Tamil Nadu to look at 
the relationship between institutional and political configurations and growth. Two 
of our cases are states within the Indian Union, while Pakistan is a country. This is 
not necessarily a problem because our aim is not a straightforward comparison to 
identify the significance of particular explanatory variables. Rather, our claim is that 
our analytical methodology can be used to investigate and shed light on all three 
transformation stories. Our hypothesis is that by identifying the institutions and 
organizations relevant for aspects of the economic transformation in these polities, 
and the specific political settlements in which implementation was being attempted, 
we can shed light on the differences in the economic experiences of these polities.  
The analysis of growth in India coming from the liberal economics tradition often 
miss critical differences between Indian states and attribute growth to economic 
liberalization and to governance structures that often have a much weaker presence 
in reality than in the models. Growth across states in India, from 1980 to 2010, the 
period that this research roughly spans, has been very varied and driven by different 
sets of factors in each case, which is not surprising given the very different political 
and institutional arrangements across states. In the case of Pakistan growth has 
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been inconsistent since the 1980s and the liberalization reforms it attempted do not 
seem to have achieved the intended results. We argue that this is not because the 
Pakistani state did not go far enough in attempting to implement the reforms but 
because the state did not actually have the implementation capacity or the 
legitimacy to implement these reforms to an extent that may have made any 
difference. If we interpret liberalization and associated good governance reforms as 
a package that aims to reduce transaction costs and make markets more efficient, it 
is unlikely that these reforms could make sufficient progress in any developing 
country to an extent that development would be significantly accelerated by these 
means alone. However, in Pakistan the reforms were particularly inimical to the 
interests of powerful informal organizations who resisted their implementation. 
If anything market-based growth strategies based on enforcing a rule of law and 
ensuring property rights require much higher enforcement capacity on the part of a 
state since here enforcement refers to all property rights and formal rules. The 
typical developing country attempting to create a viable productive sector is unlikely 
to possess these capabilities. Not surprisingly, growth-enhancing strategies in 
developing countries that have succeeded in catching up have prioritised sectors and 
selected interventions and incentives according to available implementation 
capabilities. Historically none of the countries that have made the transition to or 
towards developed economies, like Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and Malaysia 
achieved this change using the ‘market-enhancing’ good governance reform package. 
Developing states do indeed need to allocate their scarce resources properly in order 
to achieve growth and development. However, this allocation is unlikely to be 
achieved through markets as transaction costs in these economies are particularly 
high because of the weak enforcement of formal institutions and policies. Hence the 
state needs to have some capabilities of enforcing specific and targeted 
interventions and institutions that solve specific allocative and contracting problems. 
These capabilities are precisely the ones that the good governance agenda ignores in 
developing countries (M. H. Khan 2008a, 2008b, 2010b). One argument that the neo 
liberal view puts forward against solving ‘market failures’ is that intervention can 
result in government failures, and the loss of welfare due to the activity of the state 
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can be greater than the initial market failure. If this was always likely to be true, 
government inactivity is a better policy that intervention (Krueger 1974). However, 
the design of institutions and policies so that they are compatible with the political 
settlement is precisely the strategy that reduces the chances of government failures 
due to failures of implementation.  
In order to solve these ‘contracting problems’ a state must have legitimacy, which 
means that its general strategy of development must have some broad support in 
society, and the specific policies or institutions have to be compatible with the 
political settlement in the sense that powerful organizations will not block these 
strategies. There is an important if subtle difference between this position and the 
liberal argument that a state is legitimate if it can protect property rights. A 
developing country state simply does not have the capacity to protect all property 
rights but some of these states are much more legitimate than others (M. H. Khan 
2009a). Legitimacy has complex determinants in developing countries and depends 
on the distribution of benefits in a society being acceptable to those who have the 
capacity to challenge the political settlement. Legitimacy in the short-term therefore 
depends on powerful organizations (usually led by organizers from the middle and 
lower middle classes) accepting that they have a fair share of the rents in society. As 
the mobilization of demands is always increasing, sustaining legitimacy also requires 
economic growth and so the distribution of rents in the political settlement has to 
achieve a combination of political stability and economic growth. Legitimacy in turn 
affects the enforcement capabilities of the state, and this can easily result in vicious 
or virtuous cycles of development with legitimate states driving development that 
reinforces their legitimacy and vice versa.  
In liberal economics and political economy, stable property rights are achieved 
through a state’s capacity to impose social order, and this is based on the state being 
accountable to the polity, restricting itself to only deliver the limited public goods on 
which there is broad consensus and to ‘signal’ its commitment to not expropriate 
property rights in the future by reducing the size of the state ex-ante and agreeing to 
checks and balances that make appropriation in the future less likely (Bates 2001; 
Acemoglu and Robinson 2012a). Stable property rights in turn lead to lower 
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transaction costs. Low transaction costs are a key determinant of efficiency in new 
institutional economics (NIE) as will be discussed in Chapter Two. Economic 
efficiency and growth in turn further strengthen the legitimacy of the state, and 
virtuous cycles of economic and political development are then set up. The problem 
is that developing country states cannot first achieve the enforcement of broad-
based property rights and security because these public goods are expensive to 
deliver, and none of the dramatic success stories of development in the last century 
would fit the sequence of enforcement, legitimacy, transaction cost reduction and 
growth that is asserted in the liberal story. After the events of 9/11 in the USA, the 
significance of delivering security as a condition of state legitimacy and therefore as 
a precondition for development has emerged even more strongly in the 
development discourse (WB 2011). However in developing countries where 
legitimacy is more likely to be based on a complex negotiation of inclusion of 
powerful organizations into the rent allocation mechanisms of the state, an 
excessive focus on security can create incentives for the ruling coalition to use force 
in limiting access, with very damaging consequences for legitimacy and development. 
As the legitimacy of such a state declines it only becomes even more dependent on 
foreign aid and particularly on security aid, creating a vicious circle detrimental for 
growth. We see this clearly outlined in the case of Pakistan. The country is today a 
$1200 per capita economy that prioritises security, receives significant foreign 
assistance to achieve security, and yet the current ruling coalition is steadily losing 
legitimacy and developmental capacity. In Afghanistan the loss of legitimacy of the 
state and its ruling coalition is much more advanced as its president is incapable of 
constructing a ruling coalition that is even likely to survive without the military 
assistance of his Western allies. This is despite billions of dollars of aid being given to 
the government in order for it to deliver services and security. Clearly, there are 
limitations in the mainstream understanding of how legitimacy is to be understood 
and constructed. 
Gujarat, Tamil Nadu and Pakistan after 1980 are examples of different configurations 
of organizational power, and therefore of different political settlements. Gujarat has 
sometimes been described as a sub-national developmental state (Sinha 2005; Kohli 
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2012). However, Gujarat’s political settlement is significantly different from East 
Asian developmental states. It has achieved high rates of industrial growth but 
without using conditional rent strategies characteristic of East Asia and this has 
limited the scope of capability development in its industrial sector. The ruling 
coalition in the state also used a strategy of violence and exclusion to signal 
authority and its cohesiveness as a ruling coalition. However, the excluded groups 
here were generally weak to start with and the imposition of conditional inclusion on 
them (Muslims could gain inclusion if they accepted they were part of a ‘Hindu 
nation’) signalled both the strength of the ruling coalition and its commitment to the 
development of the majority community that for a time at least helped rather than 
reduced its legitimacy. We discuss the types of economic policies and institutions 
that became implementable in this political settlement as a result, and the types of 
developmental interventions that still remained outside the enforcement capabilities 
of the Gujarati polity. Tamil Nadu is a state characterized by intense clientelist 
competition between competing political organizations that cycle in and out of 
power, and yet it has managed high rates of industrial growth. The analysis sheds 
light on the institutional determinants of its success and identifies some of its 
vulnerabilities as its two-party system threatens to fragment further. Pakistan 
presents the reverse trajectory as its growth in the 1990s was lower than in the 
1980s, and the country made a transition from the growth leader in the Indian 
subcontinent to become the growth laggard. In addition it suffered from growing 
violence and instability in a context where it continued to make attempts at 
implementing good governance reforms and liberalization. The analysis suggests that 
its institutional and policy evolution has been dominated by a crisis of legitimacy of 
its ruling coalitions and weak economic organizations inherited from the populist 
1970s. Liberalization in this context produced adverse results and this needs to be 
understood in the context of a deeper analysis of the political crisis facing Pakistan. 
While we focus on the construction of the ruling coalition in all three case studies, 
the dissertation has a larger section dealing with Pakistan. We draw on revisionist 
histories of partition and the creation of Pakistan in 1947 and its further split in 1971 
when Bangladesh broke away from Pakistan. These partitions were essentially the 
result of a failure to construct viable political settlements that included all the 
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relevant political organizations. In particular, the 1947 partition was driven by the 
failure to accommodate the organizations of the substantial Muslim minority in 
undivided India. Both Pakistan and India have used their own vastly different 
interpretations of history to justify why they were the ‘good guys’ in this disaster, 
and these inadequate histories continue to justify the confrontation between the 
countries. Pakistan’s security-centric development strategy and its consequences are 
related to this history. In this context the formation of the ruling coalition in Pakistan 
has also been affected by the geo-political environment Pakistan finds itself in. Its 
alliance with the USA and its involvement in Afghanistan after 9/11 has created rents 
that have enabled the ruling coalition to exclude powerful organizations. Aid rents 
related to security have had a retrogressive impact on the construction of stable 
ruling coalitions in Pakistan and this has significant implications for the enforcement 
and management of institutions and policies that can be supportive of growth.  
The thesis offers an alternative framework for analysing the interaction of 
institutions and organizations that affect industrial performance and that should 
inform the development and evaluation of future policy responses. We also establish 
that an understanding of these processes has to be rooted in history, and sometimes 
an investigation of fairly long-period historical processes may be useful and 
necessary. We also demonstrate that the mechanisms supporting growth in these 
polities have not been mainly formal institutions and policies. Rather combinations 
of formal and informal institutions have had good or bad effects in the context of 
political settlements that have to be understood as balances of formal and informal 
institutions and organizations. We identify some of these mechanisms and trace 
their evolution over time. This allows us to analyse how particular market failures 
were overcome and we identify vulnerabilities in these arrangements as the often 
fine balances that result in good outcomes can be easily upset. We are also able to 
identify some of the reasons why the characteristics of the growth-generating 
sectors have differed across states. For instance Gujarat and Tamil Nadu have 
different manufacturing profiles based on differing mixes of sectors and technologies. 
The differences in the political settlements of these states provide an important set 
of additional explanations for these differences to complement the more usual 
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explanation based on factor endowments. Gujarat’s current political settlement that 
we characterize as ‘authoritarian clientelism’ with features of a dominant party and 
long-term time horizon for the exclusionary ruling coalition has made Gujarat a 
leader in infrastructure investments in India. In this sector solving credit and land 
market failures are imperative and Gujarat’s government has been able to provide 
this with little opposition from opposing interests like famers because of the specific 
nature of its ruling coalition as we outline in Chapter Five. In Tamil Nadu on the 
other hand despite intense competitive clientelism and the regular cycling in and out 
of its two main political parties the fact that neither reneges on large investment 
decisions made by the previous government has signalled enough credible 
commitment to high-end manufacturing companies to invest in the state. Of course 
like Gujarat Tamil Nadu was already industrially advanced by the time the Indian 
economy opened up in 1992. In Pakistan’s case the inability to develop new globally 
competitive manufacturing sectors in the 1980s and 1990s is related to the rent 
capture strategies of a security-focused ruling coalition receiving significant security-
based rents that are easy to control and allocate from above. Ironically, the social 
contestation that this strategy actually resulted in explains the weak implementation 
capacities of the ruling coalition. As the Pakistani state lacked the incentives and 
capacities to support targeted policies to promote growth, it relied more seriously 
on liberalization and good governance reforms than the Indian polities that did well. 
These strategies too could not be properly implemented, and the result was 
declining growth rates and even more social contestation as the state suffered from 
a vicious cycle of gradually declining legitimacy and performance. Effective policy 
responses in Pakistan are likely to have to address the problem of declining 
legitimacy and its roots in the failing security agenda that is associated with the US 
strategy in Afghanistan. However, our framework is not a prescriptive one but rather 
a framework for discussing policies for growth in alternative political scenarios 
whose political realism has to be assessed by political entrepreneurs on the ground.  
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Chapter 2 . Property Rights, Transaction 
Costs and Power in Institutional Change 
 
2.1 Introduction  
The primary concern of this thesis is to examine some of the ways in which 
institutions, policies and the configuration of organizations can help to explain the 
development trajectories of developing economies. Our discussion of theory and the 
case study evidence suggests that a pure institutional analysis is insufficient for 
understanding the ways in which institutions and policies actually operate because 
there is a significant gap between the formal specification of an institution and its 
operation in practice. This gap in the operation of formal institutions and policies is 
particularly important in developing countries. The ‘variable’ that we focus on as an 
important determinant of institutional operation is the distribution of power across 
organizations in a polity. The relative power of organizations is an endogenous 
variable at a macro level and an exogenous variable when we are analysing the 
effects and outcomes associated with particular formal institutions at the micro 
level. The relative power of organizations is described at the macro level by the 
interaction of organizations and institutions that determines the distribution of 
benefits and incomes across organizations as an outcome of this ongoing and 
interactive process. The macro-distribution of organizational power and the balance 
between institutions and organizations that underpins it are described as the 
‘political settlement’. At the micro-level, the political settlement is effectively an 
exogenous variable that helps to explain why particular formal institutions and 
policies have outcomes that are specific to contexts. The insight is that the 
distribution of power across organizations affects the enforceability of particular 
institutions because any particular institution implies specific income flows and 
benefits that will be either supported or obstructed by powerful organizations. If a 
particular institution does not support the interests of powerful organizations, their 
activity can have a number of implications. The formal institution may be reversed 
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(or in many cases not adopted in the first place), it can be modified formally or 
informally so that the distribution is more acceptable to powerful organizations and 
this may affect the outcomes associated with the institution, or there may be a 
conflict with other organizations including state organizations that results in 
enforcement eventually but at a more or less high enforcement cost. In each case, 
the political settlement affects the outcomes associated with the institution and this 
can help to explain why different formal institutions and policies emerge in different 
contexts and why similar institutions have different effects across these contexts. 
This analysis draws on and extends the analytical framework in Khan (2010b).  
The framework of ‘political settlements’ used in this thesis suggests that the primary 
problems of instability and volatile growth in economies going through 
developmental transformations is due to the presence of informal institutions that 
support a distribution of power that is not in line with the incomes supported by 
formal institutions in that economy. The existence of powerful organizations in a 
country whose demands cannot be supported by formal institutions means that the 
formal institutions cannot be enforced effectively without informal modifications 
that make these institutions workable in the presence of these organizations. These 
informal modifications create and distribute benefits, or rents (M. H. Khan 2010b)  
that are either directly captured by the organizations in question or distributed by 
ruling coalitions to organizations to maintain their capacity to rule. Hence how ruling 
coalitions are constructed and how power is distributed between the ruling coalition 
and excluded political organisations is an important analytical feature examined in 
this thesis. Different configurations of organizational power lead to different 
strategies to support or modify the formal institutions that deliver rents. These 
strategies in turn have implications for growth and development. In other words just 
as the distribution of informal and formal rents supports a distribution of power at 
the level of the macro-political economy, the distribution of power across 
organizations sets constraints for economic and institutional policy and the 
outcomes associated with them. This constraint could take the form of the choice of 
policy itself, as was the case of West Bengal in India which adopted agricultural 
growth strategies rather than policies and institutions that supported industry (M. H. 
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Khan 2009a; P. Roy 2012) or it could take the form of an implementation constraint 
affecting particular policies, as was the case with industrial policies in Pakistan which 
will be discussed later in this thesis.  
This distribution of power across organizations is thus important because it affects 
the enforceability of formal institutions and determines the types of modifications 
(formal or informal) that determine outcomes. The relevant outcomes include both 
economic growth and political stability. Indeed, the macro-political settlement can 
be understood as a reproducible combination of institutions and organizations 
where the institutions support a distribution of benefits that is acceptable to and 
reproduces the relative power of the relevant organizations and achieves the 
minimal economic and political conditions that ensure the reproducibility of the 
system (M. H. Khan 2012f). Two features of the macro-political settlement and its 
micro implications are given particular importance in our analysis. First, we look at 
how the ruling coalition and other powerful organizations in a society are configured 
and how this has historically evolved. This ‘data’ gives us an idea of the political 
settlements in our case studies and the directions in which they have been evolving. 
Secondly, at the micro-level, we look for evidence of the gap between formal 
institutions and their expected outcomes on the one hand and the actual 
implementation and outcomes on the other, to examine the extent to which this gap 
reflects the distribution of power across affected organizations. The purpose of this 
analysis is to explain the differential performance of economic regions in the Indian 
subcontinent and to draw out policy conclusions about feasible reform strategies in 
the future.  
The organization of the ruling coalition and the configuration of power across 
political organizations can be classified in a variety of ways. A typical feature of 
political competition in South Asia is the presence of a relatively large number of 
political entrepreneurs and organizers who organize their political supporters to seek 
rents through political competition. When the number of potential political 
organizations is large, the ruling coalition is typically composed of a subset of 
powerful political organizations. Excluded political organizations compete from 
outside to replace the existing ruling coalition, typically through elections. This 
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political context can have many variations but is broadly described as competitive 
clientelism in Khan (2012f). When the ruling coalition is able to include enough 
political organizations within it (and if necessary, effectively repress the rest), the 
coalition has a longer time horizon. This configuration of power can result in the 
same party ruling for a long time and the power structure can be described as 
‘patrimonial’. There are several variants of the patrimonial ruling coalition. If the 
ruling coalition can exclude others at little cost or with limited coercion, and if the 
leadership of the coalition have the upper hand in bargaining with lower levels, we 
have ‘strong patrimonialism’ of the type characterizing East Asia in the 1960s. If the 
ruling coalition finds it difficult to exclude others and has to take recourse to 
frequent suppression to stay in power, it is ‘vulnerable patrimonialism’. If it is 
sufficiently inclusive to make suppression unnecessary, the leadership may 
sometimes find they are unable to impose discipline on their followers and these 
contexts can be described as ‘constrained patrimonialism’. One party rule may be 
sustained with little violence but the capacity to implement may be low because of 
many powerful factions within the ruling party. In order to analyse the implications 
of these differences properly we need to define a few fundamental concepts like 
‘rents’ as well as ‘power’ as these concepts have been variously used in social 
science. This will enable us to address the issues concerning constraints on growth in 
the different political settlements that we examine in our case studies. In this thesis 
we examine case studies of Pakistan, Gujarat and Tamil Nadu through the lens of 
political settlements to map how specific distributions of power affected growth, 
stability and the pace and type of technology adoption. 
 
2.2 The Institutional Analysis of Growth 
Institutional economics is increasingly concerned with broad historical questions of 
differences in performance across countries. Countries with similar natural 
endowments and similar rules and regulations, have exhibited widely different 
economic performances. Put another way, while factor endowments and economic 
policies can explain some of the differences between countries, there is still a 
residual in performance differences that has to be explained with deeper 
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institutional, political and other differences between countries. What then are these 
other variables that affect economic growth? One possible candidate is culture and 
cultural norms which can affect the acceptability and implementation of formal 
institutions and the ways in which they operate in practice (North 1993; Fukuyama 
1996; O. E. Williamson 1998). Some heterodox political economists have placed 
politics and political organizations at the heart of differences in institutional 
performance (Bardhan 1997; M. H. Khan 2010b). The core idea is an old one. Marx‘s 
political economy with its focus on class conflict and the ‘Veblen dichotomy’ 
between negative business interests and positive industrial interests identified in the 
old institutional economics focused on the link between contestations over 
distribution and the enforcement of particular institutions as a key process driving 
economic growth.  
In contrast, much of modern institutional economics is concerned with what can be 
described as a ‘static’ institutional analysis where the background political conditions 
and contests are abstracted from. More specifically the question concerning modern 
institutional economists for much of the time has been the identification of the 
theoretically appropriate property rights structure that ensures economic efficiency 
and the minimization of transaction costs. A property right is an institution (a rule) 
that specifies the right to enjoy or use a good and this can be specified in greater 
detail as the rules governing who can make what decisions about the use and 
allocation of a particular asset (Allen 2000). Property rights are institutions and 
institutions in Douglass North’s famous definition are ‘the humanly devised 
constraints that structure political, economic, and social interactions. They consist of 
both informal constraints–sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of 
conduct, and formal rules–constitutions, laws, property rights’ (North 1990). 
Transaction costs are the costs of creating, maintaining, transacting and interacting 
with institutions in general and property rights in particular (Allen 2000) . They can 
also be broadly defined as the costs of running the economic system (Arrow 1962). 
This thesis adopts a broader heterodox view of transaction costs, where the costs of 
contestation over the choice of different specifications of rights and the costs of 
protecting and enforcing rights in the context of distributive contests are included in 
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our definition of transaction costs. Thus the distribution of power among the 
organizations affected by a particular right can be an important determinant of the 
relevant transaction costs of enforcing a particular right. However before we move 
to this level of analysis we need to differentiate our approach from the analysis of 
property rights and transaction costs in both neo classical economics (NCE) and NIE. 
Both property rights and transaction costs play an important part in NIE analysis 
while property rights are a cornerstone of NCE analysis. 
At the heart of the neo classical economic (NCE) analysis are some specific 
assumptions about the property rights over endowments that allow efficient 
exchanges and contracts to be conducted. Property rights are complete in the sense 
that all valuable assets and activities have rights and liabilities defined over them, 
these rights are exclusive in most models and finally they are transferable and 
negotiable, which is what allows markets to work. Property rights with these 
characteristics are necessary and sufficient for markets to result in efficient 
outcomes. Much of NCE has been concerned with demonstrating the efficiency 
outcomes that follow from market exchanges. Market failures are recognized, and 
solutions to market failures are identified as corrective interventions of different 
types. However, NCE did not in general go much further in identifying the deeper 
causes of incomplete specifications of property rights and other sources of market 
failures.  
NCE models are largely models of transactions where transaction costs are either 
absent or only present as costs at the point of exchange and never within the firm or 
at the level of collective enforcement. Where they exist, transactions costs are 
modelled like taxes or transportation costs. Demand for a good with high transaction 
costs adjusts as consumers respond to higher prices and hence in strict NCE there 
are no transaction costs that affect the very possibility of exchange (Allen 2000) . 
Efficiency implications for NCE arise only when market failures are due to missing 
property rights or contracting failures. Missing property rights can lead to 
externalities and in these cases policy is required to achieve what would otherwise 
have been negotiated in a market. Public goods are another source of market failure, 
this time due to a free rider problem where individuals try not to pay for the 
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provision of a jointly consumed (non-rival and non-excludable) good. If many 
individuals fail to make a contribution to the provision of such a good, it will be 
under-provided in a market. This is a market failure and the government can 
improve welfare by providing the good and financing its provision with taxation. 
Monopolies result in market failures if a single supplier produces or supplies a 
product. The ability to set prices enables the monopolist to maximize profits by 
restricting output and this too results in welfare losses compared to the alternative 
where competition brings in additional production (assuming divisible technology). 
The principal agent problem is another source of a market failure where moral 
hazard issues arise as the principal is unable to prevent the agent from cheating or 
modifying a contract in a context of asymmetric information. Thus, market failures in 
NCE are due to the absence of the appropriate welfare maximizing rules existing or 
being enforced.  
The point of departure of the New Institutional Economics or NIE was the analysis 
that market failures exist because the transaction costs of introducing or enforcing 
the appropriate rules would be too high. For instance, in the case of the negative 
externality the costs of defining property rights over each unit of pollution, or 
determining the marginal social costs of pollution and then firming the appropriate 
taxes on every polluter may be prohibitive. Thus, in the NIE analysis, the appropriate 
rules or institutions are not only able to reduce transaction costs (and therefore 
increase efficiency) but the creation and enforcement of these rules themselves 
have transaction costs. NIE was thus able to begin to explain not only the sources of 
market failures, but also why these failures may persist.  
The analysis of the social gains from institutions like property rights was extended, as 
was the analysis of the costs of creating and transacting with these rights. Some of 
this was simply formalization of old insights. Adam Smith had recognized that the 
risk of expropriation would harm investment. Property rights are therefore needed 
to extend the time horizons of asset users. Without property rights, valuable assets 
can be overused (as in the tragedy of the commons) or investments in improvement 
may not be forthcoming. Property rights allow efficient market exchanges only if 
they are well defined over all relevant assets so that assets can be transferred to the 
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highest valued uses and the effects of all activities can be fully taken into account 
(Coase 1960). And finally more detailed specifications of property rights within the 
organization of production are required to create incentives and compulsions to 
increase efficiency. Thus, Alchian and Demsetz argued that the structure of rights 
within the capitalist firm that created the ‘residual claimant’ was efficient because it 
created incentives for monitoring team production. This was a narrower version of 
the point made by Marx a long time ago about how capitalist property rights created 
the incentives and compulsions for both static and dynamic productivity growth (E. 
M. Wood 2002; M. H. Khan 2009a). 
The analysis of transaction costs was significantly deepened in the context of the 
analysis of the firm (Coase 1937; O. E. Williamson 1985). Williamson argued that NCE 
saw the firm as a production function and hence a construct described by 
technology. In contrast for the NIE or more specifically for the transaction cost 
economics approach within NIE, the firm is a governance structure. This introduced 
for the first time the issue of aligning governance structures with the transactions 
problems that needed to be addressed, a territory completely uncharted by NCE (O. 
E. Williamson 1998). The NIE school has since undergone many iterations and 
refinements and is now a far broader field of economics than one that is just 
concerned with transaction costs at the firm level. Even Williamson has extended the 
approach to look at the role of institutions in society (O. E. Williamson 1998). The 
next step was to extend the language of institutions, transaction costs and 
governance to the classical concerns of political economy analysis involving power 
structures, institutions and organizations. Authors in this area ranged from Pranab 
Bardhan and Mushtaq Khan at one end to game theoretic approaches in the work of 
Avner Greif at the other. In the latter approach institutions are modelled as the 
equilibrium behaviour of individuals in non-cooperative games like Prisoner’s 
Dilemma or Chicken Games. Property rights thus occupy centre stage in both NCE 
and NIE. However NCE begins with property rights and assumes either that they can 
be enforced costlessly or that deviations from that benchmark can be corrected with 
costless government interventions. In contrast, NIE maintains that both property 
rights and other institutions have to be created and their enforcement is not 
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costless. The effects of property rights and institutions on efficiency and growth 
depend on the ‘transaction costs’ of their creation and enforcement relative to the 
savings in transaction costs that would follow if the creation and enforcement 
succeeded.  
 
2.3 Property Rights, Transaction Costs and Conflict 
Transactions costs are an important part of institutional analysis as they determine 
(by definition) the efficiency of transactions in a society. Since transactions can be in 
markets but also through other institutions, the transaction cost framework is a 
general way of looking at all social interactions. Limiting the discussion for now to 
the transaction costs associated with property rights, it is helpful to distinguish 
between ex-ante and ex-post transaction costs as they refer to different problems 
related to transacting with property rights. Ex-ante costs include discovering and 
negotiating prices, finding the right partners and devising the contract. Ex-post costs 
include monitoring the implementation of the contract, enforcing the contract, and 
engaging with any distributive conflicts that may emerge from differing 
interpretations of the contract (M. H. Khan 2009a). In game theoretic terms 
transaction costs therefore include coordination costs, the costs of distributive 
conflicts and the costs of containing free riding (Greif and Laitin 2004). There are 
cases however where property rights cannot be created because the transaction 
costs of creating the right (through negotiation or other processes) is itself too high, 
or the reduction in transaction costs that can be achieved is too low to make the cost 
of creating and enforcing these rights unjustifiable. It was with reference to such a 
situation that Ronald Coase explicitly recognized the possibility that where 
transaction costs were too high the allocation of rights or liabilities by law should 
aim to achieve the most efficient solution (Coase 1960) .  
The insight that Coase is known for is that in a situation where transaction costs are 
low, the allocation of rights or liabilities does not matter (except in a distributive 
sense) because bargaining will result in an allocation of the asset or activity to 
maximize net social benefit. This is the core of the now famous Coase Theorem. But 
Coase also recognized that if transaction costs were significant, the initial allocation 
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of the property right mattered precisely because there would be a limited range of 
transactions. While no institutional system is ever going to achieve zero transaction 
costs the policy question in a context of substantial transaction costs is to decide 
what types of rights to create and how to allocate them given that these decisions 
matter in the context of positive transaction costs.  
The evolution of rights and institutions is a largely endogenous process within 
societies. Institutional change in an economy takes place through the interaction of 
its institutions and organizations, with organizations being the agencies driving 
processes of institutional change (North 1993). Organizations are collections of 
individuals that may themselves operate under institutional rules but their goal is to 
engage in collective action to pursue their own goals (M. H. Khan 2012f). While 
collective action by organizations has the potential to improve social outcomes, 
changes brought about by powerful organizations in their own interest can also 
damage societies. Institutional evolution is therefore subject to ‘path dependence’, 
that is change is incrementally driven by pre-existing organizations working under 
pre-existing institutions and the direction of travel may not always be progressive 
from the perspective of society or particular distributive goals. In general, the cost of 
changing institutions in another direction may be costlier than the direction it is 
already headed in even if the former change is socially more beneficial (North 1981). 
This is one of the reasons why developing countries so often fail to move towards 
efficient institutions.  
Consider the important concern amongst mainstream economists with the failure of 
developing countries to create and maintain stable and well protected property 
rights (Krueger 1974; Besley 1995; Mauro 1996; Kauffman, et al. 1999; Olson 2000; 
Bates 2001; Acemoglu, et al. 2004). The main idea here is that weakly protected or ill 
defined property rights raise the transaction costs of negotiating institutional change 
and this impedes the enhancement of net social benefit. The policy recommendation 
coming from much of this literature is to implement policy reforms that strengthen 
property rights. This sums up the ‘good governance agenda’ that has been the 
dominant policy prescription for developing countries for some time now. However 
while a strengthening of property rights may in theory make further institutional 
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changes easier and make markets more efficient, this approach ignores the 
distributive conflicts and transaction costs that may impede the achievement of well-
defined property rights in the first place. As Khan has argued, the problem is that 
traditional pre-capitalist societies also had property rights appropriate to the social 
and economic problems they were addressing. The transition from a pre capitalist to 
a more productively organized capitalist society requires the creation of new 
property rights and the destruction or transformation of old ones. This process is 
never uncontested and is seldom peaceful. This is why distributive conflicts are so 
prevalent in developing countries (M. H. Khan 2002a, 2004b, 2009a, 2012f).  
The conventional literature thus ignores many of the severe costs of contestation 
and conflict that mark the creation of the property rights that a productive 
capitalism requires. If the ‘transaction costs’ for creating these property rights are 
large (Khan calls the costs of conflicts during periods of institutional change 
transition costs) then the property rights required for the modern economy may 
emerge very slowly and indeed, trying to force the transition may not even be 
justifiable in terms of a calculus of maximizing net social benefits. Using the logic of 
NIE comparisons of net social benefits under different alternatives, there could be 
two reasons for externalities to persist as a result of missing property rights. One is 
that the potential net social benefit is more than the potential transaction cost of 
creating the right, but there is lack of knowledge about this on the part of the 
organizations involved or the state. Alternatively it could be that the net social 
benefit that is to be achieved is lower than the potential transaction cost so that 
solving the externality would not in fact be a Pareto improvement (Dahlman 1979). 
However NIE ignores a third factor which is the political (or transition) cost of 
creating or altering the rights in question. Different groups may block the change 
because they want an alternative specification or allocation of rights and the costs of 
these clients can be high depending on the relative power of these groups.  
Before moving on to an analysis of what determines a state’s enforcement capacity, 
we will  look at some of the seminal NIE literature on transaction costs as the 
argument in this dissertation can be better understood with reference to this 
literature. Two branches of the NIE literature are relevant for us. The first focuses on 
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the types of assets that are used in production (distinguishing between different 
levels of asset-specificity for instance) and the types of production processes (team 
production versus separable production) and asks what types of property rights are 
appropriate in each context. The second concerns itself with distributional conflicts 
and power structures in determining structures of property rights. One of the major 
concepts in the former body of NIE literature is the concept of the ‘residual claimant’ 
(Alchian and Demsetz 1972). This idea is based on the observation that the 
specification of property rights within a firm affects the incentives of putting in effort 
of different types, which in turn affects output. In a firm engaged in team 
production, the contribution of every factor provider is not additively separable and 
so their contribution cannot be judged simply by looking at the composition of the 
output. This creates a moral hazard problem as individuals have an incentive to shirk.  
To address this problem a residual claimant emerges, though in Alchian and 
Demsetz’s story, this process is unrealistically described as a voluntary one. Team 
members choose a monitor from amongst themselves and voluntarily grant that 
person rights over the residual to create incentives to monitor the others and 
thereby enhance efficiency. This addresses the free rider problem in team 
production through a voluntary contract. The residual claimant has the incentive to 
be an effective monitor because they have an incentive to monitor effort ex-ante 
and thereby ensure that output is maximized. But this functionalist approach to 
property rights ignores the distributive conflicts that could emerge in the 
identification of the residual claimant who would become the monitor. For instance 
it would seem implausible that workers who had equal rights to the output in the 
first place would give up their claims to the residual and agree voluntarily to be 
monitored. Even if the savings in efficiency were so large that all workers would 
actually be better off, there may still be a distributive conflict because each worker 
may want to be the chosen one who becomes the residual claimant because the 
latter is the biggest gainer. Unless one of them has characteristics that make it easy 
to choose that person over all others, a more or less long period of conflict and 
contestation may precede the emergence of the appropriate property rights solution 
in this case.  
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Williamson’s analysis of property rights introduces the concepts of opportunism and 
asset specificity. He also borrows from Herbert Simon’s theory of bounded 
rationality which posits that human beings are rational but can only be so in a 
bounded manner because it is not possible to have all the relevant information or to 
process it fully to make a fully rational decision (O. E. Williamson 1998). This is a 
serious challenge to the ‘Olympian’ rationality assumption of NCE where individuals 
are supposed to possess access to all relevant information and to have the 
computational ability to process it. Asset specificity refers to the fact that many 
assets are significantly less useful in their next best use, so their owners effectively 
earn quasi rents in the first best use. This is different from owners of property in NCE 
theory where asset-owners earn no rents. Williamson was particularly interested in 
physical assets and looked at the ownership structures that would develop in the 
face of asset specificity, essentially the emergence of integrated ownership. This 
insight can be extended beyond physical assets, to include investments in human 
capital, production chains or brand reputations. They are essentially investments in 
assets that are specific to a relationship or production process that may have little 
value elsewhere.  
When assets are specific, their owners can become hostage to opportunistic 
decisions of buyers and suppliers who may want to dictate terms to the owners. For 
instance if a vendor is producing a very specific component this may induce 
opportunistic behaviour on the part of the buyer who may feel that prices can be 
negotiated downward as the vendor cannot sell the part anywhere else or use the 
capital assets to produce something else of equivalent value. The vendor’s 
bargaining power depends on how specific the buyer’s assets are, for instance how 
easy it is for the buyer to shift orders to other possible vendors. If the vendor’s 
supply is not easily substitutable it may be the vendor who can hold the buyer 
hostage because the latter has more specific assets. In either case, the owner of the 
more specific assets is the one who stands to lose more quasi-rents as a result of 
opportunistic behaviour and the outcome is that there is likely to be a merger of 
ownership through a restructuring of property rights. More complex ownership 
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structures and contractual agreements therefore emerge because of such 
opportunism making market transactions costly.  
It is in this context that Williamson also makes the Keynesian distinction between 
uncertainty (not knowing the probability of what will go wrong) and risk (knowledge 
of the probability of what will go wrong). In a world where uncertainty is important, 
ex-ante contracts and governance structures for enforcing contracts are insufficient 
and acceptable arrangements for ex-post modifications are needed. Again, this 
implies that appropriate property rights structures have to emerge. To go back to 
the example of the component vendor and the auto assembler, governance based 
on the enforcement of contracts in a market will be insufficient. Williamson suggests 
that in these contexts there could be a takeover of the vendor by the car-maker but 
in reality this may not happen because the result would be a loss in flexibility or in a 
dilution of management. Alternatively, the two producers would need to invest in 
relationships and the development of trust, including investments by the buyer in 
upgrading the technology or capabilities of the vendor. These complex arrangements 
can be examined as possible solutions to the opportunism problem that could 
prevent sufficient investments in technology by the owner of the more specific 
assets. The more specific the asset (or specialization) the higher the costs of relying 
on market contracts while the costs of internal governance (or alternative forms of 
governance) go down with integration or other forms of joint investments or cost 
sharing arrangements. 
Williamson’s model raises interesting questions but does not tell us who becomes 
the residual claimant in the integrated production process, or how other types of 
relationships can be structured. In his Economic Analysis of Property Rights Yoram 
Barzel tries to take this model further role by suggesting that the owner of the factor 
that can cause the biggest variation in income should logically become the residual 
claimant (Barzel 1989). This extends Williamson’s analysis of identifying specific 
assets as a problem for market contracting by using the potential variations in joint 
output that each party can make to decide on which party should be the residual 
claimant on grounds of efficiency. In Barzel’s model the problem of monitoring is 
reduced the most if the factor owner who can produce the greatest variation in 
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output is the residual claimant and therefore does not need to be externally 
monitored. There is a common thread running through Coase’s analysis of property 
rights and externalities, Alchian and Demsetz’s analysis of residual claimant rights 
enabling efficient monitoring, Williamson’s analysis of integrated production as a 
way of reducing the negative effects of opportunism and Barzel’s analysis of 
determining property rights based on their capacities to vary joint output. In all 
these cases, the emergence of the appropriate property rights depends on 
calculations of rational individuals to maximize the joint net product and to 
negotiate compensations that leave all of them better off.  
The alternative approach is to recognize the relevance of the underlying economic 
logic in some of these models but to examine conflicts that can explain why the 
emergence of solutions may be blocked. For instance in the Barzel model, the party 
that can cause the greatest variation in output may not be the most capable residual 
claimant or indeed may have less bargaining power than other contenders for the 
right. Similarly, in the case of Alchian and Demsetz, there is an assumption that the 
choice of the residual claimant is the outcome of a participatory decision but in 
reality the more likely outcome may be that the residual claimant emerges through 
contestation or primitive accumulation as in the classical Marxist political economy 
analysis (E. M. Wood 2002). The common limitation in all these influential models of 
NIE is that little attention is paid to the resolution of conflicting roles and interests 
that property rights represent, and the role of power, bargaining and conflicts in 
determining institutional outcomes. The framework of political settlements that we 
use in this thesis is an attempt to bring in this level of analysis to the political 
economy of institutions.  
 
2.4 Power and Institutional Change 
The second branch of the NIE literature that is relevant for us focuses on politics, 
power and conflicts as variables affecting institutional outcomes. Admitting power as 
a variable in institutional analysis allows us to examine the effects of contestation 
affecting the implementation of institutional changes regardless of whether they are 
potentially socially beneficial or not. While not explicitly looking at conflicts and 
37 
 
power, North was nonetheless one of the first NIE economists to use the transaction 
costs framework to assess how countries evolved in their economic structures. In 
Structure and Change in Economic History North (1981) postulates that property 
rights evolve not just to reduce transaction costs but also in response to the 
motivation of the state to achieve its distributive objectives (primarily to benefit 
itself). This tension between distributive goals and efficiency goals was an important 
insight that is lost in some of North’s subsequent work.  
In his second book North (1990) contends that the differing economic performance 
of countries is not due to their choice of policies and interventions but largely a 
consequence of their institutional foundations that change slowly and in particular 
directions. This trajectory is defined by North as ‘path dependency’ because initial 
institutional conditions limit the types of changes that are feasible. This implies that 
inefficient institutions can persist and the path of change can be slow or even 
proceeding in the wrong direction. North gave examples of the English and Spanish 
feudal systems and said that differing feudal systems in each ultimately led to 
England’s ascendance as a world power and Spain’s subsequent decline. In addition, 
the absence of an effective democracy in Spain meant that the cost of changing its 
path was prohibitive. Hence path dependency was one reason why institutional 
change was a difficult process. Any significant path change implicitly faces significant 
transaction costs. In North’s analysis this is because complex and large 
compensations have to be negotiated for all the losers and the larger the scale of the 
change and the more it goes against the existing institutional structure, the more 
costly it is to agree about and enforce the compensations required.  
North explored ‘mental models’ and culture as explanations for the more rapid 
evolution of efficient institutions in some economies (North 1995). However, North’s 
analysis of culture and norms is different from the game theoretic argument. In the 
latter, ideology or culture can help if it makes players believe that there is a high 
enough probability that others will play a cooperative strategy. North’s argument 
instead makes use of cognitive capabilities to explain differences in institutional 
reform strategies. Individuals and organizations respond to economic performance 
by comparing actual economic outcomes with the expectations of their mental 
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models. A discrepancy should result in changes in analysis as the model is updated in 
light of the evidence. If repeated failures do not result in models being updated and 
different models being attempted, North suggests that this may be a failure in 
cognitive processes in some population groups. Clearly, this line of argument can 
result in problematic conclusions about the prospects of reform in some population 
groups. Fortunately, the historical evidence suggests that mental models and 
cognitive faculties cannot be an important determinant of institutional change 
because there have been many sudden changes in the paths of change in countries 
which cannot be explained with reference to these variables. For instance, it is 
difficult to explain the Chinese economic takeoff in the 1980s in terms of a sudden 
change in these explanatory variables. Nor is there much evidence that South Korea 
underwent significant changes in norms and values prior to the takeoff in the early 
1960s. However in both cases the economic takeoffs were preceded by political 
changes that may be much more significant. In his most recent work North no longer 
pursues this argument and this is discussed further later in this chapter. 
Modelled as a chicken game, conflict in response to institutional change that 
changes the distribution of benefits is likely to continue, even though it appears to 
be irrational, till one of the parties establishes that it will not concede on its strategy. 
While beliefs are being adjusted in this way, conflict is in fact the rational outcome 
and can be long drawn. This brings us to the concept of ‘holding power’ which refers 
to the ability of a party to hold out in a contest. However, holding power is not 
necessarily equivalent to economic power though the latter can contribute to the 
abilities of individuals and organizations to hold out in conflicts. Conflicts are 
expensive in terms of lost opportunities and the cost of ‘weapons’ broadly 
understood and so the organization that can mobilize more resources has an 
advantage in holding out. But holding power also depends on other abilities, such as 
organizational capabilities and the ability to absorb pain (M. H. Khan 2010b). The 
ability to absorb pain can sometimes more than compensate for the inability to 
inflict pain. These organizational and ideological differences between groups explain 
why richer groups do not always win in conflicts. The poorer side can often win 
distributional conflicts especially if they successfully deploy a cohesive ideology.  
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The holding power of the Viet Cong or indeed the Afghan Taliban can be explained in 
these terms. Both these organizations used very specific ideologies and enforcement 
capabilities within their organizations to solve their internal collective action 
problems. But in addition, ideologies also helped them to establish a reputation to 
fight. When leaders and groups are belligerent and appear to be behaving 
irrationally they are not necessarily being irrational. They may be (unconsciously) 
signalling their willingness to continue the conflict indefinitely to establish their 
holding power. Hence the resolution of both prisoner’s dilemma problems and the 
establishment of credible holding power can be embedded in building and 
maintaining power relationships. However, Bardhan cautions against the danger of 
defining power by its outcome (successful collective action or victory in distributive 
conflicts) as the analysis can then become tautologous. He suggests that power has 
to be defined in a way that is independent of its outcome to establish its usefulness 
as a variable in social science analysis. Given the multiple sources of holding power 
discussed earlier, it would be difficult to quantify power but it may be possible to 
rank organizations in terms of their holding power based on an analysis that is 
independent of outcomes. Groups can be assessed and analysed in terms of their 
economic, organizational and ideological capabilities that can contribute to their 
holding power and judgements can be made about the relative holding power of 
groups. The relative holding power of groups can therefore be an important variable 
that could explain the pace and direction of institutional change. It could also explain 
the levels of contestation associated with particular strategies of institutional change 
that can be described as ‘transition costs’  (M. H. Khan 1995).  
The analysis of politics in terms of the distribution of holding power can be 
distinguished from a focus on political institutions. North approached politics as the 
‘political market’ defined by political institutions where negotiations take place to 
change economic institutions that in turn affect the ‘incentive structure’ of the 
economy. According to North the most efficient institutional structure for the 
political market is the legislature in a representative democracy as these institutions 
can lower the transaction costs of negotiating institutional changes by allowing the 
negotiation of compensations and reducing uncertainty. However as John and Putzel 
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argue democracy doesn’t just provide incentives. It also allocates privileges and 
hence has distributional consequences (John and Putzel 2009).  However North does 
not follow up this line of analysis. He argues only that institutional analysis needs to 
look at both political and economic transaction costs but limits his own analysis to 
political institutions as the determinant of political transaction costs. Democratic 
political institutions reduce political transaction costs through a number of 
mechanisms. The ease of negotiating compensations in a democratic legislature has 
already been mentioned. In addition, NIE analysts often assume that politicians will 
cooperate with each other based on ex-ante agreements based on their electoral 
mandates while authoritarian regimes can use more ‘discretion’ in allocating 
property rights and this can have negative effects on investors (Fukuyama 2005). 
These arguments do not always hold because some authoritarian regimes in East 
Asia have done very well with industrial policy and late development. Their 
performance can be explained because some type of conditional rent allocations can 
be helped by ex-post flexibility in revoking allocations of rights in the light of future 
performance (Okuno-Fujiwara 1997; M. H. Khan 2000a).   
Engerman and Sokoloff argued that colonial histories in some developing countries 
left them with elites enjoying very unequal asset distributions and created an 
oligopolistic power structure that enabled these powerful elites to block growth-
enhancing institutional changes if these threatened to change the asset distributions 
that underpinned their privileged positions in society (Engerman and Sokoloff 2002). 
Indeed, the only escape from situations like the one described by Engerman and 
Sokoloff would be to counter the established power structure with new 
mobilizations based on overcoming the collective action problems facing more 
dispersed groups who are disadvantaged by the institutional structure (Olson 1965, 
1982). In Olson’s analysis, the creation of a more dispersed distribution of power 
through the development of new organizations that have solved their collective 
action problems is not necessarily good in the long-term for the economic growth of 
society. The proliferation of groups can result in sectional rent seeking activities by 
groups that can result in hysteresis. Olson’s analysis of the economic 
underperformance of the USA and the UK in the 1960s and 1970s relative to 
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Germany and Japan was in terms of the political stability in the first two countries 
that had slowly resulted in the proliferation of too many political organizations 
compared to the latter where war and defeat in the Second World War had 
disrupted these processes for a time. (Olson 1982).  
The relationship between endowments, property rights and political power is an 
interactive one and the directions of causality run in both ways. However, by 
simplifying the story and focusing on one direction of causality can result in 
misleading conclusions. In the earlier analysis of Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 
(Acemoglu, et al. 2001) secure property rights are an important determinant of 
institutional change leading to growth. In a famous paper the three set out to prove 
that colonies which had settler populations (primarily America, Australia, Canada) 
did better than colonies where the Europeans’ prime motive was extraction of the 
colony’s resources (most of colonized Africa and Asia). This was because where the 
conquerors ruled from afar stable property rights could not develop as a result of 
their extractive strategies and predation. In the settler colonies, colonizers imported 
the robust property rights and institutions of the home country (England in many 
cases) as the settlers wanted to replicate the broad-based productive economies of 
the home country. The relationship between outcomes was never in question: stable 
property rights are observed in countries that are richer. Acemoglu et al. however 
were making a more fundamental point that economic growth happened in 
countries that first achieved the establishment of stable property rights.  
However their analysis glosses over the question of power and sequence in the 
critical early days of the transition. Settlers did not actually first set up property 
rights to acquire the land from indigenous people in the settler colonies. Rather, in 
the colonies where settlers settled the power balance between the newcomers and 
the indigenous population allowed significant property right transformations often 
using violently unfair methods that wiped out a large part of the indigenous 
populations like American Indians and the Aborigines (M. H. Khan 2009a). Thus the 
property rights that helped construct the rapid capitalist transformation of these 
colonies were themselves the product of political processes that were not 
characterized by stable property rights and a rule of law. In this sense, the historical 
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examples used by AJR do not actually prove the point they want to make, that 
economic transformations only require the establishment of property rights and the 
rule of law. In the later work of Acemoglu and Robinson Why Nations Fail (Acemoglu 
and Robinson 2012a)  the authors add that the dispersed and stable property rights 
that they associate with growth (and which they now describe as inclusive economic 
institutions) require a dispersed distribution of political power (inclusive political 
institutions). But once again, while these characteristics can be associated with 
economies that have made substantial progress in economic development, the 
policy and analytical question is the sequence of events in the critical early years of 
transitions where conflicts with pre-existing property rights and distributions of 
power are likely to take place. 
Another significant contribution in the NIE tradition on the determinants of 
economic and political development came from Robert Bates in his Prosperity and 
Violence (Bates 2001) . Bates’ work is in line with some of North’s as he was similarly 
concerned with the political foundations of economic development. He also saw the 
creation of organizations as a driver of institutional change and of economic growth. 
According to Bates institutions had to address the problem of risk to help support 
economic growth. The formation of capital entails returns after a considerable 
passage of time and the decision to invest therefore opens the investor to a 
considerable risk of expropriation. Institutions have to evolve to mitigate this risk if 
growth is to be supported. This influential work was based on two seemingly simple 
premises. One that development from an agrarian to an industrial society involves 
the taming or ‘domestication’ of violence by centralizing the capacity for violence in 
the state and second that it requires the delegation of authority from the state 
(where violence capacity is concentrated) to those who run economic organizations 
who can use that power productively. Again, this balance does approximate what we 
observe in advanced countries and does not appear to exist in developing countries, 
but we do not have a good analysis of the details of the process of transformation 
that leads from one situation to the other.  
In developed countries, the state does have significant coercive capabilities but the 
threat of coercion is used not to capture wealth but to safeguard prosperity. Indeed 
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the centralized capacity for violence is arguably an important requirement for 
protecting economic growth. Secondly, the holders of political power in the state 
delegate considerable powers to organizations in the private sphere that have the 
power to reward or penalize others. In this manner private interests are empowered 
to act in a way that is good for collective welfare in a context of competitive markets 
that discipline the private use of authority. Bates uses examples from developing 
countries, especially African ones like Ghana, Kenya, Somalia and Sudan to make the 
point that the transformation to an industrial society only happens when there is a 
balance between economic and political interests of this type. However, there is 
once again a distinction between patterns seen in advanced and developing 
countries and the processes through which the latter transform into the former. For 
instance, the delegation of authority to firms only works once there are many 
competitive and productive firms whose competition can impose some amount of 
discipline. But even in advanced countries the balance between regulation, firm 
autonomy and the meeting of other distributive demands in society is a matter of 
ongoing negotiation. In developing countries where the productive sector is weak 
and oligopolistic, a rapid delegation of authority to economic organizations may be 
counterproductive. The state has played a significant role in pushing economic 
transformation in late developers. The political balance that Bates describes is 
emerging in some East Asian countries as the outcome of a process of successful 
development that had different characteristics in terms of the balance between 
economic and political power while it was happening.  
In terms of the processes going on in developing countries, Bates’ analysis has a 
number of shortcomings. First, violence capacity is difficult to monopolize in 
developing countries, and it is not clear what the policy implication of identifying this 
as a necessary condition for development may mean. There are many groups 
competing for political power in a developing country making it difficult for any one 
of them to monopolize violence over a sustained period. The taming of violence 
requires a strong state and a legitimate ruling coalition that does not face significant 
challenges from excluded groups outside the legal mechanisms of political 
competition. These features are absent in most developing countries. Second the 
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balance between economic and political interests identified by Bates describes 
features of developed countries but cannot be a policy objective for developing 
economies characterized by relatively small productive sectors, a relatively small 
number of competitive economic organizations and many competing political 
organizations that are engaged in political accumulation. A further reason that we 
discuss later in the context of political settlements makes the balance that Bates is 
defining difficult to achieve in developing countries. The capitalist sector is not yet 
large enough to generate enough tax for formal redistribution to create the 
incentives for political organizations to fully protect capitalists and delegate 
authority to them out of self interest. However Bates’ analysis of the balance 
between political authorities and capitalists is an apt description of many western 
countries. 
In Khan’s analysis, the balance between economic and political organizations and 
economic and political power in developing countries is particularly interesting for 
understanding different trajectories of transition. In general, the balance between 
economics and politics in developing countries is different from that in advanced 
countries. There are large swathes of voters who are not asset owners but are 
members of large political organizations that can mobilize well enough to challenge 
the ruling coalition and the formal institutions of the state. These mobilizations can 
have long historical roots and new mobilizations are constantly emerging in 
developing countries. For instance in 2013 a highly successful mobilization of the 
Islamist Hefazat-e-Islam emerged in Bangladesh and took all analysts by surprise. It 
mobilized supporters from Bangladesh’s poorer peasant class with no access to 
either economic resources or the political backing of the country’s two main political 
parties. These types of mobilizations are continuously upsetting established political 
arrangements in developing countries and changing the character of the ruling 
coalition. In India the transition from stable one party rule by the Congress till the 
mid-1970s to an increasingly fragmented system of political coalitions is an example 
of major changes in politics being driven by the emergence of new political 
mobilizations with potentially significant implications for economics. Our analysis 
examines how the changing distribution of power among political organizations can 
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help or hinder growth-enhancing institutional changes in this critical phase of social 
transformation. These processes of transformation are important to understand 
because they do not follow a simple trajectory that can be described in terms of the 
causal links suggested by comparing the patterns of politics and economics observed 
in advanced and developing countries. For instance, we see in our case studies and 
others that more inclusive political institutions in developing countries do not 
necessarily lead to more inclusive economic institutions and most such 
generalizations do not work (M. H. Khan 2004b, 2004c, 2005, 2006a, 2010b).  
 
2.5 Informality  
The modern sectors in developing countries can be described as ‘capitalist sectors’ 
based on organizations with capitalist property rights (of the type described by 
Alchian and Demsetz, Williamson and earlier by Marx), operating on the profit 
motive and based on modern technologies and organizational principles. These 
sectors can be distinguished from the traditional trade, agricultural and informal 
artisanal sectors. The latter are also typically located in the informal sectors of the 
economy that are not even in principle incorporated or regulated according to rules 
enforced by the state. The modern capitalist sectors are relatively small in 
developing countries (and this is why the average productivity of these countries is 
still low). Apart from the informal sector proper, many apparently formal economic 
organizations also have significant informally organized activities and network as not 
all economic activities can be carried out in purely rule-following ways in a polity that 
is largely informally organized. The networks of formal economic organizations with 
political organizations and the rent seeking they engage in often has large elements 
of informality in the sense that their rent seeking is not formally regulated as in 
advanced countries. Most political organizations are also characterized by large 
elements of informality. Political organizations can include informally organized 
networks and mobilizations (like the Hefazat-e-Islam referred to in the last section), 
or they can be informal networks and even mafia and criminal extensions operating 
in and through apparently formally organized political parties and organizations. 
Taken together informally organized organizations have considerable economic and 
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political significance in developing countries, and this makes the latter structurally 
distinct from advanced countries.  
The importance of informal (economic and political) organizations in developing 
countries has implications for the types of institutions we expect to see in these 
countries. In advanced countries, where formal organizations dominate, institutional 
change is driven by the rent seeking activities of formal organizations. The likely 
effects are incremental changes in formal institutions. Developing countries too have 
formal institutions that regulate formal organizations but in general informal 
organizations are not able to define their benefits and income flows by changes in 
formal institutions. The rent seeking by informal organizations is therefore likely to 
result in informal resource allocations (for instance through patron-client networks) 
or through informal modifications of formal institutions (for instance through 
modifying the rules of allocation of public goods to benefit powerful informal 
organizations). The informality that we see in developing countries is therefore not 
entirely accidental and some or much of the informality may reflect the fact that 
powerful organizations that happen to be informal organizations have achieved rent 
flows, rights and incomes through informal mechanisms that can be described as 
informal institutions (M. H. Khan 2010b). 
This ‘materialist’ analysis of informality provides a different explanation of 
informality compared to the neo-Weberian analysis of informal resource allocation 
mechanisms like patron-client networks in developing countries. Weber explained 
patron-client networks in developing societies in terms of the operation of 
traditional political hierarchies in the context of a patrimonial society where rule is 
based on the exercise of personal charisma. This type of personalised interaction 
was antithetical to the logic of capitalism. The latter required a rational rule-
following formal bureaucracy and this type of rule is associated in Weber’s analysis 
with capitalism (Weber 1968). Later neo-Weberians developed these observations to 
argue that contemporary developing societies are still based on impersonal rather 
than formal rules though no longer based on traditional hierarchy. Neo-Weberians 
attribute informality in contemporary developing countries to the weakness of 
formal structures of democracy, resulting for instance in the deleterious ‘crony 
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capitalism’ observed in South East Asia (Kang 2002; N. J. White 2004). This analysis 
assumes that informality is a mechanism through which elites capture rents and that 
democratic accountability could stop this process. However, the evidence suggests 
that while informality is indeed connected with rent capture, democratic processes 
do not stop it and indeed informal political organizations operate in developing 
country democracies to drive these processes. What is missing in the neo-Weberian 
analysis is a systemic analysis of how political order is maintained in a context where 
formal tax revenues are insufficient to maintain political stability.  
In advanced countries tax revenues are used to provide significant redistribution to 
than social stability. The fact that formal economic organizations pay formal taxes on 
a sufficient scale to achieve stability creates incentives for political organizations to 
ensure that the formal rules that ensure the profitability of these economic 
organizations are protected and enforced (M. H. Khan 2010b). This dialectical 
relationship between economic and political organizations is consistent with the 
observations of the balance between political and economic organizations in the 
work of Bates and Acemoglu and Robinson, but without asserting a causal 
relationship between them or claiming that this is achievable in a developing 
country. For instance, the UK’s National Health Service (NHS) is based on 
redistributive transfers that are part of the country’s social contract that maintains a 
welfare state, and capitalist firms pay these taxes because ultimately the contract 
ensures that the economic system is protected (Bardhan 2012). Paying taxes not 
only protects the dominant capitalist sector but also gives the capitalist sector added 
credibility and leverage to demand incentives from the state to increase their 
productivity. Of course this social contract is currently under pressure as the 
capitalist sector in many advanced countries is now dominated by the financial 
sector, and rent seeking by the financial sector has resulted in various banking crises 
followed by the socialization of losses and the privatization of profits (OECD 2013; 
World Bank 2013). 
The economies of developing countries, even of a behemoth like China, are simply 
not rich enough in per capita terms to achieve social stability purely through formal 
redistribution. The ‘problem’ with formal redistribution is that this has to happen on 
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the basis of taxing and transferring to generalized categories of citizens and firms. 
Since the most powerful organizations in any society are not those of the very poor, 
and since generalized distribution cannot exclude the very poor, a society is only 
likely to achieve stability through formal redistribution when the resources available 
for redistribution are sufficient to ensure that rules-based redistribution can provide 
enough to everybody who matters. The ‘advantage’ of informal redistribution is that 
scarce resources can be targeted to the most powerful organizations to ensure that 
they do not engage in disruptive activities against the ruling coalition or even the 
state in general. A by-product is that consequently the capitalist sector has to 
operate in a context where significant informal organizations and informal rent 
allocations are happening. In addition, much of the capitalist sector itself has low 
productivity and is not yet competitive enough to survive in global competition. 
Thus, the capitalist sector not only finds it has to engage in some informal rent 
seeking of its own, it has incentives to do that too, apart from the fact that these 
processes can also be an avenue of enrichment beyond any economic necessity (M. 
H. Khan 2004b, 2004a, 2007, 2010b).  
The period of transformation during which the capitalist sector is growing is also one 
of ‘primitive accumulation’ where the emerging modern sector is accumulating 
wealth not just through market transactions but also using non-market or ‘political’ 
means that can be legal like politically allocated land, land reform, policy-induced 
resource transfers like access to subsidized credit, and illegal activities like land 
grabs, tax evasion or extortion. This is another reason why the emerging capitalist 
sector has low legitimacy and cannot engage in legalized rent seeking, simply 
because it is politically difficult to legalize even the parts of their rent seeking that 
could be legalized. In developed capitalist societies economic and political power 
converges and capitalist firms dominate in terms of their collective rent seeking 
power. The rest of society is dependent on the capitalist sector for employment 
directly or by being part of a supply chain whether in services or manufacturing, or 
because their employment in the public sector depends on taxes from the capitalist 
sector. Hence capitalist property rights are seldom challenged and distributive 
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conflicts operate within narrow limits that do not normally extend to fundamentally 
challenging the survival of the capitalist sector (M. H. Khan 2002b, 2005, 2010b).  
The political economy of advanced economies is therefore close to the ‘good 
governance’ model of stable property rights, a credible rule of law, a government 
that is accountable and low corruption. But as we have discussed this presupposes a 
high enough per capita income that allows adequate formal redistribution and 
generates the resources for the enforcement of formal institutions. In economies 
still going through the transition period, the property rights of the capitalist sector 
and property rights in general cannot be formalized for the reasons laid out above. 
This does not mean there are no formal institutions in developing countries, there 
are and the scope of formalization is gradually growing, but formal institutions are 
always subject to challenge and organizations can quickly mobilize against them 
leading at least to systemic modifications, but sometimes to paralysis and economic 
logjams or occasionally political violence. This is the case in contemporary India and 
will be discussed further in the next chapter.  
The norm in developing countries is that capitalists need informal protection of their 
property rights and informal resource allocations to support their accumulation. 
Emerging capitalists are therefore likely to be members of patron-client networks 
and linked to political parties. This makes for complex links between corruption and 
growth. When the business-government relationships result in informal allocations 
of resources that have damaging effects that corruption becomes predatorial. We 
discuss this in more detail in section 2.6. One reason why informal rent seeking by 
business can become predatory is if powerful capitalists acquire enough holding 
power to inflict political costs on their political patrons if the latter try to withdraw 
their support. In these situations politicians can be held hostage and lose the ability 
to have a say on the types of rents that are created. Since they continue to need 
access to rents for their own political survival, the result can be a proliferation of 
‘scams’. What we observe in India is a steady increase in the bargaining power of 
business organizations relative to political organizations following the gradual 
liberalization after 1992. We argue in Chapter Four that this has led to a growth in 
value-reducing rent capture in India. Here a shift in the distribution of power to 
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economic organizations has had adverse consequences on India’s growth.  We 
discuss business-government relationships in the context of patron-client networks 
in Chapter Four. On the other hand informal business-government relationships 
operating through patron-client networks can also help overcome market failures in 
contexts where legal and formal institutional solutions are not always available (M. 
H. Khan 2002a, 2005, 2006b, 2010b).  
We have many instances of these potentially growth-enhancing business-
government relationships in India. For instance many large business houses use their 
political contacts to organise land transfers to acquire contiguously located plots of 
land for large projects. Of course this does not always support productive projects 
and speculative land capture also happens. Similarly, not all incentives or rents 
created through influence rent seeking are damaging. Many developing countries 
have used rents whose creation and management involved informal processes to 
promote industrial growth. These countries include South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, 
Pakistan and India in the 1950s and 1960s, Singapore, China and more recently 
Ethiopia, with varying levels of success (Papanek 1965; Amsden 1989; Wade 1990; 
M. H. Khan 2008b). The rent-creating instruments have included subsidies, duty 
exemptions, concessions on land prices, subsidized credit, and the granting of 
licenses for industrial investments, imports and other scarce commodities. Finally, 
informal resource allocations through political networks have been vital instruments 
for maintaining political stability. 
Thus, there are structural reasons in developing countries that ensure that the 
relationships between political and economic organizations are different from the 
formal arm’s length ones observed in developed countries. Even in developed 
countries the relationships between economic and political organizations are not 
always arm’s length ones but the degree of formality is higher than in developing 
countries. As with formal rent seeking relationships, the outcomes of informal rent 
seeking depend on the details of the bargaining process and the incentives and 
compulsions of both sides. A capitalist in a developing country might need informal 
access to the ruling coalition to secure a tax or import duty subsidy that would make 
an industrial venture profitable. These processes may be formally illegal but the 
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outcome could still be positive if the subsidy is used in ways that increase net social 
benefit. State capability or an appropriate balance of factors is needed not just to 
provide the subsidy but also to ensure that the conditions are right for its disciplined 
use by the capitalists receiving it. In India and Pakistan in the 1960s, states provided 
subsidies to capitalists to accelerate the catching-up process but the state was not 
strong enough to withdraw them and the outcomes were generally far less 
impressive compared to East Asia. The ruling coalition could not credibly threaten to 
discipline well-connected economic organizations because in South Asia the latter 
could make alliances with sub-groups within the ruling coalition who would protect 
them for a price or threaten to shift their allegiance to other political organizations 
leaving the ruling coalition in trouble (Gordon 1954; I. Ali and Malik 2009; M. H. Khan 
2009a; Walter 2010; M. H. Khan 2011b). In the case of India in the 1960s and 1970s, 
business organizations could not credibly threaten to move away from the Congress, 
but they could protect their subsidies by making alliances with sub-organizations or 
powerful politicians within Congress. As a political organization, Congress was 
internally a work coalition and the leadership could not discipline individual 
politicians or sub-organizations. Thus, the imperative of maintaining political stability 
by allowing sub-organizations access to rents meant that the disciplining of 
potentially growth-enhancing rents was compromised. This system was less dynamic 
than the East Asian one but did achieve some capability development based on 
centrally allocated rents. We will see that by the 2000s, the bargaining power of big 
business was to make business-government relationships more problematic in many 
instances.  
 
2.6 Alternative theories of Rents and Rent Seeking  
In the NCE analysis rents are defined as incomes higher than the minimum a person 
would have accepted over her next best opportunity. Rents are usually taken in this 
analysis as a signal of inefficiency because they signal a deviation from the 
competitive market equilibrium necessary to achieve Pareto efficiency or the 
maximization of social welfare. In the simplest analysis, a competitive equilibrium 
achieves an efficient allocation of resources and at this point there are no rents. 
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Interventions or restrictions on entry or exit create inefficiencies but they also create 
rents for some. In NCE although rents are essentially transfers, they are also 
associated with deadweight losses. Hence rents typically signal inefficiency and this 
is one reason why the policy agenda of free markets looks at the presence of rents as 
prima facie evidence of uncompetitive markets. Indeed some interventions that 
create monopolies by preventing market entry or that transfer incomes from one 
group to another, can be welfare-reducing as a result of creating dead weight losses.  
Rent seeking is the process (legal or illegal, formal or informal) through which groups 
or individuals spend resources to create rents for themselves or protect existing 
rents, or change the conditions of their allocation. As Olson pointed out, this is the 
objective of special interest groups when they try to solve their internal collective 
action problems. The rent seeking process has social costs as resources are used up 
in these activities. NCE economists like Krueger, Posner and Bhagwati maintain that 
there are very high costs associated with rent seeking as individuals and groups 
spend resources in order to create rents or protect their rent by influencing the state 
(Krueger 1974; J. N. Bhagwati 1982). This prevents these resources being used 
productively elsewhere leading to a global inefficiency as a result of this loss. Rent 
seeking is therefore a variant of government failure because it describes the political 
process through which resources are wasted and inefficiency is created through 
interventions that create rents. As the government’s willingness to intervene triggers 
rent seeking, NCE economists argue that the cost of government failure can be more 
than the market failure the government was claiming to target in the first place. 
According to the specific model that Krueger develops, rent seeking uses up 
resources equal in magnitude to the total rent. Hence all rents have a damaging 
consequence because they generate social costs through rent seeking. 
There are two weaknesses with the basic neoclassical argument. First, while some 
rents are indeed socially damaging, many other rents are associated with 
interventions that are very beneficial, and particularly in the context of late 
development. Second, rent seeking costs can vary quite a lot depending on the 
nature of the political market. In Khan (2000b) an analysis of rents and rent seeking 
is presented that shows that if some rents are associated with very beneficial 
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interventions and the rent seeking  cost is not too high, the overall effect the rent 
seeking  process can be socially beneficial. This is true regardless of the legality or 
formality of the rent seeking process. Rents can be associated with interventions 
that correct market failures like credit market failures or learning failures. In 
addition, it may also be necessary to allow transfers (rents) to factions and classes 
who would otherwise be disruptive. The challenge of development is for the system 
to maintain sufficient political stability (through transfers) while creating and 
managing growth-enhancing rents in ways that ensure they are not misused.  
All countries have significant rents in their economic and political systems, and in 
developing countries many of these rents and rent seeking processes are informal 
and sometimes illegal. The simple NCE analysis of rents and rent seeking cannot 
explain both the persistence of underdevelopment and violence in many developing 
countries with high levels of rents and high rates of growth in some others with 
similar levels of rents. Khan’s framework allows an analysis of specific political 
structures that can help explain why some configurations of rent creation and the 
associated institutional structures can be growth promoting. Of course, some 
economists within the mainstream NCE position or who are working closely with 
these frameworks admit to some rents being necessary for efficiency, growth or 
stability (Stiglitz 1989; Bardhan 1997; North, et al. 2009). More generally, a focus on 
rents can provide a useful lens through which to look at the interactions between 
state and society.  
A contemporary attempt at analyzing the role of rents in developing countries comes 
from Douglass North, John Wallis and Barry Weingast and subsequently Steve Webb 
(North, et al. 2007) or NWWW. These authors introduced into the mainstream 
institutional economics debate the explicit recognition that widespread rents in 
developing economies are not the result of any pathology. The framework of 
‘Limited Access Orders’ or LAO is an attempt to understand the structural differences 
between advanced and developing countries without characterizing the latter as 
inferior in any normative sense. They attempt to understand developing economies 
as social orders whose macro-political economies need to be studied in their own 
terms. The LAO is defined as an order where violence between elites is controlled by 
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creating rents for them. The rents are created by limiting access to organizational 
capabilities hence the term ‘limited access orders’. In their analysis, the most 
important capability or tool for creating rents is the capability to create 
organizations. If everybody had the tools to set up organizations and any feasible 
organization could be set up, they argue rents would be competed away and we 
would be in an Open Access Order of the type that exists in advanced countries.  
This part of their analysis is weak, as it does not describe the rent seeking process in 
advanced countries. However, they do identify the fact that in developing countries 
rents have to be created often through informal means to create incentives for the 
organizationally powerful to desist from violence. This is also one of the first 
instances where mainstream institutional analysis ascribes a positive role to 
informally created rents in maintaining political stability. There are some overlaps 
here with Bates’ ideas that the productive potential of a society is promoted through 
a stability that is born out of ‘domesticating violence’. However Bates’ had no 
analysis of rents as an instrument for achieving stability and this is the LAO 
framework’s contribution. The definition of the ‘Open Access Order’ (OAO) by 
NWWW in contrast borrows heavily from the model of open and competitive 
markets in NCE analysis. The idea that there are no rents in OAOs because 
organizational capabilities result in rents being competed away is the weak part of 
their analysis that is a throwback to a simple NCE view. This interpretation of the 
rent seeking  process in a modern developed economy is similar to Acemoglu and 
Robinson’s claim that inclusive political and economic institutions ensure 
competitive markets, without rents (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012a). In reality, 
institutions in advanced countries allow and allocate significant rents but NWWW 
make a significant breakthrough in the mainstream institutional economics analysis 
of developing countries.  
A common element in the LAO framework and the analysis of political settlements is 
that both models recognize that rents are important for maintaining political stability 
and that rents are organized differently in developed and developing countries. 
However, apart from this common agreement, the LAO framework is organized quite 
differently. The LAO identifies a ‘Dominant Coalition’ (DC) whose members support 
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each other to create organizations that sustain their rents while limiting the access 
of others to organizational capabilities. The assumption is that collusion and 
cooperation between the individuals who are potentially violent ensures their 
organizations have the capacity to solve their internal collective action problems 
(and thereby generate rents for the elites) but keeps others out. This makes the LAO 
distinctly non-Weberian because the same rules do not apply to everybody, whereas 
OAOs are characterized by impersonal rules enabling any organization.  
North et al also provide us with a typology of LAO’s based around the ease setting up 
of organizations and adherence to the rule of law. A Fragile LAO is one where the DC 
is unable to sustain almost any organization due to high levels of violence and where 
it is not possible to separate political and economic organizations. The Basic LAO is 
one where the government is the DC and still heavily restricts access to organization 
building. The third is the Mature LAO where the DC allows private organizations to 
form outside the government but still restricts access to rents. The problem here is 
that the framework classifies the entire range of developing countries from The DRC 
to China with every possible variation in between using just one variable–the ease of 
setting up organizations. This is not enough to capture all the dimensions of these 
economies. For instance both China and India have characteristics of mature LAOs in 
the North et al analysis yet the two are vastly different from each other in the 
relationships of power. India despite its perceived greater openness vis-à-vis China in 
the political sphere may not actually be closer to make the transition to a developed 
country status compared to China. If anything, the high levels of political violence 
and damaging political rent seeking associated with India’s political openness may 
make it more vulnerable or even fragile compared to China (M. H. Khan 2008b; P. 
Roy 2012). The relationship between the ease of forming organizations and the 
effects on the types of rents that are created is a complex one. It is this analysis that 
is required to assess the development prospects of countries. NWWW argue that 
there is no teleological hierarchy of the three types of LAOs, with countries 
necessarily moving from fragile to basic to mature. They also argue that is not 
necessary that mature LAOs are more developmental than basic LAOs. But then it is 
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not clear what the classification adds to our understanding of the transition 
developing countries are going through.  
 
The NWWW framework also develops the idea of a ‘double balance’ between 
economics and politics, a two-way relationship between the economic and political 
characteristics of a society. This is similar to Bates’ examination of the interaction 
between economic and political interests. In the NWWW framework, the specific 
assumption is that openness in the economic sphere creates pressures for openness 
in the political sphere and vice versa. In OAOs there is a balance between high levels 
of openness in both spheres and the reverse is true in LAOs. Using the framework of 
the political settlement, we will also examine a relationship between the politics of 
organizations seeking institutional changes to support their rents and the 
implications of these institutions and institutional changes for economic outcomes. 
But the rent seeking mechanism through which this interaction operates is different 
from both the Bates and the NWWW models.  
The transition from LAO to OAO status is based on the achievement of three 
‘doorstep conditions’. The first is a rule of law for elites. Once this is achieved, elites 
are constrained by rules and there is a steady institutionalization of such rules 
through the constant interaction between members of the DC. This paves the way 
eventually for the emergence of impersonal interactions more broadly, and the 
origin of the property rights and legal systems that are the cornerstone of advanced 
economies. The second is the emergence of perpetually lived organizations that live 
beyond their founding members, such as private corporations or even public 
corporations like municipal bodies. The most important perpetually lived 
organization is the government. A government that can only make credible 
commitments for the duration of its own life cannot credibly commit to support 
private organizations in perpetuity. This idea of perpetuity is one way in which the 
LAO model tries to address the problem of the short time horizons that many 
developing economies seem to struggle with. The third condition is central control 
over organizations that have the potential to exercise violence. As in much of the NIE 
literature, these conditions are identified as patterns based on observations of 
57 
 
advanced OAO-type countries. The authors do not satisfactorily explain the process 
through which these doorstep conditions should lead to the emergence of an OAO 
or how these conditions are actually attained in developing countries. 
In our analysis or rents and rent seeking in the framework of political settlements 
there is no assumption that elites in developing countries can generally cooperate 
and collude to exclude other organizations as in the LAO analysis. Rather, we argue 
that organizations are relatively easy to set up in developing countries and they are 
likely to compete with each rather than colluding. The relative power of different 
organizations and their strategies of conflict or compromise determine how the 
Ruling Coalition (RC) is set up. Unlike the DC, this does not necessarily include all of 
the elite and the elite do not cooperate to assist each other’s organizations. The 
ruling coalition is a loose ensemble of the organizations that are for a time in control 
over the available instruments of the state. Perhaps the most significant difference 
between the framework of political settlements and the LAO framework is the role 
of rents. According to NWWW rents are competed away in an OAO because of the 
open access. The impersonal rule of law is important to ensure this because it means 
that any competent group of people can set up an organization. The law provides 
the tools and third party enforcement to make this easy.  
However rents do exist in developed economies only that the rent seeking process is 
different and more formal. In an advanced capitalist economy the formal rule of law 
allows everyone equal access to formal rent seeking processes. However this does 
not imply an absence of rents. The reality is that access to land, finance, and 
knowledge is structurally limited to a few. As Marxist critiques point out, an 
asymmetric asset-ownership and power structure is the significant feature of 
advanced country capitalism. Rents are widespread in the formal financial sector and 
Schumpeterian rents are critical for technical progress in the advanced economy. 
Redistributive rents have a no less significant role than in developing countries but 
they are largely organized through formal transfers through the budget. In LAOs 
redistributive rents tend to be informal to a greater extent and are distributed 
through both formal and informal political organizations. Both the informal 
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redistributions in the LAO and budgetary provisions in developed social democracies 
are needed to maintain political stability.  
Apart from the issue of formality, a further critical difference between advanced and 
developing countries is that the rents required for economic dynamism in the latter 
are somewhat different. The social transformation of a society from one that is 
largely pre-capitalist to one that is largely capitalist involves significant structural 
changes in the allocation and definition of rights and in the acquisition of new 
technological and organizational capabilities. These processes require changes in 
property rights, the creation of new property rights, and policies that facilitate 
technical and organizational learning. All of these policies are likely to be associated 
with significant changes in the incomes of some, in other words, rents. The analysis 
of these rents is missing in much of the NIE inspired analyses, including Bates, 
Acemoglu and Robinson and NWWW. Whether as a result of conscious policy or as 
the outcome of complex processes, social transformations involve these changes and 
rents play a crucial role in these transitions. As mentioned earlier, rents can become 
damaging or predatory if the balance of power between organizations and between 
them and the state means that asset transfers and rents do not result in greater 
social productivity. Yet transformations where social productivity is rapidly 
increasing are also inevitably associated with significant rents. The LAO framework is 
important for identifying the importance of informal rent transfers in developing 
countries but it does not analyse productivity growth and hence it cannot be a frame 
of analysis for understanding development.  
Our analysis based on Khan (2000b) identifies a number of types of rents that are 
critical in processes of development. What this alternative analysis suggests is that 
the effect of a rent depends critically on institutional conditions such as the 
enforcement capability of the state. For instance, import protection or export 
subsidies can have very different effects depending on the institutional and 
organizational conditions that can enforce obvious conditions to ensure that the 
support is not a free gift but an opportunity to raise productivity. For instance, in a 
top-down industrial policy as in South Korea, required conditions include state 
capacity to create rents for capability development but also the capability to 
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discipline those who are receiving the rents and withdraw them if results are not 
delivered. This implies states should possess the organizational capability to identify 
priorities, and even more so, the ability to correct mistakes by re-allocating rents 
when necessary. These capabilities lead us back to the question of the distribution of 
power between organizations. If the distribution of power is such that state 
organizations are weaker than the business organizations they want to discipline, the 
outcome of the rent allocation is likely to have low or negative net social benefit. The 
recipients will resist disciplining and attempts to discipline them will have political 
costs for the ruling coalition and declining political stability or they ‘capture’ the rent 
with damaging implications for productivity. A top-down industrial policy is not the 
only way in which capability can be enhanced to raise productivity in developing 
countries but each rent allocation strategy requires an appropriate configuration of 
power for developmental outcomes to be achieved (M. H. Khan 2009b).  
Khan outlines a number of rents like transfers, natural resource rents, monopoly 
rents, Schumpeterian rents and learning rents (M. H. Khan 2000b). NCE regards most 
rents to be signals of inefficiency but with some exceptions. For instance, rents 
associated with the creation of property rights over free access resources can signal 
an increase in net social benefit as a result of controlling over-use. Property rights 
extend time horizons of users and can create incentives for maximizing net social 
benefits over time. However, even in the simple case of creating property rights to 
address a free access problem, the allocation of the rights has to be compatible with 
the distribution of power across potential claimants if the costs of conflict are to be 
minimized. If this does not happen, an improvement in efficiency may not be 
achieved as a result of the high costs of contestation. NCE has also begun to 
recognize the importance of Schumpeterian rents for creating the incentives for 
technological innovation. Much like natural resource rents, Schumpeterian rents 
create incentives, in this case for innovators to take risks in creating new 
technologies. The protection of intellectual property rights creates the higher profits 
(Schumpeterian rents) that create the appropriate incentive. In this case the state 
has to have the capability to ensure that innovators do not use their rent seeking 
capabilities to achieve excessive periods of protection or to capture tax incentives or 
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subsidies for innovation without the compulsions to deliver results. Formal rent 
seeking  processes in advanced countries have arguably created intellectual property 
rights protection regimes that are excessively protectionist and that damage the 
pace of innovation (Stiglitz 1998).  
Transfers like subsidies are rents because they create incomes that would otherwise 
not have been available to recipients. In NCE transfers are damaging because they 
are associated with dead weight losses. However this type of analysis typically 
ignores the potential welfare gains of transfers (though in some cases transfers could 
imply welfare losses if they are from poorer to richer people), and they ignore the 
benefits of political stabilization. Even in developed countries transfers to certain 
sectors (like the Common Agricultural Policy in the EU) may be necessary for 
maintaining political stability. This type of redistribution may not be directly 
productivity enhancing the political stability may indirectly contribute to social 
productivity. In developing countries these transfers happen through a combination 
of formal and informal mechanisms. In developing countries, political parties 
compete to form ruling coalitions by distributing rents to powerful political 
organizers and their constituencies to achieve the support they need to capture 
state power with the most economical distribution of rents to lower-level 
supporters. These strategies typically involve considerable elements of direct off-
budget resource allocation to organizers and supporters as well as creating 
opportunities for supporters to capture rents outside the budget through 
government contracts and employment creation. In contrast to the political rent 
distribution in advanced countries, developing countries therefore have a much 
higher level of ‘patron-client politics’ and political corruption.  
One rent that will play an important part in our analysis is the learning rent. These 
are rents associated with interventions or policies that can potentially help 
entrepreneurs and firms achieve the technical and organizational capabilities that 
they need to achieve competitiveness through the adoption of existing technologies. 
This is a critical part of the ‘catching up’ problem in developing economies. Given the 
lower labour costs in developing countries, the pace of technology adoption is often 
much slower than it could be and this is at the heart of the problem of 
61 
 
underdevelopment. The proximate constraint is that the productivity of labour is so 
low that even with very low labour costs investments in many sectors are not 
profitable. The deeper problem is a contracting failure: the transaction costs of 
hiring and training managers and workers is too high because of the difficulty of 
making and enforcing the appropriate contracts that investors do not want to take 
the risk. The training that is relevant is not mainly the acquisition of formal skills. The 
most serious gap in developing countries is the lack of ‘tacit knowledge’ about how 
to organize and manage manufacturing processes. While technology can be 
relatively easily bought in the form of machines, the only way to gain skills in 
manufacturing and achieve high productivity is through ‘learning by doing’ carried 
out with high levels of effort. During this process someone has to finance the losses 
due to low levels of productivity till the tacit knowledge has been acquired. The 
problem is that the learning-by-doing process can fail unless all participants put in 
high levels of effort in the learning. This is difficult to observe, costly to monitor, and 
difficult to address because there are many contingencies that are difficult to 
contract for ex-ante.  
If private investors face high transaction costs in organizing these investments, the 
only way learning can happen is through some form of public cost-sharing or 
subsidization, but with appropriate institutional conditions to ensure that high effort 
learning takes place. This is where a state’s enforcement capability relative to the 
types of learning strategies being attempted becomes critical. If subsidies can be 
captured without firms having to take put in the high levels of effort to achieve 
competitiveness, satisficing solutions on the part of subsidy recipients can result in 
poor outcomes. This is essentially what happened with much of the industrial policy 
initiatives in South Asia in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. However, learning rents can 
also sometimes emerge in response to initiatives and rent seeking activities of firms 
and the regulatory conditions and incentives can sometimes produce desirable 
outcomes even in the absence of strong state capabilities for monitoring and 
withdrawal of learning rents from above. For instance, in the 1980s the Indian 
government allowed Suzuki access to the protected Indian automobile market 
provided its joint venture with Maruti could produce a car in India that would be 
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significantly better than the already existing Ambassador and with 60 per cent 
domestic content within five years (M. H. Khan 2009b). This strategy promised 
significant rents to Suzuki ex-post because the Indian automobile sector had around 
85 per cent tariff protection in the early 1980s, but Suzuki would first have to invest 
significantly in transferring tacit knowledge to Indian components producers. This 
was a case of a successful use of learning rents in India because the policy allocated 
these rents in such a way that the recipients could not easily capture the rent 
without achieving the learning, given the politics and capabilities of the ruling 
coalition and the Indian bureaucracy of that time.  
Khan’s analysis therefore does not recommend a return to the ‘statist’ model of 
industrial policy that worked in East Asian countries or any form of a ‘big push’ 
strategy in countries where the ruling coalition is weak and many powerful 
organizations are competing for rents (Rosenstein-Rodan 1943). Countries like India, 
Pakistan, Bangladesh, Tanzania or Indonesia, performed poorly when they tried to 
address market failures with policies and financing instruments that were similar to 
the East Asian model but without the political settlements that were required to 
enforce and implement these types of strategies. Their failure was not due to the 
fact that intervention by the state always led to government failure, as many NCE 
economists have tried to show (Krueger 1974; J. N. Bhagwati 1982; Shleifer and 
Vishny 1993). A more likely explanation (given the success of East Asia) is that in 
second-tier countries like these, the institutions of intervention were not 
commensurate with the underlying political settlement. Ambitious policies in second 
tier countries during their industrial policy phase did result in their expansion into 
new sectors but in many cases competitiveness was not achieved as the state did not 
have the capacity to discipline entrepreneurs. In contrast, South Korea’s political 
settlement allowed state organizations to effectively allocate learning rents and 
discipline the large business houses receiving them, with the result that its industrial 
policy outcomes were much better. The configuration of economic, political and 
bureaucratic organizations described by the political settlement therefore affects the 
viability of particular institutions like industrial policy instruments and conditions. 
The macro configuration of organizational power determines the incentives and 
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capabilities of the organizations involved in rent seeking and therefore not only the 
types of rents created but also the outcomes associated with these rents as a result 
of differences in their implementation and management. We examine the analytical 
framework of political settlements in greater detail in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3 . Political Settlements, 
Organizational Power and Growth 
This chapter presents our analytical framework of the political settlement which is a 
description of the distribution of power across organizations at a macro level and 
how this distribution is maintained by the distribution of benefits generated by 
formal and informal institutions. The features of the political settlement allow us to 
analyse institutional choice and institutional performance at the micro level. The first 
section analyses how the configuration of power sets the context for institutional 
policy making and the enforcement of particular institutions. The second section 
outlines the two-way relationship between institutions and the distribution of power. 
Institutions determine the distribution of benefits across organizations and therefore 
sustain a distribution of power. The relative power of organizations in turn 
determines the extent of enforcement of particular institutions. Formal institutions 
that hurt the interests of powerful organizations are likely to be blocked, or their 
enforcement modified in informal ways. The third section outlines a typology of 
political settlements focusing on the configuration of political organizations but also 
referring to the configuration of bureaucratic and economic organizations. This 
section also describes the purpose of mapping the features of the political 
settlement at a macro level. The characteristics of the political settlement help to 
explain institutional evolution and the effects of particular institutions at the micro 
level. The final section outlines the methodology used in this research. 
 
3.1 Political Settlements and the Growth-Stability Trade-off  
The framework of political settlements allows us to explore the key issue concerning 
this research—the institutional and organizational configurations that drive or block 
growth in developing countries. Significantly, in this framework there are no good or 
bad institutions in themselves. There are only good or bad combinations of 
institutions and political settlements. This suggests there is nothing ‘intrinsically 
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efficient’ about a particular institution and nor is it transferable (John and Putzel 
2009). For instance, the attempt to operate a particular institution in a specific 
political settlement may result in such major modifications in the institution or such 
high levels of conflict that there is a net negative effect on growth. But in a different 
structure of power the same institution could create the right incentives and be 
sufficiently enforced to support positive results. This is why an effective institution 
embedded in the politics of a particular state provides no guarantee that the 
institution will work in the same way somewhere else (M. H. Khan 2010b). This 
embeddedness is different from that identified by Williamson. Drawing on North, 
Williamson argues that formal institutions are embedded in ‘informal institutions’ 
including customs, traditions, norms and religion, and these have a ‘pervasive 
influence’ on long-term growth (O. E. Williamson 2000). In the Williamson-North 
approach to informality, the claim is that some types of customs or cultures increase 
the costs of enforcement of the required formal institutions. In contrast, in our 
analysis, the most important informal institutions are not culture and norms, but the 
informal institutions of rent allocation that exist because powerful informal 
organizations exist and seek rents. However, culture and ideology do matter because 
they can be used by political organizations to mobilize supporters and constituencies 
that in turn underpin their ability to seek rents. This indirect significance of culture 
and ideology will be particularly explored in our analysis of the case of Gujarat. 
Khan defines a political settlement as a reproducible combination of a distribution of 
power across organizations and a distribution of benefits across them achieved by 
institutions, both formal and informal. The reproducibility of the system means that 
the distribution of power and the distribution of benefits across organizations are 
sufficiently aligned for a serious breakdown not to happen, though incremental 
changes in the institutional structure are always happening. A political settlement 
also has to be viable in the sense that minimum conditions of economic 
reproduction and political stability are achieved, but the degree of economic 
performance or political stability that this implies is specific to the tolerance limits of 
particular societies. Once a viable political settlement emerges where institutions 
and power are compatible the two are supportive of each other and this makes the 
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social order robust and difficult to change. The emergence of a political settlement 
only implies that these systemic features exist, it does not imply that growth or 
stability is satisfactory in a normative sense.  
Once a political settlement is established, any incremental institutional changes 
driven by particular organizations or the state will result in incremental changes in 
the distribution of benefits that may or may not be accepted by powerful groups 
within that settlement (M. H. Khan 2010b). Thus, the political settlement as a 
description of the macro-level balance between institutions and organizations 
affects the viability of particular institutional innovations and the outcomes 
associated with these at the micro-level. Hence our analysis of political settlements 
needs to be conducted both at the macro and a micro level of analysis. The macro-
level analysis identifies the institutional and organizational architecture of a polity. 
The micro-level analysis examines the path dependent and incremental processes of 
institutional change by looking at the particular changes that emerge and their 
economic and political consequences given the macro-level political settlement. At 
the macro-level, the analysis of political settlements is an identification of its 
characteristics, and therefore a description. It is not a causal theory where the 
political settlement is ‘explained’ by other independent variables. We do not have 
any credible theory that can capture the complexity of interactions that have 
resulted in different types of political settlements in different contexts. Nor do we 
have a credible theory of how one macro-level political settlement can be 
transformed into a different one. The best we can do is to look at the ways in which 
micro-level institutional and policy changes happen and their consequences. The 
very general hypothesis is that if a social system is progressing in the direction of 
greater social productivity it is more likely to gradually progress towards higher living 
standards, greater political stability and the evolution of more formal social 
democratic systems, though none of the latter are necessary outcomes of 
development.  
The micro level analysis of particular institutions and strategies looks at the 
implications of particular institutions for growth and political stability. An institution 
that has a positive effect on growth if implemented and enforced in a particular way 
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may have negative effects on political stability. The intensity of the decline in 
political stability depends on the particular implications for distribution and the 
relative power of the organizations affected by these changes. In the general case, 
we can look for any particular trade-offs between growth and stability in the context 
of specific institutional changes in particular political settlements (M. H. Khan 
2010b). This analysis can help to explain why similar institutions often produce 
differing results in different contexts.  
To structure our discussion we begin with a broad distinction between the political 
settlements of advanced and developing countries. The political settlements of 
developing countries are broadly ‘clientelist’ political settlements which refer to the 
significant sources of informal power and informal resource allocation in these 
contexts. We will look at many important differences between developing countries 
but at a broad level, developing countries have a much greater range of informal 
institutions and organizations compared to more advanced countries. The formal-
informal differentiation is not binary; there is clearly a range of levels of informality, 
which roughly corresponds to the level of development of the economy. Patron-
client relationships operating through political parties and political organizations are 
a significant mechanism through which informal rent seeking and rent allocation 
takes place. These informal patron-client structures operate in a variety of contexts, 
from contexts of authoritarian military rule to democracies though there are 
differences of detail across these contexts.  
The political pyramid in a clientelist political settlement can be loosely described as a 
pyramidal organization where patrons at higher levels of the pyramid deliver 
resources or allow rent capture by lower levels to build up the support and 
organizational strength that in turn allows the patron to capture rents using this 
organizational power in rent seeking contests at higher levels (M. H. Khan 2005, 
2010b). Developing countries whether they are democracies, single party systems or 
authoritarian regimes usually have a number of competing political organizations 
organized as patron-client groupings. How fragmented or coordinated these 
organizations are and the strategies they follow in building up their organizational 
power is specific to particular contexts, and we need to keep in mind the point made 
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earlier about the macro-analysis being primarily a description of the relevant 
characteristics and historical trends that have led to the emergence of the features 
of each case.  
In most cases, patrons in the higher levels in each network make rational calculations 
about the pay-offs they have to deliver to lower levels to garner the support they 
need to engage in their own rent seeking contests. This rational and materialist 
analysis might seem at odds with the growth of ideological organizations in South 
Asia, such as Islamist organizations in Pakistan. But in most of these cases, while the 
mobilization may indeed be based around religious ideologies, the organization and 
its supporters also expect pay-offs for the political organization to be effective. 
Effective organizations need to have access to resources and they need to be able to 
distribute it within their organizations. The sources of these resources, the relative 
bargaining power of patrons and clients at different levels within the organization, 
and what the organization does with its bargaining power in terms of the rents they 
collectively target or the policies they pursue do of course differ across 
organizations.  
The developing country political settlement can be contrasted with the general 
characteristics of the political settlements in advanced capitalist countries, though 
here too there are significant differences across countries. Here, the productive 
sector is largely modern, high productivity and formal and the rules that are 
enforced support the activities of these high-productivity economic organizations. 
Social redistribution also happens within these formal institutional structures, 
through unemployment benefits, pensions and health care. The main differences are 
that the productive enterprises can pay for the enforcement of rules, and the very 
numbers and diversity of these enterprises means that generalized rules have to be 
devised for that economic system to operate. Finally, the formal taxes these 
enterprises pay also allows political stability to be maintained through rule-following 
politics. Rule violation by politics is neither necessary nor in the interests of the 
economic organizations that pay the taxes. These feedbacks ensure that the political 
settlement here is largely formal and the rules support the interests of productive 
enterprises. But this does not mean that there are no rents and rent seeking. Both 
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economic and political enterprises are engaged in formal, rule-following rent 
seeking. The rents that productive enterprises target are rents like Schumpeterian 
rents or financial sector rents that can often be potentially productive, but can 
sometimes be very damaging. There are also political rents that are sought by 
interests and organizations that can sometimes be necessary for stability and 
sometimes go far beyond what is necessary and constitute a drag on development. 
Thus, very similar issues are involved in advanced economies but we will not pursue 
these questions further here. 
 
3.2  The Dialectical Relationship between Institutions and Power 
A social order is stable and reproducible when the distribution of benefits allowed by 
formal and informal institutions is more or less aligned with the distribution of 
organizational power (M. H. Khan 2010b).  This ‘macro-equilibrium’ is continuously 
being disturbed because economic and political activity changes the power of 
organizations and organizations are continuously engaged in rent seeking  activities 
to change formal and informal institutions. However, as long as the disturbances are 
not significant and incremental institutional changes are supported by incremental 
changes in the distribution of power, the evolution of society can be relatively 
orderly. However, many important policy and institutional changes are not driven in 
this organic and incremental way and these institutions do not necessarily work as 
expected. One way of describing the functioning of formal institutions that are 
introduced by policy is to look at the gap between the theoretical rules embodied in 
the formal institution and the actual operation of that institution. If the institution in 
question implies a distribution of benefits that is likely to be resisted by powerful 
organizations a gap is likely to open up between the formal institution and its actual 
implementation. The gap can be due to the fact that its implementation results in 
conflicts and contestation that results in partial implementation (and that too with 
significant social costs due to the contestation), or its implementation is modified to 
bring distributive outcomes closer to the distribution of power, or some combination 
of the two.  
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The actual operation of an institution in the context of a specific distribution of 
power is described as its ‘operational equilibrium’ and this is usually substantially 
different in developing countries compared to the formal specification of the rules 
that assumes that individuals and organizations actually follow the rules specified by 
the formal institution. A partial or modified implementation of formal institutions is 
often the case because the underlying distribution of organizational power usually 
does not allow the effective enforcement of many formal institutions (M. H. Khan 
2012f). For instance, the formal institution in question may be a rule that imposes a 
tax on certain activities. The tax may not be fully implemented because in the 
context of an informal power structure, the organizations that are to be taxed are 
able to resist its implementation using informal networks or even the threat of 
violence in some cases. The rule may therefore be imposed on some organizations 
and not others. In addition, even if the rule is imposed, it may be modified as a result 
of informal rent-sharing between the economic, bureaucratic and political 
organizations so that the tax is not properly assessed or delayed in its collection. In 
advanced countries, the operational equilibrium does not deviate to this extent from 
the formal specification of the rule because the overall political settlement allows 
the enforcement of formal rules. The likelihood of a particular formal institution 
being partially implemented or modified depends on the organizational power 
structure in which the institution is being imposed. This is why an analysis that 
simply focuses on the appropriateness of the formal institutional structure in a 
developing country often fails to identify the source of the institutional problem. A 
formal institution may be theoretically ‘appropriate’ but may not be appropriate in 
the political settlement of the society in question (M. H. Khan 2010b).  
Operational equilibria can be strong, moderate or weak depending on how closely 
the actual implementation of the particular institution corresponds to its formal 
specification. If the formal institution exists only in name and is very indifferently 
implemented, the formal institution has a very weak operational equilibrium. In the 
extreme case of course resistance can result in the formal institutions not even 
emerging but the situation in many developing countries is that all sorts of formal 
institutions have a legal existence but are observed to varying degrees. Acemoglu 
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and Robinson have tried to capture aspects of this problem when they identified the 
importance of ‘political losers’ and how they can create a wedge between the ‘de 
jure’ political power of political institutions and the ‘de facto’ political power 
exercised by these economic actors (Acemoglu and Robinson 2000; Acemoglu, et al. 
2004; Acemoglu and Robinson 2008). A&R posit that the reason for the divergence in 
the industrial development of Britain and Germany on the one side and Austria-
Hungary and Russia on the other is that in the latter technological change was 
successfully opposed by those who feared a loss of political power as a result of 
these changes and not just a loss of their economic rents. In the 2004 paper A&R 
offer a framework that attempts an analysis similar to ours where they argue that a 
combination of political institutions endowed with de jure powers and the initial 
distribution of economic resources determine the direction of economic growth. In 
their analysis, political institutions determine the distribution of de jure political 
power (the formal institutions in our framework). At another level the distribution of 
resources determines the real distribution of power (de facto or informal political 
power in our framework). Both sources of political power matter and their 
interaction determines the choice of economic institutions as well as the evolution 
of political institutions. This interaction explains the persistence of distributive 
outcomes as those with political power and access to economic rents in the existing 
system can block changes that threaten their interests.  
In our framework, the sources of organizational power cannot just be read off from 
initial economic endowments and economic capabilities because organizational 
capabilities have independent determinants as we discussed earlier. In developing 
countries these organizational capabilities matter greatly, and the most powerful 
organizations are not necessarily the ones that represent the interests of the rich. In 
addition, we do not share A&R's institutional analysis about the types of institutions 
and rents that ensure dynamism during social transformations. Nevertheless, there 
is an overlap in our broad analytical methodologies linking formal and informal 
power to evolutionary institutional outcomes. They also recognize that exogenous 
changes can shift the balance of power and nudge the system towards (or further 
against) growth. However, as Kunal Sen points out A&R's theory is better positioned 
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to explain ‘growth sustenance’ or ‘long-term growth stagnation’ rather than 
processes of transition. As Sen concludes, the political determinants of ‘growth 
maintenance’ are different from the determinants of ‘growth acceleration’ (Sen 
2013).  
Acemoglu and Johnson’s framework misses the important role informal institutions 
in any transition and the ways in which formal institutions are modified in informal 
ways to reflect the distribution of power. Their focus is on how informal power 
affects the trajectory of formal institutional development. In fact, particularly in 
developing countries, the effect of informal power is to influence the trajectory of 
informal institutional evolution, particularly by affecting the operational equilibria of 
formal institutions. The framework of political settlements allows us to highlight this 
level of analysis by looking at how the distribution of power at various levels affects 
institutional development at both the formal and informal levels. Figure 3.1 outlines 
the two-way relationship between the distribution of power and institutions. A 
particularly important dimension of the distribution of power is revealed in the 
construction of the ruling coalition in a polity. The organizational power that is 
reflected in the construction of the ruling coalition helps us to understand the 
evolution of the formal institutional and policy structure and the implementation of 
these through informal modifications. The interaction of these factors determines 
whether the specific institutions operating in this political settlement are growth-
enhancing or not. The framework is not so much a theory of growth as an analytical 
model for understanding the interaction of institutions and politics in processes of 
transition.  
The political settlements framework can provide insights at a number of levels and 
not all of them are relevant for the questions raised in this thesis. The interaction 
between the evolution of institutions and policies and the distribution of power 
(both formal and informal) has implications for both stability and growth in a society. 
As we have seen, the political settlements analysis also has both a macro and a micro 
level of analysis. The macro-level is primarily historical, looking at the configuration 
of organizations and the evidence of their relative power, and how they have 
evolved over time in the context of institutional evolution. Without this ‘data’ the 
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political settlement analysis suggests that a detailed analysis of institutional 
performance and a policy discussion of institutional solutions to developmental 
problems cannot be effectively conducted. However, the macro-level analysis that 
needs to be constructed depends on the specific micro-institutional questions that 
are being asked. The relevant organizations and their relative organizational 
capabilities will vary depending on the institutional and policy questions that we are 
interested in. In this thesis we are interested in a number of strategies that were 
used in Tamil Nadu, Gujarat and Pakistan for promoting industrialization and we 
construct an overview of the relevant organizational power that can shed light on 
the institutional and policy choices and the success of their implementation.  
 
 
Figure 3.1 The two-way relationship between power and institutions  
 
Source: (M. H. Khan 2010b: Figure 7) 
 
The macro-level institutional and organizational structure of a society has many 
dimensions and for convenience these can be broken down into three interactive 
sub systems. These subsystems are political, bureaucratic and economic, each 
consisting of the relevant organizations and institutions (M. H. Khan 2010b). The 
overall political settlement includes all three but for specific purposes it may be 
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useful to focus on one or two components at a time. The macro-micro distinction is 
useful because at the macro-level, the distribution of power is endogenous and is 
described by the balance of institutions and organizations, while at the micro-level, 
the distribution of power at the social level is exogenous and helps us to understand 
the pace and direction of institutional change and the operational equilibrium 
achieved by specific institutions. The distribution of power at the macro-level 
changes not only through incremental processes but can also change through 
various forms of social and political mobilizations that create new organizations or 
change their relative power. For a political settlement to be in a normal situation of 
reproduction and incremental change, the minimum conditions of political and 
economic viability have to be met. This does not necessarily mean high growth or 
low levels of conflict, but levels that are acceptable enough in that society so as not 
to provoke significant new mobilizations that result in non-incremental or disruptive 
changes. This means that in some cases a political settlement can be defined even 
with low levels of growth or high levels of political strife, and this is important for 
understanding political settlements in countries like Pakistan.  
 
3.3 A Typology of Political Settlements  
The political organizations that constitute the ruling coalition have the formal 
authority to define new policies and institutional rules. How the ruling coalition is 
constructed and what powers they actually have of implementing and enforcing the 
institutions they want is therefore likely to be relevant for understanding 
institutional evolution and performance. Political organizations operate under formal 
political institutions (such as democratic decision-making rules) but we expect the 
distribution of power across organizations to determine whether the formal political 
institutions are actually adhered to. The general features of the distribution of power 
across organizations in the typical developing country means that formal political 
institutions, like other formal institutions, operate in a way that is different from a 
strict adherence to the formal rules. The nature of the operational equilibrium will 
depend on the precise configuration of power and describing how the rules operate 
is indirectly a way of understanding this distribution of power.  
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In developing countries most political organizations are internally organized with 
significant informal rent distribution that can be described as patron-client 
relationships. The informality is more analytically interesting than the personal 
nature of these relationships. The operation of the political subsystem is an outcome 
of the formal political rules (institutions), the organization of political groups and 
parties and the formal and informal rents that are allocated to construct a viable 
ruling coalition. If the political subsystem has reproducible characteristics, the 
distribution of benefits to political players (both within political parties and across 
political parties) should be consistent with their relative power. So a description of 
the political organizations that are relevant and the distribution of rents within and 
between these organizations essentially indicates the relative power of different 
organizations and of the hierarchies within these organizations.  
Keeping in mind that both formal and informal power matters, we need to look at 
two relevant dimensions of the distribution of power affecting the ruling coalition. 
The first is the horizontal distribution of power which defines the relative power of 
other political organizations that are currently excluded from the ruling coalition. 
The second is the vertical distribution of power that defines the relative power of 
those at the lower levels of the organization relative to those at higher levels. These 
two dimensions in the distribution of power define four types of political subsystems 
(Figure 3.2). These are ideal types and most real world cases would have mixed 
characteristics, but it is helpful to identify the four extreme variants. The first can be 
described as ‘strong patrimonialism’, where the ruling coalition is strong relative to 
excluded political organizations and its higher levels are strong relative to lower 
levels. Here the ruling coalition can take a long-term view because it is not credibly 
threatened and it also has high implementation capabilities. While strong 
patrimonialism may appear to be at risk of predatory behaviour, in fact the rational 
strategy of self-seeking leaders in this context is to be developmental as that gives 
them the highest returns in terms of net present value. Developmental states like 
South Korea under Chung Hee Park were characterized with this type of political 
settlement in the political subsystem. One important feature of this political context 
is that the institutions of developmental authoritarianism can be in a strong 
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operational equilibrium here. There is likely to be little resistance and conflict facing 
their implementation and informal modifications would not distort the expected 
operation of these institutions. South Korean industrial policy was successful not 
only because the institutions made sense but also because they were implementable 
in this political settlement (Kohli 1994; M. H. Khan 1995; Woo-Cumings 1999). 
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Figure 3.2 Distribution of power and the structure of ruling coalitions 
Sources: (Based on M. H. Khan 2010b: Figure 17)   
Note: the diagram refers to Gujarat from 2000-2013, Tamil Nadu from 1989 to 2013 
and Pakistan from 2008-2013 
 
Three issues are relevant here. The developmental authoritarianism here is about 
the ruling coalition having the ability to push through developmental agendas given 
the weak organizational ability of excluded organizations. The implementation is not 
necessarily formally democratic and indeed it is unlikely to be given that democratic 
rules would not be in a strong operational equilibrium here, but the ruling coalition is 
likely to have or rapidly achieve significant legitimacy precisely because it is capable 
Gujarat  
Pakistan 
T. Nadu 
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of achieving developmental successes. Authoritarianism here is not about violent 
political repression that is paradoxically associated with authoritarianism when the 
ruling coalition is weaker. Secondly, the developmental state here is not necessarily 
a Weberian rule-following state and indeed this is unlikely given the absence of a 
broad-based productive class that we posit is necessary for the achievement of 
general rule-following behaviour as an operational equilibrium. The authoritarian 
developmental state can be expected to violate many rules and indeed at this level 
of development rules guiding behaviour or appropriate property rights may be 
missing in many areas. But formally or informally, the state is effectively able to 
enforce the rules that affect developmental outcomes. As the ruling coalition has an 
interest and an ability to enforce developmental outcomes, it is likely to do so, even 
if property rights and the rule of law are violated, as they were in South Korea in its 
early stages of development. Finally, we need to emphasize that our use of the term 
patrimonialism is to be distinguished from other usages. For instance it is not the 
same as the neo-patrimonialism referred to in sociology or in the analysis of political 
scientists like Kohli. Here the strong patrimonialism simply signals that this is a ruling 
coalition that behaves as if it has a right to rule and can actually impose its authority 
effectively given the distribution of power across organizations.  
Our framework identifies two other ‘patrimonial’ structures where authority 
structures are much weaker, with significant implications for the operational 
equilibria of different institutions. In ‘vulnerable patrimonialism’ excluded political 
organizations are strong and to remain in power, the ruling coalition occasionally has 
to resort to suppression or even violence against them. A ruling coalition that has to 
use political repression is actually vulnerable. The more repression it uses the more 
vulnerable it is, and vulnerable patrimonialism has a tendency of becoming weaker 
over time. However this ruling coalition is characterized by relatively strong higher 
levels relative to lower levels within the organization, so that rent allocation to lower 
levels is subject to the enforcement of higher level decisions. Developmental 
interventions are likely to have a moderate operational equilibrium because of this 
enforcement capability, but institutions of authoritarian exclusion of other 
organizations is likely to be in weak and contested operational equilibrium. Sadly, as 
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excluded organizations become stronger, they can promise lower-level organizers 
within the ruling coalition higher rents if they defect, and over time vulnerable 
patrimonialism begins to lose its enforcement capability over lower levels. This can 
lead to a sudden collapse of the political settlement. As we will see in a later chapter 
the Pakistani state under General Ayub Khan in the 1960s was an example of a 
vulnerable patrimonialism that achieved early developmental successes but then 
suffered a precipitous collapse.  
A third variant is ‘constrained patrimonialism’ where the ruling coalition faces weak 
challenges from excluded organizations but this is because it includes all or most 
powerful organizations within it. However, this also means that there are many 
powerful internal organizations and the authority of higher levels over lower levels 
tends to be weak. This distribution of power is usually in operational equilibrium 
with institutions that support a Dominant Party, and indeed even democratic 
institutions will enable a single dominant party to win elections repeatedly. Here, the 
ruling coalition is likely to feel secure enough to take a long view of development, 
and both democratic and authoritarian political institutions could be in a moderate 
operational equilibrium. The ruling coalition is also likely to attempt developmental 
interventions given its long time horizon but these are likely to be in weak 
operational equilibrium and achieve poor results given the weaker enforcement 
capability over internal sub-organizations. Rents are likely to be captured by internal 
organizations and rent-re-allocation effectively resisted even if this is damaging for 
the collective interests of the ruling coalition.  
India under the dominant Congress Party in the 1950s and 1960s is an example of 
constrained patrimonialism with democratic political institutions and a dirigiste 
growth strategy. China today is also an example of constrained patrimonialism with 
restricted (authoritarian) political institutions and a leading role played by the 
Communist Party under Deng Xiaoping and subsequent leaders in driving a capitalist 
transformation from Maoist statist structures. However, the internal discipline of the 
Communist Party, the product of a long history of war, revolution and social 
transformation meant that its internal hierarchical control structures quite strong. 
The Chinese political system in the 1980s was therefore not as constrained as India 
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in the 1950s and 1960s in terms of higher levels being unable to impose conditions 
and rules on lower levels. China was therefore somewhere between constrained 
patrimonialism and strong patrimonialism, probably closer to the latter. 
Nevertheless, the internal ability to discipline subsidy-receiving capitalists was 
perhaps not as high in China as in South Korea and the same types of directed 
industrial policy institutions may not have been in an effective operational 
equilibrium. In China the ruling coalition initiated a broader accumulation strategy 
enabling more of its politically powerful intermediate levels to enter the ranks of the 
emerging capitalist class but with the ability to enforce competition and internal 
accountability in ways that ensured developmental outcomes. These strategies 
included the town and village enterprises (TVEs) and the promotion of special 
economic zones, while the rents in the SOEs were left intact as a form of political 
rent distribution. Put another way Heilmann posits that the post-Mao leadership 
‘experimented’ with ‘multiple models’ rather than insisting on any single model and 
risk unrest (Heilmann 2011).  
In contrast, the internal authority structures of the Congress Party in India were 
much weaker than China and sub-organizations and individual leaders could not be 
subjected to internal accountability and discipline to the same extent. Its formal 
development strategy provided potential learning rents to a group of medium to 
large capitalists and technology adoption was also promoted through public sector 
enterprises. Political redistribution took place through formal and informal rent 
distribution. The problem was that the institutions granting rents for economic 
development could not be properly disciplined because with a weak centre, lower 
level politicians and organizations protected businesses supported by industrial 
policy for a share of their rents and the compulsions for improving competitiveness 
were much weaker. By the mid-1960s, India was hit by a combination of declining 
economic growth and new mobilizations of emerging intermediate class groups, 
organizing under regional, caste and other ideological labels, demanding inclusion 
into the ruling coalition and a share of redistributive rents. By the late 1970s the 
dominant party system fell apart. In both India and China the political settlements 
were important for understanding institutional evolution, the operational 
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equilibrium or effectiveness of these institutions and therefore the developmental 
outcomes. Deng benefited from the centralized statist structure established by Mao 
and the fragmented society that was the result of the Cultural Revolution. This 
meant that Deng and his successors had less to worry about in terms of 
redistributive demands coming from mobilized constituencies and could also impose 
greater discipline on lower levels of their own party. In contrast Nehru and even 
more so, Indira Gandhi, had to respond to a highly mobilized society where the 
construction of oppositional organizations was legitimate after a long history of 
colonial social reengineering and anti-colonial struggle. This mobilization is now even 
stronger and a critical feature of Indian politics.  
To understand the operation of political parties in India and China, or within the 
same party across different states in India, it is not enough to look at the institutional 
structure of parties (their constitutions) but also the real distribution of power across 
the organizations that constitute it, and the constituencies they in turn can mobilize. 
Political parties can be analysed both as institutions (rules for internal representation 
and accountability) and as organizations (collections of sub-organizations and 
factions that come together for specific collective goals). The internal procedures of 
a party reflect the interaction of its institutions with its sub-organizations, just as the 
actual operation of a society reflects the interaction of its institutions and 
organizations, both formal and informal. The fact that a party has a formal 
hierarchical or inclusive representative structure does not mean it will actually 
operate in that way if its formal and informal sub-organizations block these 
procedures and have the power to do this or to modify procedures in important 
ways. The political settlements analysis would explain in these terms why higher 
levels in the Chinese Communist Party can effectively discipline and command lower 
levels to a much greater extent than the Indian Congress, or why the BJP in Gujarat is 
similarly different from the BJP in Karnataka. Another way of putting this is that 
party organization as a description of how groups within it behave depends to a 
large extent on the distribution of holding power across sub-organizations within it 
and not simply an independent variable that can be easily changed as a ‘policy’. 
Nevertheless, incremental changes in institutional rules can over time have an effect 
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on party organizations but this is a relatively slow and uncertain process whose 
outcomes depend on the continuous interaction between its internal institutions 
and organizations. 
Economic outcomes in particular contexts depends not just on the presence or 
absence of constrained patrimonialism or any other singular feature of the 
distribution of power across organizations but rather on the implementation and 
modification of particular policies and institutions in the context of the holding 
power of all affected organizations. The very different growth outcomes in India and 
China under constrained patrimonialism can be explained using the political 
settlements framework when we look at the differences in relevant policies and the 
holding power and capabilities of affected organizations. Any policy or institution has 
implications for the distribution of benefits and affected organizations can be 
expected to try and influence the implementation and modification of these policies 
and institutions. The political arena that is described by the distribution of power 
across political organizations is therefore only part of the story, the holding power 
and capabilities of economic organizations also matter in defining the relative power 
of relevant organizations and the implementation of different policies has to be 
examined in this context. This is why versions of constrained patrimonialism in India 
and China at different times were associated with very different outcomes. This is 
only partly because at a higher level of detail the organization of the dominant 
parties in different ‘constrained patrimonial’ polities is quite different in detail when 
we look at the underlying distribution of power across political sub-organizations. 
More importantly, their institutions and policies were also different, as were the 
power and capabilities of their economic organizations. The political settlements 
framework says that when we look at the broader distribution of power across all 
organizations, we are better able to explain why Chinese policies and institutions had 
a greater developmental impact in China relative to Indian policies and institutions in 
India. In India in the 1950s and 1960s the capitalists had some capability and had 
relatively stronger holding power relative to the state and hence were difficult to 
discipline. In the case of China in the 1980s economic organizations had moderate 
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productive capabilities but had limited holding power relative to the state allowing 
important and effective changes in strategies of accumulation. 
The fourth and last variant is ‘competitive clientelism’ characterized by a ruling 
coalition that is not very strong relative to currently excluded organizations and 
whose higher levels are similarly not very strong relative to lower levels. Here the 
ruling coalition is likely to have a short time horizon because it expects to be 
replaced by other coalitions soon, and it also has low enforcement capabilities. This 
configuration of organizational power is most common in developing countries. 
Once organizational power has fragmented to this extent, authoritarian political 
institutions cannot be in an operational equilibrium (without excessive violence) and 
the only political institutions that are viable are democratic ones. However, 
democracy in developing countries operating in the context of competitive 
clientelism works very differently from rule-following democracies in advanced 
countries (M. H. Khan 2002b). This is because given the high level of informal rent 
allocation necessary in developing countries per capita GDP is low, political 
organizations cannot be constructed and political power sought purely on the basis 
of credible fiscal promises of taxing and spending. Even in India where formal fiscal 
redistribution is significant, it is not possible to construct political organizations 
without offering significant informal incentives to organizers. What this means is that 
what is available in the formal fiscal programme would not attract those with the 
capacity to organize politics to invest their own time and money in organizational 
activity (M. H. Khan 2012f) .  
This means that in these contexts formal democracy is the only institution that can 
be in an operational equilibrium without violence, but the operational equilibrium of 
democracy is likely to involve significant informal rent allocations that take the form 
of corruption. The political corruption in these contexts is often a manifestation of 
this informality in the allocation of rents. Informality also means that rule-following 
political competition is difficult and contested elections are common, whether in 
Kenya or Bangladesh. Stability here requires that the ruling coalition is able to 
provide credible assurances to the opposition that it will get a fair shot at gaining 
power based on its own informal strategies. The difficulty of ensuring a ‘fair’ level of 
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informality on all sides means that democracy in many developing countries faces 
challenges. The opposition frequently resorts to violent protests to redress the 
balance. The repeated instability facing Bangladesh is to a large extent due to the 
intransigence of the incumbent party towards the opposition which repeatedly takes 
to the streets to prove its holding power. The combination of political instability and 
short time horizons of the ruling coalition means that a developmental agenda is 
difficult to implement. 
In reality, the political subsystem can display hybrid characteristics in many contexts. 
A particularly interesting case is that of the ‘authoritarian clientelism’ of Gujarat 
which is a subset of constrained patrimonialism close to ‘strong patrimonialism’ but 
with features of competitive clientelism. We will see in Chapter Five on Gujarat that 
here the ruling coalition (the BJP) faces weak competition from opposition 
organizations but not so weak that it could ignore them completely. Being close to 
the conditions of strong patrimonialism, the dominant party also has stronger 
enforcement capabilities over its lower levels than the typical dominant party in 
constrained patrimonialism, but not as strong as in strong patrimonialism. Thus this 
configuration has characteristics of both constrained patrimonialism (weak vertical 
enforcement) and vulnerable patrimonialism (some opposition from excluded 
organizations). Unlike vulnerable patrimonialism where the excluded groups are 
stronger and the ruling coalition may repeatedly have to use repression against 
them, in the authoritarian clientelism of Gujarat excluded groups were much weaker 
and an episode of violence early on was sufficient to signal to them that they would 
be better off remaining quiescent. These characteristics of dominant party rule by 
the BJP in Gujarat help to explain important features of institutional performance in 
Gujarat. The very different regime of the BNP under Zia in Bangladesh also had some 
of these characteristics (M. H. Khan 2012a). 
Competitive clientelism is the most relevant configuration of political power for our 
research because the majority of developing country democracies exhibit 
competitive clientelism or are moving towards it. Both Tamil Nadu and Pakistan had 
variants of competitive clientelism but with different characteristics and with very 
different outcomes. Competitive clientelism emerges when the growing demands for 
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political rents as new social groups mobilize results in an increasing number of 
organizations and organizers and all powerful groups can no longer be 
accommodated in a single organization. As excluded organizations become stronger, 
the lower levels within the ruling coalition also become stronger: their bargaining 
power increases as the threat of leaving the coalition becomes more credible. 
Similarly as lower levels within the ruling coalition become stronger, excluded 
organizations can entice them away to increase their strength. Thus, both 
constrained patrimonialism and vulnerable patrimonialism tend to evolve in the 
direction of competitive clientelism. Ideologies and identities are regularly used both 
by dissatisfied political entrepreneurs who want to break away from existing 
organizations and also by centralizing political entrepreneurs who want to resist 
them. But in both cases ideology typically plays an instrumental rather than 
substantive role in politics. This means that while ideologies like a commitment to a 
linguistic group or a religion can mobilize intense conflicts, politics is rarely about the 
promotion of a language or religion per se.  
Competitive clientelism can set constraints on growth in a number of ways. The 
formal and informal redistribution that keeps the ruling coalition together can be a 
source of stability but it can also go out of control and restrict the resources 
available for developmental investments. South Asia in the 1950s and 1960s saw the 
beginning of mobilizations based on language and regionalism that were portents of 
the much larger movements we see in the sub-continent today. The reorganization 
of Indian states according to language and the demand for more resources for East 
Pakistan were the main movements of that time. By the 1970s these movements 
were becoming larger, with the movement in East Pakistan becoming a secessionist 
one and India seeing the formation of a powerful political party comprising of rich 
north Indian farmers taking on Mrs Gandhi’s Congress. In East Pakistan high levels of 
mobilization led to increased public investment in the region hitherto neglected by 
Ayub Khan’s industrial policies but were not enough to stave off a war and another 
partition (Maniruzzaman 1980; M. H. Khan 1999). In the Indian case the so-called 
farmers’ lobby eventually formed the first non-Congress government in New Delhi 
and this lobby has continued to hold sway over agricultural policies like fertilizer and 
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electricity subsidies in India. In both cases these movements were the beginning of 
the end for the weak versions of patrimonialism that existed in these countries: 
vulnerable patrimonialism in Pakistan and constrained patrimonialism in India.  
Later movements in the region like those based on affirmative action for India’s 
backward castes in the 1980s, the anti-Ershad pro-democracy movement in 
Bangladesh in 1991 or the political mobilization by parties like Imran Khan’s Tehreek-
e-Insaaf in Pakistan are all mobilizations of new organizations mobilizing new social 
constituencies for new rent allocations and challenging the justice of existing 
allocations. Redistributive politics of this type is a rational accumulation strategy for 
political entrepreneurs from the intermediate or middle classes given the absence of 
credible productive alternatives (M. H. Khan 1998). The new mobilizations were 
based on different combinations of three factors: demographic changes as the size 
of the intermediate classes grew, growing aspirations and the activities of ambitious 
political entrepreneurs. Most of these entrepreneurs and the higher organizational 
levels of new organizations drew on ambitious individuals from the intermediate 
classes. In many cases, the intermediate classes were also the broader constituency, 
though parties also had to mobilize much poorer people to maximize their 
bargaining power. There are many definitions of the intermediate classes in the 
literature on South Asia (Misra 1961; Alavi 1973; Kalecki 1976; A. V. Desai 1981; 
Bardhan 1988). We use Khan’s definition of the intermediate class as a residual 
category of individuals who are neither the tiny group of capitalists and surplus 
landlords at the top nor the roughly bottom fifty per cent of poor and landless 
peasants and workers whose only source of income is labour (M. H. Khan 1998). The 
middle thirty to forty per cent constitute a critical set of classes who have enough 
economic, educational and organizational resources to drive domestic political 
activities and organizations.  
The construction of this political settlement means that attempts to completely 
dismantle redistributive rents or even just the informal redistributive rents may be 
impossible to achieve and therefore counterproductive. Most developing countries 
do not have the fiscal resources to achieve political stability purely through formal 
budgetary redistribution and growing budget deficits to increase the share of formal 
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redistribution may also have damaging effects if they happen too rapidly. As long as 
political redistribution is stable and predictable the effects on accumulation and 
growth may be small. For instance, if political organizations can deliver stability in 
exchange for some rent sharing with emerging capitalist organizations, the latter 
may be able to purchase stability and the protection of their property rights for a 
relatively low price compared to the possibly untenable rates of taxation that may be 
necessary to achieve stability through generalized transfers. This was the case in 
Maharashtra in the 1970s and 1980s and Bangladesh in the 1980s when economic 
growth accelerated despite the persistence of forms of political corruption (M. H. 
Khan 2008b; P. Roy 2012).  
Populist redistribution can however become unsustainable if economic growth does 
not keep pace with the growth of transfers. In some regions of South Asia, for 
instance in Gujarat, growth has been strong enough to allow for an increase in 
formal redistribution in a sustainable way. On the other hand India’s Food Security 
Bill or the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (both set up at the federal 
level) and providing subsidized food or guaranteed work and wages for the rural 
unemployed are examples of well-meaning but populist policies that are probably 
outstripping the fiscal capacity to fund them. The real issue is that these 
redistributive strategies do not provide significant rents to the intermediate classes 
who are the organizationally strongest parts of the population and it will be a long 
time before fiscal transfers deliver enough to this group. In the meantime, political 
organizations will have to remain dependent on providing informal benefits to 
organizers and the political settlement will be characterized by this informality.  
The growth of an oligarchy in the Indian corporate sector seems to be pointing in this 
direction. A handful of companies that had achieved competitiveness in the 1980s 
and 1990s are still continuing productive investments and productive activity. But a 
growing number of regional and new corporate entities have resorted to what could 
be called destructive primitive accumulation in the form of capturing agricultural 
land, coal or the telecom spectrum with an increasingly short-termist ruling coalition 
sharing some of these rents. Chapter Four outlines this process in greater detail. 
Thus, differences in the configurations of political power have important implications 
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for the enforcement of particular institutions and for the associated growth 
outcomes.  
The economic sub-system is the equally important counterpart of the political one, 
and describes the economic organizations involved in productive activities. We are 
concerned with the formal and informal rent seeking activities of economic 
organizations and how these affect developmental outcomes. The economic 
organizations of relevance for our research are in the modern industrial sector. Two 
characteristics of economic organizations are relevant for describing the political 
settlement. First, the productive capabilities of the economic organizations matters. 
Productive capabilities are based on technical and organizational capabilities and 
describe the competitiveness of the economic organizations in question. Secondly, 
the political power of the economic organizations in bargaining with the policy-
making leadership of the ruling coalition matters in determining the outcomes of 
rent seeking negotiations. Productive capabilities depend on the historical processes 
of accumulation, learning and capability development that have already taken place. 
Political power depends on the effective holding power of economic organizations 
relative to the leadership of the ruling coalition and this depends on the economic 
power of these organizations and their rent-sharing networks with political 
organizations within or outside the ruling coalition (M. H. Khan 2010b).  
Once again, these two dimensions define four possible ideal-type combinations that 
can help to structure the discussion of real cases which are likely to have combined 
characteristics. This first scenario is one where economic organizations combine high 
productive capabilities with powerful political networks. In this case the high 
capability organizations are likely to have already achieved competitiveness but their 
rent seeking can have damaging outcomes. The difficulty of political disciplining in 
this case could lead to the emergence of monopolies or monopolistic overpricing in 
government contracts. A second scenario is a combination of low to moderate 
productive capabilities with powerful political networks. These organizations are less 
likely to have achieved competitiveness but supportive learning strategies are likely 
to fail because of difficulties in enforcing conditions on rents. This combination is 
more problematic from a developmental perspective compared to the first one.  
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A third scenario is a combination of high productive capabilities with low political 
networking power. This roughly describes the economic sector in East Asia and 
particularly South Korea in the 1960s and 1970s. Here if the political context is that 
of strong patrimonialism, East Asian industrial policy institutions can be very 
effective. But combining these economic features with a political context of weak 
patrimonialism or competitive clientelism can lead to poor support or even 
expropriation of politically weak economic organizations. This could happen if a 
ruling coalition with a limited enforcement capability or with a short time horizon 
decides to expropriate resources from profitable enterprises. The purportedly 
Communist Left Front parties in West Bengal in India did just this by transferring 
resources to their organization in the agrarian/rural sector at the expense of 
industry. This had very damaging consequences for the long-term industrial 
prospects of the state. Finally the combination of economic organizations with weak 
productive capabilities and weak political networks is potentially the most 
problematic one from a developmental perspective. Unless the ruling coalition is a 
strong patrimonial one and takes a long view in promoting productive capabilities in 
organizations that have limited immediate prospects, the likelihood is of damaging 
rent seeking  processes between the economic and political sectors (M. H. Khan 
2010b).  
The relationship between the economic and political subsystems can be complex. A 
political subsystem may support developmental institutions with one configuration 
of economic organizations but may have different incentives with a different 
economic configuration. If economic organizations have high productive capabilities 
and are on or close to the competitiveness frontier, they are likely to have strong 
internal incentives to achieve higher productivity. These may be strong enough for 
them to push for supportive policies like the protection of Schumpeterian rents or 
learning rents for their expansion into new areas. The auto component sector in 
Tamil Nadu provides an example of developmental policies driven from below by 
economic organizations. But in such a context, policy-makers must have the minimal 
capabilities to enforce competition and the withdrawal of rents when they are no 
longer necessary or are failing to achieve developmental objectives. In the Indian 
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sub-continent economic organizations, particularly when they are large, have rapidly 
developed informal relationships with political organizations. These relationships 
enable firms to avoid disciplining and to access unproductive rents by cornering 
markets or achieving preferential pricing in government contracts. This was certainly 
the case in India in the 1960s when the licensing system was captured by a few large 
industrial houses but these relationships have reappeared in new forms of ‘crony 
capitalist’ links between big business houses and politicians after the 1991 
liberalization reforms (M. H. Khan 2009b).  
Finally, the bureaucratic subsystem describing the capabilities and powers of 
bureaucratic organizations is also relevant for a full description of the political 
settlement as bureaucratic organizations can play an important role in determining 
the outcomes of institutional policies. Bureaucratic organizations can have their own 
interests in the regulation and enforcement of institutional rules. The strategies they 
are likely to use depend on their own capabilities and their bargaining power relative 
to other organizations. The bargaining power of bureaucratic organizations is based 
on their organizational capabilities (including military capabilities) and their networks 
with political and economic organizations. As with political organizations, the 
configuration of bureaucratic organizations can be classified into four ideal-typical 
combinations, this time based on the horizontal and vertical distribution of power 
across bureaucratic organizations. The first variant is that of concerted bureaucratic 
authority where the lead agency (for instance a leading department like a planning 
board or the president’s office) has effective power to coordinate across agencies as 
well as sufficient command over its own lower agencies. The lead agency can then 
become the agency through which a strong ruling coalition could enforce its critical 
policies and institutions. This bureaucratic configuration is likely to reflect a strong 
patrimonial political system, and together the bureaucratic and political systems can 
ensure that hierarchical bureaucratic rules of business and formal powers of central 
enforcement are in a strong operational equilibrium.  
A second configuration of bureaucratic organizations can be described as divided 
bureaucratic authority where the lead agency is unable to fully coordinate across 
agencies even though higher levels are able to impose discipline over lower levels. In 
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some advanced countries like the US this could be the result of a deliberate 
institutional design and if the actual distribution of power across organizations also 
reflects this, the checks and balances will be in a strong operational equilibrium. 
Rule-following checks and balances can be preferred by economic interests in 
advanced countries because the required property rights already exist and checks 
and balances reduce the chances of ex-post policy changes or expropriation (Okuno-
Fujiwara 1997). In developing countries such a bureaucratic configuration is likely to 
represent weak cooperation capabilities in a context where development needs to 
be cooperative and is therefore a less developmental configuration than the first one 
(M. H. Khan 2012e).  
A third configuration is that of constrained bureaucratic authority where the lead 
agency has coordination capabilities across agencies but is unable to effectively 
discipline lower levels to make them implement and enforce institutions in the way 
in which higher levels want. The second and third configurations are likely to reflect 
a political structure which is weakly patrimonial, so that some institutions can be 
enforced but enforcement is weaker than in the first scenario. Finally the fourth 
scenario of fragmented bureaucratic authority is more problematic and is likely to 
emerge in contexts where political power is also fragmented as in competitive 
clientelism. In this configuration the leady agency can only weakly coordinate across 
agencies and has weak control over its lower levels. Here policy implementation and 
enforcement capacities of the bureaucracy are at their weakest with obvious 
implications for the enforcement of institutions.  
The study of bureaucratic organizations in relation to the other two sub systems in a 
political settlement is a departure from conventional analyses of bureaucracies that 
have generally focussed on the presence or absence of the Weberian ideal defined 
as a meritocratic, rule following bureaucracy (Weber 1968). The idea was that 
bureaucratic postings based on merit rather than kinship or personal networks 
produced a professional organization where individual incentive structures would be 
aligned with enforcement of rules, and these in turn would support capitalist 
economic growth. However the literature from new political economy and public 
choice theory argued that bureaucrats could be self-seeking as well and in this 
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context state involvement in the economy that created opportunities for 
bureaucratic enrichment could have negative effects (Niskanen 1973) (Krueger 1974; 
Buchanan, et al. 1980). On the other hand, the role of Japan’s MITI had been 
highlighted as early as 1982 (Johnson 1982). Heterodox economists like Amsden and 
Wade produced seminal work on South Korea and Taiwan respectively showing how 
their states were able to discipline capitalists while providing learning rents for 
capability development (Amsden 1989; Wade 1990). In its East Asian Miracle report 
of 1993 the World Bank also recognized in a more diluted form the role of the state 
and of effective bureaucratic interventions in the success of countries like South 
Korea and Taiwan (World Bank 1993).  
Paradoxically the World Bank’s 1993 report was not the prelude to a deeper 
investigation of the bureaucratic capabilities that needed to be developed to support 
developmental interventions in different contexts. Rather, it strengthened the 
perception that most developing countries should not attempt these difficult 
interventions that require control over the rent seeking  process (Knack and Keefer 
1995; Mauro 1995; Easterly and Levine 1997). This strengthened the mainstream 
policy agenda of supporting the development of Weberian good governance in 
developing countries, defined as rule-following non-corrupt bureaucracies. Later 
work by Evans argued that developmental bureaucracies not only had to have 
‘Weberian’ characteristics but also ‘embedded autonomy’ so that they could 
function independently enough to discipline capitalists who were misusing rents but 
were at the same time sufficiently networked with economic organizations to 
identify the needs of capitalists (Rauch and Evans 2000; M. H. Khan 2012b). From the 
perspective of our preceding analysis, the goal of attempting to create truly 
Weberian bureaucracies in developing countries is actually unachievable. What 
Evans meant by Weberian was effectiveness in enforcing some institutions. The East 
Asian states were effective in this sense but in a general sense they were not 
Weberian because not all rules and rights were equally enforced in an impersonal 
way. Amsden and Wade’s work highlighted the importance of what we identify as 
the implementation capacity of political organizations in South Korea and Taiwan 
that ensured their bureaucracies had the incentive and capability to enforce 
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particular institutions. From the perspective of the political settlements analysis, the 
institutions the East Asian countries enforced could not be replicated in other 
countries where major aspects of the political settlements were different. Rather, 
the question should have been to identify the institutions and governance 
capabilities that would be feasible to develop in different contexts to support 
developmental rent management.  
 
3.3.1 Micro Institutional Analysis and the Growth-Stability Trade-off  
The operational equilibrium of potentially developmental institutions may depend 
on characteristics of one or more of the subsystems discussed above. The macro-
level configuration of organizational power in a society provides the background for 
assessing the likely operational equilibrium of particular institutions given these 
characteristics of the political settlement. The configuration of organizational power 
could allow or prevent the enforcement of the institution in ways that have desirable 
outcomes or otherwise. The discussion in the last section also suggests that the 
configuration of power across political, economic and bureaucratic organizations 
may be relevant for understanding the operational equilibrium of particular 
institutions. For instance two countries may have similar political organizations but 
differences in their economic organizations may result in different incentives and 
compulsions for political organizations and therefore different operational equilibria 
for similar institutions. Similar institutions and policies may therefore still result in 
different outcomes. Most conventional institutional analysis misses this complexity  
(M. H. Khan 2012f).  
The results of a micro analysis of institutions identifying the likelihood of effective 
(developmental) implementation can be summarized in the form of a notional 
growth-stability trade-off facing the institution. Incremental improvements in the 
enforcement of a potentially developmental institution can result in greater 
opposition and resistance if the distribution of incomes associated with better 
enforcement goes against the interests of powerful organizations. The implementing 
agencies then have a choice in terms of how much conflict and instability costs they 
are willing to absorb. Improved enforcement is possible at a cost, but depending on 
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the nature of the political settlement, the trade-off may be very steep, and sufficient 
enforcement may not be feasible in terms of political viability. The other alternative 
is that the formal institution is modified in such a way that even though the 
institution exists in theory, its implementation is substantially different in practice. In 
this case the developmental outcome is poor because the implementation of more 
effective enforcement is not pushed, and this too is likely if the institution faces a 
steep growth-stability trade-off. There can be many variations in the sequence of 
developments. The forced enforcement of an institution that is resisted can of 
course also result in the resistance collapsing as conflict reveals that the holding 
power of opposing organizations was actually not that high (M. H. Khan 2010b).  
How successful a ruling coalition will be in effectively implementing growth-
enhancing institutions thus depends on several critical factors. First, the incentives 
and compulsions of the policy-makers themselves are critical. The characteristics of 
political and bureaucratic organizations can help us understand their time horizons 
and limitations. In the most problematic cases, the ruling coalition may not even 
propose potentially developmental institutional changes because it lacks the 
appropriate incentives. In these cases, a consideration of the growth-stability trade-
off is a notional exercise. Secondly, the levels of resistance a ruling coalition faces 
can depend on how well-organized and networked the potential losers are. Losers 
are not necessarily defined in terms of absolute losses. Individuals and organizations 
can resist institutional changes that change the relative distribution of benefits if 
these threaten to change the distribution of power in society. This is because 
organizations rightly understand that a change in the distribution of power can have 
multiplier effects on future institutional changes that could be to their disadvantage. 
In other words both the institutions that emerge and the growth-stability trade-off 
that particular institutions face will depend on the current political settlement. This 
trade-off will be different for different countries as their political settlements differ. 
This framework crucially helps to explain why institutions evolve differently and 
work differently in different contexts.  
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Figure 3.3 . Political settlements and trade-off curves 
 
Source: (M. H. Khan 2010b: Figure 11)  
 
The vertical axis in Figure 3.2 ordinally ranks the political costs associated with 
enforcing an institution in different ways and to different extents. The horizontal axis 
measures economic outcomes (growth is a shorthand for the economic outcome) 
associated with different levels of enforcement of the institution in question. The 
growth-stability trade-off curve captures the insight that a formal institution can be 
enforced and implemented in different ways as a result of informal modifications or 
partial enforcement. If the institution is potentially developmental, better 
enforcement of all the conditions required for developmental outcomes will improve 
‘growth’ but may be associated with increasing resistance and therefore worse 
‘stability’. The shape and position of the trade-off will depend both on the 
specification of all dimensions of the macro-political settlement and the specific 
institution that is in question. The critical limit on the political cost that the ruling 
coalition can accept is defined by the minimum sustainable level of stability. It is 
unlikely that a ruling coalition will force enforcement beyond this point, but it may 
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stop well short of this unless it has strong incentives and compulsions to push 
economic development. The minimum sustainable rate of economic development in 
the diagram is the level below which the normal reproduction of the system is likely 
to be affected. Political settlements face a crisis when political conditions prevent 
the achievement of the minimum economic requirements for reproduction (as in the 
curve PS3 in the figure). 
For any particular proposed institutional change, a change in the macro-political 
settlement (which is an exogenous variable at this level of analysis) can result in a 
shift in the level of the PS curve. For instance, if the groups politically resisting the 
institution get stronger, the curve rises, and vice versa. Secondly, given the political 
settlement, if the configuration of organizational power results in strong resistance 
to the better enforcement of a particular institution its trade-off curve is steep and 
vice versa. This conceptual relationship is a useful way of thinking about the 
operational equilibrium that particular institutions are likely to actually achieve in 
different contexts. For instance the better definition and enforcement of property 
rights in land markets in developing countries can face significant resistance from the 
land mafia if these institutional changes reduce their ability to gain informal rents by 
informally enforcing contested property rights. The mafia could operate through 
political parties, sharing some of the rents with powerful organizers within political 
parties who need access to these rents to reproduce their own political power. In 
these contexts, the potential resistance could be serious enough to imply a very 
steep and relatively high growth-stability trade-off curve forcing institutional 
changes in the land market. Thus, unexpected but powerful coalitions may be 
mobilized to block or informally modify the implementation of institutional changes 
that could in principle have developmental outcomes.  
One of the objectives of this thesis is to identify the relevant characteristics of the 
political settlements in our three case studies of Gujarat, Tamil Nadu and Pakistan. In 
each case, the organizational structure relevant for understanding aspects of 
industrial and economic policies are identified and analysed. We argue that the 
political settlement in Gujarat has characteristics of authoritarian clientelism, based 
on a relatively homogeneous ruling coalition constructed in ideological terms and 
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using a variety of strategies to keep opposition organizations weak. In Tamil Nadu 
the political settlement is more straightforwardly a competitive clientelist one, and 
yet it has characteristics that allow quite significant developmental outcomes. In 
Pakistan the political settlement has evolved in the direction of a very fragmented 
competitive clientelism but the organizational capacity of the army means that there 
are occasional revivals of vulnerable patrimonialism when the army takes over. 
Democracy as an institution is more contested. Yet further moves back to vulnerable 
patrimonialism under military rule may no longer be sustainable as excluded 
organizations both formal (political parties) and informal (like Islamist organizations) 
have growing holding power and their forcible exclusion implies unacceptable levels 
of repression and violence. A second objective is to demonstrate how this macro 
picture helps to provide a richer understanding of the evolution and enforcement of 
particular institutional strategies in these different contexts.  
 
3.4 Methodology 
The case studies in this dissertation were selected for their intrinsic interest in 
elaborating the application of the political settlement framework. The cases selected 
were the states of Gujarat and Tamil Nadu in India and the state of Pakistan. As the 
political settlement framework can operate at both the national and sub-national 
levels, provided the appropriate distribution of organizational power and institutions 
are identified, the selection of national and sub-national states as subjects of a single 
study is not necessarily a problem. Our aim is not to explain the relative performance 
of these entities but rather to analyse aspects of relative performance using the 
political settlements framework. An explanation of the relative performance of 
Gujarat and Tamil Nadu would require an examination of their economies as a whole 
and their interaction with the national economy. The relative performance of 
Pakistan as a whole is not strictly comparable as it is a country with its own national 
policies. The thesis should therefore not be read as an exercise in explaining relative 
performance as a whole. Rather our aim is to look at the relative performance of 
particular sectors and policies, using the analytical framework of political 
settlements to provide analytical insights and explanations.  
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Gujarat is interesting from an institutional perspective because it is a high growth 
state in India with institutional features different from other states. It has induced 
observers to claim either that it is closer to ‘good governance’ than other Indian 
states or even that is a ‘developmental state’ within India. The political settlements 
approach classifies Gujarat quite differently as a type of authoritarian clientelism and 
argues that this can explain many of its developmental features but also its 
limitations as a model. Tamil Nadu and Pakistan both have features of competitive 
clientelism: high levels of political fragmentation and contestation and high levels of 
political corruption. But while Tamil Nadu is a high growth and industrializing state in 
India, Pakistan suffers from poor capability development in industry and growing 
levels of violence. Again, the political settlement framework can explain some of 
these features through a more granular analysis of the configuration of 
organizational power in these two.  
Our hypothesis is that standard institutional theory focusing on the enforcement of 
market institutions and liberalization is inadequate for explaining the variety of 
development outcomes seen in South Asia. Tamil Nadu and Gujarat are high growth 
states that in different ways fail to match the explanatory variables identified in 
these models. Pakistan attempted liberalization and good governance reforms with 
much more zeal than its Indian counterpart and achieved much poorer results. In 
Pakistan's case we chose to study the country as a whole rather than a particular 
province like Punjab or Sindh because no province performed significantly better. 
The adverse effects of liberalization in Pakistan affected the whole country, as does 
the growing problem of political violence.  
In engaging in this analysis, clearly the relevant institutions and organizations are 
different depending on whether we are looking at national or sub-national systems. 
However, at a very general level, in each case we look at how the ruling coalition is 
put together in each polity and the relative strength of included and excluded 
organizations. This is a historical analysis to a large extent and so part of the analysis 
goes into economic, political and social history. In the case of Pakistan the 
background history is particularly important for understanding some of its 
contemporary challenges, and the historical section is appropriately longer. We then 
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analyse the rent creation and rent management strategies that the ruling coalition(s) 
implemented to stay in power. Using this framework we show that we are able to 
explain the emergence of particular institutions and the degree of modification or 
enforcement of these institutions that help to explain important features of 
economic development and political stability. To limit the scope of the analysis to 
manageable proportions we focus on the industrial sector and look at issue of 
industrial competitiveness and capability development, but other related 
institutional issues are also covered when required. The aim is not to provide a 
comprehensive analysis of each economy along all sectoral dimensions but primarily 
to demonstrate that important aspects of institutional performance can be usefully 
analysed using the political settlements approach.  
The identification of characteristics of the macro-political settlement was partly 
based on a reading of historical and contemporary sources on the evolution of 
organizational power and political strategies in these localities. However, this was 
also complemented with interviews and discussions with a broad range of individuals 
in business, politics, the bureaucracy, the media and in academia. As our hypotheses 
about particular configurations of power in a locality evolved they were repeatedly 
tested by asking different types of organizational representatives and through this 
process, the hypotheses were progressively refined. The selection of critical and 
knowledgeable respondents was therefore important and here the extensive 
experience of the author as a business journalist in South Asia was very useful. A 
broad range of valuable contacts were used to identify critical individuals to 
interview based on a range of organizational perspectives and interests. 
The case study method is therefore the core methodology of research in this 
dissertation, providing a range of qualitative data that was used to evaluate the 
outcomes of formal institutional structures in our case studies. As Odell says, case 
studies are the relevant method where the researcher wants to ‘refine received 
theory’, document a process and allow for a stronger empirical grounding for a 
hypothesis for the cases considered (Odell 2001; M. H. Khan 2012f) .  
The case study method allows us to provide a ‘thick narrative’ that is required for 
context-specific analysis. In Gujarat and Tamil Nadu the author conducted field work 
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trips. In the case of Pakistan, political uncertainties during the fieldwork window of 
this research and the Indian passport of the author meant that information had to be 
indirectly collated from secondary literature and extensive telephone interviews. The 
most important of our interviewees are listed in an appendix. Some of our 
respondents either are or have been senior members of the bureaucracy at both 
state and national levels. Others were corporate leaders or owners of large business 
interests across both the states. Significantly we were also able to speak to members 
of political parties who were candid enough to provide insights into the informal 
workings of the formal institutions of the state. Finally we also accessed members of 
the local media who are often the best sources of information. They often possess 
useful information that is too sensitive for them to directly use but in many cases 
they were willing to share insights and information with the author.  
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Chapter 4 . The Growth Debates in India and 
Pakistan: Liberalization versus Capability 
Development 
 
 Introduction 
The ‘liberalization’ reforms that both Pakistan and India implemented in the 1990s 
were extremely important for both the economies. The period we examine in the 
thesis is from 1980 to around 2010 and beyond when much of the economic policy 
in both countries was reset according to a liberalization agenda. Putting its state 
planning days behind and opting for free market reforms has often been the reason 
put forward by many economists as the reason for India’s growth acceleration from 
the 1980s and especially since 1992. While the thesis does not directly address the 
process of liberalization this chapter briefly outlines the debates for and against 
liberalization and concludes with an analysis of how liberalization affected the 
capitalist transformation of the Indian and Pakistani economies. In India states 
gained greater powers of economic decision making, a departure from the days of 
central planning when economic development was guided by the centre. For 
economists studying India an analysis of the processes of accumulation within states 
became even more necessary in order to understand the processes of economic 
growth in India. Our case study states of Tamil Nadu and Gujarat demonstrate how 
ruling coalitions used the rent creation opportunities provided by liberalization to 
affect growth outcomes in their states in complex ways. Since liberalization usually 
implies significant institutional changes, our framework of political settlements is 
useful for analysing the implementation of liberalization in both Pakistan and India. 
According to the framework any significant institutional change requires a 
commensurate capability to enforce these changes. If the underlying distribution of 
organizational power does not support aspects of liberalization, these institutional 
changes are likely to be blocked or more likely, modified. This is the reason why the 
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implications of liberalization reforms have been different in different parts of India, 
and between India and Pakistan. This is also one reason why we contend that the 
analysis and explanation of the Indian growth acceleration has to move beyond the 
identification of liberalization as a policy to a more detailed understanding of 
regionally specific strategies and policy implementation. A review of the debates 
around liberalization will allow us to locate these observations more effectively. 
This chapter is divided into six sections. The first section sums up key literature that 
argues India’s growth post the 1990s was driven by liberalization. Section 4.2 
provides arguments that explain India’s growth through the quality of its institutions. 
Section 4.3 considers political economy explanations. Section 4.4 considers if India’s 
growth has been service sector led. Section 4.5 outlines that India’s growth is 
essentially due to capability development in the years before liberalization. Section 
4.6 considers debates about rent seeking in contemporary India. The final section 4.7 
outlines a framework of ‘reversible patron-client’ relationships which reflect the 
changing configuration power between political and economic organizations in India.  
 
4.1. The Market reforms of 1992  
We define liberalization in the conventional way as an opening of markets with 
lower trade barriers and easier access to markets for new actors in the private sector. 
Economists in both India and Pakistan have advocated a liberalization of markets in 
this sense in order for economic growth to gather momentum or to be sustained 
(Amsden 2001; Srinivasan and Tendulkar 2003; Panagariya 2005; R. Rajan 2006; M. H. 
Khan 2011b; Lal 2011; World Bank 2012b; J. Bhagwati and Panagariya 2013). This 
stems from liberal economic theory that contends that free markets not only allow 
efficient allocation of resources but in developing countries allow global capital to 
flow to these economies. Developing countries potentially provide foreign investors 
with higher returns and foreign capital inflows provide developing economies with 
access to capital and technology. Apart from liberalization the policy corollary is that 
property rights in general, but particularly of foreign investors should be protected, 
and once this is assured convergence in growth rates is likely to take place. 
Liberalization reforms were often also backed by Structural Adjustment Programmes 
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(SAP) advocated by the IMF for developing countries on the verge of bankruptcy. 
Here liberalization was about cutting back budget deficits not just to avoid payments 
crisis, but also to prevent a crowding out of private investment as a result of high 
interest rates. SAPs were part of the neo liberal development prescription of the 
‘Washington Consensus’ a term coined by John Williamson (J. Williamson 1990) that 
included measures like fiscal discipline, flexible exchange rates, ensuring security of 
property rights, trade liberalization and privatization as its major set of policy 
agendas. Financial aid was provided to the country under consideration as long as it 
adhered to the Washington Consensus prescriptions. In both countries, liberalization 
had pockets of local support, particularly from groups left out of the rent allocation 
systems of the existing institutional structure. But even a partial execution of 
liberalization took external shocks that enabled ruling elites to push through reforms 
(Jenkins 2000).  
Pakistan’s liberalization programme was more obviously driven by SAPs, the first of 
which were implemented in 1987-88, though a privatization programme to reverse 
some of Bhutto’s nationalizations of the 1970s had begun much earlier. It was 
however the second series of reforms initiated in 1994 that had more stringent 
conditionalities on public spending. Many Pakistani economists have attributed a rise 
in inequality in the country and a fall in its social sector spending directly to the SAPs 
and the conditionalities of macroeconomic stability attached to them (Anwar 1996; 
Pasha, et al. 2002; Gera 2007; Husain 2010; Lieven 2011). More details on the 
consequence are analysed in the chapter on Pakistan. India’s liberalization was 
forced when it faced a balance of payments crisis in 1991 with foreign exchange left 
for only two weeks’ worth of payments. The country pledged its gold reserves in 
return for an IMF bailout and though it did not have conditionalities imposed on it 
the central government of the time, by then a different one from the one that 
pledged the gold, decided to open up the Indian economy for both domestic and 
foreign investors in 1992. However, long before then, the institutions and 
instruments of planning like the licensing system had ceased to be effective even 
though formal tariff barriers were still high (M. H. Khan 2008b, 2009b). This was even 
truer in the case of Pakistan where the formal instruments of planning had not been 
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effective since the 1960s. However, in India liberalization was associated with a 
transition to its ‘emerging market’ story while in Pakistan it was associated with 
declining economic performance. But as Figure 4.1 shows while India’s growth was 
robust till 2007, its growth thereafter has been slipping. The question is whether 
India’s three decades of growth since around 1980 was based on capabilities that 
had been developed by specific capability development strategies that have gradual 
unwound. Sections 4.7 and 4.8 examine these questions in greater detail. 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Annual GDP growth rates India 
 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank 2013 
 
The liberal economic analysis of India’s growth take-off in the 1990s is unequivocal 
about the role of liberalization. At least till the late 1990s the World Bank was also 
one of the chief cheerleaders of India’s reforms process (Corbridge and Harris 2000). 
However, the detailed mechanisms through which liberalization was supposed to 
have raised growth are often not clearly identified. A few more sophisticated liberal 
arguments have made the case for a ‘creeping’ liberalization before the ‘big bang’ 
GDP Growth rates 
Year 
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reforms of 1991. These included arguments claiming that overinvestment in higher 
education in the previous planned economy period allowed the development of the 
information technology sector and of skill-intensive manufacturing once some of the 
controls on foreign capital and technology inflows were removed (Basu 2003; 
Veermani and Goldar 2005; Kochchar, et al. 2006). Most of these explanations 
ultimately identified greater capital inflows as an important gain of liberalization. 
However, the efficacy of these capital and technology inflows depended on some 
pre-existing technological capabilities, and this was indeed recognized in the more 
nuanced analyses.  
 
Much of the mainstream literature was however concerned with establishing the 
further liberalization that still needs to happen. One of the major remaining 
constraints identified by this school of thought is India’s rigid labour laws which it is 
argued prevents industry from hiring workers in large numbers as it is difficult to 
dismiss them if they are no longer required (Besley and Burgess 2004; Panagariya 
2005; R. Rajan 2006). As a result, one problem of Indian industry was and is that it is 
excessively skill intensive. This is because (it was argued) it was easier to fire skilled 
workers compared to unskilled workers and hence labour intensive manufacturing 
suffered (Kochchar, et al. 2006; R. Rajan 2006). Besley and Burgess provided indirect 
support for the argument by econometrically linking state level performance in 
manufacturing to greater state support for pro-business labour market legislation 
(Besley and Burgess 2004). The policy implication for this was that more labour and 
capital market reforms were necessary to keep the growth process from flagging. 
However there is little evidence that it is easier to fire skilled workers than unskilled 
workers in India. Equally most units in India’s organized manufacturing sector have 
been able to circumvent labour laws by hiring workers on a contractual basis and 
many of them flout formal labour laws as redress through the courts is expensive 
and time consuming. At best, further liberalization of the labour markets may add 
some dynamism to India’s manufacturing growth but it is hard to argue that these 
laws are holding back India’s investors to a very significant degree (Bhattacharjea 
2006). Finally, the argument of Besley and Burgess is also weak because passing (or 
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not passing) formal pro-business legislation does not necessarily translate into actual 
labour market flexibility. 
 
4.2 India’s ‘Superior’ Institutions and Growth 
Another explanation for India’s better growth outcomes following liberalization 
comes from the work of institutional economists like Rodrik and Subramanian (R&S), 
and Acemoglu Johnson and Robinson (AJR). AJR had argued in their articles on 
colonial roots (Acemoglu, et al. 2001, 2002) that countries like India, the regions of 
Meso America and South East Asia were richer than the developed countries of 
today in the pre colonial history. However the extractive institutions set up by 
colonisers in these countries (called non-settler colonies because the Europeans 
could not settle here due to disease, environments or population density) impeded 
their transition to higher productivity economies. In settler colonies like America or 
Australia on the other hand the colonisers settled the land and created secure and 
inclusive property rights. Hence in AJR’s case the stress is on inclusive economic 
institutions supported by inclusive political institutions which create conditions for 
long run growth. Of course the key feature of their analysis missed by many is that 
the emergence of inclusive institutions in their framework did not itself happen 
through inclusive institutions but required the systematic extermination of 
indigenous population in both America and Australia (M. H. Khan 2009a, 2012c). 
Viewed this way the institutional history of the transition in settler colonies is 
certainly as disruptive of property rights and more violent than the disruptions of 
property rights that happened in the non-settler colonies. Despite the weakness of 
the argument in terms of identifying the institutions required to manage transitions, 
the claim that ‘inclusive institutions’ are important for growth strengthened the 
already existing ‘good governance’ ideas about the importance of stable property 
rights and accountable political institutions for ensuring sustainable growth. 
 Rodrik and Subramanian build on the assumption that there is an agreed set of 
institutional problems that need to be resolved to ensure growth. The core 
argument of R&S’ influential paper in 2005 comes from Dani Rodrik’s own work on 
institutional economics that suggests that economic growth does not necessarily 
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require a formal protection of property rights but it does require ‘effective’ 
protection of the rights of private investors to create the right incentives for 
investment and economic activity (Rodrik, et al. 2004). This is further elaborated in 
Rodrik’s other work on ‘binding constraints’, ‘ growth diagnostics’, and ‘second-best 
institutions’ all of which point to the fact that developing countries should not 
emulate institutional policies of the developed world and instead evolve policies that 
solve the core institutional problems in ways that reflect their realities (Rodrik 2004; 
Rodrik, et al. 2004; Rodrik 2008). Aspects of Rodrik’s argument are compatible with 
our own because he is effectively saying that many formal institutions may not be 
enforceable in developing countries and it is better to attempt alternative solutions 
where the combination of the formal with informal enforcement still yields 
developmental outcomes. Our difference with Rodrik is that the most relevant 
institutional problems in developing countries may not just be the protection of 
already existing investors. It may be to create new entrepreneurs and capabilities 
and the transformation of property rights to support new patterns of resource use. 
The transition therefore requires institutional solutions that are much more 
extensive and quite different from the protection of investors. These aspects of the 
developmental transformation are downplayed in Rodrik’s analysis. 
Using their analytical framework, R&S point out that India’s growth rates actually 
started creeping up in the 1980s and since liberalization began in the 1990s the 
growth takeoff could not be attributed to liberalization. Instead they argue that the 
trigger for the takeoff was the pro-business ‘attitudinal shift’ on the part of the Indira 
and Rajiv Gandhi governments of the 1980s that created investor confidence that 
their rights would be much better protected in India. According to R&S India’s 
institutional scores (formal institutions supporting property rights and government 
accountability) were already quite high for its level of per capita income. The shift in 
government attitude created the confidence that the institutions would work better 
and led to higher growth. Before the shift investors had less confidence in 
government intentions and therefore (in our language) in the likely operational 
equilibrium of the formal institutions. But with the signalling that came with 
repeated political statements in favour of the private sector, animal spirits were 
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released and growth rates accelerated (Rodrik and Subramanian 2005). De Long has 
also attributed the growth acceleration to similar shifts in entrepreneurial attitude 
due to policy signals though he locates the shift in 1985, later than in the R&S 
analysis (De Long 2003).  
There are several problems with this argument, even though these authors correctly 
identify that liberalization cannot be a full explanation of the growth takeoff simply 
because of the timing of the growth acceleration relative to the formal policy and 
institutional changes. Firstly a lot seems to hinge on the claim that pro-business 
statements are sufficient to change the behaviour of investors given existing formal 
institutions even though these are not properly enforced. The assumption is that the 
pro-business statements effectively result in better enforcement of the formal 
institutions but this does not necessarily have to be the case. Secondly the argument 
is subject to reverse causality where government attitude is not the independent 
variable but may itself be influenced by business groups lobbying for these changes. 
Media accounts of that period suggest that some business houses with high and 
underused capabilities were lobbying the government for greater openness while 
those who had ‘invested’ in closer relationships with the Congress in the hope of 
continuing rents from licences were opposed to deregulation (for instance the Rahul 
Bajaj owned Bajaj Group, the Thapars, and the Mafatlals in the latter case and the 
Tata Group and a slew of IT companies including Infosys in the former). Most 
importantly, what is missing in this account is a discussion of the different types of 
informal processes through which the existing formal institutional structure began to 
be used in the 1980s in the context of a changing political environment, long before 
the limited formal liberalization began in the 1990s.  
 
4.3 Political Economy Explanations  
Apart from the explanations related to institutional change we look at four 
significant political economy explanations for the growth takeoff in this period 
(Jenkins 2000; Chibber 2003; Sinha 2005; Kohli 2006a). Sinha’s main thesis is that 
development in India has to be looked at from the point of view of both the centre 
and the regional players. Growth or stagnation were a result of the interface of the 
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two and cannot be explained only with reference to the statist or free market 
policies of the central government. This was one of the first academic works that 
looked at the processes of accumulation discretely within Indian states in 
conjunction with an analysis of how political and business elites of these states 
negotiated policy with the centre. The ability to do this successfully after 
liberalization helped some states (Gujarat and Maharashtra for instance) to develop 
‘strategic capacities’ (Sinha 2005). However Sinha emphasises an appropriate culture 
and ideology as the critical drivers of industrialisation strategies, or the lack of in the 
case of West Bengal. Her analysis of the concept of the developmental 
transformation of countries is also weak. She holds up Gujarat as a model of a 
developmental state but when compared to other case studies in the literature on 
such states Gujarat would not be considered as a developmental state along the 
lines of South Korea or Taiwan or even Malaysia. This is discussed in greater detail in 
the chapter on Gujarat.  
Rob Jenkins provides a political analysis of how liberalization was implemented in a 
context of a political system characterized by patronage. According to his thesis 
India’s more astute politicians pushed through these reforms because they realized 
the potential of liberalization as an alternative to the patronage regime that was part 
of the by then defunct central planning model. This led growth to be fast paced but it 
also meant that liberalization was not achieved by the sort of democracy promoted 
by the good governance agenda (Jenkins 2000). Jenkins’ argument is insightful in 
reminding us that Indian democracy is far removed from the accountability or 
inclusion that is promoted in the good governance framework or in Acemoglu and 
Robinson’s analysis of inclusive institutions. However, Jenkins still assumes that the 
institutional structure of liberalization when it was introduced operated as the 
formal institutional structure defined. In terms of his analysis of India’s political 
economy we would expect even liberal institutions to operate in a different way, and 
this leads to the question of how these institutions operated in practice in different 
parts of India.  
Two other political economy explanations are significant for our analysis. While 
Vivek Chibber’s analysis focuses on why India’ experiences with industrial planning 
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failed and is not specifically about India’s growth takeoff one of his key insights is 
that India lacked the ‘state capacity’ to implement planning. According to him South 
Korea under Chung Hee Park possessed this capacity. State capacity is itself 
decomposed in Chibber’s analysis into a ‘state’s cohesiveness as a strategic actor’ 
and its ‘ability to extract performance from private firms’. Chibber’s conclusion is 
that the Indian state was found wanting on both these counts (Chibber 2003). 
Chibber does not employ the lens of a distribution of power between organizations 
but his analysis of state capacity as enforcement capability is an area of overlap with 
our framework of political settlements. Chibber ascribes the ability of the Korean 
state to impose discipline on firms to its policy of export-led industrialization (ELI). 
According to Chibber the cohesive Korean state was able to discipline its capitalists 
because they willingly submitted to disciplining as a result of ELI. The necessity of 
achieving competitiveness in the export market provided a compulsion for South 
Korean manufacturers to upgrade their quality and technology and collectively they 
had no incentive to tolerate poor quality in other firms that may adversely affect 
their own competitiveness through poor quality inputs. This support from capitalists 
collectively allowed the state to impose discipline on individual firms which would 
allow them to manufacture in line with global standards. An immediate problem 
with this explanation is that it is not clear how the claim that there was a collective 
capitalist interest in supporting the disciplining of inefficient capitalists translated 
into empowering the South Korean state to carry out this disciplining.  
India on the other hand adopted import substituting industrialization (ISI) and this 
ensured Indian capitalists had no compulsion to collectively support the disciplining 
of individual firms. Chibber’s argument is that this was because they were each 
manufacturing for a protected domestic market and quality did not matter. Chibber 
is right to argue that the Indian state lacked the power to impose discipline on 
India’s capitalist firms. The question is whether Chibber correctly identifies the 
source of this failure. While it is true that subsidized Indian capitalists resisted 
disciplining, it was not the case that the state lacked the ability to discipline them 
because other capitalists did not support their disciplining. Rather, the state failed to 
discipline individual capitalists because they were able to construct their own 
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coalitions with powerful political organizations within the Indian capitalist system. 
This difference is critical. Political economy explanations especially from Bardhan 
(1988) and Khan (2010b) identify the construction of coalitions between business 
and the state, or to use Khan’s terminology, between business and members and 
sub-organizations of the ruling coalition. The critique becomes stronger when we 
look at Pakistan. Khan points out that Pakistan also attempted ELI policies and was 
once considered to be a country with an economic potential greater than that of 
South Korea. It also grew rapidly during Ayub Khan’s military regime with a growth 
rate of over 6 per cent from 1960 to 1970. Yet Pakistan’s ELI strategy did not result in 
successful disciplining and the business-government coalitions that blocked 
disciplining within its industrial policy were very similar to those in India. As in India 
individual firms were able to form coalitions with individuals and organizations 
within the Ayub Khan administration to protect their rents and this destroyed the 
compulsions to raise competitiveness (M. H. Khan 1999).  
Atul Kohli’s arguments also highlight the importance of attitudinal shifts but unlike 
R&S he contends that pro-business policies were also important and some were 
actually implemented especially by the Rajiv Gandhi government (Kohli 2006a). Kohli 
identifies the easing of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practice (MRTP) Act 
and some tax restrictions along with the liberalization of lending norms affecting 
large businesses as evidence of a pro-business shift. According to him this period was 
also marked by a move towards labour repression and increased public spending. 
Kohli identifies this as the beginning of a ‘developmental state’ in India and that 
these changes were responsible for India’s increased growth rates in the 1980s.  
However as we discuss in greater detail in Chapter Five on Gujarat, pro-business 
policies defined in this general way do not necessarily lead to the emergence of a 
developmental state as such policies could simply grant business organizations rents 
without achieving developmental outcomes. There is evidence from post-
liberalization India that pro-business policies of this type in a context of weakened 
regulatory capacities has increased damaging rent seeking and created many 
damaging rents (Walton 2008; Bardhan 2009; M. H. Khan 2011b). Kohli’s analysis of 
India has its origin in his analysis of the role of South Korea’s colonial heritage in the 
111 
 
construction of its developmental state. Kohli argues that Japanese colonization 
destroyed South Korea’s older elite classes and this helped the independent South 
Korean state to enforce discipline without contestation from pre-existing elites and 
this helped the construction of a developmental state. Parts of this analysis of 
colonial history are consistent with our analysis of the impact of colonization on the 
evolution of the political settlement in South Asia which we referred to in Chapter 
Two. British social engineering in India, in contrast to the South Korean experience, 
created new groups and classes which were provided with rents and patronage in 
return for providing organizational support for British rule. The Indian and Pakistani 
states inherited this legacy and had to face successive mobilizations by new groups 
claiming rents and political inclusion, eventually giving rise to competitive clientelism.  
A significant critique of Kohli, De Long and R&S has come from Kunal Sen whose 
empirical work finds that any attitudinal shift was ‘second order’ in terms of 
importance and in fact there were direct changes in economic policies that affected 
growth. Sen also locates the date of the growth acceleration from the mid 1970s, far 
before the conventional political economy explanations (Sen 2007). In his paper he 
adjusts for the year 1979, an outlier year when the second oil shock and a severe 
drought dragged GDP growth down to -5.2 per cent. Excluding 1979, he identifies 
that the proximate cause for the growth spurt is a growth in TFP that cannot just be 
the result of attitudinal shifts. He also argues that Mrs Gandhi’s anti-labour policies 
of the 1980s (that Kohli finds significant) were not particularly new and her 
government’s handling of the railway strike and decision not to nationalize the 
wholesale trade in wheat were equally significant anti-labour signals in the 1970s. 
Sen traces the source of the TFP growth down to three variables: financial deepening 
after the nationalization of India’s banks in 1969, a rise in public sector investments 
and a drop in the relative price of equipment. All of these variables are ‘policy 
determined’ and hence does not tie in with a mere shift in government attitudes 
causing growth.  
Sen divides India’s growth from the mid 1970s to the late 1980s into two parts: from 
the mid 1970s to the early 1980s and then from the early 1980s to the late 1980s. 
Growth till the early 1980s was primarily driven by financial deepening and increased 
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public sector investment. Growth till the late 1980s was a result of an easing of 
import controls in the mid-1980s whereby Indian manufacturers had access to 
capital and intermediate goods through the Open General Licence list. This led to a 
relative decline in the price of equipment for the manufacturing sector in India. It is 
this last factor that he submits as the reason for TFP growth in the Indian economy 
noted by Bosworth, Collins and Virmani (Bosworth, et al. 2007). The correlation 
coefficients are highest between TFP growth and private equipment investment at 
0.96 while it is -0.56 between TFP growth and public equipment investment and -
0.78 between TFP growth and investment in structures. We take Sen’s conclusion 
further in our analysis of growth in the Indian economy from the early 1980s to 2013 
(barring the last two years that have seen the economy in recession). We conclude 
with him that growth was neither due to dirigiste policies or liberalization but due to 
capability development in certain sectors of Indian manufacturing due to specific 
policies.  
Finally, we refer to a different type of explanation of India’s growth spurt in the 
1990s that focuses on agriculture as the proximate cause. Balakrishnan (2010)  
provides a sectoral analysis of the Indian economy from the 1960s to (give year) and 
his central thesis is that high agricultural growth driven by the ‘Green Revolution’ 
and higher public investment in agriculture resulted in higher service sector growth 
from the 1970s. Based on an econometric study, he argues that the growth impetus 
moved from agriculture to services and from there to industry. He supports this 
conclusion with data that suggests manufacturing suffered a deceleration from the 
mid 1960s and did not recover till the 1980s while the services sector was seeing 
growth from the 1970s. He also argues that the manufacturing sector was not 
significantly deregulated till the 1980s while the levels of regulation were much 
lower in the service sector allowing for more investment. However while one cannot 
deny that the Green Revolution did have a role to play in Indian economic growth, 
agricultural growth in India since 1965 has rarely been higher than 3 per cent and the 
industrial growth rate has always been above the agricultural growth rate (Table 4.1). 
The argument that changes in growth in a sector with low growth rates drove much 
bigger changes in growth rates in sectors with higher growth rates has to be more 
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persuasively demonstrated in terms of demand and supply links, beyond the 
sequencing of growth rate changes. For instance, the growth in services that 
Balakrishnan refers to is primarily in the hospitality, entertainment, private 
healthcare and education sectors and these were not significant sectors of spending 
for the rich farmers in northern India who were the chief beneficiaries of the Green 
Revolution.  
 
Table 4.1 India: Historical growth rates and acceleration with ‘planning’ 
 
1901-30  1931-47  1952-67  1968-81  1982-91  1992-2001  
Agriculture  0.5  0.2  1.8  3.3  3.5  2.7  
Industry  0.9  1.2  6.3  4.1  7.1  5.7  
Services  1.6  1.7  4.8  4.3  6.8  7.6  
GDP  0.8  0.8  3.4  3.8  5.6  5.6  
Per capita GDP  0.4  -0.5  1.4  1.5  3.4  3.5  
Note:  1901-47: Pre independence zero tariff regime 
            1947-80: Dirigiste planning 
            1980- : Beginning of economic reforms 
Source: (Acharya, et al. 2003: Table 2.1)  
 
 4.4 Paradigm of Service- led Growth? 
While Balakrishnan makes a statistical case that service sector accumulation and 
growth in the 1970s triggered India’s later growth in manufacturing there is also an 
analytical argument related to the liberalization process that suggests India’s growth 
acceleration in the 1990s was the result of productivity spillovers from the service 
sector. Table 4.2 shows that the share of the service sector in GDP has been growing 
rapidly, and is already higher than what is expected in a lower middle income 
country (46 per cent compared to India’s 55 per cent) and it is also higher than 
China’s share of the service sector in its GDP (46 per cent). The share of 
manufacturing in India even after liberalization was around 2.5% lower than the 
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average developing country at the same level of per capita income. The change in 
the share of services however was 10% higher than the average. This is at odds with 
the standard pattern of structural transformation where the secondary sector grows 
rapidly and the transformation process is about moving from a primarily agricultural 
economy to a manufacturing one. Kaldor’s three laws stated that manufacturing is 
the engine for GDP growth in developing countries, with the growing manufacturing 
sector absorbing labour from the labour surplus agricultural sector, that the growth 
of output in manufacturing will lead to higher productivity growth in manufacturing 
and finally that the higher productivity growth in manufacturing will have spillovers 
to other sectors, driving productivity improvements through learning effects and the 
supply of inputs and capital equipment.  
 
Table 4.2 Sectoral Shares in GDP in India 1980-2005 
 1980/81 1990/91 2000/01 2004/05 Change 1980-2005 
Agriculture  38.9 31.3 24.6 21.1 -17.8 
Industry  24.5 27.6 26.6 27.2 2.7 
Services  36.6 41.1 48.8 51.7 15.1 
Source: (Nayyar 2013: Table 2) based on the Central Statistical Organization, 
National Account Statistics   
 
This pattern is clearly not observed in India and so something else has driven 
productivity growth rather than high rates of manufacturing growth. One 
explanation could be that high value services played the role of manufacturing in 
India in driving productivity growth with spillovers to other sectors. This possibility 
goes against the persuasive arguments of Rowthorn and Wells and Baumol who 
argued that productivity is higher in most industrial sectors compared to services, 
and given the services sector’s lower productivity, more people have to be employed 
in the sector to sustain the same level of output growth (Rowthorn and Wells 1987; 
William J. Baumol, et al. 1989). Thus, the idea that high growth of output in the 
service sector can drive high productivity growth is a problematic one. Yet 
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economists like Nayyar and Dasgupta and Singh have argued that this is no longer 
true for India as high productivity service sectors like IT and communication services 
can drive growth with high productivity growth and spillovers along the lines of the 
manufacturing sector (Dasgupta and Singh 2005; Nayyar 2013). The problem with 
this view is that the main drivers of GDP growth have been sectors like the domestic 
trade sector and the share of high productivity services like software services within 
the overall service sector in India though growing is still below ten per cent. The 
software sector’s share in growth of services exports is also high (Banga and Kumar 
2011). However relatively low productivity service sub-sectors like trade and real 
estate still account for a high share of Indian GDP. The real picture of the Indian 
service sector emerges at the bottom end of the employment pyramid. This can be 
aptly described as a sink for unemployment in low value added jobs like at roadside 
food stalls, pop up stores and domestic services.  
It is true that growth in service sector employment has been slower than service 
sector output and in this respect India is an outlier in South Asia. This is because 
some of the output growth in services has come from high productivity, human-
capital intensive sectors like IT. Given the high prices of these services (because they 
are linked to export markets in developed economies) the share of services is also 
inflated in India. But this means those who do not have high formal educational 
competencies find no place in the high productivity segment of the service sector. 
The spillovers that economists expect from high productivity services are unlikely as 
India’s manufacturing sector has few high productivity firms that can benefit from 
the services provided by the high-productivity service sub-sector. Significantly we 
will see in the next section that manufacturing in developing countries often suffers 
from an initial low productivity and competitiveness problem that requires learning 
strategies. In contrast, services that rely on high human capital often do not suffer 
from a similar productivity differential in the developing country. If wages are lower 
in India for human capital of the same quality, those services will be globally 
competitive from the outside and business will relocate. The transfer can be quite 
rapid as long as unemployed high quality human capital exists, but there is not 
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necessarily the same learning by doing going on, and the transfer stops when the 
supply of underemployed high quality human capital runs out.  
 
4.5 Capability Development led Growth in Key sectors 
An alternative explanation of growth in the Indian economy from the 1980s onwards 
looks at how capabilities in a few manufacturing sectors were developed based on 
capabilities that had already been developed under the planning regime (M. H. Khan 
2009b, 2011b, 2013c, 2013b). India had already developed capabilities in sectors like 
automobiles and pharmaceuticals, but they had not achieved international 
competitiveness partly due to the limitations in disciplining mechanisms discussed 
earlier. From the 1980s onwards, Khan argues that in some of these sectors 
capabilities were developed to the point that they became globally competitive using 
very specific financing instruments that now created compulsions for high levels of 
effort in the learning-by-doing process. This is also the reason why growth in the 
Indian economy has been apparently patchy and sector specific implying that policy 
responses may also need to be sector specific. Future growth strategies will have to 
address critical market failures and appropriability problems especially with regard 
to financing high levels of learning and effort as well addressing contracting failures 
in land markets (M. H. Khan 2009b, 2011b). 
 We identify the former as the key problem hindering structural transformation in 
most developing countries. Contemporary economies in transition have to raise their 
competitiveness even faster than the former Newly Industrializing Economies (NIE) 
due to the drastically changed nature of the international political economy, 
especially with the introduction of WTO and intellectual property rights norms that 
reduce the range of instruments that can be used to acquire new technologies and 
finance learning. This has not made technology acquisition for the manufacturing 
sector any less necessary but has meant that the process has to be carefully 
strategized and managed. Essentially despite low wages developing economies do 
not have the relevant ‘organizational capabilities’ in most sectors that will allow 
them to use known technologies to produce goods competitively for the 
international market. This process of building organizational capability and achieving 
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competitiveness requires acquiring the ‘tacit knowledge’ of how to organize modern 
production, understanding technical specifications, quality control, inventory 
management and so on. These capabilities are not formal skills that can be learnt 
through formal training and require processes of learning-by-doing that in turn have 
to be financed. The ‘learning by doing’ that is required here is beyond that described 
by Arrow where productivity increases simply through a process of repeated activity 
(Arrow 1962). In the learning process through which competitiveness is achieved, 
the organization has to put in a high level of effort in experimenting with different 
organizational structures to achieve competitiveness rapidly. The compulsions that 
ensure high levels of effort in learning are difficult to contract and this is why private 
investors stay away from these investments and also why public financing needs to 
come with credible conditions for ensuring effort. Financing learning-by-doing is 
therefore both necessary and risky because it involves an unknown period of 
financial uncertainty and hence needs state sector support (M. H. Khan 2009b, 2013c, 
2013b).  
We define competitiveness in a specific way as outlined by Khan. Competitiveness is 
defined as the ratio between global prices and domestic cost of production for a 
product of a particular quality, or 
         
         
 . It is only when this index is greater than 
one that the domestic firm is competitive (Figure 4.2). If the technology is potentially 
one that the country can master, low competitiveness is usually the result of weak 
organizational capabilities. The financing of the learning-by-doing has to come with 
conditions and the credibility of enforcement for these conditions depends on the 
institutional rules, the organizations involved and the political settlement in the 
country (M. H. Khan 2009b, 2013c, 2013b). The state-led industrial policy 
instruments in India and Pakistan in the 1960s and 1970s did not perform too well 
because the firms receiving support with these institutional conditions could not be 
disciplined in that political settlement.  
Devising financial instruments appropriate for developing competitiveness is 
important because free trade by itself does not provide developing economies with 
the mechanisms for developing new capabilities. Neoclassical trade theory 
establishes that free trade allows each country to specialize according to its 
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‘comparative advantage’ but if the developing country lacks the organizational 
capabilities to be competitive even in low technology activities, it can be locked into 
a production possibility frontier that moves outwards very slowly. Creating 
comparative advantage through support for developing organizational capabilities is 
also necessary to capture the purely technological benefits of internal economies of 
scale. The claim that free trade expands the ‘consumer surplus’ or the ‘consumption 
possibility frontier’ that is propounded by many free trade theorists have also failed 
to deliver growth to countries that have liberalized trade regimes to make imports 
freer. The so-called consumer surplus from a freer trade regime is often defined as 
‘bonus ‘utility’’ and is in any case difficult to measure (Dunkley 2004) nor does 
increasing utility solve the imperatives of raising competitiveness in developing 
countries. We know that trade theory, especially those derived from the Hecksher-
Ohlin model, are replete with unrealistic assumptions that make them of limited use 
as policy guides for developing countries.  
 
With missing tacit knowledge a developing country can lack competitiveness 
even in sectors where it has a formally skilled workforce 
 
Figure 4.2 Loss financing in gaining competitiveness and learning 
Source: (M. H. Khan 2009b: Figure 1)  
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Figure 4.2 shows a situation where a developing country is not competitive in any 
but the lowest qualities of a product because of missing organizational capabilities. If 
it wants to produce higher value products of quality Qf a competitiveness gap of XY 
has to be covered by some form of loss-financing while learning-by-doing takes place. 
If high levels of effort are put into the learning process the competitiveness frontier 
curve should rise up and the country should be able to produce this product without 
any more loss-financing. Early industrial policy in India and Pakistan did create new 
capabilities (the competitiveness frontier moved up) but not by enough for most of 
the supported sectors to become globally competitive. When the formal structure of 
planning in India began to unravel in the 1970s, (long before liberalization) the 
availability of new forms of financing and support for learning in a few sectors 
allowed them to build on the capabilities they had developed in the dirigiste years 
and achieve competitiveness. Khan defines two types of strategies that emerged in 
the Indian manufacturing sector. These were ‘alpha’ and ‘beta’ strategies. In the 
former, organizations close to the competitiveness frontier in high technology 
sectors benefited from specific financing instruments to achieve global 
competitiveness. In the beta strategy organizations that have not managed to 
develop global competitiveness in the quality of products that they were initially 
attempting shift to lower quality products in which they can achieve competitiveness 
given their existing capabilities.  
One of the ironies of India’s growth under liberalization was not only that many of 
the basic capabilities in sectors like automobiles and pharmaceuticals were 
developed during the dirigiste period, but some of the financing instruments that 
were used in new ways in the 1980s to develop further capabilities were the dirigiste 
ones that later liberalization removed. For instance, the critical capabilities in 
automobiles and pharmaceuticals required policies that were not yet encumbered 
by the WTO and TRIPs and in the case of automobiles, relied on the existing market 
protection to create incentives for technology transfer. Growth in pharmaceuticals 
was based on India using a Patent Act that generated rents for domestic companies 
if they were successful in ‘reverse engineering’ processes for making known 
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molecules, a process that rapidly created new technical and organizational 
capabilities in the pharmaceutical industry. In the auto sector the state granted huge 
implicit subsidies to the Japanese auto maker Suzuki in the form of conditional 
access to the protected Indian market if it succeeded in satisfying stringent domestic 
content requirements. These incentives, provided through rules that were 
enforceable in the political settlement, compelled Suzuki to spend resources and 
effort in creating organizational capabilities in Tier 1 and Tier 2 producers that 
eventually created a world class auto industry in India (M. H. Khan 2009b, 2011b).  
The poor results with liberalization in Pakistan can also be understood in this 
framework. Liberalization is likely to produce good results if there are already sectors 
that are competitive or close to achieving competitiveness. In Pakistan’s case a 
combination of the deindustrialization of the Bhutto years, the lack of a coordinated 
industrial policy under the military governments that succeeded and then the rapid 
opening up of the economy under the liberalization of Nawaz Sharif meant that 
there were no significant new manufacturing sectors with the organizational 
capabilities to be globally competitive. Even in the Indian case the deepening of 
liberalization has meant that sectors that were not close to the competitiveness 
frontier were unable to achieve competitiveness given global price and quality 
standards. The strategy followed by the auto sector is what Khan describes as an 
alpha strategy, and these have become particularly difficult over time (M. H. Khan 
2009b). The auto and auto components sector in India today is not just India’s most 
successful manufacturing sector but is also globally competitive having become 
Asia’s ‘small car’ hub and exporting Tier 1 components to Japanese, European and 
American OEMs. However, the success of this sector required both the high base 
capabilities that were developed under dirigiste strategies and the financing 
instruments and domestic content conditions that allowed the further jump to global 
competitiveness standards in higher qualities. These instruments were available in 
the 1980s but are no longer there.  
In the case of the pharmaceutical sector India’s accession to the WTO meant it had 
to recognize product patents. This took away a financing instrument for capability 
development that had created strong incentives and compulsions in the sector given 
121 
 
the specific design of the instrument and the political and institutional conditions 
that made the enforcement of the patent rule credible. Reverse engineering is no 
longer available as a capability development strategy for Indian pharmaceutical 
companies some of whom had a strong research and development pipeline but 
needed more investment and capabilities to come up with a patent worthy drug that 
could prove to be their ‘blockbuster’. With the repeal of the older Patent Act Indian 
pharmaceutical companies no longer have the financing instrument for capability 
development and R&D and are instead choosing to focus on lower value generics. 
This is an example of what Khan calls beta strategies (M. H. Khan 2009b). It is our 
contention that the current slump in manufacturing growth rates in India is the 
result of very few firms having access to alpha strategies for new capability 
development, some having access to beta strategies and most having access to 
neither because they are so far away from the competitiveness frontier in their 
sectors and because liberalization has removed many likely instruments for financing 
capability development.  
 
4.6 Lal’s Analysis of Rent Seeking in Contemporary India 
The argument that the capability development in the manufacturing sector of a 
developing country requires rent management strategies worries liberal economists. 
Some of their concerns need to be addressed if only because this school of thought 
has a significant influence on India’s policy makers. The dominant view amongst 
Indian policy makers is that any form of rent management strategy is distortionary 
even though many types of formal and informal state created rents exist in the 
Indian economy. Lal in a recent article on rent seeking in post liberalization India has 
argued that some of these rents are part of ‘the entitlement economy’ or 
‘quotacracy’ (Lal 2011). Lal’s article is an attempt to explain why despite high levels 
of predatory rent seeking (land scams, telecommunication spectrum scams or coal 
block allocation scams that have notionally cost the Indian economy billions of 
dollars) productivity has gone up in the economy after liberalization. He 
differentiates between two types of rent seeking in the Indian economy and 
122 
 
provides an explanation that is very much within the framework of Neo Classical 
Economic (NCE) theories of rents and their efficiency implications.  
According to Lal it is important to distinguish between ‘pure economic rents’ and 
‘composite quasi rents’ on the one hand and ‘monopoly rents’ on the other. His 
argument is that rent extraction by political elites from the first two types of rents 
has little impact on efficiency, and the preponderance of these rents explains why 
India could grow with significant rents after liberalization. On the other hand, if rent 
extraction happens by creating monopoly rents, there are the usual inefficiency 
effects. This was the type of rent that dominated under dirigisme, and there are still 
many monopoly rents as a result of labour market restrictions. A pure economic rent, 
according to Lal is a rent from a resource whose supply is completely inelastic, like 
land. In this case a tax or rent extraction by government from those who have this 
‘rental income’ is a tax which does not cause any distortions. This is because the 
supply of land is inelastic and its owners cannot alter its supply in response to the tax 
and this ensures that there is no loss in welfare for the economy. This is like a lump 
sum tax of the type that is preferred by liberal economists. Lal categorizes the rent 
capture in the Adarsh land scam in Mumbai as an example of extraction from 
‘economic rents’. Adarsh was a housing project for war widows on prime land in 
Mumbai where flats were misappropriated by senior military officers. However to 
assume that rent extraction from land use allocations has no effect on efficiency is 
inaccurate. Land allocated to the highest valued uses may not be the most efficient 
allocation of land in an economy where prices are distorted. More importantly, the 
fact that land allocation results in rents that are captured by the powerful can induce 
the owners or occupants of land to refuse land sales. Land scams have played a role 
in raising transaction costs in land markets to the point that productive investments 
requiring land have been very adversely affected. Even in a state like Gujarat where 
the administration has high enforcement capacity, farmers have resisted land 
acquisition by the government and raised transaction costs for investors.  
According to Lal, the second type of rent that has been important after liberalization 
is the composite quasi rent. Here he quotes Alfred Marshall who defines them as 
rents that occur when two separately owned resources came together in such a 
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specific manner that the sum of their joint rents much exceeds the rents that each 
could have earned separately. The allocation of the 2G spectrum generates this kind 
of rents, by bringing together the investor’s capital and the spectrum allocated by 
the government. Here the long-run supply of one resource may be affected by the 
price (for instance the return to the owner of capital may affect future investments 
in spectrum) but Lal argues that a variety of contractual arrangements may constrain 
the party owning “the resource with controllable flow of high alternative use value” 
from trying to expropriate most of the rent. In other words, within a broad range, 
expropriation of rents by politicians may not have a big impact on the long-run 
supply of investments in these areas because investors would still be earning 
significant rents. Again, Lal argues that such ‘taxing’ is not distortionary and this 
explains why India could grow so rapidly with so many scams. This type of predatory 
rent seeking does not lead to a loss of efficiency and may even increase productivity 
in the economy because rent seekers have an incentive to grow the pie. However, 
Lal’s argument is not convincing in the case of India.  
First, Lal’s assumption that composite quasi rents can be clearly distinguished from 
monopoly rents is not correct. Many infrastructure contract allocations that Lal 
refers to as cases generating composite quasi-rents actually have elements of 
monopoly rents. If the rent extraction by government is excessive, private 
contractors have an incentive to overprice or provide substandard projects that 
government in turn overlooks, and this clearly has negative efficiency and welfare 
implications. Secondly, in situations where the bargaining position of one party (say 
the government) is higher, institutional arrangements might be inadequate to 
prevent rent extraction by that party to an extent that the other party (business) 
makes adverse allocative decisions, in the extreme case stopping to invest.   
As examples of the first, there is compelling if anecdotal evidence about how the 
rent seeking process in India has negatively impacted infrastructure projects after 
liberalization. There has been a marked growth in outbound investments from India 
by Indian companies. For instance, according to the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) 
inbound foreign direct investment (FDI) in 2006-07 amounted to $ 19.4 billion and in 
the same year outbound FDI by Indian companies was $ 11.0 billion, a ratio that has 
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been roughly maintained in most years since then. Between April 2008 and February 
2012 manufacturing accounted for the largest share of Indian outward FDI ($23.3 
billion) but investments in financial services were a close second at $ 17.0 billion. 
Most of the latter were routed through Special Purpose Vehicles (SPV) in offshore or 
regional financial centres. While this in itself is not out of the ordinary with many 
companies worldwide using SPVs in offshore financial centres to avoid taxes in a 
legal manner, in the Indian case a number of large infrastructure companies have 
sizable financial investments through SPVs. Media insiders believe that much of 
these external financial investments by infrastructure companies are a mechanism 
for routing pay-offs to politicians in order to secure contracts. The scale of these pay-
offs has arguably made infrastructure projects increasingly inefficient in India, 
contrary to what Lal’s efficiency hypothesis for India’s liberalization might suggest. 
Another externality is that many of these infrastructure investments including the 
rent seeking costs were funded by India’s banking system increasing the economy’s 
vulnerability. It would be difficult to find a paper trail for these investments given 
their sensitive political nature but enough anecdotal evidence of the change in the 
nature of rent seeking exists in the Indian media. 
Secondly, the adverse effects of post-liberalization rent seeking processes on 
investor decisions are also very visible. The high rent extraction by politicians has 
created uncertainty as investors have become wary of ex-post revelations about 
irregularities in government contracting leading to contracts later being cancelled. 
An investigative media and social activists have not found it difficult to find repeated 
examples of significant rent capture by politicians. This has not resulted in a 
reduction in corruption, but the legal cases that have sometimes followed, as in the 
2G scam case, have resulted in revocations of contracts and business confidence in 
government contracting has suffered.  
Lal’s claim that these types of rent capture are compatible with sustained growth is 
therefore not credible. Indeed, India’s growth rates have been wobbly after 2010. 
While it is difficult to link this to the patterns of rent seeking, and global economic 
conditions have undoubtedly played a role in the downturn, it is plausible to argue 
that the types of rent extraction outlined above have not been neutral in their 
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effects. A recent report by the ‘City of London’ corporation outlined bureaucratic 
wrangles and difficulties in land acquisition as being the chief constraints for 
development of infrastructure in India. It quotes figures from the GoI’s Economic 
Survey of 2011-2012 which state that out of the 583 mega projects in India 235 have 
been delayed. It also cites a McKinsey report that states that infrastructure 
bottlenecks could result in a loss of US$200 billion. In terms of GDP growth rate, this 
would amount to a loss of 1.1 per cent. The report goes on to state that given the 
current state of the Indian and global economy these projections could well be valid 
(City 2012). 
Finally Lal identifies a third type of rent as ‘monopoly rents’ which are distortionary 
interventions by the government. In the past monopoly rents were created by the 
licensing system, but after liberalization Lal argues monopoly rents exist mainly in 
factor markets, especially labour markets. His concern is that labour market 
restrictions affect marginal decisions of producers and consumers and hence ends up 
being allocatively inefficient and damaging to the growth prospects of India’s 
economy. We have already outlined why distortions in India’s labour market are 
unlikely to be the primary reason holding back India’s growth. Moreover, it is hard to 
argue that labour market rents (to the extent they exist) contribute anything at all to 
India’s huge problem with predatory rent capture by politicians. Lal’s allocative 
efficiency analysis of the impact of rents and rent capture is in very different from 
the interest of classical political economists like Adam Smith, David Ricardo or Karl 
Marx in the relationship between the economic surplus and investment and growth. 
As Khan outlines in ‘Rents Efficiency and Growth’ (M. H. Khan 2000b) classical 
political economists, unlike NCE theorists were concerned about the size and 
allocation of the economic surplus which could be used for investment and 
accumulation in society. According to them the allocation of the economic surplus is 
influenced by the interaction between distributive conflicts and the evolution of 
property rights structures (institutions). Lal’s analysis entirely misses out the 
organization of this distributive conflict and how this affects the incentives for 
different types of investment. The rents that he describes as ‘economic rents’ and 
‘composite quasi-rents’ are not rationally created by strong institutions with lump 
126 
 
sum rent extraction by politicians. Rather, they are the outcome of shifting contests 
between economic, political and bureaucratic organizations, which in turn drive 
institutional change and informal modifications of institutions. The likelihood of 
adverse outcomes emerging is very great, and the evidence suggests this is exactly 
what has happened.  
Finally, Lal like other neoclassical economists focusing on allocative efficiency sees 
no role for rents creating dynamic efficiency. The Indian economic story cannot be 
understood without an analysis of its successes and failures in capability 
development in particular sectors. In turn, these were influenced by rent creation 
processes under very specific balances of power that allowed or prevented the 
appropriate ‘rent management’. To assert as Lal does that ‘(t)hough the immorality 
of rent seeking associated with pure ‘economic’ and ‘composite quasi’ rents may be 
reprehensible, it is less damaging to growth than the continuing ‘monopoly rents’ 
generated in the labour market’ is missing the real point about growth being 
constrained by the lack of capability development strategies. There is merit in his 
argument that programmes like the Food Security Bill as they are currently designed 
are based on unsustainable subsidies and threaten to increase the fiscal deficit in 
untenable ways. The missing link is that India needs to devise an industrial policy to 
facilitate a broad based economic transition so that it can enhance its targeted 
subsidy based programmes for its poor. As matters stand now, populist programmes 
of poverty alleviation will do little in terms of employment generation which is the 
only way the country can sustainably reduce poverty.  
 
4.7 ‘Reversible Patron-Client’ Transactions and the Implications for Growth   
An important contributory factor for the poor performance of the Indian 
manufacturing sector and the downturn after 2010 has been a significant change in 
the political settlement of India since liberalization. This changed the nature of 
business-government relationships and the relative bargaining power of political 
organizations relative to business organizations. The pre-liberalization era between 
the 1950s and the 1970s was characterized by patron-client relationships between 
business and government that were long-term in nature. Most important for the 
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industrial sector were the long-term relationships between the dominant Congress 
party and the larger industrial houses. Two significant changes could be observed in 
India by the late 1980s and early 1990s. The first was the increased political 
fragmentation at the central level but more significantly at the state level. The 
organizational proliferation and the failure of accommodating them within the 
Congress Party led to the breakdown of the dominant party system. The second was 
a growing number of new capitalists who benefited from liberalization and emerged 
as a new group of large Indian corporations replacing older companies which could 
not adapt to the changes taking place in India’s political economy.  
These two factors were closely related. The regional political parties increasingly 
running state governments were no longer dependent on the centre in Delhi for 
industrial licences and could use their own agency to create rents for attracting 
industry to their state. These were parties organized by political entrepreneurs who 
had broken away from pre-liberalization parties like the Janata Dal. On the one hand 
they did not have established networks with the old corporate giants with links to 
the Congress. On the other hand they needed resources for developing their political 
organizations further. This coincided with the rise of regional capitalists who had 
developed some productive capabilities to serve regional markets in the 1970s and 
especially in the 1980s but who could not yet scale up to serve national markets. This 
was because their businesses were not large enough to generate the informal 
political transfers that would have interested the dominant Congress to develop 
relationships with them. Some of these firms were near to achieving significant 
competitiveness but this was not enough to be successful within the centralized 
planning system where getting licenses and other rent-generating instruments 
required expensive relationships with the dominant party. The main beneficiaries of 
that system were large incumbent capitalists like Birla, Tata and Bajaj.  
A conjunction of these two factors meant that regional parties that were now in 
power were free to forge their own relationships with these rising business groups. 
Indeed they had strong incentives to do so both to get access to the informal 
resources they needed for their political survival and also to increase industrial 
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investment in their states. By supporting the smaller regional capitalists they could 
forge new links bypassing the established capitalists and achieve these objectives. 
The collapse of the Congress as the dominant party in the 1980s and the transition in 
the political settlement from constrained patrimonialism to competitive clientelism 
was a critical factor allowing this change in business-government relationships and 
the liberalization regime proved to be the catalyst enabling the emergence of these 
regional capitalists. The new business-government relationships in turn 
strengthened the regional parties and led to a further entrenchment of competitive 
clientelism. Of course some of the older corporations survived the liberalization 
reforms and in time learnt to navigate the new political system successfully. 
The Adani Group, an energy and infrastructure conglomerate in Gujarat is a prime 
example of this kind of new group which emerged from nowhere to achieve annual 
revenues of $7.8 billion in 2012. Some other groups like OP Jindal (energy, steel and 
power with group revenues of $ 18 billion) or Sunil Mittal’s Bharti Enterprises 
(telecom and retail with revenues of $8.3 billion) were medium sized players in the 
1970s (though the Jindals are an older industrial family) but they became powerful 
national level conglomerates only after liberalization. Other regional groups like the 
Jaypee Group in Uttar Pradesh (infrastructure and energy with revenues of $2.4 
billion) and GMR (Revenues of $ 4.4 billion), GVK (Revenues of $ 4 billion) and Lanco 
(Revenues of $2.38 billion) in Andhra Pradesh (all with a focus on infrastructure and 
energy) also came into prominence at the same time. These companies forged close 
links with regional political parties in their home states. Ironically, the political 
fragmentation at the centre increased the bargaining power of regional parties who 
were by now key coalition partners with the Congress or the BJP in elections to the 
national Parliament. This allowed the new business organizations to benefit from 
their links with powerful regional parties like the Telegu Desam in Andhra Pradesh or 
the Bahujan Samaj Party in Uttar Pradesh. These links now gave them access not 
only to state-level rents but also to national-level rents through the allocation of 
infrastructure projects like power or airport development that they would probably 
not have been awarded in the earlier political settlement. Of course there were also 
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some prominent industrial houses that emerged at this time that maintained close 
links with the Congress or the BJP.  
The change in the macro-political settlement resulted not just in a shortening of the 
time horizon of political organizations discussed earlier. The changing nature of the 
business-government relationships just described led to significant changes in the 
relative power of economic and political organizations over time. The relative 
positions of ‘patron’ and ‘client’ in the business-government relationship began to 
change and in many critical cases the client became the patron in a new type of 
patron-client relationship. The conventional literature from political science and 
sociology tends to describe patron-client relationships as an exchange between two 
agents differentiated by the superior power or status of the patron (Schmidt, et al. 
1977). In Khan’s framework patron-client relationships are characterized by a 
difference in the relative power of the two groups involved in the relationship but 
the most important characteristic is that the resource exchange in the relationship is 
mainly based on informal negotiations and rent allocations that can be described as 
informal rent seeking (M. H. Khan 1998). Patron-client relationships of this type are 
particularly important in the construction of political organizations where higher 
levels are involved in some level of informal rent distribution to lower levels to 
sustain their organizations. The analysis of patron-client relationships in the case of 
business-government negotiations does not prejudge who is the patron and who the 
client is in each of the transactions within a business-government relationship. The 
normal assumption in the days of state-led development was that political 
organizations were typically the patrons. Patrons were always weak in South Asia, 
relative to the strong patrimonialism in East Asia, and business clients (and lower-
level political sub-organizations) could capture rents without meeting the conditions 
of the higher-level patrons. However, in post-liberalization India, the picture has 
become more complex and in some cases, economic organizations are not just 
distorting the conditions of allocation of state-created rents but are driving rent 
creation strategies. A careful analysis of changes in holding power and the 
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implications for rent-creation strategies has therefore become critical in post-
liberalization India and needs to be taken further in future research.  
Harris-White and Jenkins have done significant work outlining the intermeshing of 
formal political structures with informal networks of patronage in India (Harriss-
White and White 1996; Jenkins 2000).  However, the focus of their work has been to 
understand political processes affecting policy outcomes. Given the significant 
importance of the private sector in the patron-client relationships that affect 
significant national-level rent policies and investments, these relationships need to 
be looked at in their own terms. We observed in our field work and in our critical 
reading of credible media sources that the conventional understanding of politicians 
as patrons in business-government relationships was being increasingly challenged 
at higher political levels in India.  
The fragmentation of political organizations in India’s political settlement has meant 
that political parties, whether regional ones or the Congress and the BJP at the state 
level face more competition on the political front than ever before. This has 
weakened not just the enforcement capabilities of political organizations but also 
their bargaining power in determining the rents that are beneficial for their own 
interests. Greater political fragmentation allows economic organizations to credibly 
threaten to shift their relationship to other political organizations if they do not get 
their way. The relationship can still be described as a ‘patron-client’ one in the sense 
that business wants things that only the state can deliver and is willing to pay for it 
through its informal relationships. However, the balance of power in these 
negotiations has shifted to the point that it is useful to identify a qualitative and not 
just a quantitative change. We use the term ‘reversible patron-client relationship’ to 
describe this phenomenon. The relative power in a patron-client relationship can 
shift along a continuum till the patron is no longer a patron but has effectively 
become a client. Beginning with a weak patrimonial relationship between business 
and political organizations, as business organizations become more and more 
powerful they can begin to dictate the types of rents they want and the terms as 
well. At this point they are effectively the patrons in the relationship, which can 
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begin to resemble state capture. Relationships between business and government 
have many dimensions and the same organizations are likely to be engaged in 
multiple transactions. In some of these transactions the political organization may 
still be defining the available types of rents and the parameters of the negotiation, in 
others they may be negotiating within parameters dictated by economic 
organizations. The extreme end of this spectrum is state capture by economic 
organizations though India is unlikely to go too far in that direction because of the 
weight of many powerful political organizations that will prevent the rents agenda 
being entirely or largely set by economic organizations.  
What has emerged is therefore a transformation of patron-client relationships in 
some cases, with the relevant capitalists and politicians still engaged in repeated and 
multiple transactions but in these cases capitalists are identifiably in the driving seat. 
These cases reflect that political organizations have become weaker because of 
changes in the macro-level political settlement. Politicians are aware that 
relationships are not necessarily permanent given that rival political powers exist. 
Capitalists in these situations can dictate the creation of particular rents that benefit 
them but on the other hand they still have to defer to a balance of power with 
political organizations collectively because the numbers and the informal political 
power of emerging political organizations is also growing. Moreover, business has to 
operate within a formal democracy in India where the executive and legislature have 
formal powers of rent creation and management. This is a particular form of ‘checks 
and balances’. Capitalists have greater bargaining power because of increased 
political fragmentation. But politicians retain the formal power to pass laws and 
award contracts though they desperately need the informal kickbacks from capitalist 
organizations. These changes in the political settlement are important for 
understanding why even in the cases where capitalists were driving rent creation, 
they were typically not creating value-enhancing rents. Economic organizations 
faced similar constraints as political organizations in these relationships: they too 
could not make long-term calculations because their political partners may not 
survive long enough; they too could not devise value-enhancing rents that had 
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strong enforcement requirements and so on. However, because they are engaged in 
business activities their rent creation strategies had a different dynamic that 
sometimes resulted in new investments being facilitated in areas where returns 
were quick and assured, but also resulted in major scams on a scale that political 
organizations driving rent creation may have been unable to manage.  
The rise of the Adani Group in Gujarat is an example of the development of a 
reversible patron-client relationship of this type that is discussed in the chapter on 
Gujarat. Another variant of business capture is when capitalists directly became 
politicians and used their political organizations to support their business interests. 
One of the best known cases in South Asia is Nawaz Sharif in Pakistan. In India 
Naveen Jindal, a scion of the industrial family of OP Jindal, chairman of Jindal Steel 
and Power Ltd. is also an elected Member of Parliament belonging to the Congress. 
Jindal stands accused of involvement in what has now come to be known as ‘coal 
gate’, a corruption scam unearthed by India’s federal auditor in 2012 that involved 
the misallocation of lucrative coal blocks. The founder of Lanco, Lagadapati 
Rajagopal, is also an elected Member of Parliament with the Congress and his 
company too was found of guilty of financial irregularities in deals involving public 
sector insurance companies. 
These changes in the political settlement can help to explain the unprecedented 
levels of unproductive rent creation and capture in many areas of the economy, for 
instance in allocations of natural resources, land or telecommunication spectrum. Lal 
claims many of these were productivity enhancing rent extraction because the 
outcome was not allocatively inefficient. However, efficiency cannot be measured 
simply by the fact that new resource uses increased the price of assets and allowed 
business and politicians to extract rents. The result of these rent extraction 
strategies was to slow down investments in productive areas such as capability 
development and created strong incentives for taking some of the tens of billions of 
dollars of illicit gains in some of these transactions out of the country. The dynamic 
efficiency implications were therefore extremely serious. We know that outbound 
FDI by Indian companies has been growing but the outflow of informal and 
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undeclared illicit capital flows may be much greater. Even the formal flows are 
troubling for a low wage economy with large pools of under-employment. A 2013 
article in the Economist magazine estimated that for every dollar of FDI in Indian 
manufacturing from 2007 to March 2012 Indian firms invested 65 cents in 
manufacturing abroad (Economist 2013). For a country that aims to increase the 
share of manufacturing in GDP from the current 15 per cent to at least 25 per cent 
this does not bode well.  
In part the low investment and growth of manufacturing reflects the fact that 
competitive Indian manufacturing firms are reluctant to invest in an economy where 
politics seems to generate more constraints (in finance, infrastructure and the 
credibility of contracts) than incentives. But in addition, the reversal in patron-client 
relationships also meant that political organizations had access to large rents by 
allowing businesses to act in predatory ways. This not only reduced their own 
incentives to create value-enhancing rents, they also had even less capacity to create 
rents with enforceable conditions to assist capability development. India’s inability 
to coordinate investments in the semiconductor sector or to create supportive rents 
in the sector despite having many of the requisite technical capabilities is an 
indicator of this situation. Given the contracting failures affecting investments in 
capability development and achieving competitiveness in new products, it would be 
unrealistic to expect potentially competitive Indian companies to invest in the last 
mile of capability development on their own. Effective learning rents with ‘carrot 
and stick’ conditions that are enforceable could have resulted in new sectors like 
electronics or even semiconductors emerging. Unfortunately, after the takeoffs of 
the 1980s in sectors like automobiles, no significant sectoral strategy has emerged. 
Instead competitive manufacturing groups like the Tata Group, the AV Birla Group or 
Suzlon Energy have started moving more operations abroad in the 2000s with 
corporate groups without this option either struggling given the adverse systemic 
conditions or developing relationships with political organizations that facilitate the 
sort of predatory rent capture we outlined earlier. The areas where an 
entrepreneurial private sector does engage with short-term government incentives 
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include PPP projects that are largely in infrastructure projects or service delivery 
projects (like airport modernization) that do not call for investments with long and 
uncertain gestation, which is the case with capability development investments. It is 
interesting to note that the only countries outside of the developed west that have 
managed to foster home grown semiconductors sector have been China, South 
Korea, and Taiwan, each with high enforcement capabilities on the part of its ruling 
coalition and compatible with their political settlement. This combination of 
incentives and compulsions set out by the respective states ensured their success.  
India’s growth rates in manufacturing TFP have been trending downwards. The 
growth rate of manufacturing TFP declined from 2.6% in 1988-94 to 2.2% in 1994-
2000 (Virmani 2004: Table A2). In fact we can see from Virmani’s Figure 9 that after 
1990 the growth rate of manufacturing TFP declines further to around 2 per cent, 
much below the growth rate of TFP in the economy as a whole, estimated to be 
higher than 3 percent in the early 2000s (Virmani 2004: Figure 9). We know that 
states that were closer to the technology frontier in 1991 have seen larger increases 
in productivity and regional differences still persist (Aghion, et al. 2006). There have 
been several significant studies and surveys of TFP growth in Indian manufacturing 
published from 2000 onwards using firm level data from the Government of India’s 
Annual Survey of Industry, National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) as well as 
from the CMIE (Balakrishnan, et al. 2000; Virmani 2004; Kumar 2006; Kathuria, et al. 
2010; Mohommad 2010; Deb and Ray 2013). While most report an upward trend 
two of the studies flag problems. Using firm level data from the NSSO, Balakrishnan 
et al (2000) find no link between trade liberalization and TFP growth as opposed to 
studies using growth accounting (Kumar 2006; Deb and Ray 2013). The Kathuria et al 
study is also significant as it highlights that while TFP grew in the organized 
manufacturing sector it declined in the unorganized manufacturing sector which 
provides the bulk of employment in the manufacturing sector in India. The study 
records the increasing capital intensity in the organized sector along with decreasing 
labour productivity in the unorganized sector between the periods 2000-01 and 
2005-06.  The paper also concludes that growth in gross value added across both 
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sectors was mostly productivity driven as opposed to input driven. This could be 
either because of efficiency gains or technical progress. This data is consistent with a 
small and competitive organized manufacturing sector making steady progress but 
most of the employment-generating manufacturing in the unorganized sector is 
excluded from this and the growth of the organized manufacturing sector is slow 
(Kumar 2006; Kathuria, et al. 2010). Significantly the different methodology that 
Balakrishnan et al (2000) use seems to suggest that productivity growth after 
liberalization even in the organized sector has not been as high as other studies 
suggest. More research needs to be conducted at the micro level to unpack the 
process behind TFP performance in the Indian manufacturing sector. 
Neoclassical economists like Baumol have long recognized that innovation and 
productivity growth have been the driver of prosperity in capitalist economies 
(William J Baumol 2004). In developing countries, the process of productivity growth 
through learning is as important if not more important than innovation (M. H. Khan 
2000b). Both strategies require a productive capitalism. However, as Bardhan has 
put it, one of the features of Indian capitalism today, especially in the manufacturing 
sector is the growing weight of ‘rentier capitalism’ relative to ‘entrepreneurial 
capitalism’. There are still several sectors dominated by entrepreneurial capitalism 
but they are increasingly struggling. After the revision of the Indian Patent Act to 
make it WTO compliant, the pharmaceutical sector is making profits by 
manufacturing generic products and many have sold out to foreign pharmaceutical 
companies. Innovation in most other manufacturing sectors apart from the auto 
sector is also limited. There is an emerging electronic hardware industry that is 
manufacturing based on designs from China but these occupy the lower end of the 
mobile phone market, though predictably India is one of the leaders in developing 
‘apps’ for mobile platforms. The high value adding service sector firms in software in 
this area tend to be individual driven firms with limited employment generating 
opportunities and low productivity spillovers for the larger economy. This situation 
has come about because the gains of the 1980s and 1990s were not primarily driven 
by liberalization but because untapped high capabilities existed and financing 
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mechanisms emerged to further enhance capabilities and create a few globally 
competitive sectors. Liberalization that allowed access to capital and technology 
more easily helped this process but was not its primary driver. As easy catching-up 
opportunities were used up, for most sectors the gap with the competitiveness 
frontier was too great for private investments to rush in, and the policy instruments 
still available in the 1980s and the early 1990s were slowly being phased out. It is not 
surprising that powerful economic organizations that could increasingly call the shots 
in rent creation strategies began to look for quick rents in speculative sectors.  
Much the same story would apply for Pakistan but in a somewhat more adverse 
form. It did not have sectors close to global competitiveness when it started 
liberalizing and its political settlement had a higher level of political fragmentation 
earlier on enabling the damaging type of reverse patron-client relationships to 
emerge. Identifying policy options for moving South Asian firms closer to the 
competitiveness frontier is not directly the subject matter of this thesis. However, by 
identifying the importance of changes in the political settlement, combined with 
policy changes driven by the global shift towards liberalization, the thesis can inform 
the debate on capability development. At a minimum, it establishes that policy for 
capability development has to be designed keeping characteristics of the political 
settlement in mind. We do not discuss bureaucratic reforms in this thesis as a 
solution to India’s sclerotic growth in manufacturing. Bureaucratic capability 
development is important but its success presumes that the more powerful political 
and economic organizations are interested in particular types of bureaucratic 
capability development and will support its implementation. Generally, bureaucratic 
organizations in South Asia are not dominant, except the military in Pakistan in some 
periods. The central bureaucracy in India is a co-opted player in the current 
competitive clientelism.  
Bureaucratic organizations in a competitive clientelist political settlement tend to 
display signs of fragmented bureaucratic authority but our assessment is that the 
bureaucratic organization in India is still a divided bureaucratic authority where 
potential lead agencies, like the Planning Commission, have little authority over 
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other departments or ministerial bureaucracies but the latter still have enough 
control over their junior levels. One reason for this is historical in that over the years 
the Indian Planning Commission has been stripped of much of its powers over 
ministries and now largely survives as an institution that provides recommendations 
for India’s growth targets, though it is still influential in formal policy setting. The 
other reason is that although the political settlement in India is becoming 
increasingly fragmented, different state level agencies responsive to the party in 
power have enough internal control over their own lower levels to implement 
reasonably effectively but only in line with the interests of that political organization 
and its client capitalists. 
Our research suggests that India’s liberalization has helped strengthen the bigger 
capitalist players. Contrary to liberal economic theory, opening up markets very 
often has a tendency to strengthen those with stronger initial capabilities and assets, 
rather than levelling the playing field. Those who are behind have a harder job of 
catching up. The Indian liberalization process was no exception. Under India’s closed 
economy, some organizations and sectors like auto and pharmaceutical built up 
capabilities that enabled them to become bigger players in the 1980s and beyond. A 
few ‘entrepreneurial capitalists’ also gained in the new political settlement by 
cultivating relationships with regional political parties. While the earlier regime of 
central planning had its inefficiencies as capitalists could capture licences and 
thereby informally modify the allocation of rents, the rents were nonetheless 
formally created by the state. The new political settlement and the liberalization that 
it ushered in gradually dismantled much of the formal rent creating instruments like 
licences and economic subsidies. With the reversal of patron-client relationships in a 
few areas and the emergence of new types of business-government relationships, 
the result was the growth of informal rent capture that took the form of scams. The 
holding power of these capitalist organizations was now high enough in their 
bargaining with political organizations to get massive informal rent allocations that 
were often blatantly in violation of the law.  
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The critical bottleneck remains the financing of capability development and this is 
where future research on industrial policies in South Asia needs to be targeted. But 
the instruments and institutions of financing in our framework have to be designed 
keeping the political settlement in mind. Acemoglu et al have argued that for 
countries far from the technology frontier innovation was not the key constraint 
while financing was (Acemoglu, et al. 2006). We agree with the contention that 
financing is a most important constraint. However, just providing financing, for 
instance through development banks is unlikely to provide firms much benefit, and 
indeed the experience with many development banks in South Asia is mixed at best. 
For financing to create the right incentives and compulsions for capability 
development at the micro level, the financing instruments have to be designed such 
that the enforcement and informal modifications that are expected in that political 
settlement will still produce desirable outcomes. This calls for an innovation in the 
design of the industrial policy architecture, an exercise very few developing 
countries have attempted but one we feel needs to happen to tackle afresh the 
challenges of the capitalist transformation.  
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Chapter 5 . Gujarat: The Political Economy of 
Authoritarian Growth 2001-2013 
 
 
SUMMARY: 
The political settlements framework focuses on the interdependence of institutions 
and the organization of political power. This is particularly interesting in the case of 
Gujarat. The state is industrially advanced and has often led in terms of growth rates 
but it has also been associated with high levels of political and communal violence. 
Some of the violence also appears to have had at least the tacit approval of the 
ruling party in the state and its controversial but influential chief minister. These 
features of Gujarat are usually seen as interesting but largely unconnected. 
However, we argue that aspects of Gujarat’s institutional performance, and in 
particular the enforceability of some types of executive decisions, were indeed 
connected to the organization of power in the state. The particular years of interest 
to us are the years that chief minister Narendra Modi was in power, 2001 to 2013 
the year at the time of writing, though his terms extends till 2018. However we 
provide substantial historical analysis of the period since independence to establish 
the distribution of power already in place when Modi became chief minister. The 
communal violence of 2002 was used (if not orchestrated) to consolidate the 
centralized authority that makes Gujarat different from other Indian states, and this 
in turn allowed a particular pattern of institutional interventions that had 
implications for patterns of industrial growth. This analysis has significant 
implications for the replicability of the Gujarat model in other parts of India. 
A historical analysis of Gujarat reveals how its specific configuration of caste and the 
regional strategies of British colonial policy helped to create a mercantile class that 
later dominated Gujarat’s intermediate classes. It was the political dominance of this 
class that eventually allowed Gujarat’s current ruling party, the Bharatiya Janata 
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Party (BJP) to create conditions that fostered growth but also an atmosphere of 
communal tension that subsequently led to organised violence against the state’s 
Muslim minority. We argue that this was ‘soft violence’ because it was used by the 
dominant party against a section of the population that was organizationally weak 
and unable to react. The violence could therefore be expected to be limited and with 
limited direct effects on the growth process. Nevertheless, the ability of the political 
regime to control and direct violence at will ‘signalled’ enforcement capabilities that 
in turn had implications for strategies of economic development. In terms of our 
framework the violence had significant implications for the political strategies 
followed by political organizations within and outside the ruling coalition, and helped 
to establish an authoritarian version of clientelism dominated by the ruling BJP. 
Investors reacted positively to this and the state received high levels of investments 
in infrastructure. The chief minister was aided by the fact that Gujarat was already 
an industrially advanced state with significant oil and gas reserves. However though 
Gujarat has sometimes been described as a developmental state, our analysis also 
shows that Gujarat’s current political settlement is significantly different from the 
developmental states of South Korea or Taiwan, and the developmental institutions 
and strategies it has implemented are likewise significantly different. 
Section 5.1 provides a brief history of Gujarat from the ancient period to the coming 
of the British and how colonisation led to the creation of an intermediate class in the 
state. Section 5.2 outlines the years of the Congress after independence and traces 
the rise of the BJP. Section 5.3 outlines how the BJP came to power and section 5.4 
provides an analysis of the consequences of the new political settlement. Section 5.5 
concludes. 
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 Introduction     
Chapters Two and Three laid out why the organization of power was critical for 
understanding the emergence of particular institutions and the types of 
enforcement and modifications these would be subject to. The configuration of 
power in the ruling coalition is an important component of the overall distribution of 
organizational power in a political system with important effects on strategies of 
political competition, the time horizon of the ruling coalition and its ability as a 
principal to impose particular institutions and to enforce them. This is particularly 
important for understanding the enforcement of conditional rents. Weak 
enforcement capabilities of the state as the principal when it uses institutions and 
policies to create rents for capitalists can lead to rent capture by capitalist agents or 
the informal avoidance or modification of conditions. These in turn have an effect on 
the kind of technology adopted and consequently the nature of industrialization in 
the country. 
Gujarat was created in 1960 with the bifurcation of the former state of Bombay 
Presidency into Maharashtra and Gujarat (Figure 5.1). While the economy of the 
state was ranked eighth at that time it is today one of India’s top three economic 
performers with per capita NSDP (Net State Domestic Product) far higher than the 
Indian average (Table 5.1). Its current chief minister Narendra Modi has been able to 
achieve significant control over the state using a combination of populist communal 
(religious-sectarian) politics and discretionary administrative policies. The ruling 
party in Gujarat is the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) or the ‘party of the people of 
India’. It is also India’s second national party along with the Congress and is a 
conservative right wing party mobilized around ‘Hindutva’ or an ideology of Hindu 
awakening. 
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Figure 5.1 International and national borders of the state of Gujarat. 
Source: www.dailyherald.com/.../side_gujarat_map.gif (downloaded 27/10/2010) 
The key to understanding the developments in modern Gujarat is to identify how 
Modi was effectively able to avoid competitive clientelism by building a particular 
type of coalition that enabled the enforcement of a greater range of institutions and 
policies compared to other Indian states. He was able to do this because of the 
specific social and political history of Gujarat, a factor that is often overlooked by 
observers. Critical features of the pre-existing configuration of power in Gujarat 
enabled Modi and the BJP to construct a ‘dominant party’ with a long-term time 
horizon that allowed his administration to offer long-term rents. He decided which 
organizations could invest in Gujarat (with respect to the large, critical investments) 
and gain access to these rents on the basis of informal assessments like who would 
be most beneficial for party funding, their legitimacy etc. This accelerated industrial 
investments in particular types of technologies and sectors, but Gujarat’s political 
and administrative structure did not have the critical conditional rent management 
capabilities along the lines of South Korea and Taiwan.  Modi’s role was not confined 
to creating an authoritarian dominant party in a democratic set up, using selective 
violence to create an effective coalition with significant powers of implementation in 
specific areas. Taking advantage of the opportunities created after liberalization he 
has also been responsible for creating a system of industrial subsidies that have 
helped Gujarat gain a lion’s share of investments in India, both foreign and domestic. 
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Here too, implementation capability was the key factor, assisted by already well-
organized Gujarati bureaucratic organizations. The anti-Muslim violence of 2002 
played an important if indirect role in the processes of consolidating the ruling 
coalition in Gujarat and for signalling to other constituencies, including political 
organizations and businesses, that Gujarat had a ruling coalition and a leader with 
strong implementation capabilities. 
Table 5.1 Gujarat: Economic Characteristics 
Population (2011) 60.43 million 
(India 1.24 billion) 
Gross State Domestic Product 
2011-12 at current prices 
USD 100.15 billion 
Per capita Net State Domestic 
Product at current prices 2010-
11 
USD 1632  
(India USD 1509) 
Capita Output Ratio (2009-10) 3.11  
(India 2.32) 
Gross Fixed Capital Investment 
as % of GDP  current 2004-05 
prices (2011-12) 
37.7 % 
(India 32 %) 
Net Value Added Factory Sector 
2009-10 
USD 19.57 billion 
Share in All India Employment 
1980-81 to 2007-08 
9.5 % 
Percentage of population below 
poverty line (2012) 
16.6 % 
(India 22%) 
Source: Various (GoI Census 2011), (MoSPI), (CSO, Respective State Governments), 
(ASI 2009-10), (ASI 2009-10), (CSO), (NSSO 66th round), (Planning Commission of 
India). 
Our aim is not to provide a comprehensive analysis of growth drivers in Gujarat. 
Rather, it is to examine how an analysis of political power and institutions can 
explain how some market failures affecting development were addressed and the 
outcomes that were achieved. We are also particularly interested in the growth 
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outcomes in industry, specifically the manufacturing sector. We examine how Modi 
constructed his ruling coalition through the distribution of both formal and informal 
rents and how that impacted technology adoption and growth in the industrial 
sector in Gujarat. Under Modi the BJP’s rent management created a caste/class 
combination that combined ‘upper caste’s like Brahmans and traditionally ‘lower 
caste’s like the Patidars who since the early 20th century made the transition from 
being a lower agricultural caste to gaining acceptance as a higher caste (though not 
with the same ‘status’ as Brahmans). The Patidars have become the predominant 
capitalist and political class in Gujarat. The BJP’s coalition also includes the Adivasis 
or the indigenous population of the state who straddle both the lower class as well 
as the ‘lower caste’ strata of the state. As we will analyse later, the castes that made 
up this coalition had contradictory class interests but like most clientelist coalitions, 
they had a joint interest in enjoying privileged access to rents. Historically Brahmans 
and the ‘lower caste’s and Scheduled Castes in India (Adivasis belong to the latter) 
have rarely shared political agendas. Modi was also helped by the fact that for 
various historical reasons the BJP in Gujarat had emerged as a disciplined party that 
could serve to construct a ruling coalition in a variant of ‘patrimonial’ clientelism 
with repressive features. The successful creation of the coalition of upper Brahmans, 
Baniyas (the traditional trading caste), Patidars and Adivasis achieved an 
organizational coalition with significant holding power relative to other groups and 
allowed the BJP in Gujarat to implement a particular type of growth-enhancing 
industrial policy that did not face significant contestation for a long time.  
The coalition was constructed in a manner that allowed the inclusion of a disparate 
and wide base of constituencies but also successfully excluded a number of other 
groups and castes including the state’s Muslim minority. The episode of a short and 
extremely sharp coordinated violence against the Muslims in 2002 served not only to 
signal to the Muslims the costs of any mobilization against the BJP, but perhaps even 
more importantly signalled to other groups and castes that the ruling coalition had 
the capacity to take measures against ‘disruptive’ forces. The outcome was a ruling 
coalition that had characteristics of a dominant party (a party that is electorally 
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difficult to dislodge) without having to include all potentially powerful groups within 
it. It was also a dominant party that had considerable internal hierarchy because the 
executive had relatively high enforcement capabilities over lower party levels, which 
is not the typical case in a dominant party. This is because as we summarized in 
Chapter Three the typical dominant party achieves its dominance by including all 
powerful organizations within it, and this achieves a ‘constrained’ patrimonialism 
where the enforcement capabilities are limited by the need to include the interests 
of many diverse organizations within the ruling coalition (M. H. Khan 2010b). The 
selective use of violence in Gujarat achieved a distribution of power across 
organizations that created a different type of a dominant party ruling coalition, with 
greater enforcement capabilities for some types of institutions and policies.  
The violent events of 2002 targeted the state’s Muslim community and resulted in 
the loss of between 1,500 to 2,000 (mostly Muslim) lives. Muslims made up just 
fewer than ten per cent of Gujarat’s population in 2000 but a large section of the 
population was concentrated in a few cities making them easier to ‘target’. The 
manner in which the violence was organized has implications for our analysis of the 
political settlement in Gujarat because it signalled a particular type of informal 
executive authority, and this in turn affected the strategies of organizations within 
and outside the ruling coalition. The effects of the 2002 events in terms of our 
analysis were repeatedly supported by respondents in our interviews even though 
these connections are typically not made in the literature on economic growth in 
Gujarat. Gujarat’s growth rate fell in the year immediately after the riots but then 
recovered from 2004 (Table 5.2). An efficient administration is always welcomed by 
industry and the violence allowed the consolidation of a political settlement that 
underpinned Modi’s ability to project an efficient, and even an authoritarian 
administration with respect to the enforcement of some types of executive decisions 
(G. Shah 2010). It needs to be noted here that economic performance is very 
different in another BJP-ruled state with a high proportion of Adivasis in its 
population, which also has a BJP government. This is the state of Chattisgarh where 
the political configuration is quite different from that of Gujarat. Our argument is 
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that the distribution of organizational power is the critical variable for understanding 
institutional performance. 
Even though politics in Gujarat since India’s independence always supported pro-
business policies, under Modi the Gujarat state established a formal policy of 
promoting itself as India’s best investment destination with Modi positioning himself 
as the CEO of Gujarat. There are other Indian state governments who from time to 
time organize conferences to liaise with business but the biennial ‘Vibrant Gujarat’ 
summits organized by the Modi government since 2003 are yet to be replicated by 
other state governments in scope and scale, let alone in attracting genuine business 
interest. Many studies have shown that Gujarat displays one of the most favourable 
relationships between business and government (Sinha 2005; Massilano, et al. 2009). 
Modi has been particularly successful in attracting large investments and overseeing 
their implementation which has earned him the label of India’s most business-
friendly chief minister. The growth in per capita income in the state reflects this 
success (Table 5.2). The success of governments, in this case the BJP government in 
Gujarat, can be evaluated in terms of its particular methods of overcoming market 
failures affecting investments in industry, in particular the allocation of land and the 
financing of technology acquisition. The efficacy of particular policies and institutions 
in turn depends on the choice of particular solutions and their implementation in the 
specific political settlement.  
As we will show later in the chapter Modi was able to portray himself as a CEO for 
reasons less to do with his own personality and more to do with the socially and 
historically unique factors that allowed the construction of a particular type of ruling 
coalition in Gujarat. The construction of the ruling coalition gave his administration 
and the bureaucratic organizations involved high enforcement capabilities for some 
types of institutions and policies. Agencies like state industrial development bodies 
have existed within the Gujarat government since the 1960s. But the nodal agency, 
the Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation (GIDC) was now able to turn around 
approvals for projects faster than in earlier decades. Obviously something had 
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changed that allowed the GIDC to push through projects with fewer delays and less 
opposition, and this is what the analysis of the changes in the political settlement in 
Gujarat can help to elaborate.  
Table 5.2 Gujarat: Growth Rates of Net State Domestic Product per capita 
(at constant USD year 1980-81) 
Years NSDP per capita growth rates 
1961-70 0.2 
1970-80 2.0 
1980-90 2.6 
1990-2000 5.6 
2000-2010 7.4 
 
Source: Based on EPW Research Foundation Statistics, State Level Domestic Product Data, 
1960/61 to 2007/08. 
 
The overall political settlement in developing countries has (as we discussed in 
earlier chapters) significant features of informality and informal arrangements with 
powerful organizations that make it non-Weberian. We described these non-
Weberian political settlements as ‘clientelist’ in a broad sense and then classified 
clientelist settlements in a number of broad sub-categories.  The authoritarian sub-
variant corresponds to what we described as vulnerable patrimonialism. While there 
were elements of an authoritarian regime in Modi’s patrimonialism, nevertheless the 
Modi BJP was not a true authoritarian regime as it was able to win elections to stay 
in power. Nor was it a strong patrimonial regime of the East Asian variety because it 
did not necessarily have the capacity to impose institutional conditions on all 
organizations in that society. In particular, we shall see that business organizations 
148 
 
could not be disciplined in the way they were in East Asian strong patrimonial 
regimes.  
Thus, the Modi ruling coalition had interesting ‘mixed’ features: it was a dominant 
party that was broadly a variant of constrained patrimonialism but located in an area 
overlapping constrained patrimonialism and competitive clientelism. It had stronger 
implementation capabilities than the typical dominant party. It used violence 
occasionally, in the way that authoritarian regimes did in vulnerable patrimonialism 
but did not need to use violence to win elections. It was thus a dominant party 
system that we describe as ‘Authoritarian Clientelism’ (see Figure 3.2 Chapter Three). 
This configuration of power cannot be defined as vulnerable patrimonialism as 
excluded groups like its Muslim minority were not strong enough to require frequent 
repression. Given the distribution of power the one time shock that the BJP inflicted 
on Gujarat’s Muslim community was enough to signal its authority and obtain an 
uneasy quiescence from the community and other excluded groups. This ensured 
the ruling coalition did not have to use the permanent threat of violence against 
excluded organizations. The enforcement capabilities of the ruling coalition were 
also high enough to be close to strong patrimonialism and the BJP arguably had a 
greater capacity to impose discipline on its lower levels compared to the Congress: 
the dominant party of the 1950s and 1960s. However, despite often being called 
‘developmental’ or what in our framework is strong patrimonialism; our fieldwork 
suggests that it was not. Modi could not discipline business organizations despite 
providing them with critical incentives like land at subsidized prices. The BJP’s power 
to discipline its own supporters was also considerably less would be the case in 
strong patrimonialism because the ruling coalition had to include many disparate 
groups within it.  
Our description of the political characteristics of the settlement in Gujarat is based 
on our fieldwork and interviews that are summarized later. In addition, we find that 
the structure of bureaucratic organizations in Gujarat corresponds to a constrained 
bureaucracy in that the lead agency could coordinate across other agencies and 
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strong implementation capabilities in some areas but not others. Implementation 
capabilities were strong in some areas of industrial development but weak in other 
areas, including social welfare. Both politics and bureaucracy reflect the distribution 
of power across organizations. Granting subsidies to specific industries is only likely 
to be resisted or blocked by well-organized interests operating at the political level 
of the state, and these were not strong enough to challenge these policies. On the 
other hand welfare policies are implemented through a chain of party and 
bureaucratic organizations where lower-level organizations within the ruling 
coalition may have interests opposed to the allocation of resources according to 
formal policy targets or at least do not have the similar incentives that providing 
subsidies to business organization provides.  
Nevertheless, the authoritarian clientelist structure provided the Modi 
administration with enforcement capabilities to push through decisions on industrial 
projects favouring specific capitalists with little effective resistance and this helped 
to overcome some of the coordination problems in the area of infrastructure 
investment. Examples include the administration’s ability to provide large areas of 
land for land intensive projects with relative ease at a time when one of the key 
constraints faced by Indian industry in other parts of the country was the scarcity of 
land available through normal market processes for setting up new industrial or 
infrastructure projects. Apart from the allocation of land the administration could 
also provide significant subsidies to industry in the form of land allocations at lower 
than market prices or Power Purchase Agreements that favour the private power 
company rather than the state grid. This configuration of power thus helped to 
address some of the market failures in credit and land markets. Significantly, while 
these capabilities attracted investment into the state, they are not sufficient to 
sustain growth over time as the ability to get subsidies without conditions can create 
perverse incentives for business. It is at the level of institutions that enforce 
conditions on business that evidence is weak, and there are reasons to believe that 
the Modi political settlement has weak enforcement capabilities in these critical 
areas.   
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The configuration of power in Gujarat allowed the implementation of institutions 
and policies favouring investments in large infrastructure projects, like ports, power 
stations and SEZs with much lower levels of resistance to particular projects from 
affected groups than elsewhere in India. These types of projects have long gestation 
periods and require high capital expenditures. Modi’s marketing of an efficient, 
centralised and stable administration is likely to have helped in attracting such 
investors who have a low appetite for risk given the nature of their investments. 
Solving specific coordination and appropriability problems along with the granting of 
long term rents to such investors has given Gujarat an industrial profile but also one 
that is skewed towards infrastructure projects (as well as oil and gas since Gujarat is 
rich in both natural oil and gas). For instance Gujarat has the highest number of 
private sector ports in the country—35 per cent of India’s exports are routed 
through Gujarat. The state has the only chemical terminal port in India and the 
country’s two LNG terminals, one of which is in the private sector. One third of the 
total installed capacity in power generation in the state is by the private sector. By 
way of contrast at an all-India level the Indian private sector had contributed to only 
20 per cent of capacity addition under the 11th Five Year plan (2007-2012). In the 
last decade heavy chemicals, ports and other related offshore infrastructure have 
been the sectors with the highest growth in Gujarat (Malhotra 2008). The state along 
with Tamil Nadu has the highest number of PPP investments in the country. Just 
under 50 per cent of FDI that Gujarat received between 1991 and 2011 was in the 
chemicals and petrochemicals sector (Gujarat 2013b).  
The pro-business political settlement is also aided by the fact that Gujarat was 
already one of India’s most industrialized states with a relatively efficient 
bureaucracy by the 1980s (Sinha 2005; Kohli 2012). As we see later in the chapter 
Gujarat experienced another high growth phase under Congress chief minister 
Madhavsinh Solanki, also credited with running an efficient bureaucracy. The 
difference is that during Solanki’s tenure the bureaucracy was closer to good 
governance norms of transparency ensuring that most of the time incentives were 
provided according to formal rules. Modi’s Gujarat was different, partly because of 
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the changed nature of business-government relationships at the national level as 
outlined in Chapter Three and partly because authoritarian clientelism allowed the 
Modi administration to use discretionary industrial policy with much greater 
informality in its allocative rules. For instance it was able to exercise discretion in 
favouring some investors like the Adani Group over others, or in providing specific 
rents to investors like Tata motors when they relocated their investment from West 
Bengal to Gujarat. But we are careful to identify that its enforcement capability only 
extended to the exercise of discretion in terms of rent allocation and not to the 
enforcement of conditions on rent recipients. This was the chief limitation of the 
Modi political settlement in terms of industrial growth. There were other limitations 
of this political settlement in terms of social exclusion and repression but these 
issues are not directly the subject matter of this thesis. 
Gujarat is not the only Indian state that had features of informal authoritarianism 
within a dominant party system. One could conclude that West Bengal under the 
Trinamool Congress or Bihar under the Rashtriya Janata Dal also had these 
characteristics. However there were two crucial differences in Modi’s Gujarat. First, 
the BJP was able to control intra-party contestations that are the hallmark of 
clientelist political parties and so achieve high levels of enforcement, at least for 
major allocative decisions that were of significance to the leadership. Secondly, the 
much higher levels of capabilities of business organizations in the state and their 
greater collective and individual political power meant that the state leadership 
could engage in discretionary allocation to business and reap immediate benefits in 
pay-offs in terms of revenue and employment generation. The critical limitation was 
that the political settlement did not achieve the degree of enforcement capability 
required for conditional rent allocation that is required to create opportunities for 
new capability development. While other states also had leaders and parties with 
authoritarian characteristics, they were either in power in states with high levels of 
political competition so that the time horizon of the rulers was limited, or their own 
parties were highly mobilized and lower-level members demanded constant pay-offs 
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making implementation difficult, or they lacked a sufficient business base to achieve 
quick pay-offs by allocating rents to economic organizations.  
This configuration of power in Gujarat led to the rapid growth of sectors like 
infrastructure and power that did not need to achieve new organizational 
capabilities to become internationally competitive and which had large markets in 
India. There is no doubt that India needs more ports and roads and far more capacity 
in electricity generation and in this Gujarat and Tamil Nadu have done well (with the 
exception of power generation in Tamil Nadu). The other sector that did well in 
Gujarat is petrochemicals and related chemicals which enjoy their own natural 
resource rents and because the state granted specific subsides for say LNG terminals. 
The allocation of subsidies has also succeeded in attracting investments from high 
capability firms like Tata Motors who may otherwise have invested in other parts of 
India. There is much less evidence of investments in new capability development.   
Gujarat’s share of industrial output is an impressive 17 per cent of India’s industrial 
output. Yet the industrial sectors that make the biggest contribution nationally are 
sectors like soda ash (90 per cent of India’s production), plastic industry (65 per cent 
of India’s production) and petro chemicals (62 per cent of India’s production) (Figure 
5.4). This skew in development has led to environmental externalities arising from 
environmental hazards which could be steeper than expected for the ‘normal’ 
developing economy facing an environmental Kuznets curve. So far however learning 
strategies that ensure high levels of effort and compulsion are not in evidence in 
Gujarat even though the state seems better placed to implement a developmental 
rent management strategy that could develop new capabilities and comparative 
advantages. However a deeper analysis demonstrates that given the features of the 
political settlement in Gujarat and the reverse patron-client relationship developing 
at the all-India level between businesses and political organizations that we outlined 
in Chapter Four, a developmental rent management strategy would be difficult to 
enforce even for Modi and the BJP in Gujarat. For instance, in 2005 Modi 
demonstrated his strengths relative to the West Bengal administration by providing 
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Tata Motors with all necessary clearances within a couple of days for its relocation 
from West Bengal, rescuing the company from a dire situation. Tata Motors had 
already set up part of its plant and was close to beginning manufacturing its much 
touted 1000 dollar car in West Bengal when opportunistic but successful political 
opposition to the project stalled it. Ratan Tata the chairman of Tata Motors was 
losing face and money when Modi stepped in to the rescue. However despite the 
impressive implementation of clearances and the provision of land and subsidies, 
there was little effort to negotiate desired outcomes or monitor the consequences of 
that investment for Gujarat. The plant at Sanand has run far below capacity and 
raises questions about the return Gujarat got from significant subsidies for Tata 
Motors which are discussed later. In general there is no evidence of negotiation or 
enforcement of conditions and this is consistent with our analysis of the 
configuration of the political settlement in Gujarat.  
There are several elements that explain these limitations of authoritarian clientelism 
in Gujarat. First, the relative power of the ruling coalition in Gujarat is limited by a 
number of critical factors. The BJP in Gujarat is part of a large national party that 
needs funds to contest elections and has to appear to work with different 
combinations of castes in other states. Like with the Congress leaders from Bombay 
in the 1960 and 1970s who were important to the national party as treasurers raising 
funds for the party, the BJP in Gujarat has to play a similar role for the national BJP. 
In addition, the BJP has to work with businesses with significant holding power, 
which can relocate to other states. This makes the relative power of the ruling 
coalition in Gujarat very different from that of South Korea and Taiwan during the 
early stages of their growth. In the latter the ruling coalition was able to provide 
conditional support to industry in a way that accelerated learning in high 
productivity sectors. While learning might still take place in industries attracted by 
Gujarat’s infrastructure and government subsidies, their compulsion to develop 
capabilities in new sectors is likely to be limited.  
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On the one hand there are indigenous Guajarati business organizations like the 
Adani Group and the Mehtas of Torrent. But they have yet to make significant moves 
into productive manufacturing. The Adani Group (AG) is one of India’s largest 
infrastructure and energy conglomerates and the Mehtas have a pharmaceutical 
subsidiary but so far this has remained a medium-sized generics producer in the 
country. Yet both groups, especially AG have very specific clientelist ties with the 
Modi government which provides them with privileged access to rents but without 
the compulsion associated with developmental rent management strategies. A 
senior bureaucrat with many years of experience in policy making told us “All state 
leaders have to forge close relationships with local capitalists for reasons of 
patronage. However, the close interface between the Modi administration and some 
capitalists who have become recently successful points to a very exclusive sort of 
business-government relationship”. 
As we have outlined in Section 4.8 of Chapter Four in some of these relationships, 
business appears to be the patron rather than the client, with implications for the 
developmental implications of the types of rents they can access. The specific 
distribution of power in the state makes the political settlement in Gujarat less 
conducive to capability development than the developmental states in East Asia and 
there is a potential danger of damaging rent capture by business interests at an early 
stage of development. 
  
5.1 History of Gujarat: Indus valley to the Coming of the British 
Historically Gujarat had sea links with Mesopotamia as early as 1500BCE through 
Lothal which was one of the urban centres of the Harappan civilization and its chief 
port. This port town was part of the Indus valley civilisation. These links continued 
with trade being conducted even after and Arab geographers mention Muslim 
trading settlements in south Gujarat in 951CE. The trading community in the region 
at the time was largely made up of Hindus and Jains (a religion closely connected to 
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Hinduism and pre-dating Buddhism in India) and were later joined by the 
Zoroastrians who left Iran after Arab conquests. This trade with the Middle East 
helped southern Gujarat develop a mercantile class, especially the Baniyas, a caste 
common to both Hinduism and Jainism. 
Mahmood of Ghazni made his famous raid from the west in 1051 and it is an 
unfortunate testament to the power of historical interpretation that his sacking of a 
prosperous temple in Somnath, western Gujarat, is still a rallying cry for right wing 
Hindu elements in India today. In what probably was an overzealous conqueror’s 
attempt at subjugation, they see a symbol of an enduring Islamic threat to Hindu 
India. However mainland Gujarat was annexed and incorporated into the Tughlaq 
dynasty of the Sultanate in Delhi only in 1298. The governors of the Tughlaq dynasty 
declared independence from Delhi in 1407 and established the independent 
Sultanate of Gujarat with Ahmadabad as its capital. Gujarat was annexed as a part of 
the Mughal empire in 1572. A sociological phenomenon that was to have an effect 
even in contemporary times was the inter-marriage of Muslims with Hindu Rajputs, a 
warrior caste. This took place during the reign of the independent governors of 
Gujarat just before the Mughal conquest and gave rise to a class of Muslims who 
followed a mix of Hindu and Muslim customs (Schimmel 1980). It was this section of 
Gujarati society that was to become a focal point for Hindu ‘reformers’ in the early 
20th century. These reformers wanted to bring back the converts into the Hindu fold 
and led to a worsening of communal relations in pre-independent times and finds 
repercussion even today. However at the time a syncretic form of Islam, akin to 
Sufism was widespread in the region and these converts were not looked upon as 
out of place in Gujarati society by Hindus and Muslims alike at that time. Later Hindu 
reformers tried ‘reconverting’ this group with varying degrees of success. Gujarat is 
also home to the some of the largest communities of Shia Muslims in India, like the 
Khojas and Bohras, whereas most of India’s Muslims are Sunnis. Along with the 
Sunni Memons the Shias constituted a crucial part of Gujarat’s commercial classes. 
The three were supposed to have been converted to Islam from Hindu trading 
communities and hence maintained their entrepreneurial abilities (Engineer 1989). 
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While many Bohras and Khojas opted to stay on in India after partition a substantial 
number of Memon families migrated to Sindh, with which province Gujarat always 
had close links. In fact the Memon community was largely responsible for setting up 
the Karachi Stock Exchange and controlled the exchange’s brokerages for a 
substantial period in Pakistan.  
Around the time that the Portuguese were making their forays on the Gujarat coast 
the Marathas (originating from what is now modern day Maharashtra in India), a 
rising regional power, started attacking the borders of the kingdom and plundered 
its major cities like, Surat and Baroda. By the beginning of the 18th century Mughal 
rule started declining and the Marathas were collecting revenue from the governor 
of the province as a sign of their growing dominance. These political upheavals 
however did not unsettle the Gujarati business community enough to cause a 
decline. In fact once significant portions of the province became a part of the British 
Empire Gujarati capital flourished. 
Gujarat’s business communities experienced a dip in their fortunes when the 
Portuguese and Dutch started controlling the sea trade routes to the Middle East 
from 16th century. Consequently they started investing their surpluses in inland trade. 
Some of these investments were initially taken over by the British (Hein Streefkerk 
1997). But as British presence in Gujarat deepened so did their need for 
intermediaries. This gap was filled by the Gujarati Baniyas and to a lesser extent the 
Muslim trading classes. The Muslim trading communities could not hold on to their 
businesses as successfully as they were largely involved in shipping and 
transportation to West Asia. As trade collapsed in West Asia and the shipping 
industry got taken over by the English, Muslim business fortunes in western India 
faltered (L. Subramanian 1991). 
British investments eventually made their way into transport, communications and 
agricultural markets providing further trade and investment opportunities for the 
already well-established Gujarati business community. Trade in agricultural produce 
and money lending became the chief occupations for many of them (Lamb 1958). 
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The development of Bombay (now Mumbai) as a port and a trading centre helped 
crystallise the interests of this community further. The opening up of the Suez Canal 
and the disruption of cotton supplies from America due to the Civil War helped 
establish Bombay as India’s premier port city. Cotton was a principal crop of 
Bombay’s hinterland and Gujarati businessmen were already involved in its inland 
trading. With the American Civil War they now developed international markets. 
From the trading of cotton to establishing textile mills seemed like a logical 
extension. Till World War I a majority of the Indian owned textile mills in Bombay 
and western India were run by Parsis, Khojas and Gujarati Baniyas (Lamb 1958). 
Entrepreneurs like Walchand Hirachand and Jamsetji Nusserwanji Tata were two 
pioneering industrialists who hailed from the Gujarat region. Tata spawned a 
conglomerate that is now one of India’s first multi-national corporations. 
Hirachand’s legacy is in the form of one of India’s foremost construction engineering 
companies.  
The establishment of the Gujarati business community however, came at a cost to 
communal relations. It led to the establishment of what Subramanian calls the 
‘Anglo-Baniya order’. By 1810 when Gujarat had been annexed into the empire the 
East India Company was actively enlisting the help of the Gujarati Baniya community 
to transfer money from Bengal, its richest province, to the western coast. This was 
done through the famous ‘Hundi’ system, or an informal system of bills of exchange, 
developed by these businessmen. By the 1850s the Company had moved on to using 
public loans but the political and commercial order that was created by this 
relationship endured (L. Subramanian 1996). She also documents evidence that one 
of the first instances of communal clashes in Surat, an important Gujarati town, was 
a result of the creation of this order. In fact this riot in 1788 was first between Parsis 
and Muslims as Parsis were also beneficiaries of this order. In 1795 another violent 
riot took place in Surat between the Muslims whose power was declining in Gujarat, 
and the Baniyas whose fortunes were definitely on the ascendant (L. Subramanian 
1991). She indicates that the riots were not purely communal but they were 
symbolic of the ‘dying throes of the older indigenous political and social order’.  
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By the early 19th century the political settlement in Gujarat had changed completely 
as a result of the arrival of the English. Under the English the Baniyas acquired new 
privileges that gradually resulted in the emergence of a new political order. In terms 
of our framework of political settlements the distribution of benefits changed, and 
indeed, increased for this community. By the beginning of the 20th century the 
largely agricultural Patidars or Patels had also accumulated enough agricultural 
surplus to invest in industry and trade. Together this laid the base for the 
construction of an emergent intermediate class that was to direct the course of 
Gujarati politics in the modern era, one in which the BJP found a receptive 
constituency.  
Another contributory factor that helped create a Hindutva constituency in Gujarat 
was the work of a late 19th century/early 20th century reform movement called the 
Arya Samaj. The movement though started by a Gujarati gained popularity first in 
Punjab where it campaigned against conversions of Hindu ‘lower caste’s by Christian 
missionaries. The Samaj or association was also engaged in bringing about a more 
egalitarian structure of Hinduism by campaigning against the caste system and for 
allowing widow remarriages. However by the time the movement reached Gujarat it 
had assumed deeper communal overtones with Samajis trying to reconvert both 
Christians and to a larger extent Muslims to Hinduism, though Hinduism does not 
have principles of conversion or reconversion (S. C. White 1999). A deeper analysis is 
not necessary here except for the fact that in Gujarat the Samaj for a while worked 
in close association with the Hindu Mahasabha, another right wing Hindu 
organisation which found some favour with the more right wing Congressmen across 
India and in Gujarat. At this time Gujarati popular literary works especially from the 
noted writer and politician Kanaiyalal Maneklal Munshi were also helping to build 
this incipient Hindutva in the state. Munshi’s writings were generally based around 
themes romanticising the early Vedic period in India. A second important and 
popular theme was woven around Mahmud of Ghazni’s attack on the borders of 
Gujarat with Munshi’s heroes being Hindu kings who were protecting Hindu subjects 
from the alien aggressor. This ensured a political form of Hindutva existed among 
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the intermediate classes within the state some time before Hindutva become a 
political project across India much later in the century. Of course as Hardiman says, 
this is not to say that the politics of the 1920s was in all ways similar to the manner 
in which Hindutva was defined post-independence in the 1980s. However the idea of 
constructing a nation state with reference to Hindusim did have its roots in such 
early political movements (S. C. White 1999)  
5.2 Independence to BJP Rule: Creation of a New Political Settlement  
 
5.2.1 Creation of Gujarat from Bombay Presidency: The Congress dominant party 
system and the expansion of industrial growth  
When India gained independence in 1947 Gujarat did not emerge as a separate state 
in India but the region was amalgamated into Bombay Presidency. The region existed 
as part of the state of Bombay in which the northern part was dominated by a 
Gujarati speaking population and the southern part by a Marathi speaking one. 
Bombay, already the commercial capital of independent India was the capital of the 
state. Due to the authority of Patel, a Gujarati, Gujarati politicians came to dominate 
the state, much to the consternation of the Marathi speaking population. The two 
states of Maharashtra and Gujarat were finally created in 1960 with Bombay 
remaining the capital of Marathi speaking Maharashtra and Ahmadabad becoming 
the Gujarati capital. Most of the negotiations behind the scenes during state 
formation were being orchestrated by the Congress in collaboration and sometimes 
in confrontation with smaller regional groupings. But the Congress remained the 
dominant party in the region and later the state. It won resoundingly in both 
national/parliamentary elections and in state-level assembly elections. It would be 
worth noting here that in their quest for a separate state the elites of Gujarat had 
rallied behind the Congress. This was due to the fact that only the Congress could 
deliver the political and economic rents an emerging capitalist class in newly 
independent India could make use of. The appeal of popular Congress leaders like 
Morarji Desai also ensured support. The Hindu Mahasabha won less than five per 
cent of the votes in many constituencies across Gujarat during elections in the early 
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1960s. The communal violence of the earlier periods seemed to be have been 
subsumed in the politics of state reorganisation, especially the privileges the new 
Gujarati elite could extract.  
However Gujarati politics remained limited to mobilisation among the upper and 
middle castes, specifically the Patidars or Patels, a name many might recognise as 
belonging to India’s chief diaspora community. Within their home state the Patidars, 
once a ‘lower caste’, had gained entry into the upper sections of society due to 
upward economic mobilisation based on its agricultural surplus (G. Shah 1994). This 
was a significant feature in Gujarat and other states in India like Tamil Nadu where 
indigenous formerly agricultural communities had accumulated enough surplus to 
make the transition to industrial investments. Where this was disrupted the 
transition to industry became difficult even when the region had a high industrial 
base because future investments could not be sustained. This was at least one of the 
reasons why despite its high industrial base West Bengal found it difficult to make 
the transition. Here the process of agricultural accumulation itself was disrupted due 
to the partition of British India.  
 The Patidars did not have to face such concerns. This community was a traditional 
supporter of the Swatantra Party, a rightist party in opposition to the Congress in the 
1960s. As a result the Congress also had to ensure some of its key policies were 
targeted at the rural and urban rich (Sinha 2005) as well as being explicitly pro 
industry (Dholakia 2000). In fact unlike most other Indian states political mobilisation 
in Gujarat has seldom included the working class or poor peasants (Breman 1985; 
Hein  Streefkerk 1985; G. Patel 2002).  Even some of the state’s most charismatic 
leaders like Patel and Munshi have often been identified as conservative politicians 
who did little to make political mobilisation in the state more inclusive (Mukta 2002; 
G. Patel 2002). Trade and entrepreneurship have historically been the main basis for 
Gujarati society. The state was in fact one of the losers of the Licence Permit system 
as the engine of Gujarati growth was entrepreneurship (Sinha 2005). A possibility of 
a backward caste mobilization was also kept in check by the popular Swaminarayan 
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sect of Hindusim in Gujarat. The sect has been active among Other Backward Classes 
(OBCs) and it promotes a philosophy keeping in line with the RSS’s Hindutva (G. Shah 
1994; G. Patel 2002).  
Soon after the creation of Gujarat the state discovered oil and gas reserves. The 
state accounts for 54 and 39 percent of India’s onshore crude and natural gas 
reserves (KPMG 2007). As a result Gujarat has very quickly developed into the oil and 
gas hub of the country. This helped catalyse the industrial process in a state that had 
already benefited from being part of Bombay state, in terms of investments in 
infrastructure. By 1979-80 the state was ranked second both in terms of value of 
gross industrial output per capita and industrial employment per thousand (Paranjpe 
1988). In the initial years the Congress in Gujarat encouraged and invited 
investments to locations close to its border with Maharashtra as that put Bombay 
within easy reach of investors. Bombay was western India’s premier city and India’s 
commercial hub, so it was hoped facilitating clusters close to the city would 
encourage investors to move across the border to Gujarat (Paranjpe 1988). This has 
resulted in the corridor between Ahmadabad and Mumbai (formerly Bombay) 
becoming one of India’s foremost industrial clusters. Many of Gujarat’s policies 
initially mirrored Maharashtra’s (formerly Bombay state) including the structure of 
the state industrial development facilitator, the Gujarat Industrial Development 
Corporation which was modelled on the Maharashtra Industrial Development 
Corporation (Sinha 2005). Some of its bureaucrats had served as part of the Bombay 
state administration too. A senior bureaucrat from Maharashtra who went on to 
senior positions in Delhi told us “This ensured continuity and a familiarity with 
industrial policy making and implementation and can certainly be identified as one of 
the reasons why the state did well from the start in the industrial sector”. Sinha 
contends that Gujarat did not receive as many industrial licences as did states like 
West Bengal in the 1960s and hence most of its industrial success was due to the 
dynamism of its bureaucrats and a recognition by the administration that  
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Table 5.3 Industrial Rank of Gujarat in 1980. 
 
State Industrial Employment per 
‘000 Population 
Gross Industrial Output 
per Capita (Rs) 
Industrially Backward States 
Andhra Pradesh  8.72 392.97 
Assam 5.48 285.95 
Bihar 4.43 370.26 
Madhya Pradesh 4.88 331.80 
Orissa 3.80 318.52 
Rajasthan 4.39 298.04 
Uttar Pradesh 5.49 254.36 
Industrially Advanced States 
Gujarat 15.45 1382.05 
Haryana 10.30 983.34 
Karnataka 7.73 492.22 
Kerala  8.9 537.97 
Maharashtra 17.14 1638.73 
Punjab 10.76 833.86 
Tamil Nadu 11.95 922.6 
West Bengal 15.88 820.42 
Average of all States 9.02 657.54 
 
Source: (Paranjpe 1988: Table 1)   
Note: based on Annual Survey of Industries, Census Sector, 1979-80 and Census of 
India, 1981  
 
industrialisation was necessary (Sinha 2005). This was certainly true. Gujarat 
however saw significant public investments in industry and it is a well-known fact 
that capital formation in India during the 1960s and early 1970s was driven by the 
public sector. For instance state owned Indian Oil Corporation’s refinery in Baroda, 
Gujarat was commissioned in 1965-66 and still remains the corporation’s largest 
refinery. Till 2002 three of the state’s five petrochemical complexes were state 
owned and all six of its major chemical fertilizer complexes remain state owned. The 
fact that a Congress government was also ruling in the centre helped locating critical 
investments in Gujarat. Hence the base for Gujarat’s impressive industrial 
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performance (relative to the rest of India) was laid during this period of Congress 
rule. By 1980 Gujarat was already one of India’s most industrialized states ranked 
second after Maharashtra (Table 5.3). It’s pro-active policies with respect to 
monitoring the status of licences granted by the central government also ensured 
Gujarat saw greater industrial success in the 1960s and 1970s (Sinha 2004b). 
In 1969 the Congress Party underwent a split with one section accepting the 
leadership of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and the others opposed to it. Most senior 
Congress leaders defected to form Congress-O but Indira’s Congress or Congress-I 
was able to form a government soon after in Delhi. Gujarat was not unaffected by 
this change and the new chief minister Chimanbhai Patel faced increasing opposition 
from within Congress-I ranks which later developed into the ‘Nav Nirman’ (New 
Foundations) movement in 1974 where students were protesting against a 20 
percent hike in hostel bills. The movement however was soon hijacked by the urban 
middle class in the state that started protesting against unpopular policies of Patel 
that led to price rises. The movement was essentially against Patel’s attempts at 
intervening in deciding university level positions in Gujarat but snowballed into 
protests led by groups he had left out while manoeuvring for chief ministership. 
Many analysts have also traced the roots of modern Gujarat’s social mobilisation to 
this movement. However what emerges from an analysis of this movement as 
scholars like Shah have shown is that the Nav Nirman Movement was prescient of 
the right wing turn Gujarati politics was to take. There are several reasons for this. 
The movement saw heightened tensions between Muslims and Hindus leading to 
riots between the two even though the movement was ostensibly about price rises. 
The Jan Sangh, the immediate predecessor of the BJP was one of the chief organizers 
of the movement though for a while parties like the Congress-O and the Communist 
CPI-M also participated. Finally Modi cut his proverbial teeth in mobilizing as a young 
leader of the Nav Nirman Movement (G. Shah 1994).  
After a few precarious Congress governments in the 1970s the party regained 
stability under Madhavsinh Solanki who devised the famous KHAM alliance in 
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Gujarat. Solanki who was from a ‘lower caste’ devised an alliance of Kshatriyas (a 
lower intermediate caste involved in agriculture in Gujarat, though elsewhere in 
North India they are the upper warrior caste), ‘Harijans’ or Scheduled Castes 
(‘untouchables’ who are outside the caste system), Adivasis (indigenous tribes) and 
Muslims, collectively known as the KHAM alliance. This alliance was supposed to 
counter the forces of the ‘upper castes. While it is not the scope of this paper to 
review the literature available on caste and its relationship with class in India, at 
least in Gujarat the parallel is noticeable. Solanki’s calculations were based on the 
fact that the KHAM alliance made up over 50 percent of Gujarat’s population and he 
hoped this constituency would produce the right electoral result for the Congress. 
Having created this constituency it was now incumbent upon Solanki to provide it 
with incentives. With an eye on the elections in 1985 his government announced 
reservations for jobs in government institutions and higher academic institutions for 
the SCs and STs. The SCs and STs were a part of the KHAM alliance.   
The ‘upper castes, namely the Baniyas, Brahmans and Patidars in the state rose in 
protest and riots broke out between members of these castes and Dalits. Matters 
took a turn for the worse when Solanki pressed on and announced further 
reservations for the OBCs in the state. This turned out to be the beginning of the end 
for the Congress dominant party system in Gujarat. Solanki had sought to build a 
ruling coalition with the marginalised in Gujarat but he had not bargained for the 
sustained holding power of the ‘upper caste’s that saw their interests hurt especially 
with the introduction of reservations in educational institutions. The impetus to 
maintain the social status quo assumed greater strength than a coalition which had 
few commonalities to begin with apart from being in opposition to the ‘upper castes. 
The violence escalated to an extent where the centre, also ruled by the Congress had 
to intervene and ask Solanki to resign. Escalating violence in a key Congress-ruled 
state was too high a cost for the party to absorb. 
It has to be noted here that Solanki’s tenure as chief minister is associated with one 
of the highest growth rates that Gujarat has experienced, higher even than under 
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Modi. Sectors like electronics were given encouragement under Solanki and new 
industry friendly policies were announced (S. Patel 1988). Earlier investments in the 
state were coming good and Solanki himself was seen as a pro-industry chief 
minister. The chemical industry featuring home grown names like Tata Chemicals 
and Nirma consolidated their businesses during his tenure. Operation Flood, the 
programme to make India self sufficient in milk production was launched in Gujarat 
in 1970 but became self sufficient in the 1980s. Pharmaceutical companies that are 
now some of India’s largest like Lupin and Sun Pharma were already a large presence 
in the state’s manufacturing sector. Finally, the state’s diamond cutting industry was 
making a dent internationally much before Modi’s tenure. By the time the Indian 
economy was liberalised in 1992 the state was well poised to leverage on the 
competencies it had built up during the years of protection and as a result Gujarat 
was one of the states that benefited most from liberalisation. “Given the current 
hype about how Modi has transformed Gujarat people tend to forget Gujarat was 
always an industrially advanced state and especially that Madhavsinh Solanki 
ensured high levels of productive investment that Modi could build upon”, said a 
retired member of the senior management of a Gujarat-based electronics company.  
Yet industrial growth did not stop Solanki’s tenure from being marked by some of 
the highest levels of violence in Gujarat since the Nav Nirman movement. His 
attempts at rewarding the constituency of the marginalised in Gujarati society was 
met with stiff resistance despite the state’s positive economic performance. We will 
draw attention to the use of the word ‘constituency’ to describe Solanki’s alliance 
and the fact that the term ruling coalition has not been used. Solanki attempted to 
bring together a number of communities who were bound together only by the fact 
that they were marginalised and would have little to lose if matters didn’t go their 
way. The Kshatriyas were not natural allies of either the Dalits or Muslims but they 
had been historically involved in a power struggle with the Patidars and this is what 
influenced their decision to join Solanki’s alliance (Sheth 1976; G. Shah 1985). 
However the ‘upper caste’s had a coalition and were joined through various 
clientelist networks to state patronage. This coalition had far more to lose if Solanki’s 
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alliance succeeded in changing the distribution of benefits. Violence against his 
decisions on affirmative action was an attempt by this coalition to keep the political 
balance from changing. Again most of the violence was not spontaneous and had 
elements of deliberation (J. R. Wood 1987). Solanki was attempting to create a new 
political settlement that was not compatible with the underlying distribution of 
power, in particular the holding power of the ‘upper castes. The experiment proved 
to be unsustainable. The holding power of the excluded organizations in Gujarat at 
this time was too strong and the motivation to rally against the KHAM alliance was 
also high given that the alliance struck at the material interests of the ‘upper caste’s. 
The exclusion was marked and visible in that for the first time in Gujarat’s history 
there was not a single Patidar who was a cabinet minister in Solanki’s ministry 
between 1980 and 1985, and nor has this feature been subsequently repeated. A 
similar and more detailed history of this period is provided in (Kohli 2012). 
Any benefit the Congress’ received from asking Solanki to resign proved short lived. 
More critically it created a political opportunity that was effectively exploited by the 
Hindutva wing of Indian politics, namely the BJP, its patron the RSS and a sister 
organisation called the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) or the World Association of 
Hindus (Engineer 2002; Lobo 2002; G. Patel 2002; Mahadevia 2005). The caste riots 
of Solanki’s term had also degenerated into communal riots between Hindus and 
Muslims when the latter community had no role to play in caste politics. Communal 
politics was once again making a comeback to mainstream Gujarati politics as the 
BJP realized alienating the Dalits and Adivasis was proving to be costly for them. It is 
an unfortunate irony that Muslims and Dalits sheltered each other during the riots of 
1981 and 1985 but this empathy was to change dramatically in the 1990s once the 
VHP made significant inroads into the Dalit population of Gujarat. While it is very 
difficult to find proof in such matters many analysts argued that these communal 
riots were part of a deliberate strategy of escalating tensions between the two 
communities (Engineer 2002; Shani 2007). The situation in the state was effectively 
mirroring the communalisation of Indian politics on the whole, a process we have 
summarized briefly in Chapter Seven section 7.2. With the ‘upper caste’s in Gujarat 
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definitively against the Congress, events in the state provided the best platform for 
the BJP. In fact the Congress has effectively not been able to regain Gujarat since 
Solanki’s ouster. 
Communal politics is not new to India. All parties, national and regional, have at 
various points used populist right wing agendas in electoral politics to gain either the 
majority Hindu vote or used ‘secularism’ to appeal to Muslim voters (Chatterjee 
1995; Hansen 2000; Engineer 2002; Palshikar 2004). Muslims are the most significant 
minority in India, making up close to 17 percent of the population or over 170 million 
Indians. Significantly despite its Hindu majority, India is one the largest Muslim 
countries in the world after Indonesia, Pakistan and Bangladesh. However the 
Muslim population in the country is dispersed unevenly and they make up a majority 
in only very few regions. This makes them especially vulnerable when parties have 
agendas that specifically appeal to the Hindu voter. For instance while the BJP does 
not have an explicit electoral agenda of violence against Muslims its vision is to see 
Muslims and indeed other minorities merging into a Hindu belief system that is a 
throwback to a time before the coming of Islam in India in 7 CE: the Hindu ‘golden 
age’. However the party does not shy away from violence against Muslims, and 
sometimes, other minorities like Christians, where it thinks it is necessary for 
electoral advantage. Violence against members of Gujarat’s Muslims and Christian 
communities in the late 1990s and early 2000s are testament to this.  
 
5.2.2 The Changing Political Settlement and a BJP Government  
The BJP and its allies adopted a two-pronged strategy to upset the Congress coalition. 
It decided to reach out to the ‘upper caste’s in the state by providing a politics of 
identity, distinct from the Congress’ attempts at election-driven inclusiveness. This 
was in line with its strategy across India. The second was to carefully construct a 
strategy to co-opt the Adivasis into its fold, similar to its strategy in the Indian state 
of Chattisgarh.  The party had already won municipal elections in key Gujarati cities 
through the 1980s. As the need for mobilisation grew with these successes the BJP 
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gradually started dispersing positions within its party organisational structure to the 
OBC population of Gujarat that numbered over 30 percent of the state’s population. 
However the principle beneficiaries were the Patidars who were ‘rewarded’ for their 
fierce opposition to Solanki’s policies of reservation. As Patel says, although a ‘lower 
caste’, this constituency did not want to be associated with the KHAM alliance 
because of its association with marginalisation. With the BJP giving it the opportunity 
for upward mobilisation this constituency became a loyal one for the party (G. Patel 
2002). Such a strategy could not be adopted in Uttar Pradesh, a state that has led 
backward caste mobilisation in India, because an equivalent of the Patidar caste 
does not exist in that state. The Patidars were a ‘low’ agricultural caste who could 
make the shift to being recognized as an ‘upper caste’ after the success they had in 
investing their agricultural surplus in trade. No ‘lower caste’ had made such a 
decisive shift in UP and given how successfully mobilized the political organizations 
of the ‘lower caste’s are now in UP it might be safe to say that a significant shift in 
their allegiance towards the BJP will be difficult in the next few years. 
The other strategy adopted by the BJP was to co-opt the indigenous population 
(close to 15 percent) of the state into the Hindutva fold. For the indigenous 
population, assimilation into the Hindu ‘fold’ held more benefits than support from 
the Congress which came with little social recognition. The rents that were 
distributed to allow for this assimilation were not all economic. It also included a 
subtle but insidious combination of appealing to a specific ideology of superiority in 
the case of certain groupings and in the case of others it was simply an assurance of 
social security (Thapar 2007). Hence apart from a chance at economic advancement 
this constituency also got a chance to enter the Hindu ‘mainstream’, an opportunity 
that traditional Hindu social structure did not provide. This is what Shani calls ‘from 
the politics of redistribution to the politics of recognition’ (Shani 2005). Seen as 
practicing a ‘primitive’ kind of Hinduism because of the preponderance of animism 
among tribal groups the Hindutva parties never really concentrated on them till they 
realised Christian missionaries were converting them through their work. It should 
be noted that where even the state hadn’t reached at least some of these 
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missionaries reached deep into tribal areas to provide them with basic services like 
primary health care and education. Since the 1980s the RSS and its sister 
organisations, especially the VHP have been trying to counteract the missionaries by 
reaching into the tribal areas with attempts to ‘reconvert’ them. The VHP’s 
association with the tribal population of Gujarat was initially linked to an anti-
conversion agenda. Increasingly though the RSS and its associates used the tribals in 
a huge mobilisation against Muslims. In some areas where Muslims happened to be 
moneylenders in tribal villages the RSS incited the population on grounds of 
oppression. Historically the tribal population in the state was never a significant part 
of any political mobilisation process, even during the height of the KHAM alliance. 
This sort of sectarian mobilization of the tribal population though was 
unprecedented (Pinto 1995; Lobo 2002). However it led to disastrous consequences 
for the community and Indian polity in general. The real result of this mobilisation 
became apparent in the riots of 2002 when large tracts of Gujarat’s tribal population 
rioted with the VHP against the Muslim community. “Co-opting the indigenous 
population of Gujarat against the state’s Muslim community was the real master 
stroke of the BJP’s Gujarat strategy”, said a senior academic and policy adviser to the 
central government. 
This is not to say that the other national party, the Congress has no communal 
agenda. The Congress’ attempts at coalition building had at first tried to include all 
major interest groups (Chatterjee 1997) but increasingly relied on a large chunk of 
India’s Muslim population and the ‘lower caste’s that together make up over 50 per 
cent of India’s population. That did not stop the Congress from pursuing populist 
identity politics from time to time that would appeal to Hindus. In order to keep its 
primacy the Congress realised that appealing to Hindu ‘sentiments’ could provide it 
with a tool to cut across regions and languages. One such instance was a contentious 
move by the Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to open the lock of the Babri Masjid built 
by the first Mughal emperor and claimed by Hindutva activists to be built on the 
birth place of Ram, a Hindu deity. It was easy for the BJP to pick up where the 
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Congress left and carry it forward successfully. By 1990 the BJP had formed four 
state governments and it had much to thank the Congress for.  
In Gujarat’s case the BJP along with the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) or the 
‘worldwide association for Hindus’ and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak RSS (RSS), Modi 
was able to build a relatively homogeneous coalition that overcame barriers of class 
and caste, the latter being a critical variable in Indian politics. Both the VHP and RSS 
are ideological sister organizations of the BJP though neither fights elections. The 
RSS is in fact the parent organization of the BJP and is the source of the philosophical 
roots of the BJP’s politics as well as providing critical organizational support today. 
This coalition was positioned against the Muslim minority population of the state. 
The closest English translation for the RSS would be ‘National Association for 
Promoting Self Reliance’. ‘Swayamseva’ or self-reliance does not translate very well 
but it invokes a sense of pride through independence. Modi is known to be well liked 
by most senior functionaries of the RSS who play a very vital role in the appointment 
of senior BJP leaders not just for executive positions within the party but also for 
legislative candidates.  This gives Modi both formal and informal authority to ensure 
his writ runs without significant opposition.  
The organisational muscle to engineer the riots came from the intermediate and 
lower levels of the BJP, but more so from the VHP, especially in Ahmadabad. Local 
‘goondas’ or lumpen foot soldiers were recruited by politicians to conduct terror 
campaigns (Berenschot 2009). These foot soldiers are used during elections to 
garner support for the politicians at the grassroots. In return the goondas get 
patronage from politicians, which involve protection from the law and sometimes 
monetary compensation. This system of patronage is also similar in broad respects 
to what Khan describes for political mobilisation in Bangladesh but the differences in 
the way the coalitions were constructed have important economic and political 
consequences (M. H. Khan 2010a).  The BJP at the time of the 2002 riots was also the 
single largest party in the ruling coalition in the national government at the centre 
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and the fact that Modi and his state government were able to get away unscathed 
was in no small way linked to this fact.  
The language of ‘experimentation’ and ‘laboratory’ frequently finds its way into 
critical discourses on why the riots happened in Gujarat (R. Ahmad 2002; Engineer 
2002; Lobo 2002; Mukta 2002; G. Patel 2002). These well-orchestrated mobilisations 
gave more credence to the fact that the BJP was indeed using Gujarat as an 
experiment in developing Hindutva though the social conditions necessary for this 
remain as yet specific to Gujarat. Whatever the party’s aims it won the state level 
assembly elections with a majority in 1995. However the party had still not come to 
grips with being in power and its organisational hierarchy was uneven. This resulted 
in significant infighting within the party and between 1996 and 1998 a breakaway 
group of the BJP formed the government. By 1998 the mainstream BJP was back in 
power. As Table 5.4 shows Gujarat’s manufacturing performance was still 
impressively high. In fact the years from 1981 to 1994 saw the state achieve growth 
rates that have since not been replicated on the back of investments in the power, 
infrastructure, synthetic textiles and petrochemicals sector and the manufacturing 
sector grew faster than the national average through most of those years (Awasthi 
2000; Menon 2008). The diamond processing industry also posted its highest growth 
in the 1980s (Lee 2008). However the incumbent chief minister faced severe criticism  
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Table 5.4 Manufacturing growth in Gujarat in 1980-96 
Years                Gujarat Rank        All India 
 Mfg NSDP Share*  Mfg NDP Share 
1980-81  
NSDP from 
Manufacturing 
(Rs crore) 
1354 20.7 4 18698 16.9 
State Share in 
NDP (%) 
7.2   
1985-86  
NSDP from 
Manufacturing 
(Rs crore) 
2228 27.1 3 26413 18.8 
Change over 
1980-81 (%) 
12.9  8.3 
State Share in 
NDP (%) 
8.4 
1990-91  
NSDP from 
Manufacturing 
(Rs crore) 
3128 28.1 1 39408 20.7 
Change over 
1985-86 (%) 
8.1  9.8 
State Share in 
NDP (%) 
7.9 
1995-96  
NSDP from 
Manufacturing 
(Rs crore) 
4804 33.81 1 52969 21.7 
Change over 
1990-91 (%) 
10.7  6.9 
State Share in 
NDP (%) 
9.1 
Source: (Awasthi 2000: Table 3) Note: NSDP- Net State Domestic Product, NDP- Net 
Domestic Product * Share of manufacturing in NSDP or NDP 
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from within the BJP and outside for his handling of the relief efforts after a massive 
earthquake killed close to 20,000 people in the state. This mishandling caused the 
BJP to suffer severe losses in local by-elections (elections held mid-term when the 
constituency loses its elected representative) and the BJP responded quickly by 
asking him to resign and appointed Modi as chief minister in 2001. 
 
5.3 A New Ruling Coalition and Authoritarian Clientelism 
Gujarat’s politics took a new turn with the appointment of Modi as chief minister. 
Modi came into prominence while he was still with the RSS and only joined the BJP 
in 1987. He swiftly rose through the ranks by organising party workers at the 
grassroots and successfully mobilizing them. Within a year he was made the general 
secretary of the party in the state and gained the attention of national level leaders 
when he successfully oversaw successful BJP mobilizations in Gujarat. By 1995 he 
was made a National Secretary of the party in charge of five states at the relatively 
young age of 45, by Indian standards. Modi’s proximity to many RSS leaders also 
ensured his passage through the ranks of the BJP was unhindered. One of the first 
events that marked the beginning of the Modi government was the aftermath of 
what is now known as the Godhra incident in 2002 where a Muslim mob allegedly 
set fire to a train carriage carrying Hindu pilgrims. This has yet to be conclusively 
proven and an independent report by the Central ministry of Railways of the time 
concluded that the fire was an accident. However the violence that followed, which 
included outright killings of Muslim citizens and selective targeting of Muslim 
commercial and residential establishments in cities like Ahmadabad and Surat, 
seemed to be pre-meditated and well-planned. Informal reports spoke of Muslim-
owned shops that did not pay sales taxes (and hence were not on any official list) 
being spared only because rioters had no information on them. This pointed to the 
possibility of significant collusion between so-called spontaneous rioters and the 
administration (Brass 2003; Shani 2007). Significantly the army was called in to quell 
the violence only after 32 hours of violence. While few accuse Modi of being actively 
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involved in the riots, as head of the government the blame for inaction can squarely 
be kept outside his door. The sectarian violence was a manifestation of what Paul 
Brass calls ‘institutionalised riot systems’ where specialists indulge in ‘riot production’ 
(Brass 2003). Godhra was certainly not the first time this system was used and nor 
was this the first time that Godhra witnessed riots. However the meticulousness 
with which the riots seem to have been planned are unprecedented. Riots in India 
become a way of political mobilisation based on deeply ideological moorings of 
identifying a mythical ‘other’. This ‘other’ in India has over the years come to mean 
Muslims for Hindutva activists and sympathisers. 
One significant feature of the BJP is its deep links with the RSS. Not only does the RSS 
provide the ideological roots for the BJP it also strongly influences executive decision 
within the BJP for appointing internal office bearers and critically has a strong voice 
in suggesting even prime ministerial candidates. There have been instances in the 
BJP where the RSS has disapproved of an emerging leader and such opinions have 
the potential to derail or further his or her political career. Thus when Modi became 
chief minister in 2001 he had both formal authority (as a member of the executive) 
and informal writ by dint of being close to the RSS. This ensured he was able to 
execute governance without encountering significant hindrances. It is significant that 
Modi now is a key contender for the BJP’s prime ministerial candidate when 
elections are held to India’s parliament in 2014. That Modi still maintains close 
contacts with the RSS is clear from media reports and interviews conducted during 
this research. Senior RSS functionaries were staying in the same government 
accommodation at the same time as this researcher was while on field work in 
Ahmadabad. They had been invited by Modi to observe first-hand the progress 
Gujarat had made under him. The RSS is not known to have any political ambitions 
and nor do its leaders court the limelight in a country where politicians and ministers 
are known to go home to change before appearing on TV even in the time of a 
significant crisis. It is a combination of this moral standard (a morality at odds with 
its exclusionary philosophies) and the philosophy of a canonical Hinduism harking 
back to a Vedic past that provides the RSS with credibility within the BJP. Such 
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authority does not always make it popular among ambitious BJP leaders. However 
given that the Hindutva ideology has salience among a sizable section of the Indian 
population the BJP-RSS relationship will remain an enduring one.  
What this means in our analysis is that both formal and informal distribution of 
power in Gujarat are aligned in a manner that led to a growth-enhancing political 
settlement that nonetheless allows for a significant amount of violence. In other 
words the operational equilibrium between formal and informal organizations in the 
state is strong. We identify the RSS as an informal political organization with 
significant holding power that it draws not on the basis of from economic power but 
on the basis of its mobilizing ideology. We know from our framework that once a 
political settlement emerges the distribution of benefits across organizations has to 
be in line with the relative power of organizations. If this does not happen 
organizations with high holding power will mobilize till they have brought the 
distribution of benefits in line with their real relative power. In the case of Gujarat 
however the distribution of benefits is in line with the relative holding power of its 
key organizations. The RSS is not anti-industry and more importantly believes Modi is 
best placed to deliver its Hindutva agenda. For the RSS the benefit or pay-off is 
ideological. As we have discussed in Chapter Three mobilizations can also be based 
on ideology and not all benefits are necessarily economic in nature. This is an 
important feature of patron-client relationships that conventional analysis misses.  In 
Chapter Seven we analyse how the Pakistani Taliban is mobilizing on the basis of a 
worldview that is based on rational assumptions of pay-offs, however irrational we 
might think their mobilization is. For now at least any power sharing arrangement 
with the incumbent government is not likely to stop mobilization by the Taliban.  
The RSS’ mobilization is much less adversarial to the established state and nor is 
their mobilization as violent as the Pakistani Taliban. But for one its agenda of 
Hindutva is not to supplant the state but to recast the state in a Hindutva mould 
even if not constitutionally. Secondly the RSS has as an ally a formal political party 
that already reflects their agenda and has successfully formed the central 
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government in Delhi once as well as many state governments, unlike the Taliban. The 
other important coalitions are of the ‘upper caste’s and the Patidars all of whom are 
now part of the organizations of the ruling coalition and for whom the pay-off is a 
business friendly administration. Though ideology is not as important for these caste 
groupings as it is for the RSS it nonetheless it is an important reason for their support 
of Modi. This would be in line with our framework which says a political settlement 
that best mirrors the real distribution of power is most likely to have high 
enforcement capabilities. This is what we see reflected in the current political 
settlement in Gujarat. All organizations that have significant holding power have 
been incorporated in a form of constrained patrimonialism providing Modi with the 
enforcement capability he needs to make his policies growth-enhancing in terms of 
industrial investments. That he is able to leave out a significant portion of the state’s 
Muslim population is to do with the fact that the community has almost no holding 
power in Gujarat during the period under consideration. In the political settlement 
that has now emerged there is no other significant group left that an opposition 
party like the Congress can possibly ally with along with the state’s Muslim 
community in order to mobilize against the state’s ruling coalition.  
Hence what is often projected as Modi’s charisma or singular ability to lead is 
essentially a function of the fact that the ruling coalition that has now emerged in 
Gujarat’s political settlement is a variant of patrimonialism with repressive features 
within the institutional framework of a democracy. We cannot identify this as a 
variant of strong patrimonialism because we contend violence was used to create 
this distribution of power rather than a situation where power was distributed such 
that the ruling coalition did not have to use political repression (M. H. Khan 2012f). It 
is not vulnerable patrimonialism because the ruling coalition does not have a limited 
time horizon and in order to define it as constrained patrimonialism the ruling 
coalition would have to be more inclusive.  As highlighted in the introductory section 
while there are elements of authoritarianism in Modi’s patrimonialism it has 
identifiable features of clientelism in that the levels of monitoring over capitalists by 
the Modi administration are low. In fact the political settlement in Gujarat is best 
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summed up as Authoritarian Clientelism that at least for now seems to co-exist well 
with democracy. We define this is as such because the informal institutional features 
in Gujarat resemble an authoritarian regime though in reality Gujarat has an elected 
government and power is shared among the ruling coalition in a clientelistic manner. 
Modi has often been credited with being the efficient administrator responsible for 
steering Gujarat towards heightened prosperity. In the earlier paragraphs we 
outlined how this was because of the particular configuration of the ruling coalition 
that was in turn dependent on specific historical and social factors like caste 
configurations and historically conservative political mobilizations in the state. 
Another reason that helps Modi project himself as efficient is his ability to able to 
‘signal’ more effectively to investors that he was able to deliver specific and targeted 
rents, rather than creating an investment climate conducive to investments across 
the board. We have established Gujarat had a history of an efficient bureaucracy and 
preponderance of a manufacturing base relative to Indian levels. The difference in 
Modi’s case was that apart from sustaining Gujarat’s investment climate he was also 
able to deliver credibly on the specific rents he had promised investors. Successive 
Gujarat governments have held up business interests through various industry 
development bodies like Gujarat State Finance Corporation, Gujarat Industrial 
Development Corporation or INDEXTb. The Modi administration has continued to 
promote such organizations to aid the interface between business and government. 
GIDC today is considered one of the best facilitators for industrial investments 
especially in matters like land allocation to industry, an area where other states are 
facing increasing difficulty. Modi’s personal involvement in GIDC and his ability to 
enforce decisions relatively rapidly on both the party and the bureaucracy are 
reasons for GIDC’s success. According to an investor with significant interests in 
Gujarat “Whatever criticism might be levelled at Modi’s administration the fact still 
remains that they, thanks to Modi, are able to deliver what they promise to their 
business investors. At a time when other states in the country are unable to do so 
this singles Modi out as an effective administrator”. This however stems directly 
from the fact that the ruling coalition is configured in a way that heightens Modi’s 
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enforcement capability. Hence the Modi administration is able to provide investors 
including members of the Gujarati diaspora host of incentives especially if the 
incentives are in preferred industries.    
One notable feature of post Godhra Gujarat is the construction of ‘Gujarati asmita’ 
or Gujarati respect, by Modi. The term was coined by Munshi the popular Gujarati 
leader referred to it Section 5.2 but Modi has popularised it since then. The term is 
meant to provide a sense of heightened identity to all Gujaratis (even Muslims 
according to the BJP) and bring them together on a common platform of belonging.  
While this would have been difficult for the victims of the riots in 2002 it seems to 
have appealed to a broad cross section of Gujaratis and ties in with the BJP’s strategy 
of providing a separate Hindu identity. In neighbouring Maharashtra nativist populist 
parties have also made the Marathi identity an overtly political project. In Gujarat’s 
case ‘asmita’ is a more subtle concept. It ties in facts like Gujarat being one of India’s 
most developed states, is home to some of the country’s most successful 
entrepreneurs and that the people have a rich culture; all of which is true and 
accepted relatively unequivocally in India. Yet in this case Gujarati pride is evoked by 
suggesting Gujarati pride is somehow being questioned and a criticism of the 
political establishment is considered counter to the spirit of ‘asmita’.  
Modi’s ability carry the party with him was a key factor in signalling that he was the 
de facto and de jure leader and there were no other power centres to contend with. 
Haren Pandya a key critic of Modi within the RSS and BJP, and an ex-home minister 
in the BJP government in Gujarat was murdered in 2003. Speculation remained rife 
about the reason behind his death with opinion divided into two camps. The first 
was that this was one way of dealing with a Modi rival who was also testifying 
against him during the investigations into Godhra. The second theory is that Pandya 
paid with his life for his own involvement in the anti-Muslim violence after Godhra. 
The prosecution pressed for this latter option and won the case but doubts continue 
to be raised about the manner in which the investigation was conducted. While this 
is not the first or last time that an Indian politician is caught in a controversy that 
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concerns a political rival the speed with which the case was ‘solved’ was suggestive 
of a desire to close the Pandya chapter as quickly as possible. During his second term 
Modi had a small cabinet and kept key portfolios like the home ministry in charge of 
law and order to himself. Also he did not appoint elected BJP members to head state 
owned boards and corporations. This ensured he had his supporters who possessed 
little political currency in key positions effectively stifling opposition (Mahadevia 
2005).  Scholars like Sinha have contended that sub-national states in India like 
Gujarat became developmental after liberalisation because the new competitive 
atmosphere meant industry needed more interaction with the state to streamline 
investments than before (Sinha 2004a). However we will see later that this parallel 
while true to some extent cannot be drawn to the full length of the developmental 
logic. The signalling on the part of Modi was enough to be interpreted positively by 
investors hungry for investment opportunities in a liberalised economy (Mahadevia 
2005). 
It is when one relates the translation of this ideology to political mobilisation that 
the BJP’s strategy in Gujarat becomes apparent. The majority of the state is Hindu 
and most of the industrial interests are controlled by Hindus as well. Violence against 
Muslims would do no significant damage to the state’s economic base. Unlike the 
current Maoist insurgency in India which has deep and historically socialist roots and 
seeks to strike at symbols of economic inequity, like factories and mines, violence by 
Hindutva activists does not affect large industry and capital. It is a violence that can 
be calibrated at will using patron-client networks and is within an established 
political system, unlike the Maoists who are beyond the pale of the state or political 
authorities within the establishment. Hence this sort of violence can ironically be 
dubbed ‘safe’ for dominant economic interests. Of course there is a danger of both 
oversimplification and contradiction in defining any violence as ‘safe’ because 
violence can escalate in unplanned directions. However given that as a consequence 
of partition the Muslim population in India has shrunk relative to the total 
population and is widely dispersed across the country it has become increasingly 
common to use this asymmetry to target the community. This does not mean that 
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the community is always at the receiving end of violence but that it is easier to 
exclude the community in certain regions. In the case of Godhra, the rioters work 
was made easier as the union government at that time was a coalition led by the BJP 
and did not react in time either. Despite its communally expedient politics the 
Congress’ given its history cannot resort to organized violence of this sort and indeed 
depends on Muslim votes for electoral victory across many states, though for 
reasons analysed cannot do so in Gujarat. 
Various political parties demanded Modi’s resignation as chief minister after the 
Godhra related violence but the BJP stuck to its ground and let Modi continue. This is 
where his RSS support base was critical. All sections of the BJP are not united in 
favour of this sort of violent political mobilisation but given that the ideological roots 
of the party are within the RSS the moderates within the party had little say. 
Ironically Modi’s grip over the state machinery and the party only deepened after 
the riots. To be sure, investments in 2002-03 did see a drop but this was a minor blip 
when compared to the gains the state made in later years. This is where the BJP’s 
strategy of what we call ‘safe violence’ has succeeded. It is doubtful if a similar 
theatre can be replicated in other Indian states simply because they lack the 
distribution of power among castes and economic interests that allowed such a 
strategy of violence in Gujarat. For instance in neighbouring Maharashtra the BJP 
and its local ally tried to follow a similar strategy and almost succeeded with the 
state getting violently communalised in the 1990s and the two parties coming to 
power on the basis of Hindutva. However politics in Maharashtra is extremely 
fragmented and caste configurations do not add up very neatly making mobilisation 
only on the basis of Hindutva an unsuccessful electoral strategy. The Congress and its 
allied party could construct new alliances to resist the BJP combine. More 
importantly the coalition created by Congress in Maharashtra distributed significant 
rents to particular intermediate classes and castes and it was difficult for the BJP to 
bypass these groups entirely. The system of banking, sugar, and agricultural 
cooperatives that the Congress had created from the 1950s provided rents to a 
broad range of Maratha leaders, the dominant caste in Maharashtra (M. H. Khan 
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2008b; P. Roy 2008, 2012). Hence opposition to the BJP combine was strong. 
Violence in Maharashtra also threatened to affect productive investments as all 
communities were significantly present in Mumbai where violence had high 
economic costs. The distribution of holding power in Maharashtra has so far at least 
ensured that Hindutva does not become a sustained mobilising ideology. Of course 
the BJP in Gujarat no longer uses Hindutva explicitly but frequently evokes ‘asmita’ 
as a proxy. 
5.4 A Political Settlement of Growth with Exclusion  
The controversy surrounding Modi’s legacy in Gujarat will keep sections of Indian 
society deeply divided but very few will deny that Gujarat’s growth has been 
consistently high and accelerated somewhat under Modi. Earlier regimes had even 
higher growth rates, for instance under the administrations of Solanki or Patel (Table 
5.5). However, Gujarat under Modi saw a level of political consolidation 
unprecedented even under the Congress dominant party rule. Growth under other 
chief ministers saw large spikes and troughs but consistently high growth was 
achieved under the three Modi administrations. As we saw earlier the state saw very 
high investment levels and high levels of growth in the four years from 1981 to 1985 
under Solanki. But as a retired bureaucrat who has worked for many years in the 
state’s senior administrative ranks said during an interview for this research that 
both chief ministers provided industry with incentives. The difference was that in 
Solanki’s case senior bureaucrats were more involved in the decision making while 
Modi was likely to use discretion on his own initiative. Paradoxically this meant while 
decisions taken during Solanki’s tenure were relatively more transparent, and closer 
to effective governance consistent with ‘good governance’, decision making was also 
relatively slower. “It’s an irony”, says a retired bureaucrat who has served in various 
senior positions across the central government and states, “but everyone thinks the 
Modi administration is successful because it is implementing good governance. If 
anything it is the level of discretion used that actually enables this ease of doing 
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business. Sometimes dealing with serious bottlenecks needs to be handled with 
discretion rather than transparency”. 
Table 5.5 SDP growth rate of Gujarat under various chief ministers 
Period Chief Ministers Annual Rate Growth 
1961-71 Jivraj Mehta, Balwantrai Mehta, 
Hitendra Desai 
4.70 
1972-80 Hitendra Desai, Ghanshyam Ozha, 
Chimanbhai Patel, Babubhai 
Jashbhai Patel, Madhavsinh Solanki 
3.89 
1981-85 Madhavsinh Solanki 16.29 
1985-90 Madhavsinh Solanki, Amarsinh 
Choudhary 
13.63 
1990-94 Chimanbhai Patel, Chhabildas 
Mehta 
16.73 
1995-2001 Keshubhai Patel, Suresh Mehta, 
Shankarsinh Vaghela, Dilip Parikh 
8.82 
2001-09 Narendra Modi 10.30 
2005-11 Narendra Modi 09.35 
Note: The growth rate of 2001-09 is at 1999-2000 prices and the growth rate of 2005-11 at 
2004-05 prices. Growth rates for 1980-81 to 1993-94 are based on 1980-81 prices. Rates 
for 1994-95 to 2008-09 are based on 1999-2000 prices. 
Source: (H. Shah 2012: Table 4) based on Socio-Economic Review: 1998-99, 2006-07, 
2009-10, Budget Publication No.  30, 32 and 34 
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The changes in Gujarat’s political settlement under Modi meant that his institutional 
rules for rent allocation were more informal and discretionary, and he was able to 
rapidly allocate targeted rents to selected capitalists. The speed with which the Modi 
administration was able to roll out clearances for Tata Motor’s Nano project, even 
providing funds for the relocation from West Bengal to Gujarat bears this out. The 
Gujarat government agreed to provide a soft loan of USD 1.95 billion at an interest 
rate of 0.1 percent per year and allowed a deferred payment of the interest and 
principal amount over 20 years. A similar deal was offered by the West Bengal 
government to Tata, but Gujarat was in a stronger position to pay it (Guha Thakurta 
2009). These were significant rents that Tata Motors captured from Gujarat and it 
was Modi’s capability to make quick discretionary allocations that enabled this. 
Despite the fact that significant agitations against government land acquisition for 
business were holding up significant investments in many parts of India, the 
allocation of land for Tata Motors in Gujarat was a non-issue. Even in other pro-
business states in India, opposition parties would at least have made a statement on 
the largesse laid out by the government. Not so in Gujarat. 
The speed with which the Adani Group (Revenues of $7.8 billion in 2012) has seen 
both its fortunes and assets grow is another instance where Modi has used his 
discretion to assist a particular group. From 2006 to 2013 Adani’s revenues nearly 
trebled. While there are other industrial houses in Gujarat that benefitted from this 
form of targeted rent allocation, the relationship of the Adani Group with Modi is 
exceptional. Adani provided Modi with credibility after the riots after India’s premier 
corporate association, the Confederation of Indian Industry criticized Modi’s role in 
the riots publicly. Adani and a clutch of other Gujarati capitalists stood by Modi. This 
was serendipitous for Adani as the group had been trying to enlist Modi’s support 
but the chief minister was not keen to be seen as being close to industrialists. While 
the events of 2002 allowed Modi to consolidate his control over his political 
organization, his national political reputation was flagging and he was keen to seek 
legitimacy from all sources. Once Adani made his way into Modi’s key inner circle 
what unfolded was an example of an inverted patron-client relationship. A senior 
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national level journalist told us “Adani has brought in the best brains in port 
management into Gujarat but this has come at the expense of other possibilities for 
private ports and even at the cost of the publicly owned Kandla port which is 
suffering because of Adani’s links with the state’s administration”. 
As described in Chapter Four, the relationship between government as patron and 
business as client can vary along a spectrum and in specific cases the relationship can 
be inverted so that business is effectively the patron. Modi’s relationship with his 
closest business supporters is best defined in these terms, despite his authoritarian 
control over his own organization and his ability to override political opposition from 
other groups in the state. Although a major beneficiary of Modi’s Gujarat, we 
outlined how in Chapter Four Section 4.8 Adani had forged political relationships 
beyond Gujarat. This makes Modi the more vulnerable partner in the relationship. At 
the same time, the resources that Adani made available were important for Modi. 
Only the more visible aspects of Adani’s support are reported even anecdotally. For 
instance, there are reports of Modi having used Gautam Adani’s (the chairman of AG) 
private plane when official transportation was not available. In a public show of 
support in 2013 the Adanis withdrew their support from a programme at the 
University of Wharton because the University had withdrawn an invitation to Modi 
based on his human rights record.  
However, Adani is arguably the bigger gainer in this relationship. Without the 
informal rents the Adani Group received from the Modi administration it may not 
have made the transition from a company that was an oilseeds trader to an energy 
and infrastructure conglomerate in the span of a decade and a half. Founded in 1988 
the Group operated India’s largest private sector port in Mundra in Gujarat. The 
company also had concessions for other ports and terminals in other Indian locations 
as well as a coal terminal in Australia. The Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of 
India pointed out irregularities in 2013 in the implementation of a power purchase 
agreement that favoured Adani Power (PTI 2013; Standard 2013; TOI 2013). The CAG 
report indicts other corporate houses too (and that is line with Modi’s business-
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friendly policies) but the Adani Group seems to have gained the most. A second CAG 
indictment for gas pricing in 2009 reports that a state-owned gas utility sold gas to 
the Adani Group at a price lower than the utility’s purchase price. Credible media 
reports point to the Adani-run Mundra port being granted favours over the public 
sector Kandla port which till 2013 was India’s largest in terms of tonnage but was 
then overtaken by Mundra (Rajshekhar 2013). It is perhaps for this reason that 
despite the Government of Gujarat projecting itself as transparent and accountable, 
in a survey in 2013 in the Indian daily The Hindu almost similar numbers of 
respondents in Gujarat believed the Congress-led UPA government at the centre and 
the BJP-run state government were corrupt –76 per cent and 72 per cent of the 
respondents respectively (Rukmini 2013).  
The discretion that Modi can use in providing incentives for business is often 
perceived as an opening up for business. A recent ADB report cited Gujarat as the 
‘best destination’ in India for PPP projects placing it above even Japan in terms of the 
environment for PPP projects (ADB 2012). Infrastructure projects have long gestation 
periods and require high capital expenditures. Modi’s ability to effectively enforce 
discretionary land acquisition through state-run institutions like the Gujarat 
Infrastructure Development Board or GIDB is a key factor in attracting investors who 
have a low appetite for delays given the nature of their investments. It is not 
surprising that Gujarat has the highest number of private sector ports in the 
country—35 per cent of India’s exports are routed through Gujarat. As noted earlier 
heavy chemical industries, ports and related offshore infrastructure have seen the 
highest growth in Gujarat in the last decade (Malhotra 2008). The state along with 
Tamil Nadu has the highest number of PPP investments in the country. As we will see 
in our next chapter the competitive clientelism of Tamil Nadu is far removed from 
the authoritarian clientelism of Gujarat yet both states have managed to solve what 
can be described as the ‘credibility problem’ in politics where investors cannot trust 
a state’s ability to protect their investments over time.  
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Given Gujarat’s otherwise impressive performance the state does not do as well as 
competitors Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu in terms of attracting foreign direct 
investment (FDI). Even though its share of the total FDI coming into India was 10.35 
per cent in 2012 and the state registered the second highest growth rates for FDI, 
the share of FDI in Gujarat is just 3.6 per cent of total investments. Indian investors 
on the other hand made up 49 per cent of the total investment in Gujarat. The joint 
sector (joint state and private) remains a large part of investments in the state. The 
showcasing of Gujarat during the biennial Vibrant Gujarat Global Investors Summit is 
one way the Modi government tried to attract FDI by promoting the state as one of 
India’s leading FDI destinations. A combination of liberalized policies in oil and gas 
exploration and consistent marketing by Gujarat has made the state one of the top 
destinations for FDI in these sectors from 1991 to 2011. The chemicals and 
petrochemicals sector contributes as much as 47 per cent of the state’s 
manufacturing sector as we see in Figure 5.2 (Gujarat 2013b). Foreign direct 
investors prefer investment destinations where politics does not get in the way and 
Modi, with his authoritarian clientelism has ensured at least that.  
 
Figure 5.2 Break-up of the manufacturing sector in Gujarat 
Source. (Gujarat 2013a: Pg 66) (figures in percentages) 
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However the state does not get as much FDI in areas like engineering, electronics 
and pharmaceuticals, unlike Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu. We will see in Chapter Six 
that this can be traced to specific institutional features of Tamil Nadu. In fact there 
was a time when companies like Torrent, Zydus Cadila and Paras were well known 
success stories in pharmaceuticals and the state was a leader in bulk drugs but has 
since been affected by strong competition Chinese drug manufacturers (though they 
are still large producers) with little understanding on the part of the Modi 
administration in terms of how to reverse these trends. As we see from Figure 5.3 
Gujarat’s manufacturing is concentrated in areas that are somewhat protected from 
fierce competitiveness requirements. They are dominated by sectors like soda ash or 
salt that are low-value bulky products servicing the domestic market, sectors like 
diamond processing or plastics that do not require high technical or organizational 
capabilities, or petrochemicals and crude oil which are natural resource based 
industries.  
 
Figure 5.3 Percentage contribution of Gujarat to the Indian manufacturing sector 
Source: (Gujarat 2013a: Pg 148), Note- Diamonds is processed diamonds 
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The pro-business rent allocations in Gujarat do not necessarily imply sustainable 
growth if rents get captured by business groups that have little incentive to engage 
in productive investments. “While this trend of making real-estate related 
investments and inflating the project cost of capital lasts, with the administration 
looking the other way, the state will see high growth. Once this starts getting 
rationalized Gujarat will have to focus on increasing productivity”, says one of India’s 
leading industrialists with interests in Gujarat. In Gujarat’s case this has certainly 
been the trend yet industrial growth has also been rising indicating that at least 
some of the rents have attracted productive investments and allowed some 
privileged groups to invest in limited capability development and learning. This 
helped privileged business groups to achieve quicker turnaround times for their 
investments, critical for their profitability and stock market performance. Thus, 
Modi’s ability to make these allocations was at least partly behind Gujarat’s higher 
growth rates as seen in Table 5.2 in this chapter. 
Gujarat’s industrial success is often attributed to its efficient bureaucracy, especially 
under the Modi administration. Gujarat has been described as a developmental state 
by authors like Kohli and Sinha largely on the back of its effectiveness in promoting 
business. Kohli in particular categorizes Gujarat as a developmental state because of 
its pro-business policies. A large chunk of Gujarat’s public expenditure was 
channelled into providing policy incentives to business and Kohli argues the state 
picked ‘winners’ by defining certain investments as ‘premier’ or ‘prestigious’ in 
sectors like electronics, auto and engineering (Kohli 2012). However a 
developmental outcome is not guaranteed simply because there are state-led 
policies. To some extent the debate hinges around the definition of a developmental 
state. If a ‘developmental state’ is to achieve developmental outcomes we can 
engage in an economic analysis of what that entails. Being business friendly without 
conditions does not ensure developmental outcomes because business can capture 
the state. Outcomes may be developmental for a while and then suddenly stop being 
so. A state is likely to be developmental on a sustained basis if it has the capabilities 
to enforce developmental outcomes, and this may often involve disciplining 
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capitalists receiving assistance as was the case for instance in South Korea under 
Chung Hee Park (M. H. Khan 2012e).  
In Gujarat as in the rest of India there is significant evidence of state capture by 
business, especially with regard to land. For instance Gujarat is so far the only state 
in the country that has passed a Special Investment Region Act (2009). The Act 
allows companies to set up commercial and industrial units, residential 
developments and logistics projects within any notified area. The Special Economic 
Zone or SEZ Act of 2005 enacted by the government of India is similar but the 
difference is that only 100 per cent export-oriented units are allowed in areas 
notified under the SEZ Act. The SEZ Act itself has come under attack for letting 
companies grab land on the pretext of setting up export units. The SIR Act makes it 
even easier for companies to capture land. By 2013 the Adani Group had announced 
that it plans to develop two waterfront cities under the SIR Act. A third 
announcement under the Act is for an investment by India’s largest car maker, 
Maruti Suzuki India, though there are signs villagers in the notified area have 
opposed this move. The principal criticism against the SIR Act is that the state 
already had an agency called the Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation (GIDC) 
which allowed it to acquire land under the GIDC Act of 1962 for industrial purposes. 
It had been highly successful in setting up industrial estates with facilities similar to 
those offered under the SIR Act. This raises questions about the need to duplicate 
the GIDC Act but the latter would have been insufficient to allocate land on the scale 
required for the city development projects by the Adanis.  
Another state-run corporation that is responsible for successfully facilitating 
infrastructure projects is the Gujarat Infrastructure Development Board (GIDB). One 
of our interviewees, a senior journalist who had extensively covered politics and 
business in Gujarat for over a decade told us that one reason the new middle class 
supported Modi was that real estate valuations had been driven up by the Modi 
government’s pro-business policies making members of this class very wealthy. 
Modi’s pro-business policies combined with the BJP’s ability to rally the Hindu ‘upper 
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caste’s served the party well (R. Desai 2011). Jaffrelot provides the same reason for 
Modi’s continued success combined with his ability to play on Gujarati pride 
(Jaffrelot 2008). One of the state’s most senior journalists who was interviewed for 
the thesis described the process as similar to the primitive accumulation that took 
place in Gurgaon, a now flourishing urban agglomeration near New Delhi. As he said, 
“Most of Gujarat is like Gurgaon in the 1990s—booming real estate development 
and land prices”. Only three decades earlier, Gurgaon was an underdeveloped area 
with land owned by small and marginal farmers. The Indian government started 
providing incentives to attract companies wishing to develop the area and the 
Haryana Urban Development Authority started buying land from small farmers at 
very low prices and selling them on at very high prices. In many cases land was 
simply grabbed. The process led to Gurgaon becoming an urban centre with one of 
India’s highest per capita incomes.  
Some of this evidence supports Kohli’s argument that Gujarat is a developmental 
state because it is able to provide discretionary benefits. However, there is little 
evidence of any attempt to introduce any institutional arrangements to discipline 
business or to grant conditional rents to business under the Modi administration. 
These types of strategies are essential if business is to be supported to enhance their 
technological and organizational capabilities to compete in international markets. 
Given the Modi government’s aim of attracting investments in fields like high-tech 
engineering and with an R&D orientation, we do not see an attempt by the 
administration to direct indigenous investors who have benefited from their ties 
with the state to move into such areas. While many companies in the state oversee 
some social sector activities as part of their Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
initiatives this is no different from many other large corporations across India. If the 
Modi administration really did enjoy effective implementation capabilities when 
negotiating with business, we would expect to see conditional support for business 
to establish centres for R&D and establish new sectors where comparative 
advantage would have to be established through rapid capability development.  
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Gujarat enjoys a high share of tertiary level academic centres of excellence. However 
most if not at all were set up by the central government or were set up before Modi 
came to power. Plans announced in the Vibrant Gujarat presentations focus on the 
initiatives of the state government with little involvement from the state’s private 
sector players.  Industrially advanced states like Maharashtra, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu 
and Gujarat have crossed the stage where they need to establish themselves as 
attractive locations for industry. They need to look increasingly towards developing 
an environment that can attract investors to develop new comparative advantage 
through technology acquisition and learning, or to foster R&D to support innovation. 
Of these states, Modi’s Gujarat projects itself as the most successful. However we 
were not able to find any evidence in our field research of policies or conditional 
informal rent allocations that aimed to support investors in learning and innovation. 
This is where the developmental capabilities of the Modi administration can be 
questioned. Interestingly Tamil Nadu with a different structure of business-
government relations that are discussed in our next chapter was able to address 
some learning and innovation issues in its auto and engineering centres. The auto 
industry successfully lobbied the state government to set up a Testing Laboratory for 
the sector in the state while Gujarat as yet only has plans to do so.  
Being pro-business in a state that was already relatively industrialized and urbanized 
(Gujarat was one of India’s most urbanized states over the last two decades) when 
the Indian economy as a whole was performing well after the liberalization reforms 
of 1992 was a strategy that could not go wrong for Modi. His cooption of a large 
section of the state’s intermediate classes at one end and indigenous people at the 
other was achieved by allocating a mix of formal resources through public goods 
programmes and informal resources through the party organization. The formal and 
informal rent allocations required for maintaining political stability were lower in 
Gujarat relative to other states as a result of the Hindutva ideology providing 
ideological pay-offs for some groups and the display of strength and violence 
potential reducing or suppressing demands from other groups. The costs of 
maintaining the ruling coalition were significantly higher in Tamil Nadu, an equally 
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successful state, but one with aggressive competitive clientelism. To the extent that 
Gujarat performs better than other states in providing discretionary subsidies to 
business, these political features offer a more compelling explanation for Modi’s 
performance, rather than his forceful leadership.  
A limitation of a strategy to attract investors with implicit subsidies is that in a 
context of inter-state competition for a pool of investments, this can result in a race 
to the bottom (Sachs, et al. 2002). States like Gujarat, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, 
Haryana and Karnataka have provided significant incentives for businesses to locate 
there at the expense of states that found it more difficult to organize equivalent 
subsidies, like Bihar, Orissa and West Bengal (M. H. Khan 2011b). This competition 
has strengthened the bargaining power of business relative to that of state 
governments. The failure to control speculative acquisition of land for non-industrial 
purposes can be understood in this context, as well as the huge subsidies that 
companies like Tata have been able to bargain for locating in one state rather than 
another. Gujarat has benefited for the time being. Compared to the Indian average, 
Gujarat’s poverty levels are impressively low (A. Shah and Sajitha 2008). It is 
currently down to 17 percent from 31 percent in 1983. But as is usually the case 
some groups in the state suffer from poverty levels close to the average Indian levels. 
It is the tribal constituency in the state, the one that the BJP and its allies mobilised 
against Gujarat’s Muslims during the riots who still suffer the highest levels of 
poverty. As many as 34.5 percent of Gujarat’s tribals live below the poverty line and 
though they make up just 15 percent of the population, 43 percent of the rural poor 
are to be found in this group (A. Shah and Sajitha 2008).  
Gujarat has recently also become one of India’s commercial agricultural success 
stories. But the state of its small farmers remains precarious. Small farmers make up 
55 percent of Gujarat’s farmers and yet they operate on only 2.13 percent of the 
total cultivated area (Mahadevia 2005). The Modi administration has been proactive 
in anticipating criticism of its pro-business policies. In his second term his 
administration announced a number of welfare policies targeting Gujarat’s rural 
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communities. The state has also encouraged investments in solar energy and has a 
department of climate change to deal with environmental sustainability issues after 
being criticized by environmental groups in the country for encouraging industry 
without due regard to sustainability. 
The crucial gap therefore is in the missing capabilities to engage in developmental 
strategies that require the disciplining of capitalists. As in the rest of India, the onus 
in Gujarat is on attracting investment rather than enhancing productivity. Sinha has 
called the Gujarat government ‘statist’ (Sinha 2004a). While she is right in that after 
liberalisation ‘subnational institutions’ have become more important it is largely to 
ensure that industries find their respective states attractive to invest in (Sinha 2005). 
Unlike South Korea where Park Chung Hee could withdraw subsidies from chaebols if 
they did not meet performance targets, no Indian state, including Modi’s Gujarat has 
demonstrated the capability even to retract an invitation to invest if a company does 
not agree to particular conditions. It is worth considering a counter-factual scenario. 
Would Tata Motors have chosen Gujarat over other states like Maharashtra and 
Tamil Nadu, both popular with auto investors, if Gujarat had attached significant 
conditions about production, employment or exports to their subsidy to attract the 
investment to the state would Modi’s administration have been able to enforce 
these conditions? It is an interesting development that the private sector in India 
continues to need the help of the state after liberalisation but in terms of meeting 
developmental conditions (such as technological progress, exports, employment, 
backward and forward linkages, or welfare conditions) there appears to be even less 
of a willingness or capability to enforce than before.  
Describing Gujarat as a ‘developmental state’ is questionable if we use the 
conventional definition of such a state as one that has the capacity to both support 
and discipline its emerging capitalist sector. Gujarat offers many incentives to its 
manufacturing sector, but there is no indication of any formal or informal targets for 
investment in capability development (learning) or in R&D. For instance, in the early 
2010s, 28 percent of India’s pharmaceutical exports originated in Gujarat. 
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Pharmaceutical units in Gujarat accounted for 40 percent of the Contract Research 
and Manufacturing Services (CRAMS) from India. These are impressive figures in 
their own right and Gujarat is home to many large domestic pharmaceutical 
companies like Sun Pharma, Torrent and Cadila and Contract Research Organizations 
(CRO) like Lambda Therapeutics and Synchron. However in all these cases, and this 
would be true for most of India’s large pharmaceutical companies and CROs, 
production is restricted to generics and for the CROs their activities are restricted to 
providing clinical and pre-clinical research services to the pharmaceutical industry. 
Both sectors need high R&D expenditures to move further up the value chain for 
new drug development or proprietary research. However domestic pharma 
companies spent just 4.5 percent of their sales on R&D, much lower than the global 
average of 15 percent and far lower than developed country averages of 20 to 45 
percent. Neither the central government nor any other state government had 
policies compelling pharmaceutical companies to increase their R&D intensities 
(percentage of sales spent on R&D) and this includes the apparently developmental 
Modi administration. Moreover, given that the owners of the large drug companies 
in Gujarat, especially Torrent, had close links with the Modi government, the 
absence of any policies to steer the pharma sector to higher value products or 
research is noteworthy. In fact Torrent was provided discretionary support when it 
moved into power generation with an over 1000 MW power project near Surat in 
Gujarat, a diversification with little link to pharmaceuticals. The Group has since had 
to make for the Adani Group but remains one with close links to Modi. Given the 
nature of business government relationships in India as outlined in Chapter Four it 
would be difficult, indeed foolhardy on Modi’s part to attempt any disciplining. 
Modi is arguably even more limited in his ability to discipline the larger industrialists 
in the state like Adani and the Mehtas of Torrent as they provided invaluable support 
to Modi in the immediate aftermath of the riots in 2002. This was explicitly 
mentioned by all the sources interviewed in Gujarat. The premier national industry 
association in India the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) had condemned the 
riots and the role of the Modi administration in the strongest terms when the 
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Gujarati capitalists came to Modi’s aid threatening to form a rival regional 
association. For all its good intentions CII could not afford to lose a state chapter 
which was one it’s most dynamic and important and had to make its peace with 
Modi. A senior journalist when questioned about the evaluation of Modi’s 
administration as a developmental one replied it was not possible for Modi to be 
developmental (the reference being the South Korean type of developmental state). 
He argued that despite his outer image of strength at one level ‘Modi remains 
beholden’ to these industrialists, especially Gautam Adani, and it would be almost 
impossible for him to impose any productive compulsions on them or impose any 
conditionalities attached to the support they were receiving from the state. The rise 
of the Adani Group bears this statement out. According to one of our other 
respondents, a businessman with interests in Gujarat, large tracts of land near 
Mundra port were allocated to the group with little or no compensation for villagers 
losing the land. This is also mentioned in the Economic Times report on Gautam 
Adani referred to earlier in the Chapter. The SIR Act (referred to earlier) helped 
Adani amass large tracts of land at throwaway prices with little indication of any 
productive investments being made on them. In fact most of the investments (to 
develop a mega city) are in the nature of large real estate projects. This relationship, 
which could be characterized as a reversible patron client relationship, can scarcely 
be described as being conducive for capability development. There were no 
conditions or end results that were identified by the state or that were credibly 
monitored with plausible sanctions for non-performance. This is important because 
it is the capacity to support capitalists with effective conditions to achieve capability 
development that defines a ‘developmental state’, like South Korea under Chung 
Hee Park. Modi’s policy of providing incentives to his chosen businesses was 
effective in attracting investments to Gujarat from other parts of India, but this 
support did not come with conditions and governance capabilities that could ensure 
new capability development in key sectors like automobiles and pharmaceuticals. On 
the contrary, Gujarat offering incentives to businesses to relocate to Gujarat is closer 
to the ‘race to the bottom’ identified by Sachs et al (Sachs, et al. 2002) as this type of 
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support without conditions had a largely relocating effect within India than one of 
net capability development for India. 
Modi’s carefully projected image of bureaucratic competence and leadership is 
based entirely on being investment-friendly. That is not likely to be sufficient to 
make the state a growth model along East Asian lines. It is also worth noting the 
status of Gujarat’s Muslims at this juncture. The Sachar Committee set up by the 
government of India to assess the status of Muslims in India mentions Gujarati 
Muslims as having one of the highest per capita incomes among Indian Muslims. The 
average is affected by the incomes of a section of prosperous Gujarati Muslims. 
However, the vast majority of Gujarat’s Muslims live in ghettoes that have become 
even smaller and more disconnected since the riots. They have access to few 
economic opportunities and would certainly be reluctant to become part of the 
Gujarati ‘asmita’ movement given their recent memories of being targeted by the 
BJP. The BJP government in Gujarat and Modi still have some way to go before they 
can be labelled developmental, if at all.  
5.5 Conclusion 
Gujarat’s progress from a region that was mainly a rag tag bunch of princely states at 
the time of independence to become one of India’s most industrially developed 
states has been remarkable. The legacy of colonialism in the region was to create a 
well-defined business-oriented intermediate class. The leadership of Patel also 
ensured that the various parts of Gujarat were relatively smoothly merged after 
independence. In its early years the region remained a part of Bombay state but a 
linguistic movement by Marathi speakers ensured that the state got bifurcated into 
Marathi speaking Maharashtra and Gujarati speaking Gujarat in 1960. The initial 
reaction of most Gujarati businessmen was not in favour of the bifurcation as their 
commercial interests still lay in Bombay. However the prospect of a state that they 
could now exclusively call their own soon saw them in favour of the separation.  
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The early Congress years laid the base for Gujarat’s current industrial growth. The 
Congress government’s focus on developing the Bombay-Ahmadabad corridor 
ensured the creation of significant industrial clusters in the area. Again being a 
Congress-ruled state Gujarat had good relations with the Congress ministers at the 
centre. Leaders in the late 1960s like Morarji Desai were influential both at the state 
and central level and helped the state get significant public sector investments. The 
discovery of oil meant the state got investments in refineries and petrochemicals 
projects. This ensured the state reaped the benefits of developing the manufacturing 
capabilities required for heavy chemical-based industries. Downstream industries 
like chemicals and fertilisers made the state’s industrial base richer. Initial 
investments by the public sector started delivering results when some of the more 
successful corporations like the Indian Petrochemicals Company Ltd were privatised 
after liberalisation. In power generation significant capacity addition occurred during 
the last years of Congress rule. In agriculture, investments in the dairy sector in 
Gujarat were driven by a cooperative movement that saw India achieve self-
sufficiency in milk production. In terms of political mobilisation the state did not see 
much ‘lower’ caste mobilisation though a sizable community of ‘lower’ castes, the 
Patidars, gained upward mobility through agriculture. The Patidars were never in 
tune with the Congress’ socialist policies preferring the Swatantra Party’s more 
conservative programmes. This was the reason why the BJP found it easier to co-opt 
the Patidars into their fold. Communal tensions had always run high in the state and 
sporadic clashes or riots were common. Ahmadabad, with its specific Muslim 
localities was more susceptible to riots. If initially the violence was instigated by both 
communities in the later years there are far more instances of Hindu aggression, 
especially with the growing strength of the BJP.  
An unsustainable alliance of caste groupings that was not compatible with the actual 
distribution of power in the state led to a Congress defeat and the vacuum was filled 
by the BJP which was waiting in the wings. The communal politics being played out in 
most of the country had its effect on Gujarat as the BJP and its allies started pushing 
their Hindutva agenda in an already receptive state. Their master stroke was to co-
opt the tribals in a mobilisation against sections of the Muslim population. The 
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display of control over violence in a context where the distribution of power across 
organizations was already very favourable created a cohesive ruling coalition facing 
weak opposition. In Gujarat Modi’s writ within the BJP and over the administration 
was supreme but as we have seen, he lacked the ability to impose the same 
strictures on business in his negotiations with them.  
It would not be farfetched to say that championing industrial growth and making 
sure industry received the best possible support was partly Modi’s answer to his 
detractors. While Modi can take credit for running a superficially non-corrupt, 
streamlined bureaucracy that investors find easy to deal with, giving his 
administration much of the credit for Gujarat’s industrial growth is to ignore the 
historical trajectory of Gujarat. The Congress had already laid the basis for this 
growth and Modi added to it through his own policies, but he was not solely 
responsible for Gujarat’s strong industrial performance. Creating the enforcement 
capability that allowed pro-business rent allocations to be implemented was Modi’s 
main contribution. Yet Modi’s dependence on prominent Gujarati business groups 
was also a feature of the new inversion of patron-client relationships between 
business and government in India.   
Finally, Gujarat was also a huge beneficiary of liberalisation. The decision of the 
union government to privatise some utilities helped the state’s exchequer as did the 
central government’s decision to allow private and international companies to bid 
for the exploration and production of oil and gas. Gujarat’s natural endowments 
have played a vital role in ensuring its investment rates remained healthy. The 
Godhra incident is not central to our analysis as much as the process that led to it 
and the signalling effect it had in establishing the enforcement capability of the 
ruling coalition. By targeting a section of the population that was weak to begin with, 
Modi achieved the projection of authority at relatively low cost to his coalition. But it 
was only possible for him to do so because the distribution of power in the state was 
already conducive. Other BJP ruled states have not attempted anything quite as 
sinister. Perhaps the true test of the sources of Modi’s enforcement capability will 
only come if he is tested in governance outside his own constituency in Gujarat.    
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Chapter 6 . Tamil Nadu: Growth in the Time 
of Clientelism 
 
SUMMARY: 
Tamil Nadu enjoyed high rates of growth both before and after liberalisation due to 
a combination of factors that allowed its two main political parties to create and 
allocate rents in ways that enhanced productivity and competitiveness. Tamil Nadu’s 
populist redistributive politics has its roots in a nativist ideology. The competitive 
clientelism in the state keeps within the bounds of broadly ‘live and let live’ 
strategies because both parties share a common ideology and mobilize almost 
identical social groups. The result is a form of competitive clientelism that achieves a 
cycling in and out of the two parties in successive elections. The paradox of Tamil 
political economy is that despite its competitive clientelism, it remains one of India’s 
most industrially advanced states. We argue that while their common ideological 
history appears to make the competition between the two parties intense, their 
common ideological ancestry and the similarity of their constituencies means they 
do not have widely divergent policies. Their rent creation strategies included support 
for industrialisation and these strategies remained stable despite parties cycling in 
and out of power, allowing a steady rise in industrial investment and capability 
development. 
The challenge for Tamil Nadu is to sustain its industrial growth as political 
competition leads to the risk of its two party system fragmenting and even the 
possibility of increasing violence affecting stability. We focus on the state’s auto 
component manufacturers who grew under India’s former dirigiste regime by 
establishing links with the ruling parties and continued to grow after liberalization by 
upgrading productive capabilities. This required policies to promote learning and 
technological upgrading and entrepreneurs played a proactive role in driving this 
industrialisation. Tamil Nadu’s experience shows that capability development 
strategies for manufacturing are possible in the context of competitive clientelism.  
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Section 6.1 provides a history of Tamil Nadu focusing on the ‘Self Respect’ 
movement that led to the creation of the two Dravidian parties. Section 6.2 outlines 
the circumstances under which the Dravidian parties won elections in the state and 
came to stay in power. Section 6.3 analyses how the two parties negotiated with the 
Congress/BJP ruled centre to consolidate their hold over the state. Section 6.4 
outlines how the political configurations and rent management within the state 
affected growth outcomes. Section 6.5 provides an explanation of the how the 
political settlement in Tamil Nadu helped capability development. Section 6.6 
concludes.  
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 Introduction 
Tamil Nadu (Figure 6.1) along with Maharashtra and Gujarat is one of India’s top 
three states in terms of economic performance. It was formed in 1950 and was once 
part of the erstwhile British province called the Madras Presidency. Even at the time 
of India’s independence Tamil Nadu had a well defined ‘national’ identity based on a 
culture distinct from the rest of India. This identity still plays a part in the politics of 
the state. The state’s highly mobilized and competitive politics is based around a 
nativist ideology promoted by political leaders who have been ‘stars’ in the state’s 
thriving film industry. Anecdotally, the state is also known to be one of the more 
corrupt of the larger states in India. As a retired senior bureaucrat who has worked 
both at the state and at the national level says “Politics in Tamil Nadu is big 
business”. Given this profile one would not expect this state to be one of India’s best 
performing states in terms of economic performance. In terms of its HDI it equals 
Gujarat and betters it in terms of attracting FDI. As in the Gujarat chapter, we discuss 
how the ruling coalition was constructed in Tamil Nadu and the types of rents it used 
as a survival strategy, which consequently impacted investment and technology 
adoption strategies in the state. 
Tamil Nadu’s fragmented political organizations are typical of the competitive 
clientelist variant of patron-client politics described in Chapter three. The state’s 
political settlement has evolved into one where two large parties cycle in and out of 
power in successive elections. The party that wins has also done so with a substantial 
majority since 1989. The avoidance of political logjams due to disputed elections and 
the emergence of a ‘live and let live’ policy between the ruling coalition and 
opposition organizations have contributed to high levels of growth. These features 
make Tamil Nadu untypical as a competitive clientelist polity. The configuration of 
power and the allocation of rents that contributes to this are therefore of significant 
interest, with implications for other developing countries. Indeed understanding 
these processes may be very useful for identifying vulnerabilities in Tamil Nadu’s 
own growth strategy in the future. Whichever party is in power, the management of 
a large industrial investment is looked upon as a channel through which to create 
rents for political parties and key individuals within the parties. The assurance of 
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cycling reduces the incentives for the opposition to block these investments or to 
overturn them when they come to power. At the same time the fact that this cycle 
has continued since 1989 without the incumbent reneging on any large industrial 
investment negotiated by the previous government seems to have provided 
investors with the confidence that their property rights will be protected. This is one 
of the reasons why the state sees a high level of industrial investments despite the 
clientelistic nature of the political settlement.  
 
Figure 6.1 Tamil Nadu- one of India’s southern-most state  
Source: 
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:India_Tamil_Nadu_locator_map.svg 
 
The configuration of power that allows a cycling in and out of two alternative ruling 
coalitions has not just led to high investments but also affected the kinds of 
technologies the state has acquired and strategies of capability development. This is 
particularly interesting because the link between competitive patron-client politics 
and reasonably well-working government agencies dealing with critical market 
failures to support a growing business sector is rare in other developing countries 
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and regions within India. What then were the critical features of Tamil Nadu society, 
politics and institutional structures that help to explain the emergence of these 
arrangements? Specifically, what institutional or political factors allow relative policy 
stability in a context of clientelist cycling? 
Our focus on political settlements brings to the fore the organization and distribution 
of power between the major groups and class organizations in Tamil Nadu, and how 
this affected the efficacy and sustainability of different growth strategies. What 
makes Tamil Nadu especially interesting is that the two main parties, the Dravida 
Munnetra Kazagham or DMK (Dravidian Progress Federation) and a later offshoot 
the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazagham or AIADMK (All India Anna Dravidian 
Progress Federation) have roots in the same decidedly anti-North Indian, anti-
Brahman movement, which in its early stages was also a Rationalist movement. 
Brahman is the highest ‘caste’ in Sanskritic Hinduism and its members have 
historically been implicated in the suppression of lower castes. Caste identities still 
have deep resonance in Indian electoral politics. Approximately three per cent of 
Tamil Nadu’s population is Brahman while almost two-thirds are ‘backward castes’ 
(Wyatt 2002). While backward castes in Tamil Nadu have historically been 
subservient to the minority Brahmans the social order saw significant changes from 
the early 20th century and specifically from the 1960s, with significant mobilizations 
by lower castes and episodes of anti-Brahman violence. These movements led to the 
rise of the DMK and AIADMK which came to power as backward caste parties. 
Neither party could ideologically wipe out the other given the similarities in their 
ideological positions and the relatively small differences between them. This actually 
helped to moderate the intense competition for rents between these political 
organizations by ensuring that the party in power did not have the legitimacy to take 
the battle against the opposition too far. The rivalry between the two parties was 
therefore focused on the redistribution of largesse to similar constituencies 
(Ambirajan 1999; N. Subramanian 1999).  
This does not mean that political competition in Tamil Nadu is always peaceful. The 
state frequently witnesses violence between competing segments of the backward 
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castes. Tamil Nadu has the inglorious reputation of witnessing a high degree of 
violence against ‘Dalits’, the caste group supposedly below the Hindu caste system 
and therefore the lowest strata in this ideological system who are often the poorest 
groups in society. Ironically this violence is often perpetrated by groups belonging 
officially to the Most Backward Caste (MBCs) denomination in India which is 
designated just above the Dalits. These conflicts are directly driven by the 
competition over rents. Dalit mobilization has often posed a threat to the privileges 
of the MBCs apportioned under affirmative action programmes for disadvantaged 
castes. In particular, the Indian government uses ‘Reservations’ to protect a fixed 
share of public sector jobs for particular backward castes. The mobilization of new 
groups demanding reservations threatens the share of existing groups.  
However Tamil Nadu’s Dalits are a more significant proportion of its population 
compared to Gujarat’s Muslims. In Gujarat Muslims are just less than 10 per cent of 
the population. The percentage of Dalits in Tamil Nadu’s population is double that at 
20 per cent and have the holding power to pose a credible threat to any ruling 
coalition that excludes them or uses force to repress them. As a result, violence 
against them from any quarter is not welcomed by the leadership of political parties, 
though sporadic and sometimes serious violence does take place against the Dalits, 
as a segment of the MBCs is a major constituency for the AIADMK. But both parties 
remain culpable with the violence usually perpetrated by Backward Caste leaders 
from the two main Dravidian parties contesting the gradually growing material 
power of sections of the Dalit community. However, the ‘growing’ power of the 
latter is relative and has to be seen in the context of the historically abject socio-
economic position of the Dalit community. Yet the politics behind the violence in 
Tamil Nadu is also quite different from that underpinning the violence in Gujarat. 
While violence of any kind is unacceptable what one observes in Tamil Nadu is a 
conflict between groups in the lower strata of society whereas violence in Gujarat is 
‘informally institutionalized’ and indirectly supported by the Hindutva ideology of 
the ruling party as we have described in Chapter Four. Tamil Nadu has never 
witnessed violence on the scale of the Gujarat riots of 2002. Violence here is the 
outcome of competitive strategies to establish relative power of evenly balanced 
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groups contesting the distribution of rents. This is a commonly observed feature of 
contests over the distribution of benefits in clientelist political settlements (M. H. 
Khan 2010b, 2012f). In Gujarat the violence against Muslims was not directly driven 
by competition over the relative distribution of rents. Rather, violence was 
unleashed against a much weaker group in society precisely because it would not be 
able to retaliate, allowing the ruling party to signal its control over violence that 
helped it to consolidate ‘authoritarian clientelism’ as discussed in Chapter Five. 
 
Table 6.1 Tamil Nadu Economic Characteristics 
 
Population 2011 72.14 million  
(India 1.24 billion) 
Gross State Domestic Product 
2011-12 at current prices 
USD 104.6 billion 
Per capita Net State Domestic 
Product at current prices 2010-11 
USD 1640  
(India USD 1509) 
Capita Output Ratio 2009-2010  2.25  
(India 2.32) 
Gross Fixed Capital Investment 
2011 % GDP  2004-05 prices 
19.8% 
(India 32%) 
Net Value Added Factory 
Sector 2009-10 
USD 12.9 billion 
Share in All India Employment 
1980-81 to 2007-08 
13.1% 
Percentage of population 
below poverty line (2012)  
17.1% 
 (India 22%) 
Source: Various (GoI Census 2011), (MoSPI), (CSO, Respective State Governments), 
(ASI, 2009-10), (NSSO 66th round), (Planning Commission of India) 
 
 Tamil Nadu is one the leading industrial states of India along with Maharashtra and 
Gujarat. One of the country’s three main automotive manufacturing hubs is based in 
the state capital Chennai (the other two being with Pune in Maharashtra and the 
National Capital Region around New Delhi) and the state was ranked fourth in terms 
of attracting FDI between 2000 and 2012 (Figure 6.3). While Maharashtra and Delhi 
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historically attracted over 50 per cent of FDI flows in India Karnataka was also 
attractive for high quality IT-related investments around Bangalore, which had 
emerged as a global IT hub. Though the FDI figure for TN over this period is relatively 
low (USD 9.72 billion) its position in fourth position remained consistent. The FDI it 
received was also in manufacturing sectors with spillovers for employment and skill 
development. As we see in Table 6.4 later in this chapter, over 30 per cent of the FDI 
in Tamil Nadu was in high productivity sectors like auto, IT-related and 
pharmaceuticals, in contrast to Gujarat where chemicals and petrochemicals 
accounted for just under 50 percent of FDI between 1991 and 2011. FDI in Gujarat 
over this period totalled USD 8.53 billion placing it in fifth position behind Tamil 
Nadu.  
 
 
Figure 6.2. FDI in Indian states 2000-2011 
Source: (Mukherjee 2011: Table 2) 
Note: Mhr is Maharashtra 
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The growth rate of per capita incomes has been consistently trending upwards 
(Table 6.2) and per capita incomes have been higher than the Indian average (Table 
6.1 for the 2013 figures). While Gujarat has been described (misleadingly in our 
opinion) by some Indian commentators as a model of good governance, it would be 
even harder to make that claim for Tamil Nadu. The Tamil Nadu case is interesting 
for examining the relationship between institutions and political configurations 
driving growth in a context of high levels of corruption and clientelism. Liberal 
economics models applied to India often miss the critical differences between states 
and attribute national growth outcomes to economic liberalization and India’s 
somewhat higher than average scores on good governance for its level of 
development (Basu 2003; Panagariya 2005; R. Rajan 2006). In reality, growth across 
states in India has varied widely and has been driven by very different factors in each 
case. In particular, political and institutional arrangements have varied significantly 
across Indian states. 
Table 6.2 Tamil Nadu Net State Domestic Product per capita growth rates at constant 1980-81 
USD 
Years NSDP per capita growth rates 
1961-70 0.0 
1970-80 1.6 
1980-90 2.9 
1990-2000 4.6 
2000-10 6.2 
 
Source: Based on EPW Research Foundation Statistics, State Level Domestic Product 
Data, 1960/61 to 2007/08.EPW data 
 
Tamil Nadu’s political settlement contrasts with that in Gujarat along a number of 
dimensions. In contrast to the dominant party in Gujarat, over the last two and a half 
decades the ruling coalition in Tamil Nadu has been one or other of the two main 
parties in short-lived governments that have always been thrown out at the next 
election. The two principal parties, DMK and AIADMK, are divided by their claims of 
being closer to their shared founding ideology. In reality they are of course clientelist 
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political organizations based on the informal distribution of rents within their 
organizations. In a competitive clientelist political settlement, there are too many 
political organizers with powerful organizations and rent demands to be 
incorporated within a single party. This makes the levels of contestation and 
competition for recruiting organizers within the party organizations more intense. 
The intensity of the conflicts over interpretations of their founding ideology reflects 
this, but the similarity of their ideologies also moderates their strategies because 
neither party has the legitimacy to try and wipe out the other. Indeed the intensity 
of the ideological conflict between the two parties has decreased dramatically over 
the last three decades. Says a senior academic based in Chennai “Nativist politics did 
make this state initially but the contemporary adversarial nature of politics is largely 
about posturing and populism”. 
We will see that the roots of the shared ideology of the two parties are in a pre-
Aryan Tamil nationalism that was also violently anti-Brahman. Over time this has 
morphed into a more anodyne populist and left-of-centre politics. Politics therefore 
frequently has a populist colour in the state, as in many other Indian states perhaps 
with the exception of Gujarat. This is not to say that there are no populist schemes 
of the BJP in Gujarat but most of them have now become formal state-sponsored 
welfare schemes whereas in other states including Tamil Nadu, some or much of the 
populism works through informal rent distribution processes. In Tamil Nadu’s case 
populist schemes include the distribution of gold ‘thalis’, which are traditional 
symbols of marriage for Hindu women in south India, and free rice and mineral 
water to families living below the poverty line, over and above formal welfare 
schemes. Given this background it would not have been surprising if the state’s 
industrial trajectory had been similar to West Bengal where the Communist-populist 
ruling coalition sometimes adopted populist polices in the 1980s and 1990s to the 
detriment of industrial growth. So it is interesting that Tamil Nadu despite its 
competitive clientelism and populist politics including informal rent allocations 
managed to sustain high levels of industrial development. The key to this has been 
the relative stability of policy due to the specific distribution of power between the 
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ruling coalition and currently excluded political organizations in the state. It is this 
configuration that we will analyse more deeply in the chapter.  
In Figure 3.2 in Chapter three we located Tamil Nadu in the quadrant for competitive 
clientelism. This reflects the fact that political organizations outside the ruling 
coalition are strong and as related to that, the lower level organizations within the 
ruling coalition are also strong because they always have the credible option of 
leaving and joining the opposition. Compared to Pakistan with its increasingly 
powerful and fragmented excluded organizations, Tamil Nadu is not as far to the 
right in the diagram, implying that excluded organizations are only moderately 
strong and in any case use ‘acceptable’ mechanisms of political competition. This is 
one reason why the state maintained relative policy stability despite electoral cycling 
and competitive clientelism. This feature of Tamil Nadu’s political settlement also 
ensured that successive governments would not overturn contracts and investments 
agreed upon by the previous government. As a result, large Indian industrial houses 
and multinational corporations flocked to the state over the years. Historically, when 
Congress was a dominant party in the 1960s, the state had already been pro-
business in its development policy. With the rise of the more populist Dravidian 
parties (Dravidian refers to a pre-Aryan indigenous culture in the Indian peninsula) 
industry did not retain its primacy, but policy did not become anti-business either. As 
a result investors were confident of bringing in and investing in technology-intensive 
sectors despite their long gestation periods of investment and learning. In particular, 
business organizations that needed policy stability but were already competitive and 
needed relatively little government support to become profitable were attracted to 
the state. For instance, in the mid-2000s, Tamil Nadu accounted for 21 per cent of 
passenger car production in India and 33 per cent of commercial vehicles (Aya and 
Siddharthan 2007). It also had a significant electronics industry. Clearly, the state has 
the policy credibility to attract moderately large, high technology investments even 
though it did not have the reputation of having a centralised administration as in 
Gujarat run by an ‘efficient’ leader.  
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Figure 6.3 Contribution of some significant sectors in Tamil Nadu to the Indian 
manufacturing sector in 2008 (all figures in percentages) 
Note: HCV stands for Heavy Commercial Vehicles 
Source: (IBEF 2008) 
 
Gujarat scores higher than Tamil Nadu in attracting even longer gestation projects 
like infrastructure projects, power generation and private ports. The time horizon for 
recovering investments in infrastructure projects like ports is typically much longer 
than that required for investments in electronics or autos and therefore the former 
require the state to credibly honour contracts over a longer period. Hence we do 
observe a significant difference in the sectoral industrial profiles of the two states. 
During the course of our fieldwork interviews a common response was that 
whichever party was in opposition was careful not to damage investor confidence. A 
number of significant respondents reported a tacit agreement between the two 
parties whereby the opposition would get a portion of the rents coming from new 
investments. Secondly opposition to projects or changing contracts ex-post would 
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threaten investments when that party expected to be in power, thereby affecting 
the flow of rents.  
his implicit contract between the two parties in the competitive clientelist political 
settlement solved a number of credibility problems facing investors about the 
predictability of policies and the enforcement of their own contracts with the state 
over time. The live-and-let-live compromises in the organization of political 
competition and the informal rent sharing arrangements between the political 
parties at the highest level therefore served as an informal institutional structure 
that guaranteed continuity and provided credible commitments about contract 
enforcement to investors. However, the time horizon of credibility in contracting was 
limited to confidence that the next government was unlikely to make fundamental 
changes but the system itself faced vulnerabilities. This meant that the rent 
management institutions in Tamil Nadu could not offer very long-term contracts 
with high levels of credibility. This can help to explain why in the case of 
infrastructure investments, Tamil Nadu did not perform as well as Gujarat. 
Nevertheless, the informal rent management institutions offered sufficient stability 
and credible short-term rent allocations that were sufficient to attract high capability 
companies that were already close to the competitiveness frontier in sectors like 
automobiles and later electronics. Capability development in the former had largely 
happened in the industrial policy era when Congress was the dominant party, and 
then in the 1980s in the early stages of the transition to competitive clientelism 
when the Maruti-Suzuki venture was organized (M. H. Khan 2009b). 
In 2007 Tamil Nadu’s share of installed capacity in the auto components sector in 
India was 32 per cent and three Chennai based groups TVS, Amalgamated and Rane 
accounted for 22 per cent of India’s auto component production. Chennai has also 
emerged as India’s electronics hardware manufacturing centre with companies like 
Nokia and Flextronics setting up some of their biggest manufacturing units here. It is 
particularly significant that Tamil Nadu achieved these levels of industrial 
concentration in relatively high technology sectors without the natural resource base 
of Gujarat and without the centralized political administration that a dominant party 
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can offer. As we see in Figure 6.2 Tamil Nadu’s share of engineering based industries 
like cars, Heavy Commercial Vehicles (HCVs) and auto components is substantial 
given that its population in 2011 was 5.8% of the Indian total (Table 6.1). The 
presence of industrial clusters in Tamil Nadu for small engineering (power pumps), 
ready-made garments and cotton yarn is also substantial providing broad-based 
employment opportunities. In contrast, in Gujarat relatively largest sectors are in 
capital-intensive activities like chemicals, petro chemicals and energy much of which 
also exploits Gujarat’s natural endowments and particularly oil reserves (Figure 5.2, 
Chapter Five). 
As in Gujarat, the ruling coalition in Tamil Nadu was able to offer incentives to 
particular investors by offering a series of upfront rents. The difference with Gujarat 
was in the nature of the business-government relationships through which large 
business houses maintained close links formally and informally with the government. 
As Gujarat had a dominant party system for over 15 years, links between privileged 
business houses and the Modi administration were uninterrupted and therefore 
deeper. In Tamil Nadu business houses have had to deal with a different ruling 
coalition every five years since 1989 and therefore did not have the kind of 
uninterrupted access to the administration as in Gujarat. Nevertheless, credible 
relationships that provided upfront rents to attract investments, followed by enough 
of an assurance that policies and contracts would not be immediately challenged by 
a new government attracted high capability companies that were already 
competitive or close to achieving competitiveness. These were precisely companies 
in sectors like autos, auto components, textiles and leather where capabilities had 
already been developed in the pre-liberalization years and in the 1980s when 
liberalization was in its very early stages.  
The roots of the original Dravidian movement in the region in the early 20th century 
were in an emancipatory politics based on rationalism and an attempt to redress the 
exclusion of backward castes in Tamil society. However, the politics of the two large 
political parties that claim their descent from this movement have evolved to 
become largely populist and clientelist. Leakages of public resources are used by 
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both parties as informal rent allocations to support large party organizations. In fact 
industry and employment generation stagnated under the Dravidian parties, 
especially under the DMK (from which the AIADMK later broke away) in the 1980s as 
a result of these populist strategies. Some of the redistribution happened through 
formal populist schemes like the Mid-Day Meals scheme which we will discuss later. 
This scheme became one of India’s most successful redistributive welfare 
programmes. Implementation of such schemes encouraged even greater 
mobilizations of the state’s already relatively well-organized lower castes, in stark 
distinction from Gujarat. These mobilizations had repercussions for the survival 
strategies and legitimacy of the ruling parties. In order to maintain their legitimacy 
both parties had to vie with each other in devising and implementing welfare 
schemes and populism was a mechanism for achieving political stability and became 
an accepted and necessary part of the institutional distribution of benefits in the 
Tamil political settlement.  
It was precisely because the legitimacy of the ruling parties depended on their ability 
to deliver populist redistributive schemes that both pursued these policies, but the 
latter also led to a slowdown of growth and growing unemployment in the 1980s. 
The necessity of combining redistribution with growth led both parties to adopt 
proactively pro-industry positions in the 1990s. India’s liberalization reforms 
happened at a serendipitous moment for Tamil Nadu which could now make use of 
its high capabilities in engineering industries and in incipient industrial clusters like 
autos, textile and leather. Some of these capabilities were based on industrial 
location and licensing decisions of the industrial policy period, but some were based 
on the state’s strong performance in education. The state not only has one of India’s 
highest literacy rates but also houses some the highest numbers of tertiary 
education institutes in India, especially private engineering and medical universities.  
The Government of India ran the Indian Institute of Technology in Chennai. This 
institution is at the forefront of technical research in India that is of global standards, 
and in these areas Tamil Nadu is ahead of Gujarat. While most of the private colleges 
do not provide standards of education commensurate with the needs of cutting edge 
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technology they have nonetheless helped create a pool of human capital that finds 
employment in the state’s fast growing IT and information technology enabled 
sectors (ITeS). Thus, 37 per cent of the state’s engineering graduates specialize in 
communications, IT or computer science. The accelerated development of private 
educational institutions is also an accidental result of another rent management 
strategy which provided party supporters with land to establish educational 
institutions that are often looked upon as lucrative business opportunities in the 
state. In other instances party supporters were granted liquor ‘licences’ and these 
were usually sold on for high profits. Some of these rents were subsequently 
channelled into the education sector. The rise in the high technology service sector 
exports from Tamil Nadu is in part a consequence of these public and private 
investments in education. This is an example of the argument in Chapter Two that 
the outcomes of rent seeking are more important than the immediate costs.  
One of the vulnerabilities of the political settlement in Tamil Nadu is that it is subject 
to fragmentation from endogenous processes of political competition. Clientelist 
parties typically have dynastic and personality-based leaderships. The formal 
institutionalization of clientelist parties is difficult because these are coalitions of 
sub-organizations and every sub-organization is threatened if a leader identified with 
a particular sub-organization is elected to lead the whole party. The clientelist party 
structurally requires a leader who can act as neutral arbiter in its internal rent 
allocation contests and a dynastic leader is usually the most acceptable to all the 
internal factions. But this also means that inter-generational change can be 
contested and lead to a fragmentation of the party when there a multiple siblings or 
relatives claiming the succession. In addition, changes at the all-India level have 
resulted in a change in the types of rents that are available to important coalition 
partners in states. We will see that Tamil parties have been able to access very large 
centrally allocated rents with ease in the context of providing support to national 
coalitions in Delhi. This too has had an adverse effect in reducing the importance of 
managing state-level industrial rents with care. By the 2010s, the state began to face 
capability constraints in its manufacturing sector and neither party had a rent 
management strategy to address this problem. The constraints were not just at the 
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level of the supply of skilled personnel being produced by educational institutes. 
There was also the challenge of financing new waves of learning-by-doing in 
capability development to move up the quality and technology chain in sectors like 
auto components. In both areas rent-management strategies were falling short of 
addressing the constraints. This problem is particularly acute in Tamil Nadu where 
the bulk of manufacturing is competing in globally competitive markets. In Gujarat 
the manufacturing specialization is somewhat different and enjoys greater entry 
barriers against global competition but even there the challenge of learning and 
capability development for developing new competitive sectors is likely to affect the 
sustainability of industrial growth.  
 
6.1 From an Ancient Civilization to Politics of Populism 
6.1.1 A brief history of Tamil Nadu: 
 
Like much of southern India Tamil history has been marked by linguistic and cultural 
differences from northern India. Even while Sanskrit was developing as one of the 
classical languages of the Indo-European languages group, the Tamil language was 
developing as an independent linguistic entity in the family of Dravidian languages. 
Evidence of a cultural region called ‘Tamilakam’ encompassing much of modern 
Kerala and Tamil Nadu comes from an ancient body of Tamil literature called 
Sangam. The Sangam is essentially a collection of heroic poetry with historians 
dating the work from the first century BCE to the sixth century CE. Non Tamil 
inscriptions from the era like Ashokan rock edicts also confirm the existence of this 
region called Tamilakam with five independent states. Archaeologically the Sangam 
era is said to correspond with the late Iron Age to the Early Historic period or 300 
BCE to 300 CE (Abraham 2003). At various times this literature has often been 
invoked by Dravidian parties as an example of the difference between north and 
south India. While this was often used to prove populist political points the 
instrumentalizing role played by the Tamil language through mobilizations that 
began in the 19th century have ensured it centrality in Tami politics (Ramaswamy 
1993). Sanskrit did indeed have a role to play in society in south India especially with 
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regard to the adoption the Vedas there is little doubt that Tamil does indeed have a 
rich literary and cultural history of its own.  
By the first few centuries of the Common Era three kingdoms were already 
organizing territory in what is now Tamil Nadu, the Cholas, Pandyas and the Chedas: 
and under these kings trade routes were developed between the eastern 
Mediterranean and south-east Asia. A later dynasty called the Pallavas helped create 
a sovereign kingdom for the first time in the region (Stein 1998). Later Chola kings 
helped the kingdom become a naval power with frequent expeditions to the island 
that now make up Indonesia. It is telling that at no time before the British period in 
India did any north Indian dynasty rule over the entire southern Indian peninsula. By 
the beginning of the 14th century the region came under varying degrees of Islamic 
rule but unlike in the northern part of the country Islam and subsequent Hindu-
Muslim communalization played a limited role in the state’s politics.  
The first colonizing Europeans who evinced an interest in the region were the Dutch 
who chose Pulicat near Chennai as their base around 1609. The French and the 
British soon followed. By the middle of the 18th century the Dutch and Portuguese 
were by and large ousted from India and the south eastern coast of India where 
Tamil Nadu is situated reflected the rivalry the French and English shared in Europe.  
Three Carnatic (India’s south eastern coast) Wars were fought between the two rival 
colonial powers and Madras city changed hands between the two during this time. A 
famed standoff in South Asian history between the brilliant if eccentric French 
governor of Pondicherry, near Chennai, Francois Dupleix and Robert Clive who could 
be similarly described from the British side ended with the English winning control. 
But English and French interference in the south marked the beginning of a policy 
the British were to later use successfully across India. The policy of divide and rule 
used by the two was essentially about supporting one Indian side over the other to 
help consolidate their own rule in the South. The end of the third Carnatic war 
however decisively ended French rule in India. By the last decades of the 18th 
century the East India Company was very much in power and the area was deemed 
as Madras Presidency. 
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Like Bombay, now Mumbai, in the west and Calcutta (Kolkata) in the east of India the 
British had developed the port of Madras to be their base in southern India. Similar 
to those two cities Madras, now Chennai also saw the establishment of British 
institutions like the judiciary and provincial administration. In fact Chennai was the 
first settlement the British created in India. The British made investments in 
upgrading agriculture, especially with regard to irrigation, industry and infrastructure 
with Madras port becoming the premier port in the south. It would be easy to say 
that these earlier institutional endowments have made it easier for Tamil Nadu to be 
the industrial success it is today. However while this history might have helped, 
attempts to leverage and build on it were attempted only in the post independence 
era, and not all of it in consciously intended ways.  Our framework shows that 
growth is dependent on the political settlement that determines how politics and in 
particular the organisation of power interacts with economic institutions. The 
historical strength of institutions is no guarantee of future growth because as we 
have discussed in Chapter Two growth is not a linear sum of the effects of 
institutional variables. A very good example to demonstrate this would be the 
former first city of the British Raj in India, Calcutta. It was the capital of the Raj till 
1912 and the British lavished enough care and attention befitting a ‘second city’ on 
Calcutta. By the early 20th century Calcutta and Bengal province of which Calcutta 
was also the capital were the most industrialized in the country. Yet by the 1970s 
West Bengal and Calcutta were both in the throes of what is now commonly 
described in India in as de-industrialisation. Calcutta had similar institutional features 
to Mumbai and Chennai (except for its riverine port which was silting up as opposed 
to Mumbai’s and Chennai’s deep sea ports) yet the ruling coalition of Left parties 
chose an agrarian strategy of rent creation as opposed to industrialization (M. H. 
Khan 2009a; P. Roy 2012). Coalitions in Maharashtra (of which Mumbai) is the capital 
and Tamil Nadu did not at least have antagonistic ties with capitalists. The next few 
sections will identify the combination of institutional variables that led to the 
political settlement with its specific growth-stability trade-off in Tamil Nadu. 
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6.1.2 The origins of the Dravidian movement and a Congress attempt to overcome it 
in the initial years after independence 
Upper caste Brahmans were not the socially dominant force in the pre colonial era In 
Tamil Nadu (N. Subramanian 1999). It was with the coming of the British and their 
importance as a ‘scribal’ class that led to the rise of anti Brahmanism. The Brahmans 
in Tamil Nadu had knowledge of the scriptures and therefore had an advantage in 
being educated. Much like the Brahmans of Bengal the British picked them to be 
their scribes giving them access to government jobs and consequently a level of 
prosperity the other castes did not have. British social engineering was based on 
early oriental anthropology and drew its authority from the scriptures. In Tamil Nadu 
many of the intermediate land owning castes were not Brahmans and when the 
British were legalizing tradition they relegated them to the lower castes. This was 
because while they were not Brahmans they couldn't be fitted into the other two 
warrior and trading castes either as the latter two did not seem to exist in Tamil 
Nadu, even though most backward castes like the Mukkalathors and Vanniyars 
consider themselves to be a martial caste. It was due to this reengineering that 
temple properties also came to be appropriated by the Brahmans as were temple 
practices. They also dominated Congress politics till the 1940s. The Brahmans had a 
distinct cultural identity in that they were more Sansrikitized and at least in scriptural 
terms closer to North Indian Brahmans. Along with their newly minted higher (than 
in pre- colonial times) political and social status this already existing cultural 
difference only added to perceptions of their superiority (N. Subramanian 1999).  
It was therefore telling that the first two political movements based on anti-
Brahmanism were started by the elites among non-Brahmans. The Dravidian 
Association was formed in 1912 and the Justice party in 1916. The founders of these 
two organisations were ‘anglicized landlords’ who were demanding greater 
representation for non-Brahmans in professional and educational arenas and within 
the framework of colonial legality. An anti-Brahman movement that was based 
specifically against their superior caste position vis a vis the Shudra was to come 
later in the form of EV Ramaswami Naicker, better known as Periyar, in 1926. This 
was the Self Respect Association and the organisation became the precursor for a 
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nativist movement based on a separate cultural and linguistic identity of non-
Brahman Tamils from the rest of India. Periyar is important also because both the 
DMK and AIADMK owe their ideological origins to him. Several other Dravidian 
parties like the MDMK and PMK also owe ideological allegiance to Periyar and have 
often been coalition partners with the two main parties from time to time.  
Periyar initially joined the Congress but was disillusioned with Gandhi’s ‘North Indian 
Brahmanism’ and started the Self Respect Association. Given its avowed anti 
Brahmanism on the basis of a felt deep social exclusion rather than one that 
represented non Brahman elite sentiments of exclusion from government jobs the 
association became a more successful mass movement. Periyar’s own attitude to 
both the Indian union and anti Brahmanism is the subject of many academic debates 
and not within the purview of the paper. But we will quickly concise a few of his 
main ideological points in order to understand modern Tamil politics better. Periyar 
was the first to articulate the ‘Dravidas’ or those living in the south of India were a 
race distinct from the north Indian ‘Aryans’ (though Aryan is not a race but a 
linguistic grouping). He opposed the Sanskritic caste system on the basis of 
hegemonic North Indian Hinduism and went so far as to demand a separate Dravid 
homeland or Dravida Nadu, as a separate entity from independent India. His views 
on religion were also heretical and iconoclastic though his attitude towards the 
Scheduled Castes of India (SC) or lower castes and Tamil Muslims and Christians 
remained ambivalent. The essence of his ideology was the primacy of the Shudra 
caste or the lowest of all castes according to Brahmanical Hinduism (N. Subramanian 
1999) It was this aspect of his ideology that the later parties would adopt. His 
successor CN Annadurai opposed secession at the time of independence and this 
was one of the reason why he split from the Association (by then called Dravida 
Kazagham or DK), in 1949 to form the DMK. Periyar’s DK was against fighting 
elections while DMK was a political party ready to seek an electoral mandate. At this 
time the Congress formed the government in the first general elections in Tamil 
Nadu, then still called Madras state. The Congress was riding a nationalist wave all 
across India after independence and this propelled it to absolute majorities in most 
states. However the party did not get an absolute majority in Tamil Nadu and had to 
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depend on alliances with smaller parties to keep out the DMK and form the 
government.  
However matters started looking up for the Congress in the assembly elections of 
1957 and 1962. The Congress government under K Kamaraj introduced a number of 
schemes for the Backward Classes in the state. Kamaraj himself was the first non-
Brahman chief minister of Tamil Nadu and this helped the Congress consolidate its 
base amongst the intermediate castes in the state. While Kamaraj was not the chief 
minister over all of the seventeen years that the Congress ruled the state 
nonetheless received high levels of investment from India’s centrally planned 
economic model. The state became fairly industrialised by the 1950s and received a 
high proportion of investment in hydro-electric projects because of the abundance 
of large rain fed river systems in the state. It was under Kamaraj that the state 
received large public sector investments like the Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd (BHEL), 
a heavy engineering company and till today one of the leaders in its sector in India. 
Tamil Nadu already had established industries like leather and textiles from the 
British times. A railway wagon making factory was established in Permabur near 
Chennai that still continues to function successfully. A number of sugar and paper 
mills were also established under his watch. Kamaraj also successfully negotiated the 
setting up of the prestigious Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) in Chennai. This IIT 
became one of the first five prestigious IITs of the country and is today known as the 
alma mater for some of the best engineers from India, and some would say even be 
comparable with the best international standards in engineering education. It is 
worth noting that Kamaraj was a trusted associate of Nehru and this personal 
equation served the state in good stead.  
A quick look at these ministers in the central cabinet and how they helped influence 
Tamil Nadu’s growth in the early post independence period is required now. For 
instance TT Krishnamachari was minister for commerce and industry, finance and 
steel for various periods between 1952 and 1965. He was also the founder of the TTK 
group of industries, a large conglomerate in south India which is now a Rs 1500 crore 
group. It is a successfully diversified group with manufacturing interests in consumer 
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durables and pharmaceuticals among others as well as in services. The company is 
headquartered in Chennai and in its early years was certainly helped by the fact that 
Krishnamachari was himself a part of the government. C Subramaniam was first 
made minister for steel and mines in 1962 in the union cabinet and then became 
defence and finance ministers. From the second plan onwards India’s five year plans 
were heavily dependent on investments in capital goods related industries like steel 
to drive growth.  The portfolio of steel and mines is critical here because all Indian 
states were desirous of getting a steel plant at this stage. Tamil Nadu, despite being 
deficient in both coal and iron ore received a large investment from the central 
government in the steel sector—for instance the Salem Steel plant manufacturing 
special steels, though to be fair it is not an integrated steel plant which requires 
chiefly iron ore and coal. The politics of industrial location is still hotly debated in 
India and is not within the scope of this paper directly but ‘friendly’ central ministers 
went a long way in influencing where public sector investments went. R 
Venkataraman was an industry minister from Tamil Nadu who also promoted the 
state’s interests. He later went on to become president of India. A number of 
licences for manufacturing trucks and heavy vehicles were provided to Tamil Nadu in 
this period by these ministers (Aya and Siddharthan 2007). As a senior manager in 
the auto components sector says, “The success of the auto component sector has its 
origins in this period. Ministers were actually able to pick winners”. 
In 1967 the Congress received a rude jolt when the DMK won an absolute majority in 
the assembly elections for the state parliament. There were two key reasons for this. 
One was the Congress’ insistence on Hindi as the official language that led to anti-
Hindi riots in 1965. Second was the tenure of M Bakthavatsalam who took over as 
chief minister from Kamaraj after the latter left Tamil Nadu politics to become the 
president of the Congress Party at Nehru’s request. Bakthavatsalam was a Brahman 
by caste and did not possess either Kamaraj’s political acumen in intermediate caste 
politics or sensitivity. The DMK under Annadurai effectively mobilised public support 
even in the latter case and ensured its electoral victory in the assembly elections of 
1967. This was a significant event not just for Tamil Nadu but also for India because 
this heralded the beginning of non-Congress governments to last a full term across 
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the country (A communist government elected in 1957 in Kerala state was dismissed 
by Nehru in 1959), though the wave of regional party-led governments was still 
some time away. In Tamil Nadu itself the Congress has never regained power since. 
The Congress has been marginalised to the extent that it won only five seats in an 
assembly of 234 in the legislative elections. 
6.2 The years of the Dravidian parties, the DMK and the AIADMK: 
The watering down of Periyar and the DK’s initially strident ideologies (of anti-
Hinduism, anti-North India and an opposition of minority religions like Islam, 
because of its formal ritualistic structures) by the DMK and later AIADMK made the 
Dravidian movement more fluid and therefore both popular and populist (N. 
Subramanian 1999) It helped that the central government or centre in New Delhi 
also made important concessions like granting a separate Tamil state on a linguistic 
basis and backtracked from making Hindi the only official language along with 
English. This helped the DMK to ‘deradicalize’. It also reflected the true power base 
of Tamil Nadu, the intermediate castes, as opposed to the Congress support base 
that represented the Brahmans (Kohli 1998). The primary reason for the creation of 
the AIADMK was the competition for leadership of the DMK between two of its main 
leaders M Karunanidhi and MG Ramachandran or MGR after Annadurai’s death 
(Sastry 1974). MGR was one of Tamil cinemas most popular heroes, sometimes 
hailed even as a demi god by his fans. In fact the third reason for the undivided 
DMK’s unprecedented success was that MGR had sustained a life-threatening injury 
around the time of the elections and the ‘sympathy’ votes cast in his favour helped 
the DMK with its electoral victory (N. Subramanian 1999). In 1973 MGR broke away 
with his sizable faction based on his image as a socially crusading matinee idol 
(Pandian 1989). This interplay between the socio-cultural, popular culture and 
politics in Tamil Nadu and indeed South India has been dealt with extensively in the 
literature but will not be dealt with in this paper as it is beyond our current scope. 
However the MGR faction, called ADMK, later the AIADMK, was also able to mobilize 
groups that the DMK was not focusing on. This included castes like the Nadars and 
Mukkalathors and the party also appealed more to female voters. The AIADMK has 
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tried to reach out to Dalits but has not been adequately successful as Dalit 
mobilizations are now beginning to gain independent ground (Pandian 2000).  
Taking this analysis further the creation of the AIADMK from the DMK and later the 
even more caste-coalition specific PMK in 1989 had a two-fold consequence in the 
way Tamil politics played out. For one the AIADMK incorporated the political 
aspirations of caste groupings the DMK had neglected and thereby decreased the 
possibility of any violent mobilization by these groups. The incorporation then led to 
greater relative stability, at least for two decades despite the fragmentation of the 
political order. Second this also meant government patronage, whether directly to 
key stakeholders or through redistribution programmes led to a distribution of 
resources to groups which would not have otherwise been beneficiaries. Of course 
such a structure runs the risk of breaking down and becoming detrimental if the 
fragmentation gets too minute and there are not enough resources to make all 
breakaway factions happy. This has not yet been the case in Tamil Nadu. Also the 
breakaway group of the AIADMK commanded enough support to pose a serious 
threat to the DMK. Later groups like the PMK or MDMK have been too small pose 
real competition to the two main parties. Stability achieved through this form of 
mobilisation seems to have actually had a growth-enhancing effect on the state's 
economy. This could in fact run counter to the claim that nativist policies usually 
impede growth. A similar conclusion was reached by Swamy when he contended the 
state’s two party system helped prevent the outbreak of violence (Swamy 1998). The 
DMK was able to build sizable support among the state’s Muslim population because 
Annadurai was careful to forge closer relations with the community. It must be 
noted however that the AIADMK is not uncomfortable with employing the language 
a ‘soft hindutva’ when the need arises (Schwecke 2011).  
Having come to power the DMK was now adept at using Tamil identity from within 
the confines of formal democracy and this has since become the hallmark of the 
Dravidian movement. The links between Tamil cultural identity and outright political 
mobilization has remained muted and somewhat ambiguous since. The AIADMK has 
also followed a similar strategy since. The core of the DMK’s policies at this stage 
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though remained true to its roots in the Dravidian movement of anti Brahmanism.  It 
was the first state in the country to appoint a ministry for Backward Classes Welfare 
though ministries for Scheduled Castes existed elsewhere. It appointed a backward 
Class Commission and raised the percentage of reserved seats or ‘quotas’ for 
Backward Classes in educational institutions from 25 percent to 31 percent in line 
with the Committee’s recommendations. By bringing in new more affluent castes in 
to the category of Backward Class it increased the share of such classes in the 
population from 41 percent to 51 percent. It also provided ‘quotas’ for Christians 
and Muslims who had originally been Hindu Scheduled Castes as well as for Dakhni 
Urdu speaking Muslims. This ensured consistent Muslim support for the DMK (N. 
Subramanian 1999).  The fact that richer castes were brought into the fold also made 
the party popular among intermediate classes and in fact laid the base for 
disenchantment with the DMK on the part of Dalits in the state.  
The 1970s was the period that the patron-client politics of Tamil Nadu began to take 
shape. The DMK used redistribution and more explicit patronage to build up a loyal 
clientelist base. The DMK government rewarded farmers in the state’s northern 
plains with an expansion of wells and tank irrigation networks. This made 
commercial agriculture viable for farmers, especially peanut farming. The area of the 
northern plains was where the party had made initial gains and was now being 
rewarded for its support. Most of the construction contracts were awarded to party 
supporters or wealthy farmers influential in the area who could be depended upon 
to bring with them the support of the villagers. As an example Subramanian 
mentions NC Ramaswami Gounder, a small time leader from the Vanniyar caste who 
was lured to the DMK fold with such contracts. In turn Gounder brought with him 
the support of his extended clan and supporters (N. Subramanian 1999). To go back 
to our framework this would count as a sound example of how a clientelist political 
settlement works. As a retired bureaucrat familiar with the workings of Tamil Nadu 
told us, ‘Even if all the roads and tanks did not get built at least some did. And where 
none existed it is better than nothing’. While it was building its base among the 
intermediate classes with such instances of patronage the party was also ensuring 
militant industrial trade unions were immobilized and promoted its own unions, 
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especially in factories where Communist unions were strong (N. Subramanian 1999). 
The DMK however maintained support for workers’ unions after it demobilized the 
Communist run ones earning it the displeasure of some capitalists in the state. Apart 
from its base among the richer peasants in the state the party was gradually building 
a coalition of traders and industrialists in the major urban centres like Coimbatore 
and Madras hence it needed to stamp out militant trade unionism. On the other 
hand the DMK made peace with agricultural unions as at this time it was 
consolidating its base among prosperous caste groupings with ties of traditional 
kinship among smaller farmers. It was not just easier for the DMK to suppress 
agricultural unions but also made for better politics of survival. The DMK faced it’s 
most serious threat in 1972 when MGR was suspended from the party’s primary 
membership. While analysts ascribes the schism to both MGR’s growing popularity 
and the fact that he disagreed with the DMK’s corrupt practices our analytical 
framework seems to suggest another line of reasoning.  
By the late 1960s MGR had come to realize he was the star attraction for the DMK. 
His ‘fan clubs’ used to mobilise support for the undivided DMK, his rallies always 
registered huge attendance and many had not heard of the DMK but knew it only as 
‘MGR’s party’. MGR started asserting his influence within the DMK as a reflection of 
his importance in gaining the party votes. Karunanidhi was not willing to grant him 
the level of authority MGR saw as commensurate with his stature and decided to 
deal the DMK a body blow (Sastry 1974). He had enough supporters mobilized both 
within the DMK and outside and by 1972 when the split took place MGR was 
confident he would be a grave threat to the DMK’s dominance and formed the 
ADMK or Anna DMK. In other words MGR was ready with another large patron-client 
grouping that could unsettle the political settlement created under the DMK. MGR’s 
mobilization of his supporters into an opposing patron-client faction meant that he 
was then in a position to significantly change the distribution of benefits within the 
settlement and this in turn increased the holding power of his faction. This was 
demonstrated by the fact that the party won a by-election just seven months after 
its formation. A by-election in India is conducted after a legislative or parliamentary 
constituency is left empty for some reason (usually the death of the sitting legislator 
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or annulment of an earlier electoral result) and in some cases can be used as an 
indicator of support for the next elections for the party that wins the by-elections. 
The DMK employed significant state machinery to thwart the ADMK candidate but 
the latter emerged victorious. Clearly here we see our framework at work. The 
ADMK had gained enough traction to hold out against the more powerful ruling DMK 
and was able to inflict losses not yet commensurate with the ADMK’s formal 
structure. Most of the supporters and campaigners in the ADMK’s mobilization 
programme, and not just for the elections, were students with little experience in 
politics before the by elections took place (N. Subramanian 1999). By the time MGR 
won elections in 1977 Karunanidhi had already for almost a decade from 1967 to 
1976. 
What MGR was effectively doing was taking positions that had a wide enough appeal 
and which the DMK would have difficulty in claiming. For instance MGR was 
consciously watering down the anti-North Indian stance of the DMK and making his 
politics more inclusive to the extent that his supporters even included Brahmans. 
This combination of political positions was inclusive enough to appeal to those who 
felt alienated by the DMK’s nativism but at the same time appealed to voters who 
preferred a political opposition with Dravidian roots rather than a Congress which 
traditionally was weak in Tamil Nadu. Apart from this successful nuancing of political 
positions the AIADMK under MGR and later his protégé Jayalalithaa Jeyaram was 
also to become more populist in terms of redistributive politics while it was in 
power. Given that the DMK had already laid the ground for redistributive politics in 
the state the AIADMK could only go further. It did so by launching schemes that were 
based more on handouts and could be delivered more directly to people. For 
instance AIADMK sponsored schemes included free mid-day meal schemes for 
children in state run primary schools or providing free rice and in one instance even 
promising a television set to each household. The effect of such policies was more 
direct and immediate. The DMK’s redistributive policies were based more on 
reservations for various castes (though the AIADMK by no means abandoned this) or 
schemes to alleviate unemployment. The mid-day meal scheme however was to 
become so successful that it was adopted by states across India as an incentive to 
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send children to school (Dreze and Goyal 2003). The scheme’s origins are another 
insight into how redistributive policies if properly targeted can deliver results, 
however expedient their origins (Harris-White 2004).  
The scheme was originally implemented as much to placate one of MGR’s and the 
AIADMK’s strongest support base, women. At that time Tamil Nadu was running up a 
high fiscal burden given the large number of welfare schemes the government was 
running. The fact that DMK had implemented prohibition laws ensured a significant 
portion of revenue was lost by the exchequer. The AIADMK reversed prohibition 
laws to make up for the fiscal shortfall. Liquor licences were introduced and they 
soon became the largest source of revenue for the state. The liquor industry became 
one of the fastest growing industries in the state in the early 1980s growing at about 
20 percent annually. By 1981 alone the AIADMK government had sold 15,000 
licences. AIADMK activists cornered a large share of these and resold them at higher 
prices, ostensibly garnering funds for themselves as well as the party. In fact one 
such entrepreneur made enough from pay-offs by selling liquor licences to start a 
chain of educational institutions across the state. In the midst of this however MGR 
ran the risk of alienating women who saw the repeal of prohibition laws as inimical 
to their interests with male members of their household getting access to cheap, 
legal liquor (N. Subramanian 1999). 
The noon meal scheme was one of the most ambitious in scope in the country and 
was initially launched for six million children between the ages of two and nine. 
Incidentally the first such scheme was launched in Tamil Nadu when the Congress’ 
Kamaraj was the chief minster but it did not have the scope that the programme had 
under MGR. By 1984 it was extended to 12 million people and included homeless 
widows, veteran soldiers and the most poor among Scheduled Castes. The 
programme also employed many disadvantaged women and members of the 
Scheduled Castes. The scheme became very popular and remains associated with 
MGR to this day and had positive effects on the enrolment statistics in the state (I. S. 
Rajan and Jayakumar 1992). However this scheme was also used to distribute 
benefits to AIADMK’s supporters and once again underscores how development 
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policies cannot be made in a vacuum. It also shows how clientelistic and 
programmatic politics come together in developing countries. The underlying 
politics, especially in terms of who the beneficiaries in the patron-client structure are 
has to be taken into account. When we spoke to interviewees in the course of our 
research it became clear that the key reason for the extension of the mid-day meal 
scheme was that it reached out to a constituency the AIADMK was in danger of 
losing as well providing the party a channel to distribute lucrative contracts to run 
the scheme among its key supporters. Anecdotal and academic evidence suggests 
that procurement and distribution associated with the scheme initially provided 
AIADMK supporters with enough payoffs to keep them loyal (N. Subramanian 1999; 
Harris-White 2004). Later when the DMK ran the scheme it was similarly used to 
distribute patronage. In fact the scheme has been attacked by many who feel its 
aims of providing nutrition are being undermined by the corruption evident in its 
implementation. The purpose here is not to say that corruption should be allowed to 
be endemic. It is however an attempt at highlighting that corruption or illegal rent 
seeking is a structural feature of clientelist political settlements in much the same 
way as the AIADMK and DMK use schemes in an informal manner to build and 
sustain their respective coalitions in the absence of a large formal sector through 
which to channel resources. However as Wyatt has pointed out the fact that while 
Tamil Nadu politics under the Dravidian parties remains clientelistic both have 
combined it with ‘programmatic politics’ aligned with its populism (Wyatt 2013). 
Unlike recent arguments in some of the literature on India coming from political 
scientists (Wilkinson 2007; Manor 2010; Elliott 2011) the continuation of clientelism 
through formal programmes does not imply India is moving towards a post 
clientelistic phase. It only means that India’s political settlement is evolving into one 
where some programmes at the centre and in some states like Gujarat patron-client 
interactions are taking place through formal programmes. Even in the case of the 
National Rural Employment Guarantee Act programme which could be classified as a 
formal redistributive programme leakages take place on the lines described by Khan 
(1998) as suggested by media reports from some of India’s’ leading publications 
(Mahboob 2010; Times 2012). 
230 
 
A notable feature in the last few decades has however been a whittling down of the 
difference in redistributive policies between the two parties. It is now more a 
question of competition between the two. For instance the DMK continued to run 
the mid-day meal scheme after it came to power given its popularity. While MGR 
was alive he was the clear differentiator between the two parties and his popular 
appeal was also higher. With his death in 1987 the gap between the two parties has 
narrowed even more. “This sort of competitive policy making is the result of the 
keen ideological competition between the two—who is closer to, or at least 
perceived to be closer to—Dravidian ideology. So if the DMK builds a tidal park the 
AIADMK will build an even better one. This can even work to the state’s benefits at 
times”, says a successful entrepreneur in IT who relocated to Chennai after many 
years outside the state. Yet competition between the two leaders is so intense that 
the leaders of the two parties Karunanidhi and Jayalalithaa (she is known by her first 
name and hence we do the same) have not hesitated to jail each other when one is 
out of power. This sort of politics is unprecedented even in India where political 
rivalry among parties frequently descends into bloody violence. There is an 
apocryphal story that Jayalalithaa preserved the aluminium plate on which she was 
served her meals in jail after her arrest in 1997 by then chief minister Karunanidhi. 
When she came back to power she instructed the jail authorities to serve 
Karunanidhi in the same plate after his arrest in 2003. Yet despite such bitterness at 
the personal level instances where the incumbent party has reneged on a significant 
investment decision made by the other while it was in power have been rare in the 
state. It is this unique political arrangement that has allowed the state to provide the 
stability necessary for industrial growth.  
 
6.3 Relationship with the ‘Centre’, Coalition Politics of Today and the DMK and 
AIADMK 
Given that we are presenting the case study of a state within the Indian federation 
no analysis will be complete without a discussion on the dynamics between the state 
and the central government in New Delhi. Tamil Nadu’s politics despite being 
concerned with specific regional factors and dominated by regional parties was also 
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affected by political coalitions making up the central government that the DMK and 
AIADMK were part of. While the dynamics of national politics did not create a sizable 
dent during state assembly elections national level parliamentary elections saw the 
two Tamil parties forge alliances with national parties, especially the Congress and 
the BJP. By the mid 1980s the Congress’ stranglehold on national politics was 
significantly loosened. The first ever non Congress government was already 
experimented with in 1977 and though it did not last long, the Congress no longer 
seemed unassailable. By 1989 India was well on its way to learning to live with 
coalition governments. Regional parties from across India especially stronger ones 
like the AIADMK and the DMK were now in a position to dictate terms to national 
parties with regard to the choice of ministerial departments and as we will see in this 
section even in terms of pushing their own agenda in return for support to the 
national party. Depending on who gets a majority for the parliamentary elections in 
the state either the DMK or the AIADMK wins about 15 to 18 of the 39 parliamentary 
seats the state has. For a national party that has to cobble together a coalition in 
order to form the government these numbers regional parties provide are 
significant. 
In 1989 the Congress allied with the AIADMK for parliamentary elections and 
Jayalalithaa used this alliance to bring down the DMK government in Chennai and 
the AIADMK won a large majority in the Tamil Nadu assembly elections. This was 
possible largely because both the Congress and the AIADMK ran a campaign that 
indicted the DMK leadership of being in collusion with the Sri Lankan Tamil 
secessionist organization LTTE that was responsible for the assassination of former 
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. The accusations were never proved but it did help the 
AIADMK win the 1991 assembly elections. Incidentally more radical elements of the 
DMK were known to provide tacit support to Sri Lankan Tamils fighting to break 
away from Sri Lanka but it was never a key ideology of the DMK. However since the 
Sri Lankan government’s brutal crackdown on its Tamil citizens in the north east of 
the country both political parties in Tamil Nadu have forced the Congress in the 
centre to be more assertive in its opposition towards Sri Lanka. 
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The DMK on the other hand tested its national fortunes by being part of a non-
Congress, non-BJP coalition government that lasted from 1996 to 1998. This 
government did not last the full five years of its term but the DMK was already 
getting a taste of what national presence meant as it had ministers in the national 
cabinet who oversaw important portfolios (or ministries) like oil and gas and 
industry. This was at a time when the DMK was not in power in Tamil Nadu but by 
dint of the fact that it was now a member of the union cabinet it could still influence 
decisions about the state. This dynamic actually captures the changing nature of the 
Indian political structure and the balances and counterbalances that have sustained 
it since the breakdown of the Congress dominated one-party political settlement. 
From the mid 1970s the Congress was unable to keep up with the growing demands 
of a population that was beginning to feel some benefits of economic growth and 
demanded greater participation politically or economically in decision making 
processes. Industrial licencing had failed both as a strategy for growth and 
patronage. Intermediate classes were demanding more than the Congress could 
accommodate (M. H. Khan 2011c). It was from this political churning that India’s 
political space became more fragmented. Interestingly space was not made by 
offshoots of the Congress but was a result of genuine grassroots movements based 
on mobilizations that were either ethno-linguistic (Telegu Desam in the southern 
state of Andhra Pradesh) or on mobilization of backward classes the Congress could 
no longer represent (like the Rashtriya Janata Dal in Bihar). This was an expansion of 
the federal Indian political structure rather than a fragmentation though on the face 
of it might seem like fragmentation given the internecine nature of political battles 
and ever expanding roster of political parties in India. Yet India has not seen a hung 
parliament in the last 15 years (three parliamentary elections) and political parties 
have been able to form alliances that have lasted their terms, a marked change from 
the turmoil of the early 1990s (though the next general elections in 2014 might well 
mark a return to unstable coalitions). This could be described as a centrifugal force 
at play where political mobilizations from the margins of the Congress dominant 
party system, and not from within it, enlarged the political space rather than 
fragmentation from within the Congress. This meant a shifting of power from the 
Congress to regional parties as well as the BJP. With a tightly knit Congress led 
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dominant party system no longer possible the ‘loosening’ did not lead to a damaging 
breakdown but created a political order that was able to absorb the organizational 
power of the mobilising coalitions and prevent a collapse. How sustainable this 
process is depends on how fast factions break away and how effective existing 
factions are in distributing the benefits of economic growth.  
In Tamil Nadu’s case it meant the AIADMK and DMK leveraging their relationship 
with the two national parties for gains both at the central and state level. For 
instance the AIADMK joined the BJP-led NDA government with 28 Members of 
Parliament in Delhi and Jayalaithaa then insisted that the BJP dismiss the DMK 
government in Chennai. The then Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee refused and 
Jayalalithaa brought down the government in Delhi by one vote. The DMK was quick 
to offer support to the BJP soon after to ensure it retained clout in the centre to 
countervail Jayalalithaa. The DMK became part of the NDA government when 
elections were held again in but by 2003 it had withdrawn from the government. The 
next two general elections in 2004 and 2009 saw the DMK with the Congress’ UPA 
and the DMK extracted a due price for this support by asking and getting plum 
ministries for Karunanidhi’s associates, especially his family, namely a nephew and a 
daughter. Jayalalithaa meanwhile stayed away from the NDA perhaps reading 
correctly that the BJP’s fortunes were not on the ascendant. However an energized 
BJP under the likely leadership of Narendra Modi seems a formidable threat to the 
incumbent Congress and Jayalalithaa who is now chief minister of Tamil Nadu will 
most likely ally with the BJP in the coming national elections in 2014. This is what 
Sinha calls the ‘partisan route’ where state-level parties use their regional strengths 
to leverage with the national government for ministries or industrial investments 
(Sinha 2003). This was apparent when Dayanidhi Maran India’s telecommunications 
minister during the UPA’s first term, a member of Parliament belonging to the DMK 
successfully negotiated with mobile telephony hardware manufacturer Nokia and 
electronics design firm Flextronics to set up their India operations in Sriperumbudur 
near Chennai. Sriperumbudur has since developed into one India’s most successful 
manufacturing clusters with companies like Hyundai, (one of the earliest in the area), 
Ford, Nissan, Samsung and Dell also setting up operations there. A combination of 
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informal compulsions emanating from Maran’s ministry to locate the Nokia and 
Flextronics units in Sriperumbudur, both of which were in sectors in line with his 
ministries and the already developed manufacturing environment around Chennai 
helped clinch the deals for Tamil Nadu when other states were also vying for them. 
The DMK controlled the telecommunication ministry in both its stints with the UPA 
though its second term was not as productive for the state as the first. The party was 
recently divested of the portfolio owing to corruption charges against the relevant 
minister A Raja. This ministry was more often in the news for conducting 
undervalued auctions for telecom spectrums to create rents for themselves and 
other beneficiaries than for any other reason.  The core of the controversy is the fact 
that the licences were provided at deflated prices contrary to ruling market prices 
and there was no competitive bidding involved in the entire process, a result of the 
reverse patron-client relationships we have described in Chapter four. Some of these 
licences were then part-sold at multiples of the original amount. All of this, it is 
alleged, was arranged in collusion with Raja, a key member of the DMK and a close 
associate of Karunanidhi’s daughter.  
The Congress could only watch as the DMK with 18 seats in India’s parliament but 
still the second largest party conducted the affairs of the telecom ministry without 
much discretion. An analysis of why this was so is provided a former member of the 
legislature. He says, “Of the two the DMK positioned itself to be more adversarial to 
the Congress party and once it found itself in alliance with the party in Delhi the 
ministers from the DMK did not quite know how long they would enjoy power and 
hence went overboard in their rent seeking. Another reason is that the DMK is also 
the party with more competing patronage structures (patron-client in our 
framework) and hence has more powerful functionaries to placate. Rents from 
central ministries were one of the best ways to fulfil these demands.” Most parties 
recognize that corruption is a part of the system and the Congress itself is no 
stranger to allegations of corruption, far from it. But most political parties still prefer 
to be discreet in their dealings because corruption can quickly become an issue that 
wins or loses elections. When details of the way spectrum was allocated started 
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becoming public it threatened to destabilise the UPA government. The Congress in a 
show of strength asked for Raja’s resignation and instituted an investigation because 
of which Karunanidhi’s daughter and Raja both spent time in jail. Interestingly the 
DMK continues to be a part of the UPA alliance and Kanimozhi’s candidature to 
India’s upper house of parliament was facilitated by the Congress. The DMK’s 
performance has been one its worse in recent history and analysts have put the 
results down to a sort of fiefdom being run by a now ageing Karunanidhi’s (he is 87) 
family and associates which leaves very little scope of patronage for outsiders. A 
succession battle seems to be brewing between Karunanidhi’s two sons and this is 
bound to influence the political settlement in Tamil Nadu.  
 
 
6.4 How the Politics Affected Critical Areas of Institutional Operation 
The political processes we outline in sections 6.3 and 6.4 have had very specific 
growth outcomes in Tamil Nadu’s. As we mentioned earlier in Section 3.3 of Chapter 
three rents can be delivered to patron-client factions and political organizers in many 
ways including through productive allocation of rents. In Tamil Nadu’s case a 
combination of manufacturing capabilities built during the early years of Congress 
rule and the opportunities that the Dravidian  parties created post liberalization for 
industrial investments as part of coalition governments at the centre ensured rent 
allocation in the state remained productive even though the corruption in the state 
is well documented unlike in other Indian states like Uttar Pradesh or Bihar (Wade 
1985; Ambirajan 1999; Harris-White 2004; Vasudevan 2006). This led to higher levels 
of ancillarization, creation of cluster based industries like leather and textiles as well 
as a high technology oriented service sector in IT, ITeS and healthcare. Tamil Nadu 
also has cluster oriented industries like small engineering, leather and garments, 
investments which can be traced back to its populist politics. The Dravidian parties 
while being unabashedly populist also had to cater to a very mobilized intermediate 
class on whom an 'overhang' of Periyar's Rationalist movement still remains. So 
unlike in Bihar or UP which didn't experience similar movements of socio-economic 
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empowerment but were overtly about political empowerment parties in TN also had 
to generate employment. Its leather and garments cluster is precisely about that 
though of course the usual caveats about labour repression have to be kept in mind. 
So while the two parties were competing on populism they also had to compete on 
delivering economic growth. As a result the state has attracted a significant share of 
FDI and Indian investment from businesses that have come to realize that corrupt 
does not necessarily mean unstable or predatory. Tamil Nadu’s investment profile 
comprises of high technology, high capital cost sectors which are already close to the 
global competitiveness frontier with available human resources. These investments 
do not need much government assistance in the catching up process, but they do 
need government assistance in acquiring land, assistance for overcoming specific 
market failures and credible commitments not to overturn contracts in the future.  
A senior executive from the auto industry also remarked that whichever party comes 
to power in Tamil Nadu the bureaucrats working with it ensure that at least the 
larger, high profile investments go through unimpeded. A senior corporate 
personality summed up the current state of Tamil Nadu’s political parties in this 
manner—“They stand for themselves and against each other”. In this connection a 
‘70-30’ rule is said to have existed in the state for some time. This refers to an 
arrangement where the payoff was split between the government and opposition in 
a 70-30 ratio. This is to ensure that once the current incumbent is part of the 
opposition the then-ruling party does the same with them. This meant both political 
parties had an incentive to invite industrial investments. Our corporate source also 
said the payoff was never more than 10-15 percent of the investment so investors 
were not particularly daunted by the amount either. Yet this has not stopped Tamil 
Nadu from becoming one of India’s leading industrial states. A structure like Tamil 
Nadu’s could always be in danger of letting rent seeking become predatorial. While 
this sort of rent seeking is not yet evident the long-term infrastructural investments 
that are more pronounced in Gujarat are less in evidence in Tamil Nadu. 
The clientelist political settlement is the most common among developing countries 
and indeed all parts of India exhibit it. Yet frequent contestations in most states 
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mean a decline in either industrial growth or political stability, for instance in Uttar 
Pradesh or for some time in Maharashtra. The reason this doesn't happen in Tamil 
Nadu is that at a fundamental level the constituencies the two parties are reaching 
out to remain fairly similar, at least so far. This ensured critical policies stayed in 
place even if governments changed, like reservations for the Backward Classes or the 
mid-day meal schemes for children in primary schools. It can be argued that it would 
be unwise of any government to backtrack on successful policies implemented by 
the previous one but this has been known to happen in India. As a senior ex-
bureaucrat told us both the parties had fluid philosophies, especially when it came to 
fighting elections, “If one party’s policies worked earlier the newly elected party 
would have no hesitation is adopting and improving upon it”. It might be recalled 
here that this was in sharp contrast to Periyar who never wanted to contest 
elections and whose party, DK was ideologically quite iconoclastic. Since the 
Congress in the state was relatively weak and the two main parties represented a 
highly mobilised population based on principles of representation and equality 
populist schemes proved easier and in fact necessary to implement. Education was a 
sector both the parties prioritised—primary schooling through the mid-day meal 
schemes and through the private engineering and medical colleges. The first was for 
redistributive reasons and the second was seen as a channel for rent creation. As a 
result, Tamil Nadu’s performance on certain related human development indicators 
is higher than most south Asian standards, and certainly higher than the Indian 
average. It is ranked at number three behind Kerala and Maharashtra in terms of 
overall literacy rates. Yet the state also exhibits high inequality and some studies 
while recognising political clientelism as a ‘necessary evil’ have ascribed the 
inequality to Tamil Nadu’s competitive clientelist politics whereby poverty alleviation 
programmes might be implemented selectively depending on the support particular 
villages provide (Markussen 2010). Yet that would not seem to be the case in Tamil 
Nadu where the two parties adopt each other’s schemes when successful (as with 
the mid-day meal schemes). In the course of our research we found that some slums 
in Chennai keep both the parties’ flags handy and unfurl them depending on which 
party is in power. This way they don't lose out on largesse from either party given 
the nature of their cycling.  
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The fact that the two parties have a common ideological ancestry helps electorally 
because voters are able to migrate from one to the other without significantly 
compromising or giving up their ‘belief systems’ or more simply put political 
leanings. This is demonstrated by the fact that till assembly elections in 2011 where 
the DMK put in its most dismal performance, notwithstanding who won the two 
Dravidian parties each garnered at least 25 percent of the vote share. Between the 
two their vote share remains consistently over 55 percent since the 1980s (Table 
6.3). What then becomes significant are the voters at the margin who decide which 
party gets the majority. Analysing who the marginal voters might be and why they 
tipped to one or the other side is not the purpose of this chapter. This statistic was 
used to demonstrate how similar the electoral results were for the two parties. Since 
these results also reflected the true distribution of power there was seldom serious 
violence contesting them. This similarity in the constituency that both addressed also 
ensured policy continuity. This was because no party needed to experiment radically 
to reach out to newer sections of society. It is this fortuitous combination of social 
and political structures that has helped maintain political stability in Tamil Nadu and 
in turn has been advantageous for its growth prospects.  
To be sure both the DMK and AIADMK sought to reach out to constituencies other 
than their core grouping. The two parties do not fight elections on startlingly 
different platforms even though their opposition to each other is bitter. This is one 
reason why the clientelist settlement in Tamil Nadu is fiercely competitive. What the 
two parties cannot do with ideology they make up for by competing over who 
delivers that ideology best. In the context of the clientelist framework we have 
discussed in Chapter three, such a strategy is important to keep their respective 
support base mobilised. A similar situation exists in Bangladesh where electoral 
constituencies remain broadly similar and the two parties differ very little in terms of 
policies but the clientelist political settlement in that country has had less dramatic 
growth outcomes. The reasons for this are ‘zero-sum’ games played by the two main 
parties that end in irreconcilable ideological positions based on differing myths of 
nation creation. The live and let live ‘formula’ that has helped Tamil Nadu so far does 
not yet seem a viable option to that country’s main parties. Given this investors in 
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capital intensive projects like infrastructure projects are wary of commitments made 
by either party being reneged upon when the other is voted out of power. This has 
an adverse effect on the growth-stability trade-off (M. H. Khan 2012f) Another 
reason for the zero-sum posture adopted in Bangladesh is that it is national 
governance that the two parties are concerned with. This makes the stakes higher. In 
India the federal structure acts somewhat as a ‘shock absorber’ and given the nature 
of coalition politics currently parties can look to form coalitions at the national level 
too.  
The AIADMK’s decision to distribute liquor licences was however a break from the 
DMK’s policies and led to many party members gaining through selling them 
onwards. Some used this capital to invest in education and make the gains look more 
legitimate. But both the DMK and AIADMK used private education as a means to 
distribute patronage and generate payoffs. Says a venture capitalist based in 
Chennai, “Around the 1980s building educational institutes became very lucrative in 
Tamil Nadu as those with political connections received land at far below market 
prices in return for their support. Rather than invest in real estate they built private 
educational and medical colleges as they were regarded as more remunerative and 
that too over a longer term. The consequence was that the quality of human capital 
available to people like us started improving substantially.” Tamil Nadu (along with 
other southern states) actively encourages the establishment of private higher 
education institutes like engineering and medical colleges. Admission to such an 
institute can sometimes include what is inscrutably called ‘capitation fees’ which can 
be anywhere from $10,000 to $15,000. Most of this is unofficial and does not go into 
the accounts of the academic institute.  
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Table 6.3 Electoral performance of the DMK and AIADMK 
Year Party Seats 
contested 
Seats 
won 
% of 
votes 
polled 
% of votes in 
seats contested 
Total 
seats 
19
77 
ADK 
DMK 
200 
230 
130 
 48 
30.36 
24.89 
35.36 
25.26 
234 
19
80 
ADK 
DMK 
177 
112 
129 
37 
38.75 
22.1 
50.43 
45.7 
234 
19
84 
ADK 
DMK 
155 
167 
132 
24 
37.03 
29.34 
54.33 
40.79 
234 
19
89 
DMK 
ADK 
(JL)* 
202 
198 
150 
27 
33.18 
21.5 
38.7 
24.99 
234 
19
91 
ADK 
DMK 
168 
176 
164 
2 
44.39 
22.46 
61.14 
29.89 
234 
19
96 
DMK 
ADMK 
182 
168 
173 
4 
42.07 
21.47 
54.04 
29.54 
234 
20
01 
ADMK 
DMK 
141 
183 
132 
31 
31.44 
30.92 
52.08 
39.02 
234 
20
06 
DMK 
AIAD
MK 
132 
188 
96 
61 
26.46 
32.64 
45.99 
40.81 
234 
20
11 
AIAD
MK 
DMK 
NA 150 
23 
NA NA 234 
 
Source: Election Commission of India (ECI) Statistical reports, various years, results 
for 2011, ECI website, http://eciresults.ap.nic.in/  (ECI 2011)  
* The year the pattern of cycling began. Also the year when the ADK broke up after 
MGR’s death. We have featured the Jayalalithaa faction as that came to be 
recognised as the official one. 
NA- not available 
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Anecdotal evidence suggests some of the money goes to the patrons/owners of the 
school and some to the political party under whose watch the school was formed. 
This has had a two-fold consequence. It has helped the parties bestow largesse on 
key supporters while ensuring they also gain financial payoffs. It has also ensured the 
state produces a large number of engineering graduates compared to most other 
states. Interestingly one of the most frequent reasons provided by many software 
and engineering companies for investing in Tamil Nadu is the availability of skilled 
manpower. And Tamil Nadu has a high share of engineering graduates in the 
country. As Table 6.4 shows the computer software and hardware sectors was the 
second largest recipient of FDI in the state from 2000 to 2011. This resource pool 
was made available not because the parties consciously wanted to reap the benefits 
of higher education for the state but was an inadvertent consequence of a rent 
created for quite another purpose. This ties in with our framework which analyses 
how strategies for rent creation that are used to create strong patron-client 
networks also impact growth. 
Table 6.4 Top five sectors in FDI equity inflow 2000-2011 
Rank Sector FDI inflows in 
USD 
Share of FDI 
attracted in the 
sector (%) of all 
India total 
1 Construction 
development (townships, 
built up infrastructure etc) 
1,226.20 15.33 
2 Computer software and 
hardware 
1037.79 12.98 
3 Automobile industry 1025.85 12.83 
4 Drugs and 
pharmaceuticals 
563.10 7.04 
5 Services sector 505.39 6.32 
                         Total 4358.33 54.5 
 
 
Source: Table 3.2 RBI Regional Office Chennai (RBI 2011)  
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Apart from strong patron-client linkages within the parties Tamil Nadu is also known 
for its politicized but highly committed bureaucrats. Industrialists across the board 
rate them as one of the best along with bureaucrats from Gujarat and to a lesser 
extent Maharashtra. One of the frequent reasons cited for it is that Tamil Nadu has a 
better ‘work culture’ or ‘work ethic’. While not disputing the statement ascribing it 
merely to culture would be simplistic. A more political reason for this is at hand. At 
the time that the state was still ruled by the Congress (1950-67) there were also 
strong ministers at the centre from Tamil Nadu. Bureaucrats from the state 
interacted with key Tamil ministers in facilitating investments to the home state. It 
certainly helped that Madras was already one of India’s most industrialized cities 
thanks to British investments and Madras port was one of the largest in the country. 
But regular contact with senior ministers from their home state helped Tamil 
bureaucrats learn state craft faster. Tamil Nadu remained one of the higher 
recipients of industrial licences through the 1960s and 1970s. A deeper analysis of 
the state’s effective bureaucracy follows shortly. 
Leather and textile industrial clusters were established under Congress governments 
but have continued to turn in strong industrial performances under the non 
Congress governments too. Tamil Nadu’s power looms manufacturing cotton fabrics 
account for 30 per cent of India’s textile exports and the net value addition in the 
textile industry in the state is 37.5 per cent, the highest in the sector in the country. 
The state accounts for 65 per cent of the total number of spinning mills in the 
country and the Tirupur cluster produces 60 per cent of India’s knitwear. Tirupur is 
also one of India’s largest textile exporting hubs accounting for 90 per cent of its 
knitwear exports. The net value addition in Textile industry in Tamil Nadu is about 
37.5 per cent, the highest in the country. The Textile mills are concentrated in 
Coimbatore, Tirupur, Salem, Palladam, Karur and Erode. Tamil Nadu has around 
3,50,000 power looms manufacturing cotton fabrics and accounts for about 30 per 
cent of India's export of textiles products (Chellasamy and Karuppiah 2005).  
The Erode district in Tamil Nadu is well known for marketing of textile products of 
handloom, powerloom and readymade garments. The largest clusters are found 
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around Coimbatore, Tirupur and Erode, cities in the west central region of the state 
as well as in Chennai. A measure of the success of the state in sustaining its textile 
sector can be gauged from the fact that first textile mill was set up in Coimbatore in 
1888 and the city now houses over 100 mills. The organized sector employs over 
200,000 workers in textile mills but the sector has a significant component of 
unorganized workers (Chellasamy and Karuppiah 2005). Trade unions and social 
activists frequently raise questions about the conditions of the labour force working 
in these industries and many are valid, especially environmental issues and the 
exploitative Sumangali scheme run by mills of the area under which Dalit and 
women from poorer families are employed.  
The leather industry is another traditionally strong manufacturing sector in the state. 
Tamil Nadu is the leading leather exporting state in the country accounting for 47 
per cent of the country’s exports in 2007. The state employs 42 per cent of the 2.5 
million workers employed in the sector in India with clusters located around 
Chennai, Ambur, Ranipet, Vaniyambad  (NSDC 2008). A senior academic who has 
conducted extensive rural and semi-urban field surveys in the state says, “two things 
are specific about this state and quite unlike any other state, even Gujarat. This is a 
state with high levels of industrial capitalism but what is remarkable, in the Indian 
context, is how spatially spread out it is. In terms of sectors too the state’s industrial 
composition is more balanced. It has a fair mix of successful SME sectors and high 
technology productive sectors that very few states possess”. The continuing success 
of the leather and garments sector would bear this out. It needs to be added here 
that given the employment and export potential of both these sectors the two have 
attracted technical and financial aid from central and state governments as well as 
overseas assistance and Tamil Nadu has been no exception. Given that both these 
sectors attract employment from some of the state’s relatively marginalized 
economic classes governments had tried to ensure these sectors receive enough 
financial attention. This does cut both ways though. While it does provide 
employment to backward classes it also provides mill owners with access to a pool of 
labour that has very little social or economic agency and hence allows some of the 
owners at least to get way with exploitative practices. 
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 This strategy was unlike West Bengal where a Communist oriented coalition decided 
not to take advantage of the state’s high levels of industrialization and instead 
decided on building an agrarian constituency to keep themselves in power. The rent 
creation strategy of the Tamil parties involved industrialization and building of 
infrastructure like irrigation systems, along with the redistributive policies we have 
mentioned earlier. Bureaucrats then found it easier to act as facilitators between 
investors and the state, especially in organizations like TIDCO, the state’s industrial 
development corporation set up in 1965 that invests in joint ventures with the 
private sector and the State Industries Promotion Corporation of Tamil Nadu or 
SIPCOT set up in 1971 to facilitate term loans to industry. The state also set up the 
Guidance Bureau under the aegis of TIDCO in 1992 to make use of the opportunities 
presented by liberalization. The Bureau’s biggest success has been in attracting auto 
sector investments into Tamil Nadu, domestic and foreign. There was another 
reason why bureaucrats in Tamil Nadu were effective and that was their level of 
political commitment to the party they chose to identify with. A retired senior 
bureaucrat from Maharashtra told us that given the depth of the schism between 
the two political parties bureaucrats perforce had to choose which party to support. 
Being neutral was not seen to be a practical option though there were some who 
chose to stay above this divide. For those who did make the choice they came to be 
identified as belonging to a particular party and when that party was in power they 
therefore had to perform effectively enough. An indicator of this system was that in 
the early 1970s Tamil Nadu was one of the first states to agree to what became 
known as ‘committed bureaucracy’. This was a policy attributed to Indira Gandhi and 
her son Sanjay who envisaged a bureaucracy that would defer to what the elected 
politicians would want (since apparently that’s what the electorate wanted) and not 
question them unless the decision could be proven illegal. As a standard for 
bureaucratic credibility the idea was a complete reversal of Weber’s bureaucratic 
neutrality or even Evans’ ‘embedded autonomy’ and this policy is now credited with 
the steady decline in the quality of Indian bureaucracy. In the name of making way 
for the people’s wishes by deferring to their representatives this practice has 
actually led to bureaucrats abdicating better judgement to politicians and in fact 
went further to consolidate rent seeking. Yet Tamil Nadu adopted it fast enough 
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because its bureaucrats were already implementing this system informally. Another 
explanation comes from a bureaucrat who has worked in the state, “Bureaucrats in 
the state are procedural and tend to work by the book. This is because they are 
acutely mindful of the cyclical nature of electoral results and government formation 
in the state. Any suspicion regarding a decision taken with the earlier government 
could have them facing charges with the incumbent. This ensured bureaucrats never 
really went beyond their ambit, a feature common across the country otherwise.” 
Post liberalization the competition between the states ensured state administrations 
had to work harder to get investments and the Tamil Nadu bureaucracy was not 
found wanting in this matter. Its nodal agencies that facilitate industry, TIDCO, 
SIPCOT and Tamil Nadu Industrial Investment Corporation or TNIIC are known as 
some of the more effective bureaucratic agencies in India. This demonstrates that 
Tamil Nadu’s clientelist political settlement even included some members of the 
state’s bureaucracy. Given that both political parties were willing to encourage 
industrial investments and build links with capitalists the respective allegiances of 
the bureaucrats ensured relatively effective implementation of policy. 
 
6.5 The Political Settlement and Capability Development in Tamil Nadu  
As we discussed in our analytical framework in Chapter Three, the holding power of 
capitalists in a political settlement relative to the ruling coalition also has an effect 
on rent-allocation strategies and therefore on growth outcome. The power of the 
biggest business organizations relative to political organizations was growing in Tamil 
Nadu as in the rest of India but here because the political organizations were 
themselves not likely to be in power for very long, the capture of political 
organizations in inverted patron-client relationships of the type emerging in incipient 
form in Gujarat was less in evidence. It does not make sense for a big economic 
organization to invest heavily in a relationship with one political organization if that 
political organization has a life span of five years. This meant that a strategy of 
controlling long-term rent flows by building close relationships with a particular 
political organization was not a viable strategy in Tamil Nadu in the period under 
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review. The best that economic organizations could expect would be upfront rents to 
make their investment more attractive. This had beneficial selection effects. It 
attracted economic organizations that were already competitive or close to 
competitiveness. These high capability business organizations also found pre-existing 
formal capabilities (educated workforce) and informal capabilities (industrial clusters 
and tacit knowledge) in Tamil Nadu that made the package attractive. The high levels 
of tacit knowledge of manufacturing processes in Tamil Nadu were in turn based on 
significant industrial development during the period of industrial policy and 
protection. As we can see from Table 5.3 in Chapter Five on Gujarat, by 1980 Tamil 
Nadu was already the fourth most industrially advanced state in India. 
The allocation of industrial licences to Tamil Nadu during the industrial policy period 
was very beneficial for attracting companies like Standard Motors and Ashok Leyland 
to Tamil Nadu, the latter eventually becoming one of India’s largest manufacturers 
of heavy commercial vehicles. Other companies that emerged in this period included 
MM Forgings which began life as a dealer for Royal Enfield motorcycles in 1946 but 
by 1974 had moved into the automotive forgings industry. Today the company is one 
of the leading manufacturers of various grades of steel forgings in India. The auto 
and auto component sector in Tamil Nadu developed to service the auto industry 
that located and developed in Tamil Nadu as a result of licence allocations. The TVS 
group is one of the best examples of this secondary development. The company has 
become one of India’s largest and most respected manufacturing corporations with 
interests in automobiles, auto components, auto dealerships and financing. It was 
worth USD 4 billion in 2012 and employed around 25,000 people. Companies within 
the TVS Group like Sundaram Clayton that manufactures air brakes, Sundaram Brake 
Linings, TVS Motor Company and Lucas TVS (a joint venture with Lucas UK) have won 
international quality standard prizes like the prestigious Deming Application Prize for 
excellence in manufacturing quality. Sundaram Clayton was the first Indian company 
to win the award. The Deming Prize is a coveted award for manufacturing companies 
initially awarded to recognize the best Japanese manufacturers. The Prize is now also 
awarded to non-Japanese companies and since then many Indian companies in the 
auto components sector have been recipients. A similar company also based in Tamil 
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Nadu is the Rane group. The Group has four award winning companies Rane Brake, 
Rane Engine Valve, Rane Madras and Rane TRW Steering Systems. 
The two companies enjoyed similar growth trajectories. The TVS Group was founded 
by TV Sundaram Iyengar in 1911 and started operations as a bus fleet manager in 
rural Madras Presidency. From this Iyengar moved on to an auto dealership in 1945 
in Chennai. By the time of independence the business was a flourishing one and in 
1954 Indian Motor Parts and Accessories (IMPA) was incorporated as a distributor of 
automobile spare parts and accessories. In 1962 Brakes India was incorporated as a 
joint venture between TVS and Lucas of UK. By the 1970s TVS was a successful 
manufacturer of auto components supplying the auto belt gradually forming in the 
Chennai area. The company’s initial support came in the mid-1960s from R 
Venkataraman who was Minister of Industries in the central government and a 
Tamil, who enabled TVS to get land concessions around Chennai. The group is now is 
a global supplier for international auto companies. The Rane Group was established 
in 1928 as a distributor of auto parts. By 1959 it had diversified into the manufacture 
of valves for internal combustion engines. In 1975 it started manufacturing manual 
steering gears and today has a turnover of $3.75 billion. Other successful companies 
include Amalgamations which began as a spare parts dealership and became one of 
India’s most successful light engineering companies. Common to most of these 
companies especially the founders of the TVS Group and a tyre manufacturer called 
MRF were their links with successive Congress governments in the state. MRF’s 
founder Mammen Mappillai began with a balloon making factory near Chennai but 
MRF is today one of India’s largest automobile tyre manufacturers (Aya and 
Siddharthan 2007). The growth of these auto components companies in and around 
Chennai explains why more than 35 percent of India’s auto components production 
comes from Tamil Nadu.  
The growth of the sector can be traced to policy induced rents as a result of 
decisions of the Indian Tariff Commission of 1957 that discouraged automobile and 
spare parts imports and promoted indigenization as part of a strategy of import 
substitution. Firms like TVS which were importing spare parts had enough technical 
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knowledge and some ‘tacit knowledge’ to venture into manufacturing some spare 
parts themselves. Protection was one way of delivering rents to firms that were still 
not competitive in particular areas to engage in capability development processes 
including learning-by-doing. The limitations of India’s industrial policy particularly 
with respect to disciplining were discussed in Chapter Four. Nevertheless, even 
though India’s planning period did not create many globally competitive industries 
and sectors, it did create relatively high levels of technical and organizational 
capabilities in some areas that later achieved competitiveness in the 1980s (M. H. 
Khan 2009b).  
The auto component sector in Tamil Nadu clearly gained from protection as new 
firms were set up and new capabilities were developed (Tewari 2001; Aya and 
Siddharthan 2007). Companies like TVS started operations in the Padi industrial 
cluster close to Chennai in 1960 as a beneficiary of protection. Today the industrial 
cluster is one of the leading industrial hubs in Tamil Nadu housing many companies 
beyond the TVS group of companies. Most other auto and auto components 
companies in the state are also clustered around Chennai making it the biggest auto 
cluster in India along with the National Capital Region (NCR) near Delhi and the 
Pune-Pimpri-Chinchwad area in Maharashtra. By the time the economy opened up in 
1991 the Chennai auto cluster was significant enough to attract the attention of 
international manufacturers like Ford and Hyundai and later Honda. Even after 
liberalization began in 1991, the Indian government maintained a 70 per cent 
localization rule in the 1990s in automobile production. This helped Indian auto 
component manufacturers to develop their capabilities as the localization rule 
provided implicit rents to domestic manufacturers to finance a period of learning 
and prepare to face competition from OEM component producers like Visteon and 
Delphi brought in by international car makers. For a time, foreign car makers had to 
source a significant amount of components from Indian component manufacturers 
even if they had not yet met price and quality conditions and this is the implicit rent 
allocation that financed their learning in the critical period of the 1980s and 1990s. 
The policy instrument that directed these temporary rents to auto component 
producers, the localization rule, was one that could be effectively enforced in this 
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political settlement because no powerful organizations in the Indian political 
settlement could easily benefit by distorting the enforcement of this rule.  
 
 
Figure 6.4 Chennai’s share of the auto component sector in India 
 
Source: Mahindra World City SEZ presentation, 
http://www.mahindraworldcity.com/docs/chennai/tamilnadu.pdf 
 
Note: Figures in percentages 
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Even though the localization requirement could no longer be used in the 2000s after 
India joined the WTO in 1995, by 2005 Indian auto component makers comprised 70 
percent of the supplier base of manufacturers like Hyundai India. The Hyundai plant 
near Chennai is now Hyundai’s global export base for small cars. Clearly by the 2000s 
Indian component producers had built enough capability to supply international auto 
producers. Even though Ford still sources some key components internationally it is 
also using the Chennai cluster as part of its global sourcing base. The years of 
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capability building have paid off with an auto and auto components manufacturing 
base developing around Chennai (Figure 6.4). Net sales of the auto industry in the 
state have sustained steady growth in the 2000s (IBEF and ICRA 2008). Unlike other 
Indian states like West Bengal or Uttar Pradesh the state government in Tamil Nadu 
seldom faced protests against land acquisition for industry. This is largely because 
opposition to land acquisition has not been the focus of mass political mobilizations 
in a state where the growth of factory employment is widely supported as a 
mechanism for economic mobility. 
The Tamil Nadu experience with autos demonstrates that if a sector is near the 
global competitiveness frontier, and if policy instruments can deliver some limited 
rents for capability development, the entrance of foreign players need not 
necessarily spell doom for local enterprise. However as Tewari points out, by the 
2000s, the competitive regime in the sector meant that new entrants in the small 
and medium tier 2 and tier 3 levels of the industry need support to improve their 
skills and productivity levels (Tewari 2001). The tier 1 companies benefited from a 
series of policy rents (protected markets followed by localization rules) that allowed 
them to invest in their capabilities. Companies making up the next two tiers do not 
have access to these types of rents any more, nor do they have the political clout to 
influence policy or lobby effectively. Yet it is this segment, of potentially high 
productivity SMEs that need to be supported to take the auto components sector in 
Tamil Nadu to the next level. One option may be consolidation with tier 2 firms being 
bought out by their tier 1 customers. In the 2000s, some of the larger tier 1 
companies also lobbied the state government to provide assistance to their smaller 
suppliers (Tewari 2001). These pressures have not resulted in significant policy 
changes. As an executive from the industry says, “India has certainly arrived at the 
factory gates in terms of being a successful Tier 1 producer. But beyond that the 
distance between Tier 1 and Tier 2 and Tier 3 is quite huge”, implying more support 
is needed for this industry. 
Unfortunately, in the 2000s and beyond, ruling parties in Tamil Nadu have 
discovered much easier ways of generating rents for their political redistribution 
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without the difficult task of calibrating rent allocation to industry to develop 
capabilities as a way of increasing access to growth-generated revenues. The 
growing weakness and complex composition of coalition governments in Delhi has 
made it easier for well-placed regional parties to access significant formal and 
informal rents as the price of supporting the coalition government in Delhi. The 
future negotiation of effective rent allocations for capability development in Tamil 
Nadu will depend on the strength of economic organizations in the state and how 
business-government relationships evolve, the performance of manufacturing in the 
absence of any capability-development strategy, and the persistence of alternative 
sources of rents that ruling parties in Tamil Nadu have been able to access.  
The evolution of the Indian political settlement in the 2010s has supported 
unprecedented levels of unproductive rent capture involving the allocation of 
resources like natural resources, land or telecom spectrum. We outlined in Chapter 
Four how this was related to the gradual exhaustion of productive profit-making 
options as sectors close to the competitiveness frontier became competitive and 
others were too far behind to benefit from the shrinking set of rent allocation 
instruments that were progressively available. At the same time the demands for 
political rent allocation kept growing as new social mobilizations led to the 
fragmentation of political organizations. Finally, powerful and cash-rich business 
organizations emerged that could offer quick and significant kickbacks to political 
organizations in exchange for allocations of land, natural resources or the spectrum, 
a process that is part of the phenomenon that we described as a reversal of the 
standard patron-client relationship between business and government.  
These processes have cut out productive capitalists from the same level of political 
influence and political organizations are taking less interest in ensuring the 
profitability of these enterprises as part of their long-term rent strategies for their 
own political reproduction. Our respondents in business and the bureaucracy 
confirm that the Tamil political parties that took a pro-industrial position in the 
1990s out of self interest display less urgency in tackling the constraints affecting 
industry and technological capability development in the 2010s.  Capitalists seeking 
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to improve their productivity, quality and competitiveness are trapped between an 
indifferent ruling coalition and their own inability to offer direct and large informal 
payoffs to political organizations. Investors in states like Tamil Nadu and 
Maharashtra that have a larger proportion of high technology companies relative to 
the rest of India find themselves at a particular disadvantage because these sectors 
cannot deliver quick payoffs.  
On the other hand, the advantage that Tamil Nadu has over Gujarat is that a majority 
of its large companies especially in auto, auto components and electronics are in 
sectors that constantly need to strive to remain competitive. The compulsion to use 
rents to raise productivity and not capture them is built into the structure of their 
organizations. Their bargaining counter with political organizations is their ability to 
provide long term stability to the ruling coalition through employment generation, 
formal revenue generation through taxation and informal revenue generation for 
parties. Even if the kickbacks cannot be as large as those that can be offered by 
enterprises engaged in say natural resource rent capture or theft, they are 
sustainable over time. There is some evidence that industry in Tamil Nadu is 
beginning to realize it has enough holding power to nudge the government in this 
direction. In 2006 their lobbying resulted in the government of India launching the 
Indian Auto Mission Plan (IAMP) under which it seeks to build innovation 
architecture around programmes like the National Automotive Testing and R&D 
Infrastructure Project (NATRIP) which provides international standard testing and 
homologation (to attain standards for vehicular types) facilities for the Indian 
automobile industry. The IAMP Plan was to set up NATRIP centres in four regions of 
the country and the automobile and auto component manufacturers from Chennai 
were keen that the centre for south India was set up in Chennai. At that time the 
AIADMK government under Jayalalithaa had just come to power in the state and 
NATRIP was not a priority for her administration. However the industry lobbied and 
got her to write to the national ministry in New Delhi and the regional centre for the 
South was set up in Chennai, a boost to the sector’s attempts at increasing 
competitiveness. The NATRIP centre along with other industry-academia linkages 
through academic centres of excellence like the Indian Institute of Technology in 
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Chennai are supporting the evolution of a high-tech automotive cluster around 
Chennai.  
The longer-term prognosis for Tamil Nadu depends on whether the two-party 
competitive clientelism system with informal institutional arrangements ensuring 
relatively longer time horizons is likely to endure. The main challenge to it comes 
from endogenous forces driving fragmentation, related to succession issues. Both 
the DMK and AIADMK, but more so the DMK, are dynastic parties where succession 
is based on family rather than internal elections. In DMK’s case the fight is between 
two half-brothers who are currently claiming to be the true inheritors of 
Karunanidhi’s legacy. Their sister, who was briefly in jail on corruption charges, is 
also emerging as another powerful political figure. Clientelist parties in India have 
frequently split when succession issues remained unresolved.  If the DMK moves in a 
similar direction the current two-party system will be upset and key features of the 
political settlement may change. The AIADMK faces a different challenge as 
Jayalalithaa does not have a family she can bequeath the leadership to nor has she 
identified any deputy who can take on the reins of the party at a later date. In our 
analysis, the smooth transfer of power between the two major parties has been 
important for ensuring formal and informal institutions support growth. This may 
change if the political parties become more fragmented and engage in more hostile 
contests that include disrupting previous contracts and rent allocations to business. 
If that were to happen, the growth-stability trade-off facing the enforcement of 
institutions that support even limited capability development may become more 
adverse, potentially affecting industrial growth in the state. In contrast to the 
personalised internal politics of clientelist parties, ‘ideological’ parties like the Left 
parties in India and the BJP, practice intra-party democracy to a greater extent. But 
as we have seen in our chapter on Gujarat, the construction of political dominance 
by ideological parties also has its costs.  
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6.6 Conclusion 
Tamil Nadu has a higher share of all India industrial employment as well as a lower 
ICOR compared to Gujarat (comparing Table 5.1 and Table 6.1). Gujarat has a higher 
share of fixed capital investment and TFP in industry has grown faster in Gujarat than 
in Tamil Nadu (Kathuria, et al. 2010). These characteristics of industrial growth in the 
two states reflect the fact that Gujarat’s industrial growth has been more capital 
intensive and concentrated in sectors like petrochemicals while Tamil Nadu’s has 
been more broad based and dependent on capability development that achieved 
global competitiveness in sectors like automobiles and electronics. We have shown 
why these differences were not just related to differences in natural resource 
endowments, but more fundamentally reflected differences in the ways in which the 
political settlements were constructed and the formal and informal institutional 
support that was available for different patterns of industrialization.  
In Gujarat, the ruling coalition was almost always able to align with big business 
interests and under Modi this ability was enhanced by the creation of an 
authoritarian clientelism that allowed significant discretionary rent allocations to big 
business in capital-intensive sectors with significant returns. In Tamil Nadu its 
political settlement of competitive clientelism needed more redistributive, populist 
policies leading to a focus on welfare policies much earlier than in Gujarat and its 
manufacturing base was also in sectors with lower levels of concentration like 
textiles, leather and small and medium engineering. The search for revenues and the 
availability of significant economic capabilities allowed the development of 
enforceable rent management strategies in the 1990s that led to further capability 
development and growth in sectors like automobiles and electronics.  
The framework of political settlements allows us to shed light on the paradox of 
rapid growth of relatively high-technology sectors in a context marked by apparent 
political instability and high levels of corruption and clientelism. Far from developing 
despite these adverse conditions, we have argued that features of its competitive 
clientelism actually made possible some specific patterns of growth. We also 
identified and analysed the effectiveness of Tamil Nadu’s bureaucracy, moving 
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beyond simplistic cultural explanations. Despite the fragmentation of the DMK into 
the AIADMK and later into further groups like the PMK and the MDMK, the period 
covered by our analysis saw two major parties successively forming the ruling 
coalition. The fact that all these groups owed allegiance to the ideology of the 
Dravida Kazagham has meant that the factional conflicts were restricted to in their 
scope and informal ‘live-and-let-live’ compromises could emerge. This was also 
helped by the fact that the parties appealed to the same or very similar 
constituencies. This led to the paradox that while the parties had to compete very 
intensely to mobilize their base and deliver to them, it also led to stability in policies 
and institutions that supported the productive industrial sectors. 
The policy challenge for Tamil Nadu is to devise growth strategies that take into 
account its competitive clientelism. This is likely to require a more pro-active role for 
the state’s productive capitalist class. Productive economic organizations in the state 
have a lot to lose if the growth-stability trade-off facing developmental institutions 
became more adverse. This constituency has already established relationships with 
both parties and their dealings with political organizations are not adversarial 
because everyone assumes that the two parties will each cycle in and out of power. 
But given the weakening incentives for developmental rent management, industry 
may have to put pressure on the ruling parties to support capability development 
with rent-creating policies and institutions.  
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Chapter 7 . Pakistan: A Crisis of Legitimacy 
and Liberalization 1980-2010  
 
SUMMARY: 
Pakistan’s political economy over this period was characterized by high levels of 
conflict compounded by low economic growth. Conventional discourse explains this 
in terms of Pakistan’s weak governance: weak institutions, high levels of corruption, 
repeated challenges to its democracy and later in the period, the rise of Islamism. 
The political settlement that emerged in Pakistan towards the end of our period 
described a reproducible social balance that entailed persistently high levels of 
violence and poor economic development. Ironically, throughout this period 
Pakistan also made repeated attempts at pushing good governance reforms and 
liberalization. The political settlement analysis allows us to trace these problems to a 
growing crisis of legitimacy of the ruling coalition that has its roots in the strategies 
that the ruling coalition was persuaded to follow in a context of strong external 
influences. The alliance with the US and support for its war in Afghanistan in 
exchange for significant inflows of foreign rents provided the resources for a 
consolidation of a ruling coalition. The allocation of external rents related to security 
could be controlled from above and this enabled the ruling coalition to exclude many 
potentially powerful political organizations. But over time, this strategy made it 
easier for many new political organizations to challenge the legitimacy of the ruling 
coalition that consisted over this period of one or other of the two main parties or 
the army. The increasing challenge to the legitimacy of organizations that 
constituted the ruling coalition provoked a growing level of violence as some 
excluded organizations were effectively challenging the parameters of the 
established political settlement in Pakistan. This analysis suggests that there are 
structural but avoidable features in the combination of institutions and political 
strategies that powerful organizations have supported in Pakistan that can help to 
explain the evolution of greater instability and poorer development performance. 
This analysis identifies a different set of issues as the source of some of these 
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problems compared to the common explanations in terms of the weakness of ‘good 
governance’ and the challenges of rising Islamism. 
The evolution of the political settlement in Pakistan in our period of interest cannot 
be understood without reference to the history of modern Pakistan and of partition 
where independence was thrust on the Pakistani state as the outcome of the 
exigencies of Congress-led politics in British India. The Pakistani state in 1947 was 
faced with the task of establishing social and political control over a territory that 
historically had strong social and political organizations that were not integrated into 
the political organization of the Muslim League. From 1958 the attempt to construct 
a viable ruling coalition were shelved with the onset of military rule and the 
prioritization of economic development. However, the strategies adopted for 
economic growth were themselves exclusionary and left out important 
constituencies. These strategies contributed to the breakup of the country in 1971. 
Subsequent attempts to consolidate a viable ruling coalition in a political settlement 
that was developmental were significantly constrained by a number of factors. The 
influx of external rents associated with the wars in Afghanistan and the perception of 
a permanent threat from India allowed a relatively narrow group of (political and 
military) organizations to dominate the political system. The process of gradual 
inclusion of intermediate class organizations into the ruling coalition was therefore 
slower in Pakistan compared to India with damaging consequences for political 
stability in the long run.  
It is in the context of this specific political settlement that Pakistan embarked on 
liberalization and Structural Adjustment Programmes in the late 1980s and the 
1990s. The features of this political settlement explain why the outcomes of 
liberalization were poor. Pakistan did not have the productive capabilities to benefit 
from greater market access, nor were there significant productive capabilities close 
enough to the competitiveness frontier to benefit from the compulsions of the 
market and the financing opportunities for capability development. In contrast in 
contemporary India the effects of liberalization were better because there were 
some industrial sectors close to the competitiveness and some of these could benefit 
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from support mechanisms of the state which allowed them to raise their 
competitiveness. More importantly, the ideological and political strategies through 
which Pakistani ruling coalitions were constructed were beginning to unravel 
because of Pakistan’s growing involvement in western supported strategies in 
Afghanistan. The easy sources of external rents allowed Pakistan’s military and 
political elite to dominate their organizations from above and the concentration of 
sources of rents disadvantaged excluded organizations in the political competition. 
The adverse dynamics of this strategy became particularly evident after 9/11. On the 
one hand the concentrated rent flows controlled by the leadership of the ruling 
coalition strengthened the Musharraf regime but on the other hand, it became 
easier to mobilize against the ruling coalition whose legitimacy was increasingly 
questioned. The poor outcomes associated with liberalization in Pakistan can 
therefore be explained with reference to features of its political settlement. It 
resulted in the exposure of Pakistan’s economic organizations to market competition 
when most were far from the competitiveness frontier and the ruling coalition was 
increasingly under challenge from excluded organizations that were now aiming at a 
fundamental change in the political settlement. Faced with these challenges, the 
ruling coalition had neither the time horizon nor the implementation capabilities to 
carry out developmental rent allocations. 
Section 7.1 outlines the relationship of Pakistan with India, one we argue has an 
impact on Pakistan’s own political settlement. Section 7.2 outlines the history of 
Islam in the Indian sub-continent in order to set the context for understanding 
current mobilizations based on in Islam in Pakistan. Section 7.3 provides an analysis 
of the Pakistani settlement under Ayub Khan, Zulfiqar Bhutto and Zia-ul-Haq. Section 
7.4 outlines the advent of a vulnerable competitive clientelism in the 90s 
interspersed by caretaker governments which introduced liberalization reforms. 
Section 7.5 discusses the current crisis in the country. Section 7.6 analyses the effect 
of liberalization reforms on Pakistan’s political settlement. Section 7.7 concludes. 
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 Introduction 
Pakistan’s birth was accompanied by much sound and fury that yet signified a 
hopeful, if uncertain future for the 31 million people who made up its eastern and 
western flanks. ‘Maimed and mutilated’ at its birth (Jalal 1990), Pakistan was the 
price Jawaharlal Nehru and the Congress were prepared to pay for having a strong 
and stable central government in India (Government of Bangladesh 2003). The new 
country inherited some of the most underdeveloped parts of British India. All the 
major urban centres (Delhi, Bombay, Madras, and Calcutta) major industrial 
locations, the most important ports, much of the railway network and even the 
majority of the bureaucracy remained in the newly independent Indian state. 
Pakistan’s main urban centres were Lahore, the port town of Karachi and Dhaka in 
East Pakistan and its most valuable inherited infrastructure from the British was the 
canal-irrigated area of west Punjab which had helped the fertile Punjab plains to 
become one of the most agriculturally productive in the sub-continent. As for East 
Pakistan it was even less developed. It was made up of the rural hinterland that 
supplied raw materials to the industrially advanced western part of Bengal, now 
modern day West Bengal in India. And while Dhaka was a thriving urban centre 
during Mughal times before modern day Calcutta had been founded, it was British 
Calcutta which became the second city of the Empire. To put matters in perspective 
the contribution of industry to Pakistan’s national income was a mere one per cent 
and though East Pakistan grew 70 per cent of India’s raw jute the province did not 
have a signal large jute mill (I. Ali and Malik 2009). Table 7.1 provides a brief 
overview of the Pakistani economy in 2013. 
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Table 7.1 Pakistan Economic Characteristics 
Population 180 million 
Gross Domestic Product 2011 current USD 211.1 bn  
GDP per capita current 2012 USD 1290 
Capital Output Ratio 3.6 
Investment in Fixed Capital as share of GDP 11.8 % 
Percentage of population below poverty line 22 % 
 
Source: Various, (census.gov.pk), (World Bank World Development Indicators), 
(Bloomberg), (Asia Development Report 2007), (State Bank of Pakistan) 
 
Though Pakistan has had periods of stability, instability and violence have grown 
over the last two decades. This has contributed to the slowing down of growth in the 
Pakistani economy with GDP growth of 3.8 per cent and per capita GDP growth of 
only 2 per cent over 2008-10, the lowest in South Asia (Table 7.2). The period since 
1980 divides into three phases relevant for analysing the evolution of Pakistan’s 
political settlement. A common theme in all these phases has been a more or less 
intense contestation between included and excluded groups for access to the 
political and economic rents controlled by the ruling coalition. Pakistan’s political 
instability reflects a failure to achieve a distribution of rents across organizations that 
reflected a distribution of power that was accepted by all major organizations as the 
real distribution of power. Several factors contributed to the failure to achieve a 
balance between the distribution of benefits across organizations and their relative 
power that could have achieved significantly lower levels of political violence. First, 
the concentration of significant security-related rents in the hands of a narrow ruling 
elite supported their perception that their relative organizational power was greater 
than it actually was, and reduced their willingness to compromise with other 
organizations. Some of these organizations represented regional elites like those in 
Baluchistan, the tribal areas of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KP), the Federally 
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Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the Mohajirs (Muslim immigrants from India) 
largely based in the cities of Karachi and Hyderabad. Secondly, political organizations 
led by the intermediate classes had always been organizationally less developed in 
Pakistan compared to other parts of India. This meant that when the legitimacy of 
the ruling organizations began to be seriously challenged new organizations often 
emerged with radical agendas. Many of these organizations were willing to use 
violence to challenge the position of the dominant political organizations, and were 
not just trying to capture a bigger share or rents. The mobilizing ideology that was 
often used by new political mobilizations was Islam, much as the violent anti-state 
movement of indigenous people in neighbouring India has used a Maoist ideology.  
These distributive conflicts are very similar to those in other developing countries 
but an understanding of the specific problems faced by Pakistan requires an 
understanding of the history of its creation out of British India. First, there was no 
geographical or cultural grouping that could be identified as Pakistan within 
undivided India even as late as the 1930s. Independence was thrust upon it in 1947 
in large part by the Indian Congress party that was unwilling to accommodate 
Muslim demands for representation in a Hindu dominated India (Jalal 1985; A. Roy 
1993; Anderson 2012). Secondly, the areas the Pakistani state inherited already had 
strong social and political organizations, while the Muslim League, the party that 
won Pakistan, had not been historically strong in these areas of India. The new 
Pakistani state dominated by the Muslim League ruling coalition thus had an 
immediate challenge in enforcing its authority from the outset. Thirdly, in the early 
years, the greater population of East Pakistan and the concentration of economic, 
military and bureaucratic power in West Pakistan led to a constitutional crisis over 
the power sharing formula between the two wings. Compounding all these problems 
was the threat perception from India. These challenges led to an unstable political 
settlement in the years immediately after 1947 and contributed to the failure of 
Pakistani policy makers to come up with  broad-based employment generating 
policies. The turnaround only came with the military takeover of 1958 which 
imposed military rule in Pakistan and was associated with a vulnerable 
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patrimonialism that could nevertheless achieve some progress in industrial policy 
and accumulation (M. H. Khan 2012a).  
Table 7.2 Growth of GDP and GDP per capita under Different Regimes, Pakistan 1960-2010  
(constant 2000 US$) 
Period GDP GDP per capita 
1960-71 (Ayub) 6.8 4.1 
1971-77 (Bhutto) 4.2 1.2 
1977-88 (Zia) 6.6 3.2 
1988-99 (PPP and PML-N) 4 1.1 
1999-2008 (Musharraf) 5 3.2 
2008-2010 (PPP) 3.8 2 
 
Source: World Development Indicators 2011, World Bank 
 
A comparison of the organizational basis of the early Congress and the Muslim 
League is instructive. The Congress has a long organizational history, being founded 
in 1885 with an extensive grassroots membership that remained significant at least 
till the 1950s. In contrast, the League founded in 1906 was initially representative of 
elite Muslims in India and did not even have the intention of establishing Pakistan. It 
did not have an organizational structure in the parts of India that became Pakistan 
that was equal to the task of building Pakistan’s new institutions in ways compatible 
with the local distributions of power (Jalal 1990). While formal political organizations 
were weak in these areas, there were strong informal organizations exercising 
authority and power using informal institutions of ‘biradri’ which are networks based 
on kinship groups, both patriarchal and patrilineal. Ethnic identities and 
organizations were also strong in the different provinces making up Pakistan. The 
military rapidly emerged as a focal point for the new state not only because of the 
weakness of the dominant political organization in accommodating all the interests 
in society, but also because of the environment of armed conflict with India that 
immediately affected the disputed territory of Kashmir. The dispute is still 
unresolved and Kashmir’s accession to India remains controversial given the 
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compelling body of evidence showing that India manipulated the accession of 
Kashmir without the support of the Kashmiri public (Anderson 2012).  
The military takeover of 1958 resulted in high levels of economic growth under 
General Ayub Khan in the 1960s and Pakistan’s economic growth was in general 
higher than that of India from the 1960s till around 1990 (Table 7.3). Ayub’s military 
intervention changed the distribution of power and put the armed forces in a 
dominant position. The political settlement was a vulnerable patrimonialism in terms 
of the categorization in Chapter Three, with the ruling coalition enjoying enough 
enforcement capabilities to run a basic industrial policy but also being vulnerable to 
repeated challenges from excluded organizations that occasionally required the use 
of violence and repression against them.  
Table 7.3 Comparison of India and Pakistan in terms of GDP and GDP per capita growth 
rates 
 
Growth Rates % India Pakistan  
GDP  
  
1960-80 3.5 5.5 
1980-90 5.6 6.1 
1990-00 5.8 3.7 
2000-05 6.7 4.9 
2005-10 7.8 3.9 
Per Capita GDP  
  
1960-80 1.2 2.6 
1980-90 3.4 3.5 
1990-00 4.0 1.2 
2000-05 5.2 2.4 
2005-10 6.4 2.1 
Source: (World Bank 2012a)  
In the 1970s a democratic order emerged with Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party (the 
PPP) emerging as the dominant party. With elements of similarity with Modi’s BJP, 
Bhutto maintained his political dominance using informal threats and sometimes 
violence against political opponents. We will describe this later as a similar type of 
constrained patrimonialism with authoritarian clientelist characteristics. The return 
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of army rule under Zia in 1977 marked the reversion to another period of vulnerable 
patrimonialism but this time the economic policies and institutions began to change. 
Pakistan’s military was now more concerned with establishing a new set of political 
organizations that would support their rule than in building productive capabilities. 
The rents from the Afghan war ensured inward resource flows that kept overall 
growth rates high without adding to competitive capabilities. Zia’s political strategy 
was not very successful in by-passing established political organizations like the PPP, 
and his attempt to create new political organizations brought in elites like Nawaz 
Sharif in the Pakistan Muslim League - Nawaz (PML-N) who were quite similar to the 
elites in the PPP. Zia’s death in 1988 brought in a period of weak democratic 
governance with the PPP and the PML-N alternating in power till Musharraf and the 
army again came back in 1999. Throughout the democratic period of intense 
competitive clientelism, liberalization strategies were implemented, often in stealth 
by technocratic caretaker governments that ruled in between elections. 
Musharraf’s military government was yet another period of vulnerable 
patrimonialism. As in Zia’s regime, Pakistan’s elites enjoyed another period of 
significant security-related aid inflows, this time associated with another but much 
less legitimate (in Pakistani eyes) US intervention in Afghanistan. Once again, the aid 
inflows created a perception of strength in ruling organizations that were actually 
facing increasing social challenges and demands for inclusion from new social 
mobilizations. The failure of dominant political organizations to make the 
compromises that may have allowed evolutionary changes in the political settlement 
is, in our analysis, the source of the instability that began to grip Pakistan from the 
mid-2000s onwards. In particular, we argue that the problem of instability was not 
just the result of military rule in Pakistan. Rather, both the military and a few 
relatively elitist political parties could access a much more centralized control over 
rents than in other parts of South Asia, particularly in the context of security-related 
aid inflows. As a result, they jointly failed to achieve the inclusion of significant new 
intermediate class mobilizations within political rent distribution arrangements.  
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Pakistan’s army as an organization is most often held responsible for the country’s 
instability. The army does indeed appear ‘overdeveloped’ with respect to the size of 
the economy and the state, and it does behave as if it has the authority to act to 
represent the popular will against corrupt political parties, but in reality it is mostly 
engaged in protecting the status quo (Alavi 1983a; Jalal 1990). It usually maintains 
and protects the interests of the current ruling coalition and its attempts to create a 
new ruling coalition have usually resulted in the construction of a new coalition with 
very similar characteristics to previous ones. In reality, the actual power of informal 
organizations and networks that permeate Pakistani society have meant that while 
formal power often appears highly concentrated in Pakistan, the enforcement 
capabilities of ruling coalition have been weak, and formal rules have been 
significantly modified in reality. As in the case of Gujarat in Chapter Four, a state 
cannot be characterized as developmental just because it is formally pro-business or 
even if it able to implement rent allocations to business organizations. More 
complex enforcement capabilities are required to make a state developmental in 
terms of achieving developmental outcomes. In terms of this criterion Gujarat is not 
a developmental state. Similarly, the Pakistani Army is often accused of not using its 
apparently high enforcement capabilities to enforce developmental outcomes and 
instead appears to exaggeratedly focus on external adventures. In fact, the Pakistani 
army arguably lacks the organizational power base in broader society to enforce the 
difficult institutional rules that would be necessary for developmental outcomes. 
Viable developmental strategies would have been to reconstruct the composition of 
the ruling coalition or devise institutional interventions that were developmental but 
also enforceable in this political settlement. Instead, the availability of easy rents for 
any ruling coalition that played along with external strategic interests in the area, the 
strength of informal organizations that the ruling coalition failed to accommodate 
and indeed the fact that the army perceives important strategic threats to Pakistan 
resulted in institutional strategies that were neither developmental nor capable of 
delivering stability in the longer term.  
In contrast, the mainstream ‘good governance’ analysis of Pakistan suggests that 
Pakistan’s instability is due to its weak democratic institutions and so the 
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strengthening of these institutions could turn the country’s fortunes around 
(Candland 2000; Haque 2000; Easterly 2001). Interestingly, this type of analysis 
cannot explain why neighbouring India which has been a democracy for most of the 
time and has had elections that have been largely free and fair has also experienced 
growing levels of political fragmentation, contestation and violence. The difference is 
that the Indian political settlement at the federal level has evolved to a competitive 
clientelism with characteristics of ‘vulnerable maturity’ where no one organization 
can imagine that it can dominate all the others (M. H. Khan 2011b; P. Roy 2012). In 
the context of a complex society with a proliferation of organizations, this at least 
allows the excluded enough of a hope of inclusion through ‘normal’ clientelist 
politics. This can entail quite a lot of ‘normal’ violence but keeps most aspiring 
organizations away from radical strategies to overthrow the state. In Pakistan, the 
army has for a long time been able to claim dominance and by association the 
parties that have ruled in close association with the army have followed strategies of 
dominating politics from above. But unlike Gujarat’s authoritarian clientelism where 
Modi’s ruling coalition was able to browbeat excluded organizations to be quiescent, 
in Pakistan the excluded have been able to increasingly challenge the legitimacy of 
the ruling elites, increasingly using the critique of radical Islamism, and adding to the 
centrifugal forces of regional and ethnic separatist movements. 
In the period studied in the thesis, from 1980 to around 2010, the evolution of the 
Pakistani political settlement had two significant effects. The first was a loss of 
enforcement capacity on the part of the ruling coalition because of its ebbing 
legitimacy, which resulted in weaker enforcement of all formal institutions and 
growing levels of violence. While violence has also been growing in India, the 
distribution of power across organizations supported by institutional rent allocation 
is somewhat more stabilizing in averting radical strategies on the part of the 
excluded. This is not always the case, as the case of the Maoist uprisings and regional 
separatist movements in India testify, but the level of challenge is arguably higher in 
Pakistan. The second effect was low levels of economic growth associated with 
sustained attempts at liberalization and good governance reforms, again in a context 
of weak enforcement. Liberalization in Pakistan was associated with low and 
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declining growth as is evident from Tables 7.2 and 7.3 above. This period will be 
analysed in greater detail in Section 7.7. 
What was interesting about liberalization in Pakistan was that the most significant 
moves towards liberalization were made by unelected ‘caretaker’ governments that 
served between elections, made up of technocrats, with the backing of the military. 
They reflected the ideological preference of increasingly weak ruling elites who 
lacked the power to enforce any pragmatic developmental strategies. The political 
and policy establishment were willing to adopt the recommendations of 
international financial institutions and donors largely because they lacked any 
alternative strategy of their own. In particular, they did not consider the viability of 
liberalization in a country where economic organizations were in most cases not 
globally competitive in any sector. Even more critically for Pakistan, the limited 
implementation of liberalization actually further weakened already weak 
bureaucratic organizations through administrative restructuring and decentralization. 
The reforms were ostensibly driven by a desire to prevent the state from capturing 
public goods and hence ensuring economic growth but in reality the opposite 
happened. Weakening state capacities arguably led to more decentralized rent 
capture and declining service delivery. In contrast, in India a few sectors were close 
enough to the competitiveness frontier to engage in a further spurt of rent-financed 
learning in the 1980s which led to the emergence of at least a few globally 
competitive sectors (M. H. Khan 2011b).  
Declining political and economic stability can open up a vicious cycle of declining 
legitimacy and weaker enforcement capabilities leading to even more adverse 
economic and political outcomes. This process has a number of elements. First, the 
time horizon of the ruling coalition can become shorter as it faces greater 
uncertainty. This can result in the creation and capture of quick rents that are more 
likely to be unproductive and predatorial. Secondly, this can lead to the ruling 
coalition facing even stronger contestation by emerging political organizations, some 
of whom may adopt radical strategies of overthrowing the system. Finally the ruling 
coalition can lose the ability to provide any support for capability development in 
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economic sectors, and in particular in manufacturing. Pakistan’s growth in the 1990s 
and beyond has been driven by the financial sector, real estate and associated 
services that do not need an effective industrial policy but which also provide few 
Kaldorean dynamic economies. Economic growth becomes vulnerable, providing 
limited employment generation and this too strengthens excluded political 
organizations by supporting the perception that the system is not working. 
7.1 Setting the Context 
The constraints to growth and stability in Pakistan can be traced back to the loss of 
legitimacy of the political organizations that could constitute its ruling coalition as a 
result of their sustained involvement in unpopular policies associated with US 
interventions in the region and economic liberalization. While this describes the 
current situation an understanding of the evolution of the political settlement 
requires a look at the history of the partition of India. Indeed, we argue that it is 
interesting to remind ourselves about the history of Islam in South Asia because this 
provides insights into the complex communal relationships affecting not just 
partition but also contemporary South Asia as well. India’s internal structural 
dynamics which requires a politics of accommodation and concession in keeping a 
continental country together has an often overlooked impact on Pakistan’s polity. 
There is an unarticulated policy of the ruling Indian elite to convince those wanting 
or threatening secession that breaking away from India will have huge costs. If 
Pakistan can have good relationships with India and perform as well as India, this is 
not a good signal to a multitude of other would-be Indian secessionists. As a result 
India’s aim is to have strategic and economic dominance in the region to make this 
convincing and credible. This is also why any resolution of the dispute in the Kashmir 
Valley on any terms that signal Indian weakness is off the table even if Kashmir 
imposes huge costs on India. The Indian position has inevitably impacted on 
Pakistan’s security-dominated political settlement from its birth as has been 
documented in Ayesha Jalal’s seminal work on these issues (Jalal 1990). It is 
important to revisit this framework at a time when Pakistan seems to be facing its 
worst crisis since 1971, the year Bangladesh was created out of a united Pakistan.  
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Another focus of our analysis will be the ideology of nation building that led to the 
growing ‘securitization’ of Pakistan's political economy. By securitization we refer to 
two parallel discourses applied to Pakistan–that of providing human security and the 
other preventing it from becoming a ‘failed state’. All other developmental agendas 
increasingly became subservient to these. The Indian subcontinent was partitioned 
on the basis of a ‘two nation theory’, referring to the Islamic and Hindu ‘nations’ but 
now has the distinction of housing three countries, Pakistan, India and Bangladesh. 
As Jalal has pointed out, Pakistan was ‘painfully’ carved out ‘ostensibly’ as a 
homeland for British India’s Muslims (Jalal 1990). Yet as is evident from Figure 7.2 
Pakistan is a far more heterogeneous country than most observers realise, and not 
just because of the number of languages spoken in that country. Subsequent 
revisionist historical accounts have pointed out that far from being a spontaneous 
organic process it was the result of a competition for controlling rents between the 
Indian National Congress (Congress) and the Muslim League in undivided India. 
Congress refused to admit the League’s well founded contention that Indian Muslims 
needed some constitutional arrangement to protect their interests and the League 
refused to accept that the Congress could represent Muslim interests in a first-past-
the-post polity where India Muslims (around a third of the population) would be a 
perpetual minority (Jalal 1990; A. Roy 1993; M. H. Khan 2009c, 2010a, 2011a; 
Anderson 2012). 
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Figure 7.1 Languages of Pakistan 
Source: http://ethnicityinpakistan.blogspot.co.uk/ (accessed 03/06/2012) 
Note: the provincial boundaries of Pakistan in this map though not marked out 
correspond roughly to the Baluch (Baluchistan), Sindhi (Sindh), Punjabi (Punjab) and 
Pushtu (Khyberpakhtunkhwa) speaking areas. Some of the Pashtu speaking regions 
of the country’s northwest also make up the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. 
Chitrali is spoken in the northernmost district of Khyberpakhtunkhwa. The Shina and 
Balti speaking areas are in Pakistan’s Gilgit-Baltistan. 
 
Pakistan emerged in 1947 not because the Indian Muslims had a well-articulated 
plan for Pakistan based on a shared idea of national identity. Rather, it emerged 
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because all the propositions that the Muslim League came up with to achieve some 
level of constitutional protection for Muslims were rejected by Congress. Once it was 
born, however, Pakistan’s leaders had to construct a national ideology that asserted 
that its independence movement was always about creating a separate homeland 
for Muslims (Jalal 1990; Talbot 2005; Kohli 2006b; Walter 2010). To be sure a small 
Muslim constituency in India had imagined an independent, sovereign Pakistan from 
the 1930s, but most Indian Muslims, including Mohammed Ali Jinnah, were not 
committed to an independent country till as late as 1946, when the final 
negotiations broke down (Jalal 1985, 1990; A. Roy 1993; M. H. Khan 2010a; 
Anderson 2012). One reason for this was that India’s Muslims were territorially 
dispersed, and the regions where they were concentrated, in the east and the west, 
they had local majorities and did not feel threatened enough to support the Muslim 
League. Whether a united India would have been successful is anybody’s guess but it 
is clear that partition was the outcome of conscious and expedient decisions taken 
by the Indian National Congress to maintain its dominance even if that meant losing 
some territory to Pakistan (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012b; Anderson 2012).  
This reading of history is inconvenient for both Pakistan and India, but an objective 
analysis is essential for understanding the implications of partition for contemporary 
politics. In India the national myth is that the Congress did everything it could to 
keep the country together but failed in the face of the League’s communal politics. In 
Pakistan, the equivalent Pakistani myth is that Pakistan was created to protect 
Muslims from Hindu dominance. The logic of prioritizing security in Pakistan is the 
direct result of this (mis)reading of the history that led to partition. The security 
imperative of Pakistan’s military and political leadership continues to inform critical 
strategies like its pact with the US. The Pakistani perception that India may use 
military force to overrun it is particularly ironical given that it was the unwillingness 
of the majority Hindus to share power and rents with Muslims that was ultimately 
behind the Congress decision to push Muslims out in 1947. Interestingly, 
contemporary India has a significant anti-Pakistan and anti-Muslim rhetoric as part 
of its political discourse primarily driven by the right wing Bharatiya Janata Party 
(BJP) to challenge the ‘secular’ banner of the Congress.  
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Both countries have thus manipulated history at various levels to construct two 
nationalist narratives: one based on the idea of an Islamic nation facing an existential 
threat from India and the other based on a claim of secular inclusiveness. Both 
narratives deny significant historical facts and processes driving the partition of 1947 
and the strategic calculations that led to the respective nation-states emerging. The 
consequence of partition was the gradual rise of ‘soft Hindutva’ in India (Engineer 
1995; Assadi 2002; Rangarajan 2005; Banjerjee 2007; Shani 2007; R. Desai 2011). A 
gradual diffusion of markers of Hindu identity in culture, media and even the state is 
a reflection of a gradual erosion of the formal secular commitment of the Indian 
state. The Indian constitution still remains robustly secular but the informal norms of 
the Indian polity have gradually become more Hindu-centric. In a similar way, while 
Jinnah was hardly a religious person and was more concerned with the political goal 
of protecting the access to rents and opportunities for Muslims, the logic of partition 
gradually led to a growing Islamization of Pakistan. In particular, excluded political 
groups in Pakistan have increasingly mobilized by challenging the Islamic credentials 
of the ruling elite in Pakistan, particularly when the international alliances of the 
latter involve supporting the US in regional wars.  
The growth of radical Islamism was accelerated in the 1980s by General Zia-ul-Haq’s 
US-supported strategy of arming non-state Islamist actors to fight against the 
Soviets. By all accounts this process spawned a wide variety of non-state military 
organizations and by the 2000s, forces like the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan or TTP 
began to threaten the Pakistani political establishment itself (Lieven 2011). Many 
observers hold Pakistan’s Afghan policy under Zia responsible for the rise of Islamic 
mobilization. However, we argue that there were deeper fissures in the construction 
of the ruling coalition in Pakistan and given the country’s founding mythologies, 
significant challenges to the legitimacy of the ruling elites were likely to emerge 
sooner or later in the language of a betrayal of these ideals.  
A distinguishing feature of our analysis relative to most political economy analyses of 
Pakistan is in the assessment of the significance of the army in explaining Pakistan’s 
developmental trajectory. The implicit pact between the Pakistani Army and 
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business and landed elites, and the army’s dominance of Pakistani politics and 
economics have been identified and discussed in many outstanding contributions 
beginning with Ayesha Jalal’s seminal work on this topic  (Rashid and Gardezi 1983; 
Jalal 1990; Cohen 1994; Jalal 1995b; Rizvi 2000; Arif 2001; Rizvi 2001; Cheema 2003; 
Rizvi 2003; Zaidi 2005; Siddiqa 2007; Haqqani 2010). However we contend that the 
Army is not an all-powerful monolith, and rules only because the dominant political 
and economic organizations have worked closely in tandem with it. The effect has 
been to monopolize a significant share of rents at relatively high levels of the social 
hierarchy, to the detriment of achieving a political settlement with low levels of 
violent contestation. If the Army as an organization were indeed powerful vis-à-vis 
other organizations, it may have been able to create a developmental along the lines 
of Taiwan or South Korea both of which were initially led by strong military-backed 
governments. But in fact Pakistan’s army did not have the enforcement capacity to 
pursue a developmental agenda in the 1960s and its enforcement capacity was even 
weaker in the 1980s or 1990s. By the 2000s, the capability of the army to control a 
significant part of rent allocations from above in alliance with its political and 
business allies began to be challenged by significant political mobilizations that were 
often informal and violent. This is why we argue that the role of the Pakistani army 
has to be analysed in the context of a broader range of organizational mobilizations 
that describe the political settlement in Pakistan and its evolution. 
Another element in the political violence and instability that intensified in Pakistan in 
the 2010s was the growing militancy of the long marginalized tribes of FATA 
especially in North and South Waziristan. This is often explained in terms of a 
strengthening of fundamentalist Islamic movements. However, the growing tensions 
in the region were also the outcome of a breakdown of traditional social structures 
in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the FATA brought about by economic changes and the 
conflict in Afghanistan. In this sense these conflicts had much in common with the 
Maoist movements in India’s hinterland, where marginalized social groups engaged 
in violent attempts to overthrow ruling elites rather than attempting to enter their 
patron-client networks. The ideological discourse in Pakistan was obviously different 
given its history, but the structural features of the conflict had much in common. At 
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the heart of this process was a significant level of exclusion of these societies from 
the political rent allocation processes of standard patron-client politics combined 
with shocks that destroyed the legitimacy of the established political organizations at 
the very moment when inclusion became necessary to avoid conflict.  
In Pakistan, the loss of legitimacy of mainstream elites came from a foreign policy 
crisis. Pakistan’s external rents in the 1990s were conditional on support for the US 
offensive in Afghanistan. While Pakistan carried out some operations in pursuit of 
this objective, its strategic interests in Afghanistan also meant it could not afford to 
fully abandon the Taliban if it wanted to ensure an eventual Pakistan-friendly 
government in Kabul  (Lieven 2011). At the same time Pakistan’s policy of ignoring 
US drone attacks in these areas and the Pakistani Army’s own actions against in the 
Swat region contributed to fundamentally weaken the legitimacy of the Pakistani 
state in these marginal societies. A more orthodox Islamist ideology began to replace 
the ‘Pakhtunwali’, the social code of the Pathan tribes in the region (Ahmed 1980; 
Economist 2009; Lieven 2011). The rise of the Taliban in Pakistan is often mistakenly 
conflated with irredentist terrorism. We argue that strategies of violence are better 
understood in the context of a broader analysis of processes of mobilization and the 
success or failure of accommodation of new groups within an evolving political 
settlement.  
7.2 History of Islam in the Indian Sub-Continent: Hostage to Polemics 
The history of Islam in the Indian subcontinent has to be distinguished from the 
political mobilizations around religious, ethnic, caste and other identities as 
competing groups have attempted to acquire the organizational power to capture 
and retain rents through the political process (Jalal 1990; Rodrik 2007). The reason 
why a delineation of history is so important to the formation of the countries within 
the sub-continent is that each has constructed its identity based on the same 
sequence of historical events but with starkly contrasting interpretations of these 
events. Recent revisionist histories have demonstrated how a strand of Indian 
nationalism was implicitly Hindu nationalism and in certain contexts continues to be 
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so (Sobhan 1990; Islam 1992; Chatterji 1995; Quazi 2005; Rodrik 2007; S. Khan no 
date).  
Islam had an established though limited presence in India much before Islamic rule 
was established in Delhi. By the 7th century CE Calicut in southern India was India’s 
foremost entrepot with already established trade links with Rome and the Middle 
East now being extended to Arab Muslim traders. By the 14th century CE the growing 
numbers of Arab Muslim traders were well assimilated into the society of the Hindu 
Zamorin kings of the region (Dale 1990; Osella 2008). However the establishment of 
Muslim rule on the Indian sub-continent began with the conquest of Sind under the 
Iraqi governor in 711 CE which resulted in the province’s incorporation into the 
Umayyad caliphate. Mahmud of Ghazni (Ghaznavi in present day Afghanistan) 
invaded Punjab in the early 11th century CE but did not establish his rule. Another 
Afghan king Muhammad of Ghor declared himself independent from Ghazni and 
established a kingdom spanning the north western Indian sub-continent. His 
successor Qutb-ud-din-Aibak shifted the capital from Lahore to Delhi and became 
the first Muslim ruler of the Indian sub-continent. In India it is a measure of the 
contemporary polemics involved that the Sultans of Ghaznavi and Ghori are singled 
out as ruthless conquerors, especially Ghaznavi’s campaign in Gujarat which involved 
the looting of a Hindu temple, Somnath. That incident like so many others of similar 
nature in world history is more ‘a rhetoric of state building’ or as Ahmad observes in 
both the case of Somnath and other temple desecrations it served as a ‘pseudo 
religious wartime sport’ to serve as ‘proof for the self-satisfaction of the invaders 
that the wars they were waging were not for… the carving out of an empire, but had 
religious justification’ (A. Ahmad 1964). Thapar has gone on to say that 
contemporary Hindu accounts do not ascribe much importance to the plunder of 
Somnath (Thapar 2005). Yet this has been mythified by the now mainstream right 
including the BJP as a wound on Hindu consciousness and identity wreaked by Islam 
in India. In Pakistan on the other hand Ghaznavi and Ghauri are short and medium 
range ballistic missiles capable of hitting Indian targets, so named in an obvious play 
on the names of the two Sultans who made successful forays into ‘Hindu’ India. At 
the time of Mahmud of Ghazni’s invasion Hinduism was not the Brahmanical religion 
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recognized as such today but a collection of diverse sects and cults which only 
gradually came to resemble the Brahmanical religion of today. The term Hindu 
according to Thapar was initially used as a geographical and ethnic marker or for the 
indigenous population and not as a monolithic community (Thapar 1996, 2005; 
Rodrik 2007; Besley and Persson 2011). This identity came into being in the 
19th century CE under British rule when access to jobs and resources were 
dependent on the size of the community, hence a mobilization on the lines of an 
upper caste Brahman dominated identity became necessary (Prakash 1988; Thapar 
1996; Rodrik 2007; S. Khan no date). 
The period between 1206 CE to 1525 CE saw various Muslim dynasties consolidate 
their hold over north India in various degrees. Babar, a Chagatai Turk established 
Mughal rule in India from 1526 CE, making India under Mughal rule one of the 
largest empires in the world in the 16th and 17th centuries. The revenue system and 
land records formulated under Akbar the most famous Mughal king were used by 
the British and continue to be the basis of current revenue administration in some 
parts of India. For this period historians have outlined various scenarios of what the 
relationship between the two communities could have been. While not attempting a 
detailed analysis it is possible to say they straddled a spectrum from syncretic co-
existence (Fearon 2010) to exhibiting political tensions (Marx 1996) to ‘an insular co-
existence’ (A. Ahmad 1964). However despite attempts to describe this phase of 
Muslim expansion in India as colonization by the founders of Hindu right wing 
organizations writing in the early 20th century CE historical evidence shows no 
support for this discourse.  Whatever be the approach ones takes given 
historiographical evidence it is not possible to conclude that the two communities 
were at perpetual war with each other or that the two did not influence each other 
in very fundamental ways. The detailed socio-political dynamics between Islam and 
Hinduism are beyond the scope of this paper but one would still need some 
references to these processes to fully grasp what happened in 1947. Eaton 
summarizes the dynamic effectively when he calls Islam both the dependent variable 
through ‘accretion’ or natural growth and the independent variable through the 
‘reform’ process where Islam is posited as socially distinct (Ritzen, et al. 2000). In the 
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deeper south there were alternating Hindu-Muslim dynasties at odds with the neat 
periodicity some scholars, especially earlier Orientalist ones and from current right 
wing organizations have tried to outline for Indian history of Ancient (Hindu)-
Medieval (Islamic)-Modern (British Colonization and the independence movement) 
(Thapar 1996; Rodrik 2007; Besley and Persson 2011; S. Khan no date).  
The growth of Islam in South Asia was achieved not through systematized and 
violent conversions but through a mechanism of deep rooted social transformation 
especially in the provinces of Punjab and Bengal and Sind. Bengal, Sind and western 
Punjab were areas outside the immediate primary influence of Brahmanical 
Hinduism at the time of the spread of Muslim rule in India. They were also far away 
from the centre of Mughal rule strongly suggesting there were non-state agents 
responsible for the spread of Islam in these places contrary to current beliefs about 
Islam being spread through forced conversions by the rulers. In the case of Bengal a 
split in the course of the river Ganga in the 17th century into what are now the Hugli 
that flows into West Bengal and the Padma into Bangladesh had social 
repercussions. The eastern and older part of the delta, now west Bengal was already 
Hinduized while the portion of the province now served by the Padma was largely 
forested and the communities there were still had animist beliefs some of which 
persist till today (Government of Bangladesh 2009). The Mughals who were keen to 
settle this area as it had turned into a fertile region due to silting by the Padma gave 
land grants to Muslim ‘pioneers’ some of who were Sufis settled eastern Bengal and 
gradually converted the communities there into Islam (Keefer and Knack 2007). In 
Sind as the various tribes of the region settled in irrigated areas around the river 
Indus the Pirs or holy men from various Sufi orders emerged as arbiters in fights 
between the tribes gradually increasing their own power and driving the adoption of 
Islam. In Punjab the nomadic Hindu Jat tribes would come into contact with urban 
residents around the Sufi shrines and once the Jats adopted settled cultivation they 
gradually adopted an Islamic identity focused around the shrine (Keefer and Knack 
2007).  Hence the areas with the largest numbers of Muslims, eastern Bengal, 
western Punjab, Sind, NWFP and Baluchistan were not strictly within the folds of 
caste-bound Brahmanical Hinduism around the times we are referring to. The idea of 
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conversion in Islam only became popular around the 19th century CE when British 
scholars were trying to cast the spread of Islam in South Asia in the mould of what 
Christian missionaries were doing in European colonies.  
The rest of the section will not delve further into Islamic rule in India once it was 
established because that does not contribute directly to events surrounding 
partition. What only needs to be mentioned about the initial period of British rule, as 
early as in the first few decades of the East India Company was the beginnings of the 
creation of a historiography of Hinduism that necessarily cast Muslims as ‘foreign’ in 
India  (Chatterjee 1991).  The history that we outline is certainly not the version of 
history of partition as it is popularly understood in the sub-continent and indeed 
elsewhere in the Western world which is of a fatal clash of opposing cultures. The 
reason we outline is more materialist with culture once again being instrumentalized 
for mobilization and the roots of the conflict between sections of the Hindu and 
Muslim community in South Asia lie with the advent of electoral reforms in British 
India and the creation of separate electorates (Government of Bangladesh 2003; M. 
H. Khan 2009c, 2013a). This was a period of significant constitutional reform by the 
British and League and Congress strategies around this time focused heavily on their 
responses to these attempts at reform, essentially to the various strategies of power 
sharing that the British were trying to implement. The decisive stage in the creation 
of Pakistan and India begins from 1909 with the introduction of the Morley Minto 
reforms or the Indian Councils Act. For the first time this Act allowed election of 
Indian members to the Legislative Councils at both the centre and the provinces. 
Following this were the Montagu Chelmsford reforms in 1919 which started the 
system of dyarchy in India and allowed for relatively significant autonomy to the 
provinces. This Act shifted the theatre of Hindu-Muslim representation to the 
provinces, especially Punjab and was no longer concerned with power sharing in 
Delhi (Jalal and Seal 1981). The Government of India Act in 1935 provided for 
significant autonomy to existing provinces and resulted in the creation of separate 
provinces, most significantly the creation of Sindh from Bombay Presidency. The 
proportion of franchise through direct elections also increased under this Act. Some 
have also credited the Act with bringing about the origins of ‘patronage politics’  in 
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the sub-continent as elected ministers started jockeying for power (Alavi 1983b). 
Interestingly the League was still not a force to reckon when elections were held 
under the new Act in 1937, just a decade before partition. The Congress had 
majorities in seven provinces and the Muslim majority provinces of Punjab and 
Bengal had non-League governments, though in Bengal it was in coalition with Fazlul 
Haq’s middle class peasant dominated Krishok Proja Party and in Punjab the Fazl-I-
Husain’s Unionist Party was in power. Both these parties though Muslim dominated 
were an alliance of class interests—upper class land owning in Punjab and middle 
peasant in Bengal. The irony of this contradiction makes for interesting academic 
pursuit but is beyond the scope of this paper. By 1946 matters changed completely 
in both these provinces.   
In the interim British India witnessed its most tumultuous decade. While defending 
itself against the Axis powers in the World war the British were also trying to 
hammer out an Indian constitution best suited to the many diverging interests in 
India. To this end it organized three Round Table Conferences, set up the Communal 
Awards (which provided for separate electoral constituencies for minorities) and 
finally the Cabinet mission in 1946. The history of this period perhaps remains one of 
the most widely researched periods in colonial history and this paper will not 
attempt to reproduce it here. But between these years the League grew in 
popularity with the Muslims under Jinnah who was now able to legitimately claim 
that he spoke for Muslims given the Congress’ general recalcitrance with issues of 
representation (Jalal and Seal 1981; Bradford Jr. 1990; Jalal 1990; Government of 
Kazakhstan 2003). Most level headed historical accounts of this period of history 
portray Jinnah as an astute leader who dangled Pakistan as a bargaining counter for 
securing legitimate Muslim rights (Jalal 1985; Government of Bangladesh 2003). For 
one certainly for a majority of his political life Jinnah disagreed, with Gandhi’s 
strategy of mixing religion with politics.  It is of course also well documented that 
Jinnah agreed with the one last effort the British put in to ensure an undivided India, 
the Cabinet Mission (Jalal 1985; Hasan 1993; A. Roy 1993; Anderson 2012). The 
Cabinet Mission rejected the idea of a sovereign Pakistan and divided the 11 British 
ruled Indian provinces into three ‘sections’ which could later if they wished from into 
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three ‘groups’. The centre would only oversee foreign affairs, defence, 
communication and finance for the three groups and substantial local autonomy was 
left to the sections. Provinces were allowed to secede from the Groups but not the 
Indian union. The three sections were the Hindu majority provinces that make up 
much of modern India today, the Muslim majority provinces of the north west 
(Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan, NWFP) and the Muslim majority provinces of the east 
(Bengal and Assam though Assam had a sizable not majority Muslim population). Yet 
this was rejected by the Congress and Nehru who felt only a strong ‘centre’ ruled by 
the Congress was in India’s interests (Bradford Jr. 1990; A. Roy 1993). 
What partition does demonstrate is how important the creation of demography is 
once a western style representative democracy is introduced in developing 
countries. Historians of partition have consistently demonstrated how electoral 
mobilisations based on demography in Punjab, Sindh and Bengal allowed for 
successful cleavages to take shape (Islam 1992; Chatterji 1995; Talbot 2005; World 
Bank 2007). In the case of Sindh and Punjab it was mobilisation by Muslim 
landowners and pirs (holy men) respectively that helped the League’s cause in 1947. 
In undivided Bengal under the British (the eastern part of the province became first 
East Pakistan and then won independence for itself as Bangladesh) conversely it was 
the upper caste Hindus who mobilised for partition (Chatterji 1995; M. H. Khan 
2010a). As Khan describes it in the case of Bengal the shift towards a religion based 
identity or communal one was essentially a ‘crisis of exclusion’ where the 
economically and politically powerful but minority in terms of population Hindu elite 
were threatened by the increasing political mobilisation of a rising Muslim 
intermediate class. The issue at hand was who would rule Bengal’s provincial 
assembly and wield power. Matters were very different in 1905 when Muslim-Hindu 
unity in Bengal was seen as exemplary. It was a successful combination of Muslims 
and Hindus that opposed an initial administrative partition of Bengal in 1905, a 
feature of imperialist Britain’s famous ‘divide and rule’ policy. What changed from 
then to 1947 was the introduction of limited suffrage and separate electorates 
(where Muslims would vote only for Muslims) and the resulting emergence of a 
specific patron-client political settlement (M. H. Khan 2010a). Elections required the 
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competing groupings of Hindu elites on one side and the intermediate class of the 
Muslim peasantry on the other to wield organizational power and this was done 
through patron-client politics. As we have mentioned in Chapter Three developing 
countries whether democracies, single party or with authoritarian regimes can have 
competing patron-client groupings. This is an almost universal feature of developing 
countries and their presence can be linked to their low levels of economic growth. 
Redistribution is then achieved through informal means that is often called 
patronage politics as a pejorative but is a structural feature of developing countries, 
and not cultural.  
In the end a combination of the impatient British, expedient Congress and 
precipitate League ensured the rejection of further attempts to forge an Indian 
federation and finally resulted in partition and independence in 1947. The irony was 
that a third of British India’s Muslim population lay outside the new ‘Muslim nation’–
a mockery of the two nation theory. It was impossible for the sizable Muslim 
population within the Hindu majority provinces to make the move to Pakistan even if 
they wanted to. This made it possible for the Congress to cast the League action 
almost as an act of secession (Jalal 1995a) and it is this (mis)interpretation that sticks 
to the sub-continent to this day. 
7.3 The First Three Decades: From Industrial Policy to ‘Islamization’ 
The first serious blow to independent Pakistan occurred in 1948 with the death of 
Jinnah.  By 1951 its first Prime Minister Liaquat Ali was mysteriously assassinated.  
However through this political turmoil Pakistan pursued aggressive policies of 
industrialization in the first two decades of its independence. In the 1960s it actively 
encouraged capitalists willing to invest in industry by subsidizing their learning 
through bearing the start-up risk. This proved to be successful with Pakistan’s 
manufacturing growth rate outpacing India’s. While there have been arguments that 
Pakistan was building from a very low base its gains in the manufacturing sector 
cannot just be explained away by the base effect as we will see in later sections. 
Here Pakistan’s attempts at industrial development were different from India’s 
dirigiste economy in that it encouraged private sector participation and the state 
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remained as the risk bearer in the initial stages, an institutional innovation not often 
seen in developing countries (M. H. Khan 1999). In the 1970s and 1980s Pakistan had 
developed two export oriented industries, a viable cotton textile industry and a 
highly successful surgical instruments industry. In fact right till the 1980s India’s GDP 
growth trend was lagging behind Pakistan. However the strategies for industrial 
development used by the two countries did not have the desired effects.  
On the political front in Pakistan the military stepped in to bolster the flagging 
strength of Pakistan’s political parties. The League in both East and West Pakistan 
lost its popularity and came to be replaced by a United Front government in East 
Pakistan and by political parties like the Republican Party in West Pakistan. By the 
time Ayub Khan’s coup took place in 1958 the civil-military complex was already 
quite strong in Pakistan. Also in place was an anti-Indian rhetoric that was based on 
the interpretation of having seceded from ‘Hindu’ India as mentioned in the Section 
7.2. This meant any show of opposition to the centre was immediately marked off as 
anti-national and even pro-Indian (Talbot 2005).  
A lot has been written about Pakistan’s early years of industrial development 
(Gordon 1954; Papanek 1967; Sayeed 1995; Zaidi 1999; M. L. Ali, et al. 2003; 
Robinson 2010; National Institute of Statistics 2012) and the country was quickly 
able to achieve a trade surplus due to an overvalued exchange rate during the 
commodities boom of the Korean War in the 1950s. As Noman points out this 
created enough wealth for many of the country’s trading class who now also had 
surplus to invest in industry when the boom from the Korean War petered away (M. 
L. Ali, et al. 2003). In the 1950s manufacturing became the leading sector in Pakistan 
growing at 8 per cent per year (Robinson 2010). However more important than these 
growth rates were three important institutions that were set up by the government 
in this period the Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation (PICIC), the 
Pakistan Industrial Finance Corporation (PIFCO) and the Pakistan Industrial 
Development Corporation (PIDC). These institutions were innovations at the time as 
they acted as risk financiers for manufacturing though their effect on increasing 
inequality is now a matter of debate within Pakistan. The PIDC was the lead 
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organization and served as a financial institution that funded learning as it made the 
initial investments in areas the private sector did not immediately see returns in 
before selling these enterprises to entrepreneurs (M. H. Khan 1999). As we have 
discussed in chapter two of this paper entrepreneurs in developing countries often 
fail to invest in critical industries due to the risk imposed by high entry costs and late 
profitability. With PIDC bearing this initial risk entrepreneurs could then be bought in 
at a stage which was relatively more within their capabilities or more importantly 
aligned with their appetite for risk. The declining terms of trade for agriculture also 
meant that the agriculture driven economy of East Pakistan suffered more due to 
the strategy of ISI, contributing to the perception of marginalization in that province 
that would reach its climax in the creation of Bangladesh (Power 1963; M. H. Khan 
1999, 2012c).  
The period of General Ayub Khan’s tenure (1958 to 1969) has been well documented 
in literature on Pakistan (Gordon 1954; Alavi 1976; M. H. Khan 1999; Robinson 2010; 
Walter 2010). Muhamad Ayub Khan rose to prominence when he was appointed 
commander-in-chief by Liaquat Khan in 1951 and he took over power in a coup in 
1958. Burki suggests that the army was able to step in because a conflict between 
the landed indigenous elite and the migrant politicians created a situation where the 
army could strengthen its own position (Burki 1980). Ayub's rule is marked by two 
significant milestones namely the attempt to establish democracy directly bypassing 
political organizations in rural Pakistan through ‘Basic Democracy’ and high levels of 
industrial and economic growth that was achieved by first through PIDC’s policies 
and then by discretionary allotments to selected capitalists. These had consequences 
that helped explain the political settlement towards the end of Ayub’s reign, namely 
the explosion of secessionist dissent in East Pakistan and even in West Pakistan 
significant political opposition to him that saw the rise of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. 
Pakistan’s urban population grew from 17 percent in 1951 to 22.5 percent in 1961 
with a three-fold increase in the number of industrial workers. It is no surprise that 
opposition to the Ayub regime was the strongest in growing urban centres (Jalal 
1990; Sayeed 1995). For one his strategies did not even work in West Pakistan but it 
was even more unsuited for the east. Bengal, even as an undivided province in 
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British India was known for its high levels of political mobilization and sensitization 
(Sayeed 1995). The secession of Bangladesh from united Pakistan can be best 
described as the exclusion of the East Bengali elites from the Punjabi and Mohajir 
(Muslim migrants from India to Pakistan) controlled political.  
Table 7.4 Sectoral and GDP growth rates 1971-77 (constant US$2000) 
GDP 4.2 
Agriculture 2.1 
Industry 5 
Manufacturing 3.4 
Services 6.6 
Source: (World Bank 2012a) 
 
The issue in East Pakistan however was not as simple as an upsurge in latent 
nationalist sentiments fuelled by an almost colonial attitude of ‘Punjabi’ West 
Pakistan (M. H. Khan 2010a). At least in the 1950s there was a genuine attempt by 
both wings of the country to make the arrangement work with many Bengali 
politicians in leadership roles nationally and there was no groundswell of support for 
independence even till the mid 1960s (M. H. Khan 2010a). In the best south Asian 
tradition though mainstream Bangladeshi discourse excises this historical fact and 
concentrates only on the ‘War of Liberation. For sure the terms of trade being 
against agriculture and the overvalued exchange rate did affect the agriculturally 
better endowed East Pakistan (rice, jute) in the 1950s. Levels of investment were 
also higher in the western wing than in the east but as Talbot, Khan and Jaffrelot 
have shown towards the end of the 1960s investments were actually on the rise in 
East Pakistan (M. H. Khan 1999; Jaffrelot 2002; Talbot 2005). By the time popular 
resentment in both West and East Pakistan forced Ayub Khan to leave office in 
favour of General Yahya Khan in 1969 there were other catalysts would eventually 
lead to the formation on Bangladesh after a decisive and opportunistic Indian 
military intervention in 1971. This was basically the fact that Bhutto and the PPP 
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were vehemently opposed to Mujib-ur-Rahman becoming Prime Minister of Pakistan 
even after he won a majority in the elections of 1970. 
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto came to power in tumultuous times but he had the support of the 
West Pakistani elite who despite being a minority were loathe to lose economic and 
political power to East Pakistan. Despite presiding over the dismemberment of the 
country Bhutto’s early years were characterized by a high level of support for him. 
The first reason for this was that the army was still recovering from its loss against 
India and still too weak. The second reason was Bhutto’s early recognition of the fact 
that patronage based politics was necessary to ensure his survival. To this end 
Bhutto diluted the strength of Pakistan’s highly capable bureaucracy by firing 1300 
civil servants in 1972 who had incidentally entered the civil service through the 
tightly regulated Civil Service of Pakistan, a holdover from the British times mirroring 
the similar Indian Administrative Service. This was done in order to facilitate lateral 
entry for important members of the PPP and supporters of the regime in return for 
their support. The other key feature of Bhutto’s redistributive politics was the 
nationalization of some industries, the financial and education sectors. However he 
alienated a large section of small-scale industrialists and traders by nationalizing 
three semi- cottage industries of rice milling, cotton milling and ghee (clarified 
butter) production (Sayeed 1995).   
Bhutto identified his policies as ‘Islamic Socialism’, a sort of catch-all phrase that he 
tried to supplement with populist, redistributive policies. But his explicit use of Islam, 
the first time since independence was essentially a cover for an authoritarian one-
party rule. His policies could not deliver the broad based growth that Pakistan so 
desperately needed precisely because apart from a few populist measures most of 
the regime’s energies were concentrated on building a combination of clientelist 
support that it thought would ensure support. GDP growth stalled to 4 percent and 
manufacturing was the worst performing sector (Table 7.4). His populist economic 
policies had succeeded in slowing down the Pakistani economy though some 
economists like Zaidi and Hamid contend that some of the growth in Zia’s tenure 
occurred as projects sanctioned under Bhutto came on stream later and that the 
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small scale industry sector actually did better under Bhutto (Zaidi 1999; Hermes and 
Lensink 2001). However the clientelist political settlement can veer damagingly 
towards high levels of fragmentation and contestation with patrons unable to 
enforce order over their various factions if economic growth is low and therefore the 
opportunity for payoffs is low. The operational equilibrium under Bhutto proved too 
tenuous with just the rural voter base on his side and once again popular protests 
laid the ground for Zia-ul-Haq’s coup. What added to the collapse of the political 
settlement in this period was also the growing strength of the army that Bhutto had 
to depend on to quell uprisings in Baluchistan. The political settlement under Bhutto 
can be described as authoritarian clientelism. 
Table 7.5 Sectoral and GDP growth rates 1977-88 (constant US$2000) 
GDP 6.6 
Agriculture 3.9 
Industry 8 
Manufacturing 8.8 
Services 7 
 
Source: (World Bank 2012a) 
 
 This brought Zia-ul-Haq into power with a coup in 1977 and he ruled Pakistan till his 
assassination in 1988. Enough has been said about Zia-ul-Haq and his rule and its 
import for Pakistan (Jalal 1995b; Zaidi 1999; M. L. Ali, et al. 2003; Talbot 2005; Karim, 
et al. 2010; Robinson 2010). Hence this section won’t attempt a lengthy exposition of 
the details of Zia’s regime but only pick out and analyse the most consequential 
aspects. All agree that Zia’s regime turned out to be the one that firmly linked 
Pakistan to the Cold War anti-Soviet Union global geo-political discourse. His regime 
is also known for repression of civil liberties and using Islam as an ideology to foster 
national unity in the face of Soviet presence in Afghanistan as well as heightened 
political mobilization within Pakistan. Yet the Pakistani economy grew at a rate 
averaging over six percent in these years.  Zia did not start out as an ally of the US. It 
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was only with the Regan administration’s involvement in aiding the Mujahideen 
forces in Afghanistan that Pakistan occupied a frontline position in the US’ anti 
Soviet strategy.  
Pakistan’s growth in the Zia years was not linked to an expansion of its 
manufacturing sector. The economy grew due to a rise in the proportion of foreign 
aid, especially military aid that flowed into country because of its involvement in 
Afghanistan, and the increasing remittances from Pakistani citizens working in the 
Middle Eastern countries as the Pakistani political economy became more linked to 
the Middle East, especially as a result of its attempts to institutionalize Islam within 
the state. Between 1978 and 1986 skilled Pakistani workers sent home as much as 
$25 billion in remittances (M. H. Khan 2011b). A reversal of some of Bhutto’s 
nationalization policies also followed but remittances and aid were the main reasons 
for Pakistan’s GDP growth in this period (Table 7.5). Aid of course added to the GDP 
numbers and the remittances helped spawn a middle class larger than was seen in 
the previous decades (Zaidi 1999; Talbot 2005; Robinson 2010). The rise of this 
middle class led to the development of a few sophisticated industrial clusters around 
Faisalabad and Sialkot that sustain till today, though in the face of increasing costs 
and decreases in productivity, the reasons for which will be discussed later. The 
cotton textile sector also did well but could not move beyond low value added 
manufacturing. While a re-privatization was not carried especially in the insurance 
sectors barriers to entry for private enterprise were quickly dropped and this helped 
small entrepreneurs and growth picked up once again (Sayeed 1995; Zaidi 1999). 
However lack of appropriate policy instruments to aid this entrepreneurial base led 
to increasing informality in the Pakistani economy from this time. This period did see 
the emergence of a new type of capitalists but they were very different from those 
during Ayub’s tenure. These capitalists had political ambitions and were more closely 
meshed into patron-client structures of Pakistani politics. They included families like 
the Lakhanis, Sharifs and Hashwanis who made their money through newly 
deregulated sectors like cement, oil seeds, and fertilizers (Sayeed 1995). However 
the growth they produced can best be described as what Khan defines as primitive 
accumulation or growth through off market (informal) activities like land grabs, 
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resource capture or extortions (M. H. Khan 2002a, 2012e) without providing any 
positive feedbacks into the formal economy through productivity and employment 
led growth. The Sharifs are of course the most well known with the family now 
becoming one of South Asia’s leading political dynasties through the Pakistan Muslim 
League (Nawaz) or PML (N). 
Towards the end of his tenure Zia had began to distance himself from the more 
obscurantist demands of the Ulema but by then the country was already deeply 
divided on sectarian lines (Talbot 2005). Like Ayub, Zia missed an opportunity to 
discipline the capitalists his regime created because his focus remained foreign 
policy. More importantly the rise of the middle class could have provided credibility 
to targeted industrial policy instruments had they been introduced and 
implemented. The political settlement that evolved in the Zia era, a long 11 years 
was one where the army became the organization superior over all others. The army 
was also increasing its role in directing the economy and even taking part in 
production. Formal political organizations (electoral parties) were kept under severe 
repression. And informal organizations, especially of small businesses and religious 
organizations were created for the army to gain legitimacy at a time when political 
freedom was suppressed. It is impossible to answer where Pakistan might have 
headed had Zia not been assassinated. However the levels of repression and 
exclusion in the political settlement would likely have made it unsustainable. 
7.4 Democracy, moves towards Liberalization and a return to Military Rule 
General Zia’s untimely death provided Pakistan’s leaders with an opportunity to 
break with the past and in a sense the military establishment did so by refraining 
from continuing with army-led rule. Elections were held in 1988 and the PPP under 
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s daughter Benazir Bhutto won a majority enough to form a 
civilian government. There were high expectations from Benazir, but this was to be 
no transformational move that changed the political structure of Pakistan in any 
permanent manner but a transitional one where only the seat of formal power 
changed. Informally the army still retained effective power. Once again this section 
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will only highlight the significant events that were to affect the political settlement at 
this time.  
 
Table 7.6 Sectoral and GDP growth rates 1988-99 (constant US$2000) 
GDP 4 
Agriculture 4.3 
Industry 4.5 
Manufacturing 4.0 
Services 4.3 
 
Source: (World Bank 2012a) 
 
Talbot (2005) provides a detailed exposition of this period for those interested. It 
was Benazir’s attempts at toeing a line independent of the army and the powerful 
president Ghulam Ishaq Khan that cost her prime ministership in 1990. However her 
own autocratic style, inability to break the stranglehold of large landlords, 
appropriation of state resources for private use, especially deals concerning her 
husband Asif Ali Zardari, later to be Pakistan’s president and an inability to direct 
economic growth provided the Army with enough rationale to dismiss her. 
Increasing confrontations with the powerful Islami Jamhoori Ijtehad (IJI) of which 
Nawaz Sharif was the main leader were debilitating but more critically the PPP’s 
failure to come to any compromise with the Muttahida Quami Movement or MQM 
in Sindh meant the province, especially Karachi the economic hub of the country was 
rocked by violence throughout her tenure. The MQM was founded in 1974 to 
represent the rights of Urdu speaking migrants from British India and has remained a 
political organization in Sind with significant holding power that the party uses to 
mobilize its supporters, sometimes violently when it feels a threat to its existence. 
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Nawaz Sharif came to power after elections in 1990 and despite being close to the 
Army as well as having his power base in the influential Punjab province he found it 
difficult to run the government given the mistrust between the political 
organizations and the army. The legacies of Zia’s Islamic mobilization were also 
bearing down heavier on him because his ruling alliance the IJI included parties like 
the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) that wanted to press ahead with their agenda of Islamization. 
He survived in power for three years because he was a cannier politician than 
Benazir having been chief minister of Punjab earlier and helping his father build their 
industrial empire during the Zia regime (Talbot 2005). Yet Sharif’s downfall was 
exacerbated by his anti-Saddam policies when the Pakistani sentiment was anti US 
and pro-Saddam. More importantly the army was also displeased with Sharif for 
taking Pakistan US relations to one of its lowest ebbs as a result of some Chinese 
arms procurements. Perhaps the greatest shortcoming was the absence of any live 
and let live politics between the PML (N) and the PPP on the lines of those achieved 
by the Dravidian parties in Tamil Nadu. If the two parties had come together to 
oppose the army and President Ghulam Ishaq Khan at this time at this time civilian 
rule might have been strengthened in the country. However the intense clientelistic 
competition between the two main parties made political stability a casualty in 
Pakistan. On the economic front Sharif’s first term largely saw a policy of economic 
liberalization. By the October of 1990 as many as 89 state enterprises were up for 
sale and controls on inflow of foreign currency were removed in an effort to attract 
foreign investment. The Sharif government was accused of misappropriation of 
public funds in cooperative societies which led to ordinary depositors losing Rs 20 
billion. In 1993 a caretaker government was sworn after the President Ishaq Khan 
dismissed the Sharif government, once again because the president and the prime 
minister were at loggerheads. Moeen Qureshi, a former vice president of the World 
Bank was brought in to head the caretaker government. This feature of caretaker 
governments in Pakistan being headed by political outsiders will be discussed later in 
the section. 
Benazir was re-elected in the elections of 1993 but like with the two elected 
governments before decisive power remained with the army and president. But the 
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most singular problem in her second term before she was dismissed again in 1996 
was the civil war like situation in Karachi as pitched battles were fought between the 
MQM(A) or the Altaf Hussain faction of the MQM and the army with the PPP 
government being unable to stem the violence. However incessant counter 
insurgency tactics ensured the violence at least died down. However, Talbot argues 
that this also ensured Pakistani society still remained deeply divided. It is not as if 
the violence in Karachi was the only issue that plagued the second PPP government. 
The needs to implement IMF imposed austerity and the realities of keeping the 
military on her side ended up with the party alienating organized labour, a key PPP 
support base. Labour was hit by privatizations under austerity and on the other hand 
her own party functionaries uncomfortable with ex-military officials being appointed 
as governors of provinces (Talbot 2005). The PPP victory also had an adverse impact 
on sectarian conflicts rather than quelling them. As our framework suggests 
powerful organizations that do not accept the legitimacy of an election result will 
contest it to achieve a distribution of benefits and authority that reflect what they 
believe is the true distribution of power. In this case organizations like the Tehrik-e-
Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM, a breakaway group from the Jamaat-e-Islami) 
were fighting the Pakistani army for the implementation of the Sharia in the 
Malakand region of Khyberpakhtunkhwa, a fallout of the strategy of aiding the 
Afghan Taliban (Talbot 2005). Contrary to popular knowledge Pakistan was already 
fighting its own citizens who wanted a society based on exclusively Islamic tenets as 
long ago as 1992. By the mid 1990s the Pakistani state was trying to balance two 
similar forces but opposing strategies (Toufique 1996). On the back of these 
developments ambitious efforts were made to bring down the budget deficit to 4.5 
percent of the GDP in line with IMF requirements. Her budget of 1996 proved to be 
highly unpopular as an already beleaguered middle and lower class were saddled 
with higher costs of living. Benazir agreed to further tax increases to receive the third 
tranche of a standby which the IMF was refusing to release. This proved politically 
unsellable and violent anti budget demonstrations followed spearheaded by the 
transport sector, doctors, booksellers and newspapers vendors going on strike 
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(LaPorte 1997).  Political recriminations between Benazir and president Leghari acted 
as the catalyst in the dismissal of her government.  
Nawaz Sharif and the PML (N) were voted back in the elections of 1996 with the JI 
refusing to take part. The JI boycotted the elections at this time because it felt the 
voter lists and constituencies need to be redrawn and did not reflect changes in 
population. In reality the JI was unable to match the patron-client politics, especially 
the biradri based politics of the two main clientelist parties (PPP and PML) and hence 
would have been unable to compete electorally with them. This is still one of the 
reasons why the JI hasn’t become a formidable electoral force in Pakistan. (However 
after elections held this year the JI has entered into a coalition to run the provincial 
government in Khyberpakhtunkhwa with Pakistan’s emerging opposition party 
Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaaf though it itself has a share of only nine seats). By this time 
Pakistan’s debt levels meant every Pakistani carried a liability of $500 (Talbot 2005). 
Given the increasing politicization of the bureaucracy and Sharif’s attempts at 
deliberately weakening the judiciary the Army was called in to perform routine 
administrative tasks. This only made the Army stronger and better able to check 
Sharif’s growing bent toward authoritarianism (Talbot 2005).  
But the real import of Sharif’s animosity towards the Army was its consequences for 
the economy. The Pakistani economy saw a dip in the GDP growth rate from the 
levels of the Zia years, from 6.6 to 4 per cent (Table 7.6). The PML(N) at one point 
seemed to be political organization most suited to develop capabilities among 
Pakistan’s indigenous businessmen (Lieven 2011) . It was created by the Army, 
specifically Zia, and the Sharifs and similar families were successful businessmen 
with the correct kinship networks. This would have helped the Army overcome 
difficulties arising out of picking ‘winners’ and hence solve the problem of lack of 
legitimacy that so often confronts states pushing an industrial agenda that favours 
some over others. As we have mentioned before one of the reasons for the failure of 
Ayub Khan’s attempts at implementing industrial policy was an inability to choose 
capitalists who could also claim legitimacy from Pakistan’s other social classes. By 
the time Sharif came to power the Pakistani middle class had also evolved enough to 
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demand the benefits of further industrialization.  The party was also in alliance with 
the JI and the latter’s popularity among those sections of the country who are both 
conservative and lower middle class and newly emerging middle class would have 
provided the PML (N) with the added legitimacy it lacks now, especially with Islamic 
organizations mobilizing much more intensely in contemporary Pakistan and not 
always for economic redistribution.  
Another advantage was that the PML (N)’s stronghold is in Punjab, Pakistan’s 
industrial heart which includes industrial centres like Faisalabad (in the Saraiki 
speaking region) and Sialkot (near Lahore). The Saraiki speaking regions can 
sometimes be at odds with the Punjabi speaking regions but Sharif was still able to 
carry his party through in the Saraiki regions. However Sharif took the Army head on 
and at this time General Pervez Musharraf ensured Sharif’s wings were effectively 
clipped. This prevented any repetition of a military-political-capitalist alliance 
reminiscent of Ayub’s times. Along with the efforts of the Ayub era and Zia’s missed 
opportunity the Sharif administration’s second tenure can also be seen as a phase 
that showed the highest potential for implementing an industrial policy, but the 
opportunity soon dissipated in part due to Sharif’s own political recalcitrance. As 
Lieven points this is one of the key reasons why Pakistan will not see a replication of 
even the modest growth in Egypt and Iran which was achieved through the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s support base of a relatively prosperous commercial class or in Iran’s 
case through the Bazaaris. The Bazaaris are Iran’s heterogeneous commercial class 
who were neglected by the Shah but were mobilized effectively by leaders of the 
Revolution especially through their networks in mosques located in urban trading 
centres. Some Bazaari leaders were subsequently given positions of power in the 
government. A Turkish ‘model’ seems almost an impossibility given that the ruling 
AKP has its support base directly among the Anatolian capitalists who were 
neglected by the Army regimes in Istanbul. This gives the AKP credibility among a 
sizable section of capitalists in the country. More importantly the per capita incomes 
of all these countries are higher than Pakistan’s, especially Turkey, and the classes 
mobilized could utilize their relative economic prosperity to move towards a more 
successful transition to a broad-based capitalism. It would be difficult for the JI to 
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drive such a transformation in Pakistan because there is little investible surplus 
among its aspirational but lower middle class support base who could mobilize to 
drive growth. The JI has strong views about social justice based on its Islamic world 
view but would have little to deliver on formal economic policy (Lieven 2011). Yet it 
is interesting that the widespread lawyer’s movement in Pakistan that proved to be 
General Musharraf’s undoing found strong support with the JI. Hence attempts at 
policy making would do well to involve the JI even though its presence in the 
National Assembly of Pakistan is very low.  
The interregnum between the PPP government and the PML (N) government in 1993 
saw a caretaker government in power headed by a former vice president of the 
World Bank (there was another headed by Balakh Khan Mazari but achieved little in 
terms of the economy). While this might not seem out of place now, what with 
African leaders frequently having World Bank careers behind them, in 1993, and 
certainly for South Asia, this was a first. Other senior ministers in the Moeen Qureshi 
government were also more businessmen than politicians: the finance minister was 
a leading industrialist while the information minister was the head of IBM in Pakistan. 
For a country whose organized sector was pitifully small and which was still caught 
up in a transition from a proto-capitalist to a broad-based productive capitalism this 
was a technocratic government that in no way represented the true social, political 
or economic structure of the country. However both Benazir and Sharif acquiesced 
to this choice largely because it meant unpopular reforms could be carried through 
without the popular politicians taking the blame. The Army also backed Qureshi as a 
means to introduce austerity based reforms. Pakistan had already received its first 
structural adjustment loan in 1982 under Zia but the military government had 
cancelled it perhaps anticipating the protests that later such programmes would lead 
to. Military expenditure was one of the key reasons why Pakistan’s foreign debt 
liabilities reached close to $19 billion in 1990-91. By 2008 this had gone up to 
unsustainable levels of $44 billion (Mahmood Tahir 2009). In 1996 the second 
caretaker government of Meraj Khalid stepped in between Benazir’s and Sharif’s 
second term. This included Shahid Javed Burki, a World Bank vice president as the 
country’s chief economic advisor. Once again in line with IMF requirements Burki 
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tried to introduce reforms like taxing agriculture, privatization, rationalizing 
petroleum prices etc.  
Table 7.7 Sectoral and GDP growth rates 1999-2008 (constant US$2000) 
GDP 5 
Agriculture 3.2 
Industry 6.8 
Manufacturing 8.6 
Services 5.7 
 
Source: (World Bank 2012a) 
 
The political settlement of the democratic period reflected a competitive clientelist 
distribution of power across political organizations. The ruling coalition, whether 
PML-N or PPP was weak, and lacked long time horizons and implementation 
capabilities. Technocrats supported by the army and with the tacit approval of the 
political and business leadership pushed through early liberalization reforms. There 
was little evidence of significant resistance from big business which suggests that the 
hidden subsidies and benefits were informally continued. However, subsidies to 
social sectors began to be cut, reflecting the weak incorporation of intermediate 
class interests in the ruling political organizations. While this was happening, the 
capture of significant resources by economic and political organizations higher up 
the political hierarchy intensified. The evidence and charges of political corruption 
increased as a result of heightened primitive accumulation involving elites in both 
parties. The partial implementation of liberalization reflects the distribution of 
power in the political settlement with adverse effects for long-term growth and 
political stability. Much of the structural adjustment programmes were pushed 
through the institutional mechanism of the caretaker government. The caretaker 
governments were not answerable to Pakistan’s National Assembly, nor were they 
composed of political parties who operated on the basis of any patron-client system 
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and they had the tacit support of the army. This freed the technocratic caretaker 
governments of any clientelistic compulsions and the army’s support gave them a 
free hand to announce the reforms. A later section in the chapter deals with the 
adverse consequences of such reform by stealth. 
The government of General Pervez Musharraf that followed was dominated by 
security issues and security-related rents. Musharraf is likely to be remembered for 
two key issues–the brief and rash Kargil War with India and the decision to take on 
the Taliban in earnest (though Pakistan had started initial crackdowns on Islamist 
organizations as early as 1992) at the behest of the Americans after 9/11 including 
sending the Army into vulnerable areas like the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) in Lahore. 
The regime’s imperatives of charting out a strategy that would allow it to balance 
between the need to be an American ally and using the Taliban to create strategic 
anti-India depth placed Musharraf between a rock and hard place. Like Ayub and Zia, 
when faced with growing civil and political unrest he fell back on local municipal 
elections in 2000 to bypass the clientelist political parties and co-opt new political 
organizers at lower levels (Talbot 2005; Lieven 2011). In 2002 Musharraf created a 
party mostly of defectors from the PML (N) called the PML (Qaid e Azam) or PML (Q). 
As Lieven says Musharraf was genuinely committed as a liberal progressive but once 
again ran into the realities of South Asia’s complex social structures and patron-
client politics. On the economic front his high profile finance minister and later prime 
minister Shaukat Aziz, a former Citibank senior executive steered the economy at a 
time when growth hovered between 6.6 percent and 9 percent (Lieven 2011). His 
policies once again veered close to Qureshi’s and Burki’s, essentially privatization 
and deregulation. For a while his policies seemed to have worked and enhanced yet 
military aid was once again responsible for higher growth rates (Table 7.7). It was 3.9 
per cent when Musharraf took over in 1998 (Lieven 2011). In certain consumer 
driven sectors like mobile telephony and internet usage these policies worked well. 
The number of mobile phone subscribers rose from 300,000 in 1997 to 35 million in 
2007. Internet users went from 200,000 to 2.4 million in the same period. Even 
exports did well increasing from $7.5 billion in 1998-99 to $17 billion in 2006-07 
(Shaukat Aziz in an interview in Emerging Jordan) (Oxford 2007). However as Lieven 
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recounts businessmen in key industrial centres like Faisalabad felt the growth targets 
of Aziz (phones, fridges, net connections) were misplaced when what the country 
needed a comprehensive investment architecture for industrial growth. That was 
simply not provided (Lieven 2011).  
The political settlement under Musharraf approximated to a more vulnerable variant 
of vulnerable patrimonialism. Compared to Zia Musharraf had to exercise greater 
repression to exclude powerful organizations. This ironically led to the weakening of 
the army and its ability to discipline excluded organizations. Moreover, unlike Zia, 
the Afghan adventure that now gave the military access to external rents was this 
time deeply unpopular in many sections of Pakistan’s population. But these strategic 
and rent capture imperatives once again overshadowed a developmental agenda. 
Finally, compared to Zia, Musharraf’s strategy was even less aligned to deliver to 
lower levels of society and the political organizers and organizations at these levels. 
The exclusion of a majority of the intermediate class in areas like the FATA and 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa eventually led to their successful mobilization by informal 
religious organizations and pushed the country to the brink of civil war. This ensured 
the gains from the early years Musharraf’s tenure could not be consolidated.  
 
 
7.5 Contemporary Pakistan–Deepening of a Crisis of Legitimacy 
 
Table 7.8 Sectoral and GDP growth rates 2008-10 (constant US$2000) 
GDP 3.8 
Agriculture 2.2 
Industry 4 
Manufacturing .9 
Services 2.2 
 
Source: (World Bank 2012a) 
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For the first time since independence an elected government completed its five-year 
term in Pakistan 2013. Elections were held in the same with a relatively high turnout 
that returned Nawaz Sharif to power. Importantly the current Army chief of staff 
Ashfaq Parvez Kayani has maintained a studied distance from political developments 
and has passed an order directing senior Army officials to withdraw from civil 
departments, though Pakistani analysts have also suggested the Army is very active 
in the political arena, only not visibly. What this means for an organization long used 
to political power and patronage will be difficult to predict but that this is an 
organization in transition is not in doubt. The PPP is surviving only because those 
planning any possible revolt know that in the tradition of South Asian dynastic 
politics unseating Zardari, now seen as a member of the Bhutto dynasty, will 
destabilize the party as such parties only coalesce around a dynasty. Both the 
military and political establishment’s complicity in allowing drone attacks that kill 
Pakistani civilians on Pakistani as ‘collateral damage’ soil is ensuring they lose 
credibility in the eyes of ordinary Pakistanis. In all of this the economy has taken a 
back seat. As Lieven recounts businessmen do want the government to provide 
credible direction but do not want what the government is now offering in the way 
of more liberalization (Lieven 2011), and in some cases even the ‘Most Favoured 
Nation’ status to India is being opposed given that India remains the stronger 
economy.  
From the point of view of our framework the strength of informal political 
organizations with high holding power has made the enforcement of formal 
institutions difficult even by the Army. The Army’s operations in the North-West of 
the country in the early 2000s actually weakened its hold over organizations it could 
once direct. According to the International Growth Centre violence in FATA, 
Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa increased significantly since 2005. Sind and 
Punjab had historically been witness to high levels of political violence but the other 
three provinces remained relative peaceful. It was with Pakistan’s involvement in the 
so-called war on terror that violence escalated especially in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. 
After 2005 the province became the second most violence prone province. On the 
heels of the Army’s operation in Swat and Malakand militant attacks in response to 
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the Army’s operations increased by 46 times (Shapiro, et al. 2012). This best 
demonstrates the reasons for escalating violence with the Army operations pitting 
the state against organizations that were once allies of the ruling coalition. Once 
again the state thought it could manage the choices of including and excluding 
organizations at will. But events proved otherwise with the distribution of power 
being such that organisations like the TPP had the potential to destabilize the 
country significantly. 
Contrary to beliefs that the Army was the most powerful organization dominating 
political, bureaucratic and economic sub-systems, our analysis suggests otherwise. 
While there is little doubt that the Army in Pakistan pervaded these three sub-
systems, it was by no means uncontested. If anything contestations by both formal 
and informal political organizations increased in the decade starting in 2000. The 
rents that the Army distributed to its clients came under increasing contestation by 
other informal, irregular groups we have identified earlier. Given that the Army 
experienced a crisis of legitimacy due to its support, though qualified, of US policy 
and the drone attacks, its power relative to other organizations has become even 
more contested than in the past. A spate of attacks on defence personnel in 2013 
around the country pointed to the fact that the Army no longer had the requisite 
enforcement capability to direct the irregular forces it once employed for strategic 
purposes.  
Organizational power was embedded within informal religious and quasi religious 
organizations and their sustained exclusion from the US aid-led distribution of 
benefits overseen by the Army is pushing Pakistan towards more significant 
challenges to the existing political settlement. However a distribution of benefits 
bringing these organizations more in line more in line with their real holding power 
will require fundamental, non-incremental changes to the Pakistani political 
settlement. The current political settlement where the Army and bureaucratic and 
business elites share the distribution of benefits is unlikely to be changed voluntarily 
by the latter organizations. What we observe therefore is increasing contestations by 
informal Islamic organizations that are no longer demanding pay-offs but are seeking 
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a change in the constitution of the political settlement. The new Sharif government 
in 2013 expressed a desire for rapprochement but continued drone attacks 
undermined the credibility of this effort. A lack of developmental institutions is 
hampering growth though there are signs of higher private sector involvement with 
a consensus towards more pro-market reforms, especially in the financial sector. As 
a result of this most productive organizations still possess only moderate capability 
and with little formal support developing further capabilities is difficult. As Table 7.8 
shows manufacturing growth was eventually the hardest hit.  
7.6 The Political Settlement and Liberalization: Wrong Policy or Poor 
Implementation? 
Liberalization dominated the institutional and policy reform agenda of Pakistan from 
the 1980s to the 2010s. It was driven by IMF supported Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAPs) that aimed for a combination of austerity and liberalization, 
particularly trade liberalization and privatization. While the growth of GDP and per 
capita incomes both declined in the 1990s they were some improvements in the 
2000s. However inequality increased in both periods though poverty data was on a 
declining trend between 2001-05 (Husain 2010). Total Factor Productivity growth 
was at its lowest from 1990-91 to 2000-01 (Harber 2009). Pakistani economists 
attribute much of the adverse outcomes to Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) 
that Pakistan implemented in this period (Anwar 1996; T. A. Khan 2000; Bhutta 2001; 
Becker-Ritterspach 2007; Nosheen, et al. 2010; Khan Ali Ejaz Rana 2011; P. Roy 2011). 
There are two types of questions about liberalization in Pakistan during this period. 
The first was whether it was the appropriate policy response to the political and 
economic problems that Pakistan was facing. The second was to understand how the 
programme was likely to be implemented given the weak formal enforcement 
capabilities of the state. Even if the programme had been theoretically appropriate it 
may not have achieved good results in this context. More interestingly, the manner 
of its partial and modified implementation may have had specific adverse effects. 
Pakistan received six tranches of loans under SAPs since the 1980s. A large body of 
literature has evaluated their impact (Redelet S 1998; Naiman and Watkins 1999; 
Baro R. J 2005). The Pakistani criticism of the SAPs suggests that the slowdown and 
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growth in economic inequality is at least in part a result of these programmes. Table 
7.9 compares economic growth before and after reforms. The GDP growth rates and 
rate of growth of exports were both higher in the pre reform period. Pakistan 
received approximately $31 billion in IMF loans and other external assistance 
between 1985 and 2000. The most damaging phases of structural reform seem to 
have occurred under the Nawaz Sharif governments. In 1989-90 the government put 
108 of Pakistan’s 175 public service enterprises on sale in industries ranging from 
engineering, oil and gas, telecommunication and fertilizers. At that time their pre-tax 
profit amounted to $ 605 million and their total assets were valued at $ 36.7 billion. 
A ‘fast tracking’ of the process resulted in 66 of these being sold but the proceeds 
yielded only $3.9 billion, far lower than their asset values (T. A. Khan 2000). The 
private sector only continued to do well in a few sectors like cotton textiles and for 
the most part the growth of the private sector came in the service sector.  
Table 7.9 Key economic indicators before and during the reform period 
Pakistan  Mean BR 
(1980s) 
Median 
BR 
Standard 
Deviation 
BEFORE 
Mean AR 
(1990s-
2007) 
Median 
AR 
Standard 
Deviation 
AR 
Real GDP  
growth rates 
6.7 6.5 1.7 4.8 4.8 2.3 
Investment rate 
(% of GNI) 
18.7 18.8 0.4 18 17.3 1.4 
Current Account 
deficit (% GDP) 
-2.9 -3.3 1.2 -1.3 -2.7 3.7 
Real export 
growth rates 
9.8 12 13.2 7.8 7.6 11.3 
 
Note: BR is before reform, AR is after reform. 
Source: (Nosheen, et al. 2010: Table 3) 
 
Nawaz Sharif also liberalized Pakistan’s stock markets in 1991. As a result the market 
capitalization of the Karachi Stock Exchange increased five times between 1990 and 
1994. Net portfolio inflows into the Pakistani economy amounted to $3.3 billion 
between 1991 and 1995 (I. Ali and Malik 2009). In 1990 the share of total banking 
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assets owned by the public financial institutions was 92.2 per cent. By 2009 this 
share had dropped to 18.70 per cent (Waheed 2010). However despite the increase 
in private sector participation and increased financial flows Pakistani banks 
performed less than satisfactorily in terms of extension of credit to the private sector. 
In 2006 Bangladesh had a higher private sector credit to GDP ratio than Pakistan 
despite being the country with lowest per capita incomes in the sub-continent (SBP 
2006) Credit has also not been flowing to sectors like SMEs despite efforts of the 
government (GoP 2011). Pakistan’s GDP growth rates were slightly higher under 
Musharraf, but then declined again (Table 7.2). 
Tables 7.5 to 7.7 show that manufacturing had spurts of growth after the process of 
liberalization but by the end of the 2010s the industrial and manufacturing sector in 
Pakistan faced significant challenges. Unlike India and Bangladesh, Pakistan did not 
develop any new globally competitive sectors in the 1980s or 1990s. According to 
some studies economy-level TFP improved in the 1990s but this is largely explained 
by the growth of some high value services like finance, after the liberalization of 
1991 and better capacity utilization of in the 1990s as domestic demand was 
sustained by security-related external rent inflows (Kemal 2007; Husain 2010). Some 
studies show that growth in the manufacturing sector remained input-driven rather 
than productivity-driven over this period (Chaudhry 2009). A working paper of the 
State Bank of Pakistan concludes that trade openness had a negative correlation 
with TFP growth while government consumption and FDI were positively correlated 
(S. U. Khan 2006). Most empirical studies of this period agree that growth was driven 
by the service sector and manufacturing growth suffered from low productivity and 
competitiveness. A cross country report by UNIDO on competitive industrial 
performance (CIP) shows that Pakistan’s competitiveness since liberalization has 
shown a downward trend. The same report also identifies an aggregate 
competitiveness problem in India but its performance was relatively better than that 
of Pakistan. Pakistan’s manufacturing value added per capita was close to India’s in 
1990  but by 2000 it had fallen to 70 per cent of India’s and 18 per cent of China’s 
(Table 7.11). Significantly the value of manufactured exports per capita was 165 per 
cent higher than that of India in 1990 and even exceeded China by 7 per cent. But by 
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2000 this figure had dropped considerably to become only 58 per cent higher than 
India (Ansari 2005). Pakistan’s higher manufacturing exports per capita reflect the 
initially greater export orientation of Pakistan’s manufacturing sector. The 
interesting feature is the time trend in export performance relative to India. 
Some level of volatility is expected in manufacturing performance in developing 
countries, but the trends in productivity and competitiveness in Pakistan’s case 
suggest that liberalization has had an adverse effect on competitive capabilities. This 
is consistent with our qualitative finding that there were no capability development 
strategies in the 1980s and 1990s even of the type that Pakistan attempted in the 
1960s and the results are validated in productivity and competitiveness indicators 
for the manufacturing sector (Tables 7.10 and 7.11).   
Table 7.10 TFP growth in Pakistan 
Year 60-04 60-69 70-79 80-89 90-99 00-04 
Real 
GDP 
Growth 
 5.4 6.31 4.9 6.3 4.4 4.5 
Capital  1.9 2.1 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.6 
Labour  1.8 1.6 2.0 1.8 1.7 2 
TFP  1.7 2.6 1.1 2.6 0.8 0.8 
Source: (Husain 2010: Table 5)  
 
The growth of the financial sector did not translate into more innovative credit 
instruments that could assist capability development in Pakistani manufacturing. 
Interestingly the ten largest corporate groups in India, including Reliance, Essar and 
Adani, have an average net debt to EBITDA (earnings before interest, tax, 
depreciation and amortization) ratio of 5.6 and are probably excessively 
overleveraged as a ratio above 5 is considered unsustainable (Crabtree 2013). In 
contrast, Pakistan’s corporate sector displays the opposite problem. The equity to 
debt ratio of 8:2 suggests they rely far too much on internal resources for 
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investment and have limited access to acceptable terms of credit from the banking 
sector. According to Husain if this ratio could be reduced to 7:3 the country’s 
investment to GDP ratio would move up to 21.2 per cent from 20 per cent (Husain 
2007). Arguably, financial liberalization has not served the manufacturing sector 
even though this was one of the reasons cited for liberalization in the 1990s. In 
India’s case the figure quoted above is probably evidence of liberalization 
increasingly serving narrow, and increasingly unproductive interests as highlighted in 
Chapter Four. 
Table 7.11 Pakistan’s declining competitiveness 
                  1990                        2000 
 MVA 
per 
capita 
USD 
MHT 
in 
MVA 
(%) 
MX 
per 
capita 
USD 
MHT in 
mfg 
exports (%) 
MVA 
per 
capita 
USD 
MHT 
in 
MVA 
(%) 
MX 
per 
capita 
USD 
MHT in 
mfg 
exports (%) 
Pakistan 56 31.9 45 8.1 63 35.1 60 8.9 
China 113 57.6 42 34.4 350 57.3 183 44.6 
India 60 55.3 17 17.9 90 58.4 38 19.7 
 
(Competition as measured by the Competitiveness Industrial Performance Index) 
MVA- Manufacturing Value Added 
MHT- Medium and High Technology 
MX- Manufactured Exports 
Source: UNIDO quoted in (Ansari 2005: Table 2)  
 
Our comparison of Pakistan with India suggests that while there are differences 
there is also much in common in the challenges faced by the two countries. Their per 
capita incomes are fairly close and in terms of indicators like poverty and inequality 
they are also very similar. Both adopted liberalization reforms in the early 1990s that 
led to the rapid growth of the service sector. However as outlined in Chapter Four 
India adopted liberalization reforms when at least a few of its important 
manufacturing sectors like automobiles and pharmaceuticals had achieved global 
competitiveness. Despite this, the Indian economy still suffers from market failures 
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in finance that impede manufacturing companies from achieving greater 
competiveness and new manufacturing sectors emerging. In the case of Pakistan, 
liberalization happened at a time when it did not have any major sectors of 
manufacturing that were reasonably close to the global competitiveness frontier.  
Yet Pakistan’s manufacturing included sectors like textiles, simple electronics and 
surgical instruments that could have benefited from capability development 
strategies. There is no evidence in Pakistan of the type of capability development 
strategy in the Indian automobile sector outlined in Chapter Four and Khan (2009b). 
This is despite Pakistan having an auto components and assembly sector which may 
have benefited from similar incentives for technical and organizational capability 
development. The textile industry is Pakistan’s most critical industry in terms of its 
contribution to the economy. Pakistan is the fourth largest producer of cotton with a 
nine per cent share of the world market. Its textile industry accounted for 54 per 
cent of exports, 38 per cent of industrial employment and 8.5 per cent of GDP in 
2011.  But the textile sector also faces ‘significant productivity and quality gaps’ 
(Iqbal, et al. 2010). It still operates at the low end of the value chain rather than high 
value added products. The chief constraint in the sector despite relatively low wages 
is the lack of technical and organizational capabilities to compete in global markets. 
Pakistan is also trying to be a significant player in the ready-made garments sector 
but has some way to go before it can catch up with Bangladesh. Given that the 
average total cost per operator hour in the case of Bangladesh is $0.31 and 
Pakistan’s is almost double that at $0.56, it faces a significant challenge in raising 
productivity and quality enough to compensate for its initial cost disadvantage 
(PRGMEA 2010). These are unlikely to happen without adequate policies. 
The Sialkot industrial cluster producing high quality surgical instruments for western 
export markets is one of Pakistan’s successful manufacturing sectors. The sector 
exports close to 90 percent of its production and was established in the 1960s under 
Ayub Khan’s industrial policies. It was an early beneficiary of export incentives. It is 
already at a higher end of technical competence than the cotton textile industry and 
exports to high income markets. In 2008-09 Pakistan exported surgical instruments 
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worth $250 million mostly to the US with the sector employing about 150,000 
workers. Like much of the developing world’s success stories government policy was 
important in pushing the sector up the value chain. In 1994 significant quality 
requirements were imposed by the American Food and Drug Authority (FDA) on 
imported surgical instruments. Given the importance of the sector, manufacturers 
reached an understanding with the government to provide the necessary training to 
employees that would enable the sector to compete on the terms required by the 
FDA (Nadvi 1999). This collaboration required limited public funds or monitoring 
because the sector already had high capability and a strong incentive to improve its 
quality to keep its market. It was one of the few examples of successful capability 
improvement with government assistance in the 1990s when the political settlement 
was competitive clientelist. The effort proved a success and Pakistan was able to 
regain its lost share in the export market.  
The Pakistani government has since delinked itself from direct involvement in the 
sector, but the successful outcome suggests that these linkages should be 
maintained for pragmatic capability development initiatives. The PML-N government 
of Sharif that was involved in this initiative was not anti-industry but it was also not 
pro-actively promoting industry. The extensive privatization programmes of the 
1990s provided the PML-N with enough opportunities for rent allocation without 
difficult strategies of promoting industrialization through capability development. A 
report of the Rawalpindi Chamber of Commerce identifies why government 
assistance is necessary for addressing productivity and competitiveness problems 
(Aaliya 2010). Training and re-skilling are consistently identified as bottlenecks and 
we would add the problems of organizational capability development, which 
requires learning-by-doing strategies. All these competitiveness enhancing strategies 
require financing and an appropriate design of the governance of the financing 
strategy so that financing is not captured as an unproductive rent. The report says 
that despite the presence of many banks and leasing companies, access to finance is 
only easy for large companies who have good personal relations with the banks. 
Small vendors have limited access and face higher financing costs, making 
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investments in raising competitiveness risky and costly. Small and medium 
manufacturing and agro based industries remain ‘credit-starved’ (Husain 2007).  
A sector that has the potential to transform the fortunes of Pakistan’s manufacturing 
industry is the auto and auto components sector. Till the 1970s the automobile 
sector in Pakistan relied on simple assembly of imported kits and early attempts at 
localization did not succeed. The Pakistan Automobile Corporation (PACO) was set 
up under the Bhutto administration to manufacture cars locally and consisted of two 
segments: Pak-Suzuki in collaboration with Suzuki of Japan and Millat Tractors (the 
latter was nationalized having been established in 1964 to market Massey Ferguson 
Tractors in Pakistan). While the economic policies of the Bhutto era are often 
criticized for setting back the pace of Pakistan’s industrial growth some sectors 
actually benefited from these dirigiste policies. The automotive sector was certainly 
one of them. Pak-Suzuki was the largest auto company in the country and Millat 
Tractors emerged as one of the country’s leading manufacturing companies looking 
to export to markets like Afghanistan and some African countries by the early 2000s.  
A comparison with India’s auto sector is useful here. It is significant that Maruti 
Suzuki made its entry into India’s protected market almost a decade after PACO was 
established and played the role of a catalyst in developing India’s auto sector. One 
difference stands out clearly. Unlike India where the auto sector was protected till 
liberalization in the 1990s the Pakistani auto market was dominated by imports till 
1971. The long period of protection had allowed India to achieve significant learning 
by doing even if it produced very low quality cars and heavy commercial vehicles. 
Nevertheless, India had achieved the capabilities to make these vehicles entirely 
within India. When Suzuki came to India it was promised significant implicit rents in 
the protected market (as well as other explicit subsidies like the allocation of prime 
land) as long as it achieved significant local content in five years based on developing 
the technological and organizational capabilities of tier one and two component 
producers. The ex-post rents offered to Suzuki and the possibility of actually 
achieving the indigenization given the high initial capabilities encouraged Suzuki to 
accept this deal. It was able to roll out cars with the required levels of indigenization 
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by the 1990s. The consequent development of Suzuki’s vendor base led to the 
growth of India’s auto component sector that today has two successful indigenous 
auto manufacturers, Mahindra & Mahindra and Tata Motors. India’s auto 
component manufacturing sector is also one of Asia’s most competitive. It would not 
be inaccurate to say the long period of protection had positive dynamic 
consequences for India despite significant short-term inefficiencies (M. H. Khan 
2009b, 2013c, 2013b). 
Pakistan did not have a strong initial capability base in automobile manufacturing in 
1971 and could not set ambitious targets for Suzuki in the 1970s that India could in 
the 1980s. Given that the manufacture of tractor parts was technically and 
organizationally less complex compared to car components it was this sector that 
saw the most growth (Ghani and Khan 2004). However since the 1990s a process 
similar to the one observed in India’s auto sector was unfolding in the Pakistani auto 
sector in scope if not in scale. The opening up of the market to foreign 
manufacturers meant they were able to make use of the base developed by Pak 
Suzuki, and Honda and Toyota also set up assembling and manufacturing operations. 
As a result some auto component producers like Ragstar Engineering achieved high 
levels of export competitiveness. The Pakistani government established programmes 
like the National Trade Corridor Improvement Program (NTCIP) and the Auto 
Industry Development Program (AIDP). However, policymakers failed to come up 
with instruments for financing capability development that ensured compulsions for 
high-effort learning. This failure can be understood given the difficulties of enforcing 
formal instruments in the political settlement in Pakistan that was gradually moving 
in the direction of weaker enforcement and time horizons.  
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Figure 7.2 Automobile sales figures from 2008-09 to 2012-13 
Source: (PAMA 2013) 
Note- Wheelers are 2/3 wheelers (scooters, motorcycles, ‘tempos’) 
 
Automobile production has not broken through to achieve global competitiveness. 
Production was low in the 2010s with production in 2012-13 being at its lowest level 
since 2009-10 (Figure 7.2). Tractor production figures are somewhat better, picking 
up in 2012-13 after a period of low growth, but two and three wheeler sales have 
been the most robust reflecting the relative competitiveness of Pakistani vehicles at 
the lower end (PAMA 2013). The policy and academic literature on the automobile 
sector uniformly mentions the important role of government and why it needs to do 
more despite initiatives like the NTCIP and AIDP. A crucial problem here is the 
relationship between economic organizations in the sector and the ruling coalition. 
The Indian auto and auto components producers in Tamil Nadu had historical links 
with different parties who could constitute the ruling coalition. The ability of the 
ruling coalition to direct rents to their clients in the business sector in a context of 
competition between firms and between political parties made rents available for 
capability development with competitive compulsions for raising productivity. The 
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configuration of economic and political organizations in Pakistan was less favourable 
for rent allocations that could create compulsions for capability development. There 
were too few players in the automobile sector, their capabilities were not close to 
global competitiveness and political organizations in the 1980s and 1990s had weak 
implementation capabilities and short time horizons. Credible support for high effort 
capability development therefore did not emerge.  
A few qualifications on the measures of competitiveness in existing studies are 
needed here. Studies on competitiveness carried out by the World Bank, the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) and the Competitiveness Support Fund (CSF) have been 
influential in policy circles but they have also and rightly come in for some criticism 
for the particular indicators they use. They rely on indicators like education or infant 
mortality that are useful in their own right but have little necessary bearing on levels 
of competitiveness. Some of the data also suffers from selection bias and is 
unrepresentative. For instance the Executive Opinion Survey in the CSF report was 
conducted among Pakistani executives who work in firms with more than 100 
employees, when most of Pakistani business is concentrated in the small scale sector 
(McCartney 2011). The UNIDO report is less biased towards inappropriate ‘good 
governance indicators’ of the sort used in the ADB, WB and CSF reports and relies 
more on measures of per capita MVA or manufactured exports, but these measure 
competitiveness by looking at its outcomes. In the UNIDO report there are also 
problems with assigning equal weight to all indicators and not adequately 
differentiating between assembly and manufacturing (Ansari 2005). Yet it is arguably 
the index that comes closest to measuring true competitiveness (see our discussion 
in Chapter Four) unlike measures based on good governance indicators of 
competitiveness like security of property rights and democracy.  
Finally, privatization has been a much bigger programme in Pakistan than in India but 
it has not achieved significant results. Privatization will only lead to greater static and 
dynamic efficiency if firms are capable of competing in a more open economy and if 
privatization reduces the unconditional support given to firms by different types of 
explicit and hidden subsidies. Hidden subsidies to large business organizations in 
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Pakistan come from a variety of mechanisms including bank loans on soft terms, and 
these remain politically easy to access for large private sector firms (Khwaja and 
Mian). Indeed, privatization was a mechanism for directing further rents the 
politically connected business organizations. Between 1990 and 2004 the sectors 
that accounted for the largest share in privatization proceeds were banking, energy 
and telecommunications, sectors (Syed, et al. 2012) that are not linked directly to 
manufacturing growth and capability development. Thus, the implementation of 
privatization and liberalization in the context of the configuration of power in 
Pakistan did not create significant pressures for capability development and more 
importantly, reduced the policy space for interventions that could assist capability 
development except in a small number of cases.  
A Government of Pakistan Labour Force Survey in 2003-04 concluded that the 
majority of new jobs were created in the country’s unorganized, informal economy 
the share of which in non-agricultural employment was 70 percent (M. H. Khan 
2012d). Two recent studies on the impact of the SAPs have found they have had an 
adverse effect on indicators like employment, poverty, income distribution and 
export performance (Nosheen, et al. 2010; Lieven 2011). As Table 7.8 and 7.9 
suggest per capita GDP growth rates remained low throughout the period of SAP 
reforms and export growth suffered. Liberalization reforms in Pakistan had poor 
effects because the country was neither politically nor economically ready to be an 
open economy. It did not have a broad base of economic organizations close to the 
competitiveness frontier and its political organizations were becoming weaker and 
facing greater contestation, which reduced their enforcement capabilities and 
eventually resulted in high levels of political instability and violence. Liberalization 
enabled a very small section of the population to reap benefits through the growth 
of the service sector and through informal rent allocations that continued through 
the banking system, through privatizations and overt forms of ‘primitive 
accumulation’. Most economic and social indicators suggest the majority of 
Pakistan’s population remained outside this ‘globalized’ economy. This is where 
significant structural similarities remain with India whose liberalization strategies are 
proving to be inadequate for driving further growth (M. H. Khan 2011b). The 
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structural exclusion of Pakistan’s excluded social groups is however greater than in 
India and the declining legitimacy of the traditional political organizations creates 
challenges for maintaining stability. 
7.7 Conclusion 
The application of the political settlement approach to Pakistan provides a number 
of insights. The mainstream discourse on Pakistan highlights the absence of right 
institutions especially democratic ones, the presence of corruption and the growth 
of Islamism as the sources of Pakistan’s problems. Our analysis suggests a different 
set of problems. First, the founding myths of Pakistan and the security prioritization 
it allowed created a more centralized rent distribution system that failed to 
increasingly integrate emerging mobilizations within the intermediate classes. At the 
same time, the political settlement that had allowed substantial capability 
development interventions in the 1960s became progressively less conducive for 
interventions that could address these market failures in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Exacerbating the problem was the strengthening of liberalizing ideologies in this 
period that led to the deliberate abandonment of capability development strategies 
in this period. By the 2000s Pakistan was in the double bind of lacking capability 
building strategies for its economic organizations while its political organizations 
faced growing challenges from new more informally organized political organizations 
that want to overthrow the system and not just claim a share of rents.  
Capability development strategies were most successful in Pakistan immediately 
after the onset of military rule in 1958 under Ayub Khan. The ruling coalition did not 
have the capacity to discipline subsidy recipients as in East Asia, but significant 
capability development happened, financed by public subsidies. The problem was 
that that vulnerable patrimonialism excluded too many powerful organizations and 
resulted in political conflict and the violent rupture of 1971.  
This was followed from 1972 to 1977 by Bhutto’s attempt to create a dominant party 
in a version of constrained patrimonialism with authoritarian characteristics. He used 
the populist slogan of Islamic socialism to sustain an authoritarian party. There were 
a few successes in setting up capability development projects, as in automobiles, and 
313 
 
some public sector investments, but his period was marked by an attack on 
Pakistan’s big capitalist that generally served to destroy productive and 
organizational capabilities. A second phase of military rule under general Zia-ul-Haq 
was a significant turning point towards Pakistan’s current impasse. The availability of 
centralized security-related rents associated with support for the Americans in 
Afghanistan and a failed attempt to destroy the old political organizations without 
successfully incorporating organizations representing the lower intermediate classes 
set the characteristics of the unstable political settlement that continues to affect 
Pakistan. Economic liberalization began in the 1980s as the military ruling coalition 
relied more on external rents and took less interest in capability development.  
Zia’s death brought in an era of deepening liberalization and structural adjustments 
under weak political governments in an intensely competitive clientelist political 
settlement. Economic organizations were too weak to dominate the political system 
and negotiate support for capability development, but individual business groups 
were powerful enough and well-enough connected to political organizations to 
sustain their rents through informal mechanisms like bank loans, and primitive 
accumulation based on getting government contracts and land allocations. Sectors 
like textiles and the successful surgical instruments sector soldiered on but did not 
enjoy the support for capability development that could have pushed them into 
more diversified and higher valued products. At the same time, the alienation of 
excluded groups increased as the traditional political parties engaged in more and 
more egregious corruption and unproductive rent capture.  
Islam in Pakistan gradually progressed from being the identity of Muslim elites in 
British India mobilizing to protect their access to rents in a democratic independent 
India where they would be a perpetual minority to the mobilizing ideology of 
excluded groups within Pakistan. To isolate the ruling groups who are also Muslims 
but who subscribe to more ‘liberal’ forms of Islam, it is not surprising that excluded 
groups would distinguish themselves by defining Islam in a form that is guaranteed 
to isolate the ruling elites. The sometimes misguided attempt by military and 
traditional political elites to use Islam to consolidate their own support is only part of 
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the explanation for the growing mobilization of the excluded using increasingly 
radical Islamic ideologies. The logic of the political contest over rents suggests that 
radical Islamism would probably have emerged anyway as long as the political 
organizations controlled by higher level elites failed to rapidly incorporate 
organizations led by and catering to the political ambitions of lower intermediate 
class groups.  
This is the context in which local religious leaders, or mullahs, who were once at the 
bottom of the social hierarchy in regions like FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa relative 
to the landowning maliks and the educated ulemas, gradually became leaders of 
political mobilizations (Dorronsoro 2002; Lieven 2011). These leaders have 
overturned the social hierarchy in many places and displaced the maliks and amirs to 
fill the vacuum the Pakistani state had never really filled (Lieven 2011). We have 
argued that the emergence of violent political conflicts and strategies of radically 
targeting the social order rather than demanding incorporation is similar to the 
experience of Maoist movements in India. The failure to gradually incorporate 
marginalized groups in rent distribution systems can result in the emergence of 
radical rejectionist movements. Class divisions superimposed on the failure of 
inclusion of potentially powerful groups within the political settlement can explain 
these outcomes, with culture and ideology playing a secondary role in explaining the 
mobilization ideologies. The role of class conflicts and failed clientelist strategies of 
inclusion and exclusion in explaining the rise of movements like that of the Taliban 
and other rejectionist social movements in Pakistan and India is an area of research 
that needs to be developed further in the future. 
Islamic culture is often wrongly used to explain Taliban radicalism. A distinction has 
to be made between Islam as a set of cultural norms and its role as a mobilizing 
ideology for different types of social movements. In fact Islam has been used as a 
mobilizing ideology by many different types of groups and classes in South Asia with 
very different strategies that can be understood and explained in the context of 
specific contests over assets and rents. The new mobilizations using Islam in Pakistan 
are novel because a history of exclusion of certain classes and groups has resulted in 
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Islam being used for nothing less than a complete restructuring of the political 
settlement. Our analysis of political settlements adds further depth to approaches 
that have argued that Islam as culture does not explain much about the specific 
characteristics of different political and economic mobilizations.  
The political settlement in Pakistan in the 2010s seems to be sustainable only in the 
form of a medium-term impasse. The ruling coalition still has access to enough rents 
to sustain their hold over power but the excluded organizations are also displaying 
high holding power through their mobilizations that are often violent. The low 
enforcement capabilities of political and bureaucratic organizations also mean that 
strategies of creating new productive capabilities are likely to face significant 
constraints. Economic organizations are too weak in terms of political power and 
economic capabilities to define a productive policy agenda. But many are well-
enough connected to benefit from quick rent opportunities that can be shared with 
their political allies. These emerging features of unproductive business-government 
relationships are common to both India and Pakistan. The political settlement in 
Pakistan can and should change but this is a political process and not a technical or 
economic one that is amenable to policy in any simple way. Clearly, the 
incorporation of significant layers of new groups and organizations into the political 
settlement not just marginally, but as important players, is necessary if political 
stability is to be achieved. How this can be done when established elites still believe 
that the principle battle they are fighting is against Islamist extremism that on is a 
political challenge that will have to be faced by Pakistani political entrepreneurs. The 
political settlement analysis suggests that this type of organizational restructuring 
can only evolve internally and cannot be achieved through the interventions of 
external agencies. The conventional security and governance agenda assumes that 
with appropriate support to the Pakistani elite, groups like the Taliban can be wiped 
out. By locating the emergence of these challenges to Pakistan’s established elites in 
the context of failed strategies of exclusion we contend that strategies of continuing 
this exclusion through the use of more force are likely to fail in the long-run and 
indeed result in even more violent and radical responses from below.  
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Chapter 8. Conclusion 
 
This dissertation applies the analytical framework of political settlements to 
understand institutional and policy evolution and associated outcomes in Gujarat, 
Tamil Nadu and Pakistan. The research contributes to the development of a 
consistent political economy approach for understanding the historical experiences 
of development and ultimately the development of better frameworks for discussing 
policy options and alternatives in different contexts. 
The ruling coalition in each of our case studies, Gujarat, Tamil Nadu and Pakistan was 
constructed differently and reflected historical differences in the organization of 
social, political and economic organizations in these localities. The differences in the 
organization of power at the level of society and in the ruling coalition had significant 
implications for responses to economic and political challenges. The evolution of 
institutions and policies followed different trajectories and the enforcement of 
particular institutions and policies was quite different depending on the interests of 
and contestation by powerful organizations. The political settlements framework 
argues that understanding these contextual differences is critical for understanding 
differences in the evolution and performance of particular institutions.  
This analytical claim is illustrated in this dissertation by looking at the policies and 
institutions that supported industrialization and industrial capability development. 
The focus on industry was simply to make the scope of the research manageable 
even though other related institutions and issues emerged to elaborate the 
dynamics of each case. Apart from that, we believe that industrial development and 
in particular the development of a broad-based employment generating 
manufacturing sector is essential for sustaining development in labour surplus 
economies.  
The aim was to study the process of transformation in these cases so as to identify 
the factors that can explain the relative success of some cases and the potential 
sources of vulnerabilities. Focusing on India at the state level is important because 
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India is too often looked at as a single growth model whereas in reality each state 
has different political arrangements, institutional capabilities and a ruling coalition 
that has evolved differently as a result of specific social and historical processes. 
Regional imbalances in India are glaring and demand deeper explanations. The 
political settlements framework that identifies the distribution of organizational 
power provides important insights into the emergence and operation of a number of 
growth-enhancing institutional arrangements in these states.  
The high rates of growth in Gujarat are commonly attributed to the superior 
leadership of Narendra Modi, to ‘good governance’ in the state or to the evolution of 
a ‘developmental state’ in Gujarat. Our framework suggests that much can be 
explained by the specific distribution of power that supported its ruling coalition and 
that was further reinforced by political strategies of selective violence. The 
‘authoritarian clientelism’ that was constructed in Gujarat was critical for 
understanding the specific enforcement capabilities that drove growth in a particular 
set of industrial sectors. This analysis suggests that leadership quality was a second 
order factor, and that the model is not likely to be replicable across India. Tamil 
Nadu’s growth is usually not held up as a model in India despite achieving growth 
outcomes similar to Gujarat and having a manufacturing sector that is more broad-
based and competitive. One reason for this is that its fractious competitive 
clientelism based on populist politics is harder to describe as good governance or a 
developmental state. The political settlements approach helps to show how the 
distribution of power in the state allowed a series of growth-enhancing institutional 
measures that attracted high capability economic organizations. Rather than the 
dominant party of Gujarat and its authoritarian clientelism, the politics of Tamil 
Nadu is closer to the politics of most developing countries making the state 
particularly important in discussions of policy design in these contexts.  
Pakistan is often dismissed as a country close to state failure. The solutions are often 
thought to involve even more intense attempts at institutionalizing good governance 
and strengthening its security capabilities. Deeper questions are not asked about the 
reasons behind its failure to resolve internal conflicts so that a relatively stable 
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political settlement with lower levels of violence can emerge. The analysis here 
suggests that much of this has to with historically exclusionary political strategies of 
successive ruling coalitions including the army. The dual strategy of elites since the 
1980s was to keep powerful informal organizations out of the rent-creation and 
allocation processes of mainstream politics while using them for strategic purposes 
against external enemies. The result of this has been to increase contestation and 
violence, particularly after the legitimacy of the ruling elites began to collapse as a 
result of their association with a failing US political strategy in Afghanistan.  
By the 2000s, the distribution of benefits allowed by formal and informal institutions 
in Pakistan was much more out of step with the distribution of power across its 
formal and informal organizations compared to the situation in Gujarat or Tamil 
Nadu. This explains the greater violence and political instability in Pakistan. From the 
perspective of this analysis, the danger to Pakistan comes less from the 
intransigence of its informal Islamist organizations and more from the strategies of 
its ruling elites who refuse to accommodate demands for the inclusion of new 
groups from the lower intermediate classes in rent allocation and management 
systems.  
Each of our cases demonstrates different strategies of organizing patron-client 
politics that in turn results in contrasting interfaces between politics, institutions and 
economic outcomes. The structuring of political organizations through patron-client 
relationship is deeply consequential for how social transformations are negotiated in 
developing countries, using a combination of formal and informal institutions. One 
of the common themes emerging from our case studies is that the informality of 
patron-client structures makes even successful arrangements relatively vulnerable 
and ‘developmental’ political settlements face continuous endogenous 
transformations that can make them less developmental over time. The regressive 
evolution of the political settlement is most obvious in the case of Pakistan, but 
worrying aspects in the evolution of patron-client structures are evident in Tamil 
Nadu and at the all-India level. The strong dominant party in Gujarat was based on 
the implementation of some pretty undesirable political strategies involving 
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considerable violence. Even so, this configuration of power is not only unlikely to 
remain unchanged over time, but more importantly, it does not provide a replicable 
model for other parts of India. The latter is an important policy observation given the 
often unquestioning support for the ‘Gujarat model’ in some policy circles.  
A significant observation that emerges from our research is that the political 
settlements of both Pakistan and India are facing substantial endogenous changes. 
We have highlighted elements of these changes but our framework is not a 
predictive one as far as the evolution of the political settlement itself is concerned. 
The direction of change depends on which organizations are mobilizing and how 
they do so. Further research could focus on what drives these mobilizations in South 
Asia and elsewhere. At a more specific level more work is required on how the 
nature of coalition politics in India is changing and the implications of these changes 
for the systems of rent management at the state level. We have considered these 
questions briefly in Chapter Six but this could be a future area of research on the 
Indian economy.  
We conclude by reiterating that the aim of this research is essentially to 
demonstrate an application of a method for understanding institutional performance 
and we did not aim to provide a full analysis of comparative growth in these 
localities. We have not looked at other factors that explain growth differences like 
natural endowments or linkages with the global economy. We have also not looked 
at agriculture and services in any great detail, or the linkages between these sectors 
and industry. Nevertheless, we hope to have established that the framework of 
political settlements can shed important light on institutional performance by 
focusing on a narrow range of issues.   
  
321 
 
Bibliography 
 
Aaliya, Ahmed 2010. Pakistan Surgical Industry: Structure, Issues/Problems and 
Recommendations. The Rawalpindi Chamber of Commerce and Industry: 
 
Abraham, Shinu Anna 2003. Chera, Chola, Pandya: Using Archaeological Evidence to Identify 
the Tamil Kingdoms of Early Historic South India, Asian Perspectives 42 (2): 207-23. 
 
Acemoglu, Daron, Philippe Aghion and Fabrizio Zilibotti 2006. Distance to Frontier, Selection, 
and Economic Growth, Journal of the European Economic Association 4 (1): 37-74. 
 
Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson 2001. The Colonial Origins of 
Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation, American Economic Review 91 (5): 
1369-401. 
 
Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson 2002. Reversal of Fortune: 
Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution, The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 117 (4): 1231-94. 
 
Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson 2004. Institutions as the 
Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth. Working Paper  No. 10481. National Bureau of 
Economic Research: Cambridge Mass. Available HTTP: 
<http://www.nber.org/papers/w10481> 
 
Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson 2000. Political Losers as a Barrier to Economic 
Development, American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 90 (2): 126-30. 
 
Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson 2008. The Role of Institutions in Growth and 
Development. Working Paper No 10. Commission for Growth and Development: Washington 
DC. 
 
Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson 2012a. Why Nations Fail. New York: Crwon 
Business. 
 
Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson 2012b. Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, 
Prosperity and Poverty. London: Profile Books. 
 
Acharya, Shankar, Isher Judge Ahluwalia, K.L Krishna and Ila Patnaik 2003. India: Economic 
Growth 1950-2000. Global Research Project on Growth. Indian Council for Research on 
International Economic Relations: New Delhi. Available HTTP: 
<http://www.gdnet.org/pdf2/gdn_library/global_research_projects/explaining_growth/Indi
a_complete_31Mar04.pdf> 
 
ADB, Asian Development Bank 2012. Infrascope Report. 
 
Aghion, Philippe, Robin Burgess, Stephen J. Redding and Fabrizio Zilibotti 2006. The Unequal 
Effects of Liberalization: Evidence from Dismantling the License Raj in India. NBER Working 
Paper Series  No. W12031. National Bureau of Economic Research: Cambridge MA. 
 
Ahmad, Aziz 1964. Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment: Oxford India. 
322 
 
 
Ahmad, Riaz 2002. The State of Lies and the Lies of the State: The Gujarat Pogrom and the 
Future of India, in Sondhi, ML, Mukarji A (ed.) The Black Book of Gujarat, New Delhi: Mainak. 
 
Ahmed, Akbar S. 1980. Pukhtun Economy and Society: Traditional Structure and Economic 
Development in a Tribal Society. London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul. 
 
Alavi, Hamza 1973. The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh, in Gough, 
Kathleen and Hari P. Sharma (eds) Imperialism and Revolution in South Asia, New York: 
Monthly Review Press. 
 
Alavi, Hamza 1976. Rural Elite and Agricultural Development in Pakistan 
Rural Development in Bangladesh and Pakistan, in Stevens, Robert D., Hamza Alavi and Peter 
J. Bertocci (eds), Honolulu: East West Centre Books, University Press of Hawaii. 
 
Alavi, Hamza 1983a. Class and State, in Gardezi, Hassan and Jamil Rashid (eds) Pakistan: The 
Roots of Dictatorship, London: Zed Press. 
 
Alavi, Hamza 1983b. Class and State in Pakistan, in H Gardeci, J Rahid (ed.) Pakistan The 
Unstable State, Lahore 
 
Alchian, Armen A. and Harold Demsetz 1972. Production, Information Costs, and Economic 
Organization, American Economic Review 62 (5): 777-95. 
 
Ali, Imran and Adeel Malik 2009. The Political Economy of Industrial Development in 
Pakistan: A Long-Term Perspective, The Lahore Journal of Economics 14: 29-50. 
 
Ali, Muhammad Liaquat, Sarder Shafiqul Alam, Shah Asad Ahmed, P-J Dixon, A.S. Halls, P.M. 
Thompson and P. Sultana 2003. Understanding Livelihoods Dependent on Inland Fisheries in 
Bangladesh and Southeast Asia. Understanding Livelihoods Dependent on Fisheries 
DFID/MSP Project No. R8118. DFID: London. 
 
Allen, Douglas 2000. Transaction Costs, in Boudewijn Bouckaert, Gerrit De Geest (ed.) 
Encyclopedia of Law and Economics: Edward Elgar. 
 
Ambirajan, S 1999. State Government Subsidies: The Case of Tamil Nadu, Economic and 
Political Weekly 34 (14): 811-21. 
 
Amsden, Alice 1989. Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Amsden, Alice 2001. The Rise of "The Rest": Challenges to the West from Late-Industrializing 
Economies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Anderson, Perry 2012. The Indian Ideology: Three Essays Collective. 
 
Ansari, Javed A 2005. Pakistan's Industrial Competiveness. Market Forces. College of 
Management Science, PAF-Karachi Institute of Economics and Technology: 
 
323 
 
Anwar, Tilat 1996. Structural Adjustment and Poverty:The Case of Pakistan, The Pakistan 
Development Review 35 (4): 911—26. 
 
Arif, KM General 2001. Khaki Shadows: Pakistan 1947-1997. Karachi: Oxford University Press. 
 
Arrow, Kenneth J. 1962. The Economic Implications of Learning by Doing, The Review of 
Economic Studies 29 (3): 155-73. 
 
Assadi, Muzaffar 2002. Karnataka: Hindutva Policies in Coastal Region, Economic and 
Political Weekly 37 (23): 2211-13. 
 
Awasthi, Dinesh N 2000. Recent Changes in Gujarat Industry: Issues and Evidence, Economic 
and Political Weekly 35 (35/36): 3183-92. 
 
Aya, Okada and NS Siddharthan 2007. Industrial Clusters in India: Evidence from Automobile 
Clusters in Chennai and the National Capital Region. Discussion Papers. Institute of 
Developing Economies-Japan External Trade Organization: 
 
Balakrishnan, Pulapre 2010. Economic Growth in India: History and Prospect. New Delhi: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Balakrishnan, Pulapre, K Pushpangadan and Suresh M Babu 2000. Trade Liberalisation and 
Productivity Growth in Manufacturing: Evidence from Firm-Level Panel Data, Economic and 
Political Weekly 35 (41): 3679-82. 
 
Banga, Rashmi and Dinesh Kumar 2011. India’s Exports of Software Services: Role of External 
Demand and Productivity. UNCTAD: 
 
Banjerjee, Sumanta 2007. Thirty Years after the Emergency, Economic and Political Weekly 
42 (31): 3194. 
 
Bardhan, Pranab 1988. Dominant Proprietary Classes and India’s Democracy, in Kohli, Atul 
(ed.) India’s Democracy: An Analysis of Changing State-Society Relations, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press. 
 
Bardhan, Pranab 1997. Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues, Journal of 
Economic Literature 35 (3): 1320-46. 
 
Bardhan, Pranab 2009. Notes on the Political Economy of India's Tortuous Transition, 
Economic and Political Weekly 44 (49): 31-36. 
 
 
 
Baro R. J, J. Lee 2005. IMF Program: Who is Chosen and What are the Effects. NBER 
Working Paper  
 
Barzel, Yoram 1989. Economic Analysis of Property Rights. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
324 
 
Basu, Kaushik 2003. The Indian Economy: Up to 1991 and Since. BREAD Working Paper  No. 
052. Bureau for Research in Economic Analysis of Development, Kennedy School of 
Development, Harvard University: Cambridge MA. 
 
Bates, Robert H. 2001. Prosperity and Violence: The Political Economy of Development. New 
York: W.W. Norton. 
 
Baumol, William J 2004. The Free-Market Innovation Machine: 
Analyzing the Growth Miracle of Capitalism. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Baumol, William J., Sue A.B. Blackman and Edward N. Wolff 1989. Productivity and American 
Leadership: The Long View. Cambridge Massachusetts: MIT Press. 
 
Becker-Ritterspach, Florian 2007. Maruti-Suzuki's Trajectory: From a Public Sector Enterprise 
to a Japanese Owned Subsidiary. 15th GERPISA International Colloquium, 20-22nd June. 
GERPISA International Network: Paris. Available HTTP: <www.becker-
ritterspach.de/pdf/Gerpisa%20Becker-Ritterspach.pdf> 
 
Berenschot, Ward 2009. Rioting as Maintaining Relations: Hindu-Muslim Violence and 
Political Mediation in Gujarat, India, Civil Wars 11 (4): 414 – 33. 
 
Besley, Timothy 1995. Property Rights and Investment Incentives: Theory and Evidence from 
Ghana, Journal of Political Economy 103 (5): 903-37. 
 
Besley, Timothy and Robin Burgess 2004. Can Labour Regulation Hinder Economic 
Performance? Evidence from India, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 119 (1): 91-134. 
 
Besley, Timothy and Torsten Persson 2011. Pillars of Prosperity: The Political Economies of 
Development Clusters. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Bhagwati, Jagdish N. 1982. Directly Unproductive, Profit-seeking (DUP) Activities, Journal of 
Political Economy 90 (5): 988-1002. 
 
Bhagwati, Jagdish and Arvind Panagariya 2013. Why Growth Matters: How Economic Growth 
in India Reduced Poverty and the Lessons for Other Developing Countries New York: 
PublicAffairs. 
 
Bhattacharjea, Aditya 2006. Labour Market Regulation and Industrial Performance in India: A 
Critical Review of the Empirical Evidence, The Indian Journal of Labour Economics 49 (2): 
211-32. 
 
Bhutta, Zulfikar Ahmed 2001. Structural Adjustments and their Impact on Health and Society, 
International Journal of Epidemiology 30: 712-16. 
 
Bosworth, Barry, Susan M. Collins and Arvind Virmani 2007. Sources of Growth in the Indian 
Economy. NBER Working Paper Series  No. 12901. National Bureau of Economic Research: 
Cambridge MA. Available HTTP: <http://www.nber.org/papers/w12901> 
 
Bradford Jr., Colin I. 1990. Policy Interventions and Markets: Development Strategy 
Typololgies and Policy Options, in Gereffi, Gary and Donald L. Wyman (eds) Manufacturing 
325 
 
Miracles: Paths of Industrialization in Latin America and East Asia, Princeton NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
 
Brass, Paul R 2003. The Production of Hindu-Muslim Violence in Contemporary India 
Washington: University of Washington. 
 
Breman, Jan 1985. Of Peasants, Migrants and Paupers, Capitalist Production in West India. 
New Delhi: Oxford University Press. 
 
Buchanan, James M., Robert D. Tollison and Gordon Tullock (eds) 1980. Towards a Theory of 
Rent Seeking. College Station: Texas A.M. Press. 
 
Burki, Shahid Javed 1980. Pakistan Under Bhutto, 1971-1977. London: Macmillan. 
 
Candland, Christopher 2000. Institutional Impediments to Human Development in Pakistan, 
in A Shastri, A Jeyartnam Wilson (ed.) The Post Colonian States of South Asia, Democracy, 
Development and Identity, London: Hurst and Company. 
 
Chatterjee, Partha 1991. History and the Nationalization of Hindusim: Permanent Black. 
 
Chatterjee, Partha 1995. Religious Minorities and the Secular State: Reflections on an Indian 
Impasse, Public Culture 8 (1): 11-39. 
 
Chatterjee, Partha 1997. Introduction: A Political History of Independent India, in Chatterjee, 
Partha (ed.) State and Politics in India, Mumbai: Oxford University Press. 
 
Chatterji, Joya 1995. Bengal Divided: Hindu Communalism and Partition, 1932-1947. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Chaudhry, Azam Amjad 2009. Total Factor Productivity Growth in Pakistan: An Analysis of 
the Agricultural and Manufacturing Sectors, The Lahore Journal of Economics 14 (SE): 1-16. 
 
Cheema, Pervaiz Iqbal 2003. The Armed Forces of Pakistan. Karachi: Oxford University Press. 
 
Chellasamy, P and K Karuppiah 2005. An Analysis of Growth and Development of Textile 
Industry in India. Available HTTP: <http://www.fibre2fashion.com/industry-article/1/11/an-
analysis-of-growth-and-development-of-textile-industry-in-india7.asp> 
 
Chibber, Vivek 2003. Locked in Place: State-Building and Late Industrialization in India. 
Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
City, City of London Corporation 2012. Indian Infrastructure 2010-2012: Review. 
 
Coase, Ronald 1937. The Nature of the Firm, Economica 4: 386-405. 
 
Coase, Ronald 1960. The Problem of Social Cost, Journal of Law and Economics 3 (1): 1-44  
 
Cohen, Stephen P 1994. The Pakistan Army: California University Press. 
 
Corbridge, Stuart and John Harris 2000. Reinventing India: Liberalization, Hindu Nationalism 
and Popular Democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
326 
 
 
Financial Times 2013. Concerns Grow over Indian Industrials’ Debt Burdens, (by Crabtree, 
James)  14/08/2013  Available HTTP: <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f8967f6e-04d0-11e3-
9e71-00144feab7de.html#axzz2cnAevFOl> 
 
Dahlman, Carl J. 1979. The Problem of Externality, Journal of Law and Economics 22 (1): 141-
62. 
 
Dale, F Stephen 1990. Trade, Conversion and the Growth of the Islamic Community of Kerala, 
South India, Studia Islamica 71: 155-75. 
 
Dasgupta, Sukti and Ajit Singh 2005. Will Services be the New Engine of Economic Growth in 
India? CBR Research Programme on Enterprise and Innovation. Centre for Business Research, 
University of Cambridge: 
 
De Long, Bradford J 2003. India since Independence: An Analytical Growth Narrative, in 
Rodrik, Dani (ed.) In Search of Prosperity: Analytical Narratives on Economic Growth, 
Princteon: Princeton University Press. 
 
Deb, Arnab K and Subhash C Ray 2013. Economic Reforms and Total Factor Productivity 
Growth of Indian 
Manufacturing: An Inter-State Analysis. Department of Economics Working Paper Series. 
University of Connecticut: 
 
Desai, Ashok V. 1981. Factors Underlying the Slow Growth of Indian Industry, Economic and 
Political Weekly 16 (10/11/12): 381-92. 
 
Desai, Radhika 2011. Gujarat's Hindutva of Capitalist Development, South Asia: Journal of 
South AsianStudies 34 (3): 354-81. 
 
Dholakia, Ravindra 2000. Liberalisation in Gujarat: Review of Recent Experience, Economic 
and Political Weekly 35 (35/36): 3121- 
24. 
 
Dorronsoro, Giles 2002. Pakistan and the Taliban: State Policy, Religious Networks and 
Political Connections, in Jaffrelot, Christophe (ed.) Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation, 
New Delhi Manohar. 
 
Dreze, Jean and Aparajita Goyal 2003. Future of Mid-Day Meals, Economic and Political 
Weekly 38 (44): 4673-83. 
 
Dunkley, Graham 2004. Free Trade. Myth, Reality and Alternatives. London: Zed Books. 
 
Easterly, William 2001. The Political Economy of Growth Without Development: 
A Case Study of Pakistan. Paper for the Analytical Narratives of Growth Project, Kennedy 
School of Government, Harvard University. 
 
Easterly, William and Ross Levine 1997. Africa's Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic 
Divisions, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 112 (4): 1203-50. 
 
327 
 
ECI, Election Commision of India 2011. Statistical reports. Available HTTP: 
<http://eciresults.ap.nic.in/> 
 
Economist 2009. Waziristan 
The Last Frontier, Economist (30 December 2009) Available HTTP: 
<http://www.economist.com/node/15173037> 
 
Economist 2013. Made outside India, (by Economist)  10/08/2013  Available HTTP: 
<http://www.economist.com/news/international/21583285-growth-slows-and-reforms-
falter-economic-activity-shifting-out-india-made-
outside?fb_action_ids=10153129189975599&fb_action_types=og.likes&fb_ref=scn%2Ffb_e
c%2Fmade_outside_india&fb_source=aggregation&fb_aggregation_id=288381481237582> 
 
Elliott, Carolyn 2011. Moving from Clientelist Politics toward a Welfare Regime: Evidence 
from the 2009 Assembly Election in Andhra Pradesh, Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 
49 (1): 48-79. 
 
Engerman, Stanley and Kenneth Sokoloff 2002. Factor Endowments, Inequality, and Paths of 
Development among New World Economies. Working Paper  No. 9259, October 2002. 
National Bureau of Economic Research: Cambridge Mass. 
 
Engineer, Asghar Ali 1989. The Muslim Communities of Gujarat: An Exploratory Sstudy of 
Bohras, Khojas and Memons. Delhi: Ajanta Publications. 
 
Engineer, Asghar Ali 1995. Lifting the Veil. Hyderabad: Sangam Books. 
 
Engineer, Asghar Ali 2002. Gujarat Riots in the Light of the History of Communal Violence, 
Economic and Political Weekly 37 (50): 5047-54. 
 
Fearon, James D. 2010. Governance and Civil War Onset. Background Paper for the WDR 
2011, edited by World Bank. World Bank: Washington D.C. 
 
Fukuyama, Francis 1996. Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity. New York: 
Free Press. 
 
Fukuyama, Francis 2005. State-Building: Governance and World Order in the Twenty-First 
Century. London: Profile Books. 
 
Gera, Nina 2007. Structural Adjustment Programs in Pakistan: A Boon or a Bane? . Lahore: 
Lahore School of Economics Press. 
 
Ghani, Jawaid Abdul and Jamshed Hassan Khan 2004. Network Relationships and Asset 
Specificity in Pakistan's Automotive Industry, Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy 9 (1): 84-
100. 
 
GoP, Government of Pakistan 2011. Pakistan Banking sector. Consulate of Pakistan: Geneva. 
 
Gordon, Scott H. 1954. The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery, 
Journal of Political Economy 62 (2): 124-42. 
 
328 
 
Government of Bangladesh 2003. Bangladesh: A National Strategy for Economic Growth, 
Poverty Reduction and Social Development. General Economics Division, Planning 
Commission, Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh: Dhaka. 
 
Government of Bangladesh 2009. Steps Towards Change: National Strategy for Accelerated 
Poverty Reduction II - FY 2009-11. General Economics Division, Planning Commission, 
Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh: Dhaka. 
 
Government of Kazakhstan 2003. Innovative Industrial Development Strategy of the Republic 
of Kazakhstan. Astana. 
 
Greif, Avner and David Laitin 2004. A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change, American 
Political Science Review 98 (4): 14-48. 
 
 
 
 
 
Gujarat, Government of 2013b. Vibrant Gujarat 2013, Manufacturing Sector Profile. 
Gandhinagar. 
 
Hansen, Thomas Blom 2000. Predicaments of Secularism: Muslim Identities and Politics in 
Mumbai, The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 6 (2): 255-72. 
 
Haqqani, Hussain 2010. Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military: Carnegie Endowment. 
 
Haque, Nadeem Ul 2000. Beyond Planning and Mercantilism: 
An Evaluation of Pakistan’s Growth Strategy, The Pakistan Development Review 
 45 (1): 3-48. 
 
 
 
Harris-White, Barbara 2004. Nutrition and Its Politics in Tamil Nadu, South Asia Research 24 
(51): 51-71. 
 
Harriss-White, Barbara and Gordon White 1996. Liberalization and the New Corruption, IDS 
Bulletin 27 (2): 1-5. 
 
Hasan, Mushirul (ed.) 1993. India's Partition: Process, Strategy and Mobilization. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Heilmann, Sebastian 2011. Policy-Making through Experimentation: The Formation of a 
Distinctive Policy Process, in Heilmann, Sebastian and Elizabeth J Perry (eds) Mao's Invisible 
Hand: The Political Foundations of Adaptive Governance in China, Vol. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press. 
 
Hermes, Niels and Robert Lensink 2001. Changing the Conditions for Development Aid: A 
New Paradigm?, The Journal of Development Studies 37 (6): 1-16. 
 
Husain, Ishrat 2007. Pakistan’s Investment Scenario and Capital Markets 
 Institute of Business Administration: Karachi. 
329 
 
 
Husain, Ishrat 2010. Pakistan's Growth Experience: 1947-2007, Business Review 5 (2): 11-33. 
 
IBEF, Indian Brand Equity Foundation 2008. Tamil Nadu. 
 
IBEF, Indian Brand Equity Foundation and ICRA 2008. Tamil Nadu. 
 
Iqbal, Muhammad Shahzad, Faiz. M Shaikh and Mahmood Babak 2010. Development of 
Textile Industrial Clusters in Pakistan, Asian Social Science 6 (11). 
 
Islam, Anisul 1992. Foreign Aid and Economic Growth: An Econometric Study of Bangladesh, 
Applied Economics 24 (5): 541-44. 
 
Jaffrelot, Christophe 2008. Gujarat: The Meaning of Modi's Victory, Economic and Political 
Weekly 43 (15): 12-17. 
 
Jaffrelot, Christophe (ed.) 2002. Pakistan : nationalism without a nation. London: Zed Books. 
 
Jalal, Ayesha 1985. The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for 
Pakistan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Jalal, Ayesha 1990. The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan's Political Economy of 
Defence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Jalal, Ayesha 1995a. Conjuring Pakistan: History as Official Imagining, International Journal of 
Middle East Studies 27 (1): 73-89. 
 
Jalal, Ayesha 1995b. Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia: A Comparative and 
Historical Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Jalal, Ayesha and Anil Seal 1981. Alternative to Partition: Muslim Politics Between the Wars, 
Modern Asian Studies 15 (3): 415-54. 
 
Jenkins, Rob 2000. Democratic Politics and Economic Reform in India. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
John, Jonathan Di and James Putzel 2009. Political Settlements 
Issues Paper. Governance and Social Development Resource Centre  
 
Johnson, Chalmers 1982. MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy 
1925-1975. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
 
Kalecki, Michal 1976. Observations on Social and Economic Aspects of Intermediate Regimes, 
in Kalecki, Michal (ed.) Essays on the Developing Economies, Brighton: The Harvester Press. 
 
Kang, David C 2002. The Puzzle and the Theory Crony Capitalism: Corruption and 
Development in South Korea and the Philippines, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Karim, Zahurul, Shahidul Huque Khan, Md. Golam Hussain, Zulfiqar Ali and Mosharraf 
Hossain 2010. Growth and Development: Potential of Livestock and Fisheries in Bangladesh. 
330 
 
Bangladesh Food Security Investment Forum, 26-27 May 2010. Dhaka. Available HTTP: 
<http://bids.org.bd/ifpri/growth-dev4.pdf> 
 
Kathuria, Vinish, Rajesh SN Raj and Kunal Sen 2010. Organised versus Unorganised 
Manufacturing Performance in the Post-Reform Period,  45 (24): 55-64. 
 
Kauffman, Daniel, Aart Kraay and Pablo Zoido-Lobatón 1999. Governance Matters. World 
Bank Policy Working Paper  No. 2196. World Bank: Washington. 
 
Keefer, Philip and Stephen Knack 2007. Boondoggles, Rent-Seeking and Political Checks and 
Balances: Public Investment under Unaccountable Governments, Review of Economics and 
Statistics 89 (3): 566-72. 
 
Kemal, A. R. 2007. Industrial Competitiveness of Pakistan (2000-10) in Economic Reforms: 
The Road Ahead (2007 -2010), Lahore Journal of Economics September: 17-30. 
 
Khan Ali Ejaz Rana, Nawaz Atif Muhammad, Hussain Altaf 2011. European Journal of 
Economics, Finance and Administrative Sciences,  (29). 
 
Khan, Mushtaq Husain 1995. State Failure in Weak States: A Critique of New Institutionalist 
Explanations, in Harriss, John, Janet Hunter and Colin M. Lewis (eds) The New Institutional 
Economics and Third World Development, London: Routledge. 
 
Khan, Mushtaq Husain 1998. Patron-Client Networks and the Economic Effects of Corruption 
in Asia, European Journal of Development Research June 10 (1): 15-39. 
 
Khan, Mushtaq Husain 1999. The Political Economy of Industrial Policy in Pakistan 1947-1971. 
SOAS Department of Economics Working Paper No. 98, School of Oriental and African 
Studies, University of London. 
 
Khan, Mushtaq Husain 2000a. Rent-seeking as Process, in Khan, Mushtaq H. and K.S. Jomo 
(eds) Rents, Rent-Seeking and Economic Development: Theory and Evidence in Asia, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Khan, Mushtaq Husain 2000b. Rents, Efficiency and Growth, in Khan, Mushtaq H. and K.S. 
Jomo (eds) Rents, Rent-Seeking and Economic Development: Theory and Evidence in Asia, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Khan, Mushtaq Husain 2002a. Corruption and Governance in Early Capitalism: World Bank 
Strategies and their Limitations, in Pincus, Jonathan and Jeffrey Winters (eds) Reinventing 
the World Bank, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
 
Khan, Mushtaq Husain 2002b. Fundamental Tensions in the Democratic Compromise, New 
Political Economy 7 (2): 275-77. 
 
Khan, Mushtaq Husain 2004a. Power, Property Rights and the Issue of Land Reform: A 
General Case Illustrated with Reference to Bangladesh, Journal of Agrarian Change January 
and April 4 (1-2): 73-106. 
 
Khan, Mushtaq Husain 2004b. State Failure in Developing Countries and Strategies of 
Institutional Reform, in Tungodden, Bertil, Nicholas Stern and Ivar Kolstad (eds) Annual 
331 
 
World Bank Conference on Development Economics Europe (2003): Toward Pro-Poor Policies: 
Aid Institutions and Globalization, Proceedings of Annual World Bank Conference on 
Development Economics, Oxford: Oxford University Press and World Bank. Available HTTP: 
<http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDS_IBank_Servlet?pcont=details&eid=000160016_200405181
62841> 
 
Khan, Mushtaq Husain 2004c. Strategies for State-Led Social Transformation: Rent-
Management, Technology Acquisition and Long-Term Growth, in Asian Development Bank 
and Vietnam Development Forum (eds) Which Institutions are Critical to Sustain Long-Term 
Growth in Vietnam?, Hanoi: Asian Development Bank. 
 
Khan, Mushtaq Husain 2005. The Capitalist Transformation, in Jomo, K.S. and Erik S. Reinert 
(eds) Development Economics: How Schools of Economic Thought Have Addressed 
Development, London and New Delhi: Zed Press and Tulika. 
 
Khan, Mushtaq Husain 2006a. Corruption and Governance, in Jomo, K.S. and Ben Fine (eds) 
The New Development Economics, London/New Delhi: Zed Press/Tulika. 
 
Khan, Mushtaq Husain 2006b. Determinants of Corruption in Developing Countries: the 
Limits of Conventional Economic Analysis, in Rose-Ackerman, Susan (ed.) International 
Handbook on the Economics of Corruption, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
 
Khan, Mushtaq Husain 2007. Governance, Economic Growth and Development since the 
1960s, in Ocampo, José Antonio, K.S. Jomo and Rob Vos (eds) Growth Divergences: 
Explaining Differences in Economic Performance, Hyderabad, London and Penang: Orient 
Longman, Zed Books and Third World Network. Available HTTP: 
<http://www.un.org/esa/desa/papers/2007/wp54_2007.pdf> 
 
Khan, Mushtaq Husain 2008a. Governance and Development: The Perspective of Growth-
Enhancing Governance, in GRIPS Development Forum (ed.) Diversity and Complementarity in 
Development Aid: East Asian Lessons for African Growth, Tokyo: National Graduate Institute 
for Policy Studies. Available HTTP: <http://mercury.soas.ac.uk/users/mk17/Docs/GRIPS.pdf> 
 
Khan, Mushtaq Husain 2008b. Vulnerabilities in Market-Led Growth Strategies and 
Challenges for Governance. Research Paper Series on Governance for Growth. School of 
Oriental and African Studies, University of London: London. Available HTTP: 
<http://mercury.soas.ac.uk/users/mk17/Docs/Vulnerabilities%20in%20Market%20Led%20G
rowth%20Strategies%202.doc> 
 
Khan, Mushtaq Husain 2009a. Governance Capabilities and the Property Rights Transition in 
Developing Countries. Research Paper Series on Governance for Growth. School of Oriental 
and African Studies, University of London: London. Available HTTP: 
<http://mercury.soas.ac.uk/users/mk17/Docs/Property%20Transitions%20internet.pdf> 
 
Khan, Mushtaq Husain 2009b. Learning, Technology Acquisition and Governance Challenges 
in Developing Countries. Research Paper Series on Governance for Growth. School of 
Oriental and African Studies, University of London: London. Available HTTP: 
<http://mercury.soas.ac.uk/users/mk17/Docs/Learning%20and%20Technology%20Acquisiti
on%20internet.pdf> 
 
332 
 
Khan, Mushtaq Husain 2009c. Pro-Growth Anti-Corruption and Governance Reforms for Viet 
Nam: Lessons from East Asia. Public Administration Reform and Anti-Corruption Policy 
Discussion Papers. United Nations Development Programme: Ha Noi. Available HTTP: 
<http://www.vn.undp.org/content/dam/vietnam/docs/Publications/21815_19026_2812200
9_FINAL_10122009_Vietnam_Anti-Corruption_Governance_MushtaqHKhan_English_.pdf> 
 
Khan, Mushtaq Husain 2010a. Bangladesh: Partitions, Nationalisms and Legacies for State-
Building. SOAS University of London: London. Available HTTP: 
<http://mercury.soas.ac.uk/users/mk17/Docs/Bangladesh_paper.pdf> 
 
Khan, Mushtaq Husain 2010b. Political Settlements and the Governance of Growth-
Enhancing Institutions. Research Paper Series on Governance for Growth. School of Oriental 
and African Studies, University of London: London. Available HTTP: 
<http://mercury.soas.ac.uk/users/mk17/Docs/Political%20Settlements%20internet.pdf> 
 
Khan, Mushtaq Husain 2011a. Governance, Growth and Poverty Reduction, in Sundaram, 
Jomo Kwame and Anis  Chowdhury (eds) Poor Poverty: The Impoverishment of Analysis, 
Measurement and Policies, London: Bloomsbury Academic. 
 
Khan, Mushtaq Husain 2011b. India's Evolving Political Settlement and the Challenges of 
Sustaining Development. SOAS University of London. London. Available HTTP: 
<http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/12844/> 
 
Khan, Mushtaq Husain 2011c. India’s Evolving Political Settlement and the Challenges of 
Sustaining Development  
 
Khan, Mushtaq Husain 2012a. Bangladesh: Economic Growth in a Vulnerable Limited Access 
Order, in North, Douglass, John Wallis, Steven Webb and Barry Weingast (eds) In the Shadow 
of Violence: The Problem of Development for Limited Access Order Societies, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. Available HTTP: 
<http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/11680/1/Bangladesh_LAO.pdf> 
 
Khan, Mushtaq Husain 2012b. Beyond Good Governance: An Agenda for Developmental 
Governance, in Sundaram, Jomo Kwame and Anis Chowdhury (eds) Is Good Governance 
Good for Development?, London: Bloomsbury Academic. 
 
Khan, Mushtaq Husain 2012c. Governance and Growth: History, Ideology and Methods of 
Proof, in Noman, Akbar, Kwesi Botchwey, Howard Stein and Joseph Stiglitz (eds) Good 
Growth and Governance for Africa: Rethinking Development Strategies, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Khan, Mushtaq Husain 2012d. The Political Economy of Inclusive Growth, in de Mello, Luiz 
and Mark A. Dutz (eds) Promoting Inclusive Growth: Challenges and Policies, Paris: OECD 
Publishing. Available HTTP: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264168305-3-en> 
 
Khan, Mushtaq Husain 2012e. The Political Settlement and its Evolution in Bangladesh. SOAS: 
London. 
 
Khan, Mushtaq Husain 2012f. The Political Settlement, Growth and Technical Progress in 
Bangladesh. SOAS, University of London: 
 
333 
 
Khan, Mushtaq Husain 2013a. The Political Settlement, Growth and Technical Progress in 
Bangladesh. DIIS Working Paper  No. 2013:01. Danish Institute for International Studies: 
Copenhagen. Available HTTP: <http://www.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/WP2013/WP2013-
01.Bangladesh%20-%20Mushtaq-H-Khan.pdf> 
 
Khan, Mushtaq Husain 2013b. Political Settlements and the Design of Technology Policy, in 
Stiglitz, Joseph, Justin Yifu Lin and Ebrahim Patel (eds) The Industrial Policy Revolution II. 
Africa in the Twenty-First Century, London: Palgrave. 
 
Khan, Mushtaq Husain 2013c. Technology Policies and Learning with Imperfect Governance, 
in Stiglitz, Joseph and Justin Yifu Lin (eds) The Industrial Policy Revolution I. The Role of 
Government Beyond Ideology, London: Palgrave. 
 
Khan, Safdar Ullah 2006. Macro Determinants of Total Factor Productivity in Pakistan. SBP 
Working Paper Series. State Bank of Pakistan: 
 
Khan, Shadnaz no date. Aid Flow to Bangladesh and the Question of Accountability of CSOs 
at National Level to the People They Serve. Unnayan Onneshan: Dhaka. 
 
Khan, Tariq Amin 2000. Economy, Society and the State in Pakistan, Contemporary South 
Asia 9 (2): 181-95. 
 
Khwaja, Ijaz Asim and Atif Mian Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms? Rent 
Provision in an Emerging Financial Market, The Quarterly Journal of Economics November 
2005: 1371-411. 
 
Knack, Stephen and Philip Keefer 1995. Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-
Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures, Economics and Politics 7 (3): 207-27. 
 
Kochchar, Kalpana, Utsav Kumar, Raghuram Rajan, Arvind Subramanian and Ioannis 
Tokatlidis 2006. India's Pattern of Development: What Happened, What Follows? IMF 
Working Paper Series  No. WP/06/02. International Monetary Fund: Washington DC. 
Available HTTP: <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2006/wp0622.pdf> 
 
Kohli, Atul 1994. Where Do High Growth Political Economies Come From? The Japanese 
Lineage of Korea’s “Developmental State”, World Development 22 (9): 1269-93. 
 
Kohli, Atul 1998. Can Democracies Accommodate Ethnic Nationalism? The Rise and Decline 
of Self-Determination Movements in India, in Basu, Amrita and Atul Kohli (eds) Community 
Conflicts and the State in India, Wedding: Oxford University Press. 
 
Kohli, Atul 2006a. Politics of Economic Growth in India, 1980-2005 Part I: The 1980s 
Economic and Political Weekly 41 (13): 1251-59. 
 
Kohli, Atul 2006b. Politics of Economic Growth in India, 1980-2005, Part II: The 1990s and 
Beyond, Economic and Political Weekly 41 (14): 1361-70. 
 
Kohli, Atul 2012. Poverty among Plenty in the New India, New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
KPMG 2007. Accelerating growth in Gujarat: A discussion note 
334 
 
 Mumbai. 
 
Krueger, Anne O. 1974. The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, American 
Economic Review 64 (3): 291-303. 
 
Kumar, Surender 2006. A Decomposition of Total Factor Productivity Growth : A Regional 
Analysis of Indian Industrial Manufacturing Growth. National Institute of Public Finance and 
Policy: New Delhi. 
 
Lal, Deepak 2011. India’s Post-Liberalisation Blues, World Economics 12 (4): 1-12. 
 
Lamb, Helen B 1958. The Indian Merchant, The Journal of American Folklore 71 (281): 231-40. 
 
LaPorte, Robert Jr 1997. Pakistan in 1996: Starting Over Again, Asian Survey 37 (2): 118-25. 
 
Lee, Yue Man, Sarah Pinto, Rupert Simons, Nina Stochniol, Clara Zverina 2008. The Gujarat 
Diamond Cluster: Is It Forever? Microeconomics of Competitiveness. 
 
Lieven, Anatol 2011. Pakistan: A Hard Country. London: Allen Lane. 
 
Lobo, Lancy 2002. Adivasis, Hindutva and Post-Godhra Riots in Gujarat, Economic and 
Political Weekly 37 (48): 4844-49. 
 
Mahadevia, Darshini 2005. From Stealth to Aggression: Economic Reforms and Communal 
Politics in Gujarat, in Mooij, Jos (ed.) The Politics of Economic Reforms in India, New Delhi: 
Sage Publications. 
 
Caravan 2010. NREGA’s Reality Check: Can India’s Most Ambitious Legislation Lackle Poverty? 
, (by Mahboob, Jeelani)  10/05/2010  Available HTTP: 
<http://caravanmagazine.in/reportage/nrega%E2%80%99s-reality-check?page=0,0> 
 
Mahmood Tahir, Rauf A Shahnaz, Ahmad Khalil Hafiz 2009. Public and External Debt 
Sustainability in Pakistan (1970s – 2000s), Pakistan Economic and Social Review 47 (2): 243-
67. 
 
Malhotra, Gunjan 2008. Structure and Performance of Industries in Gujarat, Journal of 
Scientific and Industrial Research 67: 708-16. 
 
Maniruzzaman, Talukder 1980. The Bangladesh Revolution and its Aftermath. Dhaka: 
University Press Limited. 
 
Manor, James 2010. Beyond Clientelism: Digvijay Singh’s Participatory, Pro-Poor Strategy in 
Madhya Pradesh, in Price, P and A Ruud (eds) Power and Influence in India, New Delhi: 
Routledge. 
 
Markussen, Thomas 2010. Inequality and Political Clientelism: Evidence from South India. 
Discussion Papers, Department of Economics. University of Copenhagen: 
 
Marx, Karl 1996. The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, in Carver, Terrell (ed.) Karl 
Marx: Later Political Writings, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
335 
 
Massilano, Callo, Siddhartha Mitra and Purnima Purohit 2009. States-Business Relations in 
Indian States. Improving Institutions for Pro Poor Growth (IPPG). Available HTTP: 
<http://www.ippg.org.uk/papers/dp25.pdf> 
 
Mauro, Paolo 1995. Corruption and Growth, Quarterly Journal of Economics 110 (3): 681-712. 
 
Mauro, Paolo 1996. The Effects of Corruption on Growth, Investment and Government 
Expenditure. Working Paper WP/96/98 Policy Development and Review Department. 
International Monetary Fund: Washington. 
 
McCartney, Matthew 2011. Pakistan, Growth, Dependency, and Crisis, The Lahore Journal of 
Economics 16 (SE): 71-94. 
 
Menon, Sudha Venu 2008. Drivers of Economic Growth in Gujarat. Munich Personal RePEc 
Archive: 
 
Misra, B.B. 1961. The Indian Middle Classes: Their Growth in Modern Times. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Mohommad, Adil. 2010. Manufacturing Sector Productivity in India: all india trends, Regional 
Patterns, and Nnetwork Externalities from Infrastructure on Regional Growth, Department of 
Economics, University of Maryland 
 
Mukherjee, Atri 2011. Regional Inequality in Foreign Direct Investment Flows to India: The 
Problem and the Prospects. Reserve Bank of India Occasional Papers. Reserve Bank of India: 
 
Mukta, Parita 2002. On the Political Culture of Authoritarianism in Bremen, Jan, Ghanshyam 
Shah, Mario Rutten (ed.) Development and Deprivation in Gujarat, New Delhi: Sage 
Publications. 
 
Nadvi, Khalid 1999. Collective Efficiency and Collective Failure: The Response of the Sialkot 
Surgical Instrument Cluster to Global Quality Pressures, World Development 27 (8): 1605-26. 
 
Naiman, Robert and Neil Watkins 1999. A Survey of the Impacts of IMF Structural Adjustment 
in Africa:  
Growth, Social Spending, and Debt Relief. Centre for Economic and Policy Research: 
Washington DC. 
 
National Institute of Statistics 2012. Economic Census of Cambodia 2011. National Report on 
Final Census Results. Ministry of Planning, Cambodia. Supported by Government of Japan 
and Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA): Phnom Penh. 
 
Nayyar, Gaurav 2013. Inside the Black Box of Services: Evidence from India, Cambridge 
Journal of Economics 37: 143–70. 
 
Niskanen, William A. 1973. Bureaucracy: Servant or Master? London: Institute of Economic 
Affairs. 
 
North, Douglass C 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
336 
 
 
 
North, Douglass C. 1981. Structure and Change in Economic History. New York: W.W. Norton. 
 
North, Douglass C. 1995. The New Institutional Economics and Development, in Harriss, John, 
Janet Hunter and Colin Lewis (eds) The New Institutional Economics and Third World 
Development, London: Routledge. 
 
North, Douglass C., John J. Wallis, Steven B. Webb and Barry R. Weingast 2007. Limited 
Access Orders in the Developing World: A New Approach to the Problem of Development. 
World Bank Policy Research Paper  No. 4359. World Bank: Washington DC. 
 
North, Douglass C., John J. Wallis and Barry R. Weingast 2009. Violence and Social Orders: A 
Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Nosheen, Misbah, Javed Iqbal and Aisha Bibi Sadiqa 2010. The Structural Adjustment and 
Socioeconomic Performance of Pakistan, European Journal of Economics, Finance and 
Administrative Sciences (25). 
 
NSDC, National Skill Development Corporation 2008. Human Resource and Skill 
Requirements in the Leather & Leather Goods: Study on Mapping of Human Resource Skill 
Gaps in 
India till 2022. 
 
Odell, John S 2001. Case Study Methods in International Political Economy, International 
Studies Perspectives 2: 161-76. 
 
OECD 2013. Statistics: Aid Disbursements to Countries and Regions. The Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD): Paris. Available HTTP: 
<http://www.oecd.org/statistics/> 
 
Okuno-Fujiwara, Masahiro 1997. Toward a Comparative Institutional Analysis of the 
Government-Business Relationship, in Aoki, Masahiko, Hyung-Ki Kim and Masahiro Okuno-
Fujiwara (eds) The Role of Government in East Asian Economic Development: Comparative 
Institutional Analysis, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
Olson, Mancur 1965. The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press. 
 
Olson, Mancur 1982. The Rise and Decline of Nations. London: Yale University Press. 
 
Olson, Mancur 2000. Dictatorship, Democracy and Development, in Olson, Mancur and Satu 
Kähkönen (eds) A Not-so-Dismal Science: A Broader View of Economies and Societies, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Osella, Fillipo, Osella, Caroline 2008. “I am Gulf”: The production of cosmopolitanism among 
the Koyas of Kozhikode, Kerala, in Simpson, Edward, Kresse, Kai (ed.) Struggling with History: 
Islam and Cosmopolitanism in the Western Indian Ocean, New York: Columbia University 
Press. 
 
337 
 
Oxford, Group Business 2007. Emerging Jordan. 
 
Palshikar, Suhas 2004. Majoritarian Middle Ground?, Economic and Political Weekly 39 (51): 
5426-30. 
 
PAMA, Pakistan Automotive Manufacturers Association 2013. Sales and Production. Karachi. 
 
Panagariya, Arvind 2005. The Triumph of India's Market Reforms, the Record of the 1980s 
and 1990s. Policy Analysis  No. 554. CATO Institute: Washington DC. 
 
Pandian, MSS 1989. Culture and Subaltern Consciousness: An Aspect of MGR Phenomenon, 
Economic and Political Weekly 24 (30): PE62-PE68. 
 
Pandian, MSS 2000. Dalit Assertion in Tamil Nadu, Journal of Indian School of Political 
Economy 12 (3&4): 501-17. 
 
Papanek, Gustav F. 1965. Growth and Structural Change in Pakistan's Manufacturing 
Industry: A Comment, Pakistan Development Review 5 (4): 659-62. 
 
Papanek, Gustav F. 1967. Pakistan's Development - Social Goals and Private Incentives. 
Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press. 
 
Paranjpe, Jyoti 1988. Inducing Industrial Locations in Backward regions: A Study of 
Maharashtra and Gujarat, Economic and Political Weekly 23 (7): 312-30. 
 
Pasha, Hafiz A, Aisha Ghaus and Kalim Hyder 2002. The Slowing Down of the Growth of Total 
Factor Productivity in Pakistan. Research Report 44. Social Policy and Development Centre  
 
Patel, Girish 2002. Narendra Modi’s One-day Cricket: What and Why, Economic and Political 
Weekly 37 (48): 4826–37. 
 
Patel, Sujata 1988. Legitimacy Crisis and Growing Authoritarianism, Economic and Political 
Weekly 23 (19): 946-48. 
 
Pinto, Stany 1995. Communalisation of Tribals in South Gujarat, Economic and Political 
Weekly 30 (39): 2416-19. 
 
Power, John H. 1963. Industrialization in Pakistan: A case of frustrated take-off?, Pakistan 
Institute of Development Economics 3 (2): 191-207. 
 
 
 
PRGMEA, Pakistan Readymade Garments Manufacturers & Exporters Association 2010. 
Pakistan's Garment Sector: An Overview. 
 
 
 
Quazi, Rahim M. 2005. Effects of Foreign Aid on GDP Growth and Fiscal Behavior: An 
Econometric Case Study of Bangladesh, The Journal of Developing Areas 38 (2): 95-117. 
 
338 
 
Rajan, Irudaya S and A Jayakumar 1992. Impact of Noon Meal Programme on Primary 
Education: An Exploratory Study in Tamil Nadu, Economic and Political Weekly 27 (43/44): 
2372-80. 
 
Rajan, Raghuram 2006. India: The Past and its Future, Asian Development Review 23 (1): 36-
52. Available HTTP: < http://www.adb.org/Documents/Periodicals/ADR/pdf/ADR-Vol23-2-
Rajan.pdf> 
 
The Economic Times 2013. The Other Big 'A', (by Rajshekhar, M)  15/09/2013  
 
Ramaswamy, Sumathy 1993. En /gendering Language: The Poetics of Tamil Identity, Society 
for Comparative Study of Society and History 35 (4): 683-725. 
 
The Telegraph 2005. The Ungainly Right, (by Rangarajan, Mahesh)  Available HTTP: 
<http://www.telegraphindia.com/1050418/asp/opinion/story_4619131.asp> 
 
Rashid, Jamil and Hassan Gardezi 1983. Independent Pakistan: Its Political Economy, in 
Gardezi, Hassan and Jamil Rashid (eds) Pakistan: The Roots of Dictatorship, London: Zed 
Press. 
 
Rauch, James E. and Peter B. Evans 2000. Bureaucratic Structure and Bureaucratic 
Performance in Less Developed Countries, Journal of Public Economics 75 (1): 49-71. 
 
RBI 2011. FDI synopsis on Chennai. Reserve Bank of India: 
 
Redelet S, J. Sachs 1998. Rdelet, S. and J. Sachs, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1 
(1074). 
 
Ritzen, Jo, William Easterly and Michael Woolcock 2000. On "Good" Politicians and "Bad" 
Policies: Social Cohesion, Institutions, and Growth. World Bank: Washington DC. Available 
HTTP: <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWBIGOVANTCOR/Resources/wps2448.pdf> 
 
Rizvi, Hassan Askari 2000. Military and Politics in Pakistan: 1947-1997. Lahore: Sang-e-Meel 
Publications. 
 
Rizvi, Hassan Askari 2001. The Military, in Weiss, Anita M and Zulfiqar S Gilani (eds) Power 
and Civil Society in Pakistan, New York Oxford University Press. 
 
Rizvi, Hassan Askari 2003. Military, State and Security in Pakistan. Lahore: Sang-e-Meel 
Publications. 
 
Robinson, James A. 2010. The Political Economy of Institutions and Resources, in Leal, 
Donald R. (ed.) The Political Economy of Natural Resource Use: Lessons for Fisheries Reform, 
Washington DC: The World Bank. 
 
Rodrik, Dani 2004. Industrial Policy for the Twenty-First Century. Draft Working Paper 
Available HTTP: <http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~drodrik/UNIDOSep.pdf> 
 
Rodrik, Dani 2007. One Economics, Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions and Economic 
Growth. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
339 
 
Rodrik, Dani 2008. Second-Best Institutions. NBER Working Paper 14050. Available HTTP: 
<http://www.nber.org/papers/w14050> 
 
Rodrik, Dani, Arvind Subramaniam and Francesco Trebbi 2004. Institutions Rule: The Primacy 
of Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic Development, Journal of 
Economic Growth 9 (2): 131-65. 
 
Rodrik, Dani and Arvind Subramanian 2005. From "Hindu Growth" to Productivity Surge: The 
Mystery of the Indian Growth Transition, IMF Staff Papers 52 (2): 193-228. 
 
Rosenstein-Rodan, Paul N. 1943. Problems of Industrialisation of Eastern and South-Eastern 
Europe, The Economic Journal 53 (210/211): 202-11. 
 
Rowthorn, Robert E. and John Wells 1987. De-Industrialization and Foreign Trade. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Roy, Asim 1993. The High Politics of India's Partition: The Revisionist Perspective, in Hasan, 
Mushirul (ed.) India's Partition: Process, Strategy and Mobilization, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Roy, Pallavi. 2008. Democracy, Politics and Industrial Growth: Comparative Performance of 
Maharashtra and West Bengal. MSc dissertation, Department of Development Studies, 
School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), London. 
 
Roy, Pallavi 2011. Growth in the Time of Clientelism: Tamil Nadu State in India. SOAS, 
University of London: London. 
 
Roy, Pallavi 2012. India’s Vulnerable Maturity: Experiences of Maharashtra and West Bengal, 
in North, Douglass. Wallis, J John. Webb, R Steve. Weingast, Barry. (ed.) In the Shadow of 
Violence Politics, Economics, and the Problems of Development, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
The Hindu 2013. Two out of three say UPA is corrupt, (by Rukmini, S)  23/07/2013  Available 
HTTP: <http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/two-out-of-three-say-upa-is-
corrupt/article4945558.ece> 
 
Sachs, Jeffrey, Nirupam Bajpai and Ananthi Ramiah 2002. Understanding Regional Economic 
Growth in India. Harvard University Working Paper Series  No. 88. Harvard University Center 
for International Development: Cambridge Mass. Available HTTP: 
<http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/CID/cidwp/088.pdf> 
 
Sastry, Ramaswamy K 1974. A Chronicle of the DMK Split, Economic and Political Weekly 9 
(13): 527+29-31. 
 
Sayeed, Asad. 1995. Political Alignments, the State and Industrial Policy in Pakistan:A 
Comparison of Performance in the 1960s and 1980s, Faculty of Economics and Politics, 
University of Cambridge, Cambridge. 
 
SBP, State Bank of Pakistan 2006. Issues in Sectoral Allocation of Credit. Karachi. 
 
340 
 
Schimmel, Annemarie 1980. Islam in the Indian Subcontinent, Handbook of Oriental Studies. 
Leiden: Brill. 
 
Schmidt, Steffan W., Laura Guasti, Carl H. Landé and James C. Scott (eds) 1977. Friends, 
Followers, and Factions. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
Schwecke, Sebastian 2011. New Cultural Identitarian Political Movements in Developing 
Societies: The Bharatiya Janata Party. New York: Routledge. 
 
Sen, Kunal 2007. Why Did the Elephant Start to Trot? India’s Growth Acceleration Re-
examined, Economic and Political Weekly 42 (43): 37-47. 
 
Sen, Kunal 2013. The Political Dynamics of Economic Growth, World Development 47: 71-86. 
 
Shah, Amita and OV Sajitha 2008. Poverty and Livelihood among Tribals in Gujarat: Status, 
Opportunities and Strategies. Working Paper No 187. Gujarat Institute of Development 
Research: 
 
Shah, Ghanshyam 1985. Caste, Class and Reservation, Economic and Political Weekly 20 (3): 
132-36. 
 
Shah, Ghanshyam 1994. The BJP and the Backward Castes in Gujarat, South Asia Bulletin 14 
(1): 57-65. 
 
Shah, Ghanshyam 2010. Beyond Caste Voting: Modasa, Gujarat Revisited, Economic and 
Political Weekly 45 (4): 54-61. 
 
 
 
Shani, Ornit 2005. The Rise of Hindu Nationalism in India: The Case Study of Ahmedabad in 
the 1980s, Modern Asian Studies 39 (4): 861-96. 
 
Shani, Ornit 2007. Communalism, Caste and Hindu Nationalism: The Violence in Gujarat. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Shapiro, Jacob N, Fair Christine and Rasul Bakhsh Rais 2012. Political Violence in Pakistan 
1988-2010: Patterns and Trends. Working Paper 12/0063. International Growth Centre: 
 
Sheth, Pravin N 1976. Patterns of Political Behaviour in Gujarat: Sahitya Mudranalaya. 
 
Shleifer, Andrei and Robert W Vishny 1993. Corruption, Quarterly Journal of Economics 108 
(3): 599-617. 
 
Siddiqa, Ayesha 2007. Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan's Military Economy. London: Pluto Press. 
 
Sinha, Aseema 2003. Rethinking the Developmental State Model: Divided Leviathan and 
Subnational Comparisons in India, Comparative Politics 35 (4): 459-76. 
 
Sinha, Aseema 2004a. The Changing Political Economy of Federalism in India: A Historical 
Institutionalist Approach, India Review 3 (1): 25-63. 
 
341 
 
Sinha, Aseema 2004b. Ideas, Interests, and Institutions in Policy Change A Comparison of 
West Bengal and Gujarat, in Jenkins, Rob (ed.) Comparing Politics Across India’s States: Case 
Studies of Democracy in Practice 
 
Sinha, Aseema 2005. The Regional Roots of Developmental Politics in India: A Divided 
Leviathan. Indiana: Indiana University Press. 
 
Sobhan, Rehman (ed.) 1990. From Aid Dependence to Self-Reliance: Development Options for 
Bangladesh. Dhaka: Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies. 
 
Srinivasan, TN and Suresh D Tendulkar 2003. Reintegrating India with the World Economy. 
Washington DC: Peterson Instittute. 
 
 
 
Stein, Burton 1998. A History of India: Blackwell. 
 
Stiglitz, Joseph E. 1989. On the Economic Role of the State, in Heertje, Arnold (ed.) The 
Economic Role of the State, Amsterdam: Bank Insinger de Beaufort NV. 
 
Stiglitz, Joseph E. 1998. More Instruments and Broader Goals:Moving Toward the Post-
Washington Consensus. Paper presented at Villa Borsig Workshop Series 1998 
 
Streefkerk, Hein 1997. Gujarati Entrepreneurship: Historical Continuity against Changing 
Perspectives, Economic and Political Weekly 32 (8): M2-M10. 
 
Streefkerk, Hein 1985. Industrial Transition in Rural India: Artisan, Traders and Tribals in 
South Gujarat. Mumbai: Popular Prakashan. 
 
Subramanian, Lakshmi 1991. The Eighteenth-Century Social Order in Surat: A Reply and an 
Excursus on the Riots of 1788 and 1795, Modern Asian Studies 25 (2): 321-65. 
 
Subramanian, Lakshmi 1996. Indigenous Capital and Imperial Expansion: Bombay, Surat and 
the West Coast. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. 
 
Subramanian, N 1999. Ethnicity and Populist Mobilization : Political Parties, Citizens, and 
Democracy in South India. New delhi: Oxford University Press. 
 
Swamy, AR 1998. Parties, Political Identities and the Absence of Mass Political Violence in 
South India, in Basu, Amrita and Atul Kohli (eds) Community, Conflicts and the State in India, 
New Delhi: Oxford University Press. 
 
Syed, Anwar Ali Shah G, Lawal Muhammad Anka, Syed Asad Raza Abidi and FM Shaikh 2012. 
Privatisation and Reform Programme of Public Sector Enterprises in Pakistan 1960–2004, 
Asian Social Science 8 (12): 171-80. 
 
Talbot, Ian 2005. Pakistan: A Modern History. London: Hurst and Company. 
 
Tewari, Meenu 2001. Engaging the New Global Interlocutors: Foreign Direct Investment and 
the Transformation of Tamil Nadu’s Automotive Supply Base. Centre for International 
342 
 
Development, Harvard University's Research and Advisory Project for the Tamil Nadu 
Government: 
 
Thapar, Romila 1996. The Tyranny of Labels, Social Scientist 24 (9): 3-23. 
 
Thapar, Romila 2005. Somanatha: The Many Voices of a History: Penguin. 
 
Thapar, Romila 2007. Secularism, History and Contemporary Politics in India in Dingwaney 
Needham, Anuradha, Rajeshwari Sunder Rajan (ed.) The Crisis of Secularism in India, Durham: 
Duke University Press. 
 
2012. NREGA Funding May be Stopped if no Redressal: Jairam Ramesh, (by Times, Economic)  
Available HTTP: <http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-09-
07/news/33677092_1_nrega-funds-complaint-cell-rural-employment> 
 
TOI 2013. CAG indicts Narendra Modi govt for "undue" favours to corporates: Times of India. 
Available HTTP: <http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2013-04-
04/india/38276743_1_adani-power-ltd-reliance-industries-ltd-undue-benefit> 
 
Toufique, Kazi Ali. 1996. Property Rights and the Issue of Power: The Case of Inland Fisheries 
in Bangladesh. PhD dissertation, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge, Cambridge. 
 
 
 
Veermani, C and Bishwanath Goldar 2005. Manufacturing Productivity in Indian States: Does 
Investment Climate Matter?, Economic and Political Weekly 40 (24): 2413-20. 
 
Virmani, Arvind 2004. Sources of India's Economic Growth: Trends in Total Factor 
Productivity. Working Paper  No. 131. Indian Council for Research on International Economic 
Relations: New Delhi. 
 
Wade, Robert 1985. The Market for Public Office: Why the Indian State is not Better at 
Development, World Development 13 (4): 467-97. 
 
Wade, Robert 1990. Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in 
East Asian Industrialization. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Waheed, Abdul 2010. Financial Sector Reforms and Economic Growth: A Time Series Data 
Analysis for Pakistan. Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization: 
 
Walter, Barbara F. 2010. Conflict Relapse and the Sustainability of Post-Conflict Peace. 
Background Paper for the WDR 2011, edited by World Bank. World Bank: Washington DC. 
 
 
 
WB, World Bank 2011. The 2011 World Development Report: Conflict, Security and 
Development. World Bank: Washington DC. 
 
Weber, Max 1968. Economy and Society. 3 vols. New York: Bedminster Press. 
 
343 
 
White, Nicholas J 2004. The Beginnings of Crony Capitalism: Business, Politics and Economic 
Development in Malaysia, c. 1955–70 1, Modern Asian Studies 38 (2): 389-417. 
 
White, Sarah C. 1999. NGOs, Civil Society and the State in Bangladesh: The Politics of 
Representing the Poor, Development and Change 30: 307-26. 
 
Wilkinson, Steven I 2007. Explaining Changing Patterns of Party-Voter Linkages in India, in 
Kitschelt, H and SI Wilkinson (eds) Patrons, Clients and Politics: Patterns of Democratic 
Accountability and Political Competition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Williamson, John 1990. What Washington Means by Policy Reform, in Williamson, John (ed.) 
Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened?, Washington DC: Peterson Institute. 
 
Williamson, Oliver E. 1985. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York: Free Press. 
 
Williamson, Oliver E. 1998. Transactions Costs: How it Works, Where is it Headed, De 
Economist 146 (1). 
 
Williamson, Oliver E. 2000. The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead, 
Journal of Economic Literature 38 (3): 595-613. 
 
Woo-Cumings, Meredith (ed.) 1999. The Developmental State. Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press. 
 
Wood, Ellen Meiksins 2002. The Origins of Capitalism: A Longer View. London: Verso. 
 
Wood, John R 1987. Reservations in Doubt: The Backlash against Affirmative Action in 
Gujarat, India, Pacific Affairs 60 (3): 408-30. 
 
World Bank 1993. The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy. Oxford 
University Press: Oxford. 
 
World Bank 2007. Bangladesh: Strategy for Sustained Growth. Bangladesh Development 
Series  No. 18. The World Bank, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit: Dhaka. 
 
World Bank 2012a. World Development Indicators Online, ESDS: Manchester: Accessed 
through Economic and Social Data Service. 
 
World Bank 2012b. World Development Indicators Online. Accessed through Economic and 
Social Data Service. ESDS: Manchester. 
 
World Bank 2013. World Development Indicators Dataset. The World Bank: Washington. 
 
Wyatt, Andrew 2002. New Alignments in South Indian Politics: The 2001 Assembly Elections 
in Tamil Nadu, Asian Survey 45 (2): 733-53. 
 
Wyatt, Andrew 2013. Combining Clientelist and Programmatic Politics in Tamil Nadu, South 
India, Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 51 (1): 27-55. 
 
Zaidi, S Akbar 1999. Issues in Pakistan's Economy. Karachi: Oxford University Press. 
 
344 
 
Zaidi, S Akbar 2005. State, Military and Social Transition: Improbable Future of Democracy in 
Pakistan, Economic and Political Weekly 40 (49): 5173-81. 
 
 
  
  
345 
 
Appendix 
 
List of People Interviewed 
 
A Member of Parliament who wishes to remain anonymous 
A senior police officer in Chennai who wishes to remain anonymous 
A senior national level journalist from the English print media who wishes to remain 
anonymous 
A leading Indian industrialist with interests in Gujarat who wishes to remain anonymous 
A senior bureaucrat in the Ministry of Finance, Government of Tamil Nadu who wishes to 
remain anonymous 
A senior bureaucrat, Finance Dept, Government of Tamil Nadu who wishes to remain 
anonymous 
Ajay Umat- Resident Editor, Times of India, Ahmadabad 
AKD Jadhav- Former Secretary, Ministry of Mines, GoI 
Ashish Vachhani- IAS, Deputy Director, Lal Bahadur Shastri National Academy of 
Administration 
Basant Rawat- Correspondent, The Telegraph, Ahmadabad 
Bhaskar Chatterjee- Former Secretary, Department of Public Enterprises, Ministry of Heavy 
Industries and Public Enterprises 
CJ Murali- Director, Inexco Case Metals Solutions 
CP Raman- Former President, TVS Motors Ltd  
Dr Ali Cheema- Associate Professor of Economics, Lahore University of Management Studies 
Dr Asad Sayeed- Director and senior researcher at the Collective of Social Science Research 
Dr Ashok Desai- Former Chief Economic Adviser to the Prime Minister of India 
Dr Pronab Sen- Chairman of National Statistical Commission, Former member, Planning 
Commission of India 
GD Gautama- Chief Information Officer, Government of West Bengal 
M Velmurugan- Executive Vice Chairman, Guidance Bureau, Industries Dept, Govt of Tamil 
Nadu 
Madhavan Nambiar- Former Secretary, Ministry of Civil Aviation, GoI, 
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Mohan Eddy- Director, India Satcom,  
Musa Raza- Former Principle Secretary Government of Gujarat and Former Chief Secretary 
Jammu and Kashmir 
Naresh Gupta- Former Chief Electoral Officer, Tamil Nadu  
Prof GSG Prasad- Asst Prof, Madras Institute of Development Studies (MIDS) 
Prof R Nagaraj- Formerly at MIDS 
Prof Venkatesh Athreya- MIDS 
R Poornalingam- Chairman, Nagapattinam Energy, Former Secretary, Ministry of Textiles, 
GoI 
R Ramakrishnan- Director, TVS Motor Company, Former Rajya Sabha member and sheriff of 
Madras,  
R Ramaraj- Senior Advisor, Sequoia Capital 
R Ramasubramanian- General Manager, Manufacturing, Fasteners Division, Sundaram 
Fasteners 
R Seshasayee- Executive Vice Chairman, Ashok Leyland 
Ramnath S Mani- Chairman and CEO , Emergys Software Pvt LtdEntrepreneur 
Sashi Kumar- Chairman, Media Development Foundation  
Stavan Desai- Resident Editor, Divya Bhaskar, Baroda 
VN Bharadwaj- MBBS, former General Manager, Indian Airlines 
Zoha Waseem- London and Karachi based Security Analyst 
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Sample Questionnaire 
 
The questions below were indicative ones only to test the hypotheses for each of the 
case studies. However the actual discussions that followed were always open-ended. 
 
 
Questions for the Tamil Nadu Case Study 
 
1. At a political level did the common ideological ancestry of both the DMK and 
AIADMK (through the DK) have any bearing in providing stability to the state despite 
their intense rivalry? 
  
2. Is it possible to ascribe any structural reason to the periodic cycling in and out of 
the two parties from government ever since the death of MGR? 
   
3. What were the initial links between industrial houses (especially in the auto 
component/engineering sectors) with politicians like Kamaraj, TTK, Anna Durai, C 
Subramaniam and later Karunanidhi, MGR and Jayalalithaa?  
   
4. What were the constituencies that the DMK and AIADMK looked at to distribute 
patronage--specifically industrial/commercial or agricultural, or combinations of 
both? How did industry calibrate its relationship with the two parties?  
   
5. Specifically what kind of links were established between Chennai's auto and auto 
components industry and the DMK/AIADMK leadership? Companies in this sector 
had grown and developed competencies before 1992 (liberalisation) and this 
couldn't have happened without some help from the state/government. 
   
6. What effect has the evolution and institutionalisation of coalition politics at the 
centre had on the political strategies of the two parties? 
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7. Assuming a level of corruption exists in Tamil Nadu (as it does in every state) why 
is it not predatorial with harmful growth outcomes? 
   
8. A significant portion of Tamil Nadu's Plan expenditures is on redistributive, 
sometimes populist expenditure schemes. How has this affected politics in the state 
and how does the state generate resources to sustain them (apart from sales tax 
revenues and the Central government portion of Plan allocations)? 
   
9. What is specific about the political structure in Tamil Nadu that has allowed its 
bureaucracy to be one of the most effective in India? Did the Tamil Nadu Industrial 
Corporation play any significant role in industrialisation, especially post-1991? 
 
 
Questions for the Gujarat Case Study 
 
1. In the context of Gujarat the thesis analyses what are the aspects of the 
administration under Narendra Modi that led to its high growth, albeit accounting 
for the fact that Gujarat has always been one of India’s highest growth states with a 
very efficient bureaucracy and abundant mineral resources namely oil and gas. What 
did Modi do to add to this that sustained Gujarat’s growth?  
 
2. Specifically I am trying to establish a link, if possible, between the riots and the 
image Modi has cultivated of being a leader in command and who can ‘control’. Did 
it signal a sort of effectiveness Indian businessmen were looking for and were always 
ready to support but couldn’t because of political correctness immediately after the 
2002 riots? But once Modi had established his business friendly credentials found it 
easier to support him? For instance Christophe Jaffrelot suggests it is the new urban 
middle class that supports Modi the most, (along with the business elite of course). 
 
3. In the above context why did Modi have to use the idea of Gujarati Asmita to 
forge an identity for the state? What was the political strategy behind it? 
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4. Secondly what is the specific nature of the business government relationship in 
Gujarat that leads to high industrial investments? For instance what led to the 
sudden rise of the Adani Group (and I mean in the last decade or so post Modi’s chief 
ministership)? 
 
5. In terms of how state-led incentives and interventions are structured what sort of 
industries are most likely to succeed in Gujarat, for instance those with high 
gestation periods like infrastructure (engine power and ports), high technology 
manufacturing (auto, electronic components) or those in the ancillary sectors? 
 
6. At a time when liberalization has meant states are out-competing each other with 
incentives for both domestic and foreign investment how has Narendra Modi 
developed the enforcement capability that makes it easy for industry to locate in 
Gujarat? For instance despite Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee’s high credibility the 
government under him lacked the enforcement capability to ensure Nano’s viability 
in the state even after enjoying over a two-thirds majority in the state Assembly. 
Gujarat has also seen a share of anti-industry agitation but the Modi government 
seems much better equipped to handle those. What feature in the Modi 
administration allows this to happen? 
 
Questions for the Pakistan Causes Study 
 
1. To your mind what has been the primary cause for the decline in Pakistan's 
economic performance? 
 
2. How deep is the link between kinship and political office in Pakistan? I ask because 
most analyses of Pakistan's polity seem to emphasise that ties of kinship are 
important both to gain votes and office, and these ties are invoked by those with 
either huge landholdings or large businesses. If these were as important the societal 
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structure of Pakistan has very influential bearings on its political economy. Also do 
you see any changes in this structure? 
 
3. To what would ascribe the continuing influence of the military in Pakistan's 
political economy?  
 
4. Who would you consider the dominant groups that can influence Pakistan's 
politics currently, in order of influence, for instance, the Army, lawyers, political 
parties mobilised around Islam, the more 'established' parties like PPP, or PML (N), 
now the TH, large landlords, big capitalists? 
 
5. How acute do you think the current crisis of governance is in Pakistan, especially 
the face-off between the PPP government and the judiciary and then the situation in 
Waziristan? 
 
6. There is a concept in economics called rent, which I am sure you are aware of! 
How do you think each important political constituency in Pakistan generates this 
rent? It could be through some form of state capture of subsidies, grants etc, it could 
just be political rents that is access to power. Unpacking these links would make it 
easier to understand Pakistan's economic map. 
 
